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A SYSTEM

OF

CHRISTIAN RHETORIC,

FOR THE USE OF

PREACHERS AND OTHER SPEAKERS.

BY

GEORGE WINFRED HERVEY, M.A.,

AUTHOR OF "RHETORIC OF CONVERSATION," ETC.

"The light of nature, which is a sparke of the will of God, hath taught many usefull rules even to the Pagans, anent the right way of makeing solemne speeches before others. * * * But the best rules are taken from the preachings of Christ, of the Apostles, and Prophets."

John Livingstone (*b.* 1603; *d.* 1672).

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TO

The Rev. Russell Jennings,

OF DEEP RIVER, CONN., U. S.,

THIS WORK

Is Dedicated

IN

TESTIMONY

OF

THE HEART-FELT OBLIGATION

AND

HIGH REGARD

OF

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THIS work may be distinguished from others of its class by a number of noticeable points. It is not an essay or collection of lectures on selected parts of the subject, nor is it a record of individual experience and advice; neither is it a special treatise composed in the interest of a church, or sect, or seminary, although as the foot-notes bear witness, it is largely indebted to sterling works of all these kinds. It is rather a *system*, treating of all the prominent branches of Christian Rhetoric and of their relations no less to one another than to things that are radical and even foundational. Yet this system is not theoretical only, but practical as well.

Of the service it can render to the secular speaker, a few words ought, perhaps, to be premised. In reconstructing general rhetoric, a task the writer judged unavoidable, he has corrected some errors that have been misleading authors and readers ever since the days of Cicero, while he has placed in new lights and aspects many a precept and maxim of the old classical rhetors. Here, also, rhetorical Method, Arguments and Figures of every description, and the qualities of the Oratorical style are, he fancies, set forth in forms not much less condensated, practical, and working than in any other existing book. Even his analysis of the eloquence of the Hebrew prophets, the results of which are traceable throughout these pages,

would, likely enough, prove of considerable utility to secular orators in addressing Christian men and in handling ethical and ecclesiastical subjects.

The question whether the writer's innovations are really errors is discussed in the Introduction. The work has, indeed, been composed according to a new method and on a new basis: albeit the writer does not profess himself a new oracle; so far from it, he may be more properly regarded as a consulter and reporter of ancient oracles, attempting to teach himself and others by rhetorically testing and formulating things that are generic in the individual, things that are world-wide in the local, and things that are of the future in the past. From the Christendom of to-day he has purposely brought fewer authorities and examples than he could have done justifiably; because, the frank truth to tell, he deems it a disputed border-land where it is dangerous for him to pilgrimize.

Some of the other characteristics of this volume the hasty inquirer will find prenoted in the table of contents.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE present work is a well-meant attempt to build a system of Sacred Rhetoric on what the writer has been led to regard its only proper foundation. From the time of the Christian fathers, until a very recent day, the best precepts on preaching were based partly on the classic rhetorics and partly on the experience and observation of preachers. Some, indeed, as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Cyril, believed that Christian eloquence does not need to borrow the false ornaments of the old pagan rhetoricians; while Chrysostom and Augustine held these ethnic rhetoricians to be ultimate authorities on pulpit oratory, but not to the entire exclusion of the inspired preachers, and especially the Apostle Paul, whose epistles the former recommends for their dialectics, and the latter for their union of wisdom and eloquence. Of late, two or three writers have endeavored to construct a more Scriptural theory of the art of preaching. Among these, the foremost is Rudolf Stier, who in his *Keryktik*, maintains that the preacher is a herald sent of God to proclaim his word to men. He insists much on the necessity of Christian piety in the preacher, and on the importance of a large amount of Biblical matter in the sermon. He attempts to pull down the classical rhetoric, but he does not undertake to build a sacred rhetoric in its stead. He is satisfied with general views of preaching and an earnest defence of them. His theory, as reduced to practice and exemplified by himself, teaches that the sermon should be chiefly composed of parallel passages of Scripture dovetailed by means of practical thoughts expressed in plain and popular language. Stier does not, however, as many have supposed, limit his notion of the duty of the preacher to that of the mere herald—a notion which one of his disciples illustrates from Homer's description of the *ceryx*—a notion which, as has been justly observed, if logically carried out, would make preaching consist in the simple repetition of Scripture. He admits that pastoral ministrations

should, in large measure, be didactic.[1] His little book made a deep impression on the minds of a great number of Lutheran ministers; even Nitzsch[2] is so far his disciple as to define the sermon a message and an annunciation. Sikel, again, in his *Halieutik*, is less theoretical and takes broader ground by considering the preacher in the use of his various means of persuasion as *a fisher of men*.[3] These are the principal German authors who have sought their respective theories of Homiletics in the oracles of God.

Others, as Claus Harms, discuss the subject from its human side, maintaining the necessity of guarding Christian freedom and the rights of a living personality; Schleiermacher, on the other hand, finds the origin and end of the sermon in church life and the rites of Christian worship, demanding that it shall be the expression of the spiritual consciousness of the Christian audience. But of all the German writers on Homiletics, Christian Palmer is one of the ablest. Adopting some of the best ideas of Stier, and originating many others equally excellent, he has, it is generally conceded, produced a very readable and practical essay—we say essay, because his work, like almost all of its class, is too immethodical, too incomplete in such matter as belongs to its proper field, while it contains many things that are irrelevant and of too general a drift. Like Stier, he finds but little to admire outside of Lutheranism, and writes under the manacles of ecclesiastical usage. The fifth edition (1867) exhibits many additions and improvements; but it does not, as we expected it would, teach its readers more clearly and more correctly the relations of the preacher to the Holy Ghost.[4] This edition is enriched with many illustrations from some of the most distinguished German clergymen. Some of the more recent German writers, as Nitzsch and Otto, have belittled and degraded Homiletics by giving it scanty space in large treatises on Practical Theology. The Italian and Spanish writers on the subject, have followed too closely and too far the footprints of Cicero, Quintilian, the Christian Fathers, and the Schoolmen. The same must be said respecting French writers; making exceptions, however, in favour of Gaussen (De Arte Concionandi) and the more recent, familiar, and excellent Vinet. Of the early English writers the best are Perkins, Wilkins, Edwards and Blackmore; these and the rest are in-

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1 Grundriss einer Biblischen Keryktik. Halle, 1844, p. 248.

2 Prac. Theol. II., §101 and §123.

3 Thos. Boston composed a short treaties on the same subject.

4 Evangelische Homiletik (pp. 573, 8vo.) Stuttgart, 1867; see also his article on the same subject in Herzog's Real Encyclop.

tensely practical, but too superficial, and of very limited range. Two or three recent authors, actuated by a sacerdotal spirit, appear to concur with Ostervald in regarding the sermon as a kind of important, if not necessary, "interruption" of divine worship. Some of the Oxford Tractarians and Ritualists complain that too many churchmen set so high a value on preaching as to break the spirit of reserve, and to disparage prayer and the sacraments. These too often wrap the sword of the Spirit in a cloth and hang it up behind the ephod. The homiletical literature of America is rich in courses of lectures and in admirable essays on preaching and the Gospel ministry. Our admiration of these writers is heightened when we consider that many of them were required to lecture in one or more of the other departments of theological instruction, to preach two or three times every Sunday, and in some cases to serve as financial agents of their seminaries. To praise some of these productions would be presumptuous, to blame others, invidious: the present writer is beholden to almost all of them, but will be thankful to any one who will have the goodness to call his attention to an American author who has taken any broad fundamental site and built upon it methodically.

The writer has endeavored to find the true ground-works of Homiletics and to reduce the science to something like a clear and sufficient system. Some of the principles upon which, in his judgment, the science is properly founded, may here be mentioned. One of these is that all true preachers of the Gospel are successors of the prophets, including the "Light of the World" in his prophetical character; accepting the term *prophet*, however, not in the sense of *mere* predictor,[1] but of one who speaks in behalf of God and with his commission and assistance, whether the commission be special, and the inspiration plenary, or otherwise. Be it also observed that we say *prophet* and *speaks;* for we do *not* think that *all* parts of the sacred writings furnish models for the *preacher*.

The Lord Jesus Christ as a Priest, had no literal successor; and the apostles as to rank and mode, were the last of their line, while as prophets they were of their Divine Master the last successors that were fully, but not the last that were partially, inspired.

Another of these principles is, that it must be the duty and privilege of all preachers, to heed the precepts and to follow the example of the best of their predecessors; that the holy prophets are best, in this sense; that they spoke as they were moved by the Holy

[1] Rev. John Davison held that prophets were not only foretellers but pastors. Discourses on Prophecy, p. 49.

Ghost, and, therefore, neither sinned nor erred either as to the matter or to the manner of their utterances; and best in this other sense, that they spoke and were predestined to speak not only to their own respective generations, but to all generations, and were therefore moved to adapt their communications to man, as a creature endowed with certain natural powers of mind, and to mankind as a race betraying a common origin and possessing a common fund and average amount of knowledge.

One other principle is that, while the true preacher is, in the main, identical with the Scripture prophet, he is in some important points, and yet not *essentially*, different from him; for in order to supply in the post-apostolic preachers the lack of the peculiar and incommunicable gifts of their predecessors, they are indued with other similar and correspondent gifts, while they also enjoy all the benefits that flowed from the exertion of the intransmissible gifts of their great prototypes.[1]

On such a foundation as this, congruity teaches us what materials we should build. The public addresses of Moses and the other Hebrew prophets, the sermons of our Divine Master, the sacred speeches of Peter, Stephen, and Paul, and the inspired biographies of these, together with the Scripture precepts on preaching, are the quarries to which we are beholden for the most solid, as well as the most polished, parts of our work. Here we have found materials of a quality exceedingly rich, and at the same time diversified with a variety so moderate as to preserve their unity and homogeneousness. They embrace the peculiar excellences of the Hebrew eloquence, its simplicity and imagery, its sanctitude and spontaneity, its energy and keenness, modified and supplemented by the copiousness, the didactic precision and the logical pliancy of the Hellenistic oratory. And these have naturally attracted to themselves whatever in post-apostolic sermons possesses kindred and congenial qualities. Chrysostom, Augustine, Luther, Vieyra, Bunyan, Brydayne, Wesley, Whitefield, and other such men have afforded us valuable materials wherewith to buttress and to window this homiletical structure.[2]

We have all along considered it of no small importance to find out also what the Scriptures do *not* teach and maintain, concerning the work of preaching. We have not, therefore, thought ourselves

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1 Here we do not, be it observed, discuss questions of church polity; and yet we think that our homiletical theory is not adverse to any Protestant views of the ministeral office and work.

2 By glancing at our illustrations of figures in the Glossary, the reader will get a clue to our method of investigation in all parts of the work.

authorized to make much use of the apostolical epistles. As they were written in the epistolary style, it is, we think, an error to hold them up as models of pulpit eloquence—an error that is found in writers on preaching as eminent as Chrysostom and Augustine, Vinet and Stier. As models for ecclesiastical letters, they deserve the foremost place; but to regard them as examples of sacred oratory is to confound plain and important distinctions. We have, however, ventured to admit among our materials what is commonly entitled "The Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Hebrews," because, with the exception of the short letter appended, viz., xiii. 22–25, the style is oratorical and not epistolary. For the same reason we have likewise admitted the "General Epistle of James." Whether they were first delivered orally to primitive churches, or not, in the form of "the word of exhortation,"[1] we cannot now determine. And could we decide the question in the affirmative, we would not, after all, be able by such decision to disturb in any wise the common and well grounded conviction that, in their ultimate form and destination, they are apostolical epistles. And it is but fair to add, that almost all of these letters were intended by the Divine Spirit to be read aloud to the primitive churches; and accordingly their style bears a closer resemblance to that of oratory, than would that of any strictly private correspondence.

To the Greek and Roman orators and rhetoricians we are all largely indebted for not a few instructive examples, terms, and precepts. But we ought not to forget that these classic authorities are pervaded with a thoroughly ethnic spirit. Against their acrimony, contentiousness, insincerity, ambition, flattery and general selfishness, the habitual study of the holy prophets, is the best safeguard. "I have raised up thy sons, O, Zion, against thy sons, O, Greece."

"My former disciple! do you then attempt to dissuade ingenuous young men from studying the masterpieces of classical eloquence?" Pardon us, dearly beloved professor, we are so much indebted to you that we would fain say to your young friends and mine, Know assuredly that the prophets were the earliest of public speakers. Do not therefore study the orations of the ethnic Greeks and Romans less, but study the sermons of the old Hebrew and Hellenistic prophets more; otherwise you will find the classic eloquence to be what Father Augustine found it, a stream of Babylon.

Such are our materials; and if they have been wisely chosen, they are of the nature of authorities upon which we may base principles precepts and apologies—principles which will legitimate our theory

[1] Cf. Acts xiii. 15, and Heb. xiii. 22.

—precepts which may be enforced by a recurrence to those principles—apologies by the aid of which the young preacher who keeps these precepts may defend himself against all unfriendly criticism. The homiletical rules we already possess are numerous, and many of them are excellent, but they are, if we mistake not, wanting in that unity and weight, which they would possess, did they rest on authorities that are universal and final. Almost every professor of sacred rhetoric has inculcated principles of his own, which his more learned successor has either ignored or exploded. Not a few pastors have peculiar views upon the subject—views, which however discordant among themselves, are somewhat harmonious in their unreasonable opposition to those of the learned professors. As for the good Christian people, the diversity of their creeds respecting this matter is almost endless: while here and there we find a cautious student who, the more deeply he reads on this subject, the more is he entangled in doubt and confusion as to the best way of preaching in general, or as to the best way that is within reach of his individuality, or the way that would be the most useful in his peculiar field of labour. Or he has, it may be, read some essay which professes to set forth the scriptural manner of preaching, and has thus found a little temporary repose in a narrow onesidedness. One author would fain demonstrate that a sermon is nothing but a proclamation; another has made it appear very probable that the true sermon is a solemn talk, while a third has shown with equal probability that the primitive sermon was very much of a didactic lecture. Each of these can quote a Greek verb in support of his theory, but has overlooked the fact that the three original words in question, together with others, contribute to clear, varied, harmonious, and comprehensive views of the art of preaching. Other writers, not less earnest, turning away from these philological aspects of the subject, fix their attention on some biographical example, or historical event, and consequently find in the apostle Paul the most admirable exemplar for all preachers, or else discover in the tongue of fire, and the Pentecost sermon of Peter, the origin and the model of all true pulpit power. Now, if we are not much mistaken, such authors are right in believing that the Bible contains supreme and ultimate authorities on this subject; but they are wrong in trusting that it has yielded them to those who have read it thus narrowly and superficially. A little more depth and breadth of inquiry would have brought them and their readers a richer reward. And yet we may well believe that they have done much good.

A justification will perhaps be demanded of us for adding to the number of parts into which the science has always been divided, by

introducing the subject of inspiration, and by giving it the place which has hitherto been thought to belong to invention. We must, however, leave this part of our work to make its own apology: a few words of explanation will here suffice. We employ the term to denote the co-operation of the Divine Spirit in preaching, or his effects on the will and intellect of the man of God. This lower inspiration is the same in its origin as, but in its effects different from that which moved the sacred speakers and writers, and which, so far as their divine communications were concerned, secured them against sin and error. Then as to invention, by removing it to the second place, we do not disparage it; on the contrary, we exalt it, for if we have disturbed its ancient order, it was because we respected the conditions on which the Creator Spirit can breathe into it the breath of his own life. And practically it will ever be found that the mind demands the right mood and impulse before it can exercise itself profitably in finding and arranging matter for discourse. Our method is psychological—the only method that can promise to restore to sacred rhetoric its failing vitality and strength.

The present treatise, so different in groundwork and superstructure from any that has hitherto appeared, will naturally provoke some very plausible objections.

It may be said that as the mind refuses to class the utterances of the holy prophets among mere human communications, it can never regard them as proper examples for our imitation. Any attempt to copy them would be little short of an irreverent travesty of things the most sacred, or else lead to a depreciation of the copyist who would provoke his hearers to contrast his work with his models. Besides, such copying would be unfriendly to the formation of habits of original and independent thinking, composing, and speaking.

We answer that it is one thing to *copy* servilely and superficially, but quite another to *imitate* freely and profoundly. The copyist mistakes defects for excellences, allows little or nothing for differences of time and place, follows one admired example to the exclusion of all others, and assumes the form without being animated by the soul of his master. The imitator, on the other hand, follows not so much the *production* of his favorite master as his *method* of composition, or the *principles* on which he works. He does not imitate in all respects those whom he thinks the most worthy of following in many respects.[1] Agreeble to this sound rhetorical maxim is Sir Joshua Reynolds' advice to students of art. "If," says

[1] Cicero, De Oratore, B. ii. ch. xxii.; Quint., B. x., ch. ii.

he, "your ambition be to equal Raffaelle, you must do as Raffaelle did, take many models, and not even *him* for your guide alone, to the exclusion of others." . . . "He that imitates the Iliad," says Dr. Young, "is not imitating Homer." It is not by laying up in the memory the particular details of any of the great works of art that any man becomes a great artist, if he stops without making himself master of the general principles on which these works are conducted. If he ever hopes to rival those whom he admires, he must consider their works as the means of teaching him the true art of seeing nature. When this is acquired, he may be said to have appropriated their powers, or at least the foundation of their powers to himself."[1] In respect of dramatic writing, the same rule holds good: for, as Guizot has observed, modern tragedy has a ground of its own and peculiar to itself: and yet he thinks that Shakespeare's system of composition should furnish the plan according to which genius ought still to work.[2] It is in such manner and measure that we recommend the student of sacred rhetoric to imitate the inspired speakers of the old dispensation and the new.

As to treating these sacred oracles with irreverence, a man may to some appear to travesty or burlesque them without a disposition or intention to do so. But no preacher is in duty bound to accommodate himself to every hearer's notions of what is solemn, or to take the least notice of bilious critics, and the haunting "ghosts of a linen decency." And so far as our fear of suffering in reputation by contrast is concerned, if we took counsel of that we would never preach at all; for who ever thought he could equal the Sermon on the Mount? It may, indeed, be said, that when any one manifestly attempts to imitate another, he provokes damaging comparisons, and that this is the principal danger in question. To this we reply, that as the models we here recommend are perfect, it is but small disgrace to come short of their matchless excellences. Were they very imperfect, then we would run the hazard of being despised both for attempting to imitate them and for failing in the endeavour.

Besides, it is a matter of fact that these inspired preachers have some of them, for more than a thousand years, had a very marked rhetorical influence on post-apostolic speakers. Thus Origen found that the reading of them communicated to his enthusiasm a spark of their own inspiration; and whenever Bossuet wished to compose a sermon he was in the habit of reading a chapter in Isaiah for the purpose of attuning his powers; and when Lord Chatham was going

1 Sixth and Eleventh Discourses. 2 Cf. Christian Palmer's Homiletik, p. 715.

to speak on any very important subject, and wished to make a deep impression, he would, we are told, read some of the boldest flights of the same prophet. Instances of a similar kind are numerous. Now the omniscient God must have foreknown that not only his ministers but his people in many ages and nations would gradually and unwittingly, if not purposely, learn to conceive and express religious ideas according to the example of the holy prophets, with whose writings they would be familiar. And he alone could comprehend the vast importance of making his communications to mankind in such a style as would assist them to form right habits of conception and expression. But who can for a moment entertain the idea that the only wise God and perfect committed a blunder in making this style the vehicle of his revelations, or that he intended this style as a judgment, but the revelations it conveys as an unspeakable mercy to us? Yet, if the above objection holds good, one or the other of these ideas must be entertained. If, again, we maintain that an exposure to the influence of this style be unfriendly to a just independence of mind and a beneficial originality of thought, how can we escape from the same dilemma? The old classical writers on rhetoric teach that an intelligent imitation gives a right direction to our natural faculties and improves even genius itself. Did the late James Hamilton, by yielding himself so heartily to the attractions of this sacred style, impair his own style or enslave and impoverish his mind? We think not. But be this as it may, certain it is that he who labours to be "mighty in the Scriptures" must, wittingly or unwittingly, receive some tincture from their style.[1] And if there are any qualities of this style which it is enfeebling or otherwise injurious to imbibe, then the most devoted admirers and profoundest students of those qualities are the most exposed to this harm, while the despisers and neglecters of the Scriptures are the only persons that may hope to escape such corruption of their style and such debility of their minds.

It is sometimes averred that the Bible was not designed to teach us rhetoric any more than it was designed to teach us metaphysics or astronomy. But this is a backstroke of our enemy's sword which threatens to behead his royal friend: in asserting this of rhetoric as a science, does he not unawares assert as much of theology as a science? Undoubtedly; and the same may be asserted of the orations of Domesthenes and Cicero; yet the classical rhetoricians

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1 Thus Dr. Pusey has, from long communion with the Hebrew Scriptures, formed a style which for the public speaker is preferable to that of Dr. Newman, which, however classically correct, is lacking in the Hebrew enthusiasm.

have sought and found in them many of the materials wherewith they have constructed their imperishable works. Who, then, can forbid us to resort to the utterances of the Scripture prophets for analogous but higher objects? It would be singular enough if He, who has made it the duty of thousands of young and unpractised men to serve as stewards of His mysteries, had not given them any precepts or examples as to the manner of preparing, distributing, and presenting His truth, and so left them in this extraordinary work without that guidance which He has denied neither to them, nor to their brethren in the discharge of their ordinary religious duties. Ambrose of Milan, writing on another subject, has disposed of this question sententiously: "Scriptores Divinorum Librorum quamvis non secundum artem scripserunt, sed secundum gratiam, quæ supra artem est; ii tamen qui de arte scripserunt, in eorum scriptis artem invenerunt."

Another objector may say, "Rhetoric should be based upon materials which are generally acknowledged to be eloquent; but the inspired oratory, though it may really be eloquent, has never been acknowledged by men of taste in general, to be any standard by which to test the qualities of sacred eloquence. To make it therefore the standard of taste and the foundation of rhetorical rules, were as absurd as the pretension of the Mahometans who maintain that the great miracle wrought in the composition of the Koran, consisted in the inimitable style and acme of elegance to which Mahomet attained—a miracle sufficient to establish his claim to the inspiration of God." The error of the Mahometans, we reply, consists in maintaining that an incomparable elegance of style is a mark of divine inspiration. We may, indeed, reasonably expect to find a revelation from heaven conveyed with perspicuity, or energy, or such other property as is the most serviceable to the divine ideas and their recipients. But elegance, so far from being a peculiar quality of the sacred style, is conspicuous in some very abject and atheistical productions. Nor is elegance or beauty indispensable to that style which now exclusively concerns us. In oratory, it may be on the contrary, and frequently is, a positive blemish and injury, because it detracts from simplicity and force. The divine Inspirer chose, in general, not that style which is the most beautiful in the esteem of the few, but that which is the most useful to the greatest number of souls.

There is a dialogue in Plutarch's Morals on the question, "Why has the Pythian priestess ceased to deliver her oracles in verse?" Diogenianus wonders at the meanness and lameness of the verses which conveyed the ancient oracles into the world. And, indeed,

he had a right to expect good poetry from Apollo, who was, as he says, called the president of the Muses. So might we demand elegance of style from the Holy Spirit, were he professedly the author and patron of such elegance. Diogenianus and Bœthus go on to disparage the oracles by contrasting them with the poems of Homer and Hesiod until they encounter the better mind of the poet Serapio, who tells them that they ought to correct their judgment which is forestalled by bad taste. Their sight and hearing are diseased. They ought not to find fault with the Pythia because she does not warble as charmingly as the fair songstress Glauca, nor tickle the ears and fancy with the graceful measures of Sappho. "The priestess," says he, "utters sentences altogether thoughtful and serious . . . Cadmus heard from heaven a sort of music that was neither lofty nor soft, nor shattered into trills and divisions; for severe holiness will not admit the allurements of pleasure." Far as Plutarch is from the true notion of the sacred style, he is nearer correctness than the Mahometans are; and let his Serapio be the judge of all those who still deny that the inspired oratory deserves to be generally recognised as the standard of sacred eloquence. But still the objector is undoubtedly right in asserting that the inspired sermons have never been generally adopted as the standard of pulpit style. The fact remains, we grieve to think, but whether to the disparagement of the eloquence of the ancient prophets, or of that of their modern successors, no competent judge will be slow to decide.

It may, moreover, be objected that to compose a work of sacred rhetoric for preachers of this century upon the foundation of the Hebrew and Hellenistic eloquence of the sacred Scriptures, is to be guilty of a stupendous anachronism. Every age, it is said, demands and obtains that kind of preaching which is best for it. The preachers of the fourth century could not have met the exigencies of the sixteenth, nor would the preachers that were so acceptable in the sixteenth be tolerated in the nineteenth. How preposterous, therefore, to recommend Isaiah and Paul as proper models for the preacher of to-day! This objection, we may reply, takes for granted that the preaching of every age and country has a type or character which is essentially peculiar. Some ages have undoubtedly had their homiletical fashions, exhibiting certain novelties respecting the division of sermons, their length, or other such minor matters, but aside from these and similar things (differences of doctrine being out of the question), the history of preaching shows that the sermons of almost every Christian age have differed as widely among themselves as any one of them differs from any sermon that

was preached last Sunday. Besides, who can study the standard pulpit literature of a given age or land, and after ascertaining its rhetorical peculiarities (as for example, those of the time of James I., when it was fashionable to quote Greek and Latin), can affirm that it was, in general, the best for that land or that age ?[1] What minister of the gospel would have the hardihood to say as much of his own sermons ? But if any preacher does hazard this assertion, we would respectfully ask him to inform us what he means by the word *best.* The best as to aim or spirit, or subject matter, or form, or style ? By what standard found to be best in any or some or all of these respects ? The best because the most useful ? Or best because the most popular ?

Now we do not wish to provoke contradiction, but we are constrained to hold that in as far as any imperfect age demands and obtains the preachers it likes best, in so far is that age growing degenerate.[2] Yes, we must advance a step further, and maintain that the age or nation or church that determines the chief rhetorical qualities of its preaching is (unwittingly, of course) corrupting the men that ought to be its spiritual guides ;[3] for the right rhetorical qualities of the pulpit are determined by the oracles and grace of God, while, on the contrary, wrong ones are determined by the more or less debased and debasing taste of the people who perhaps "after their own lusts have heaped to themselves teachers having itching ears." All true preachers are called of God to do his work, receive their commission and their message from him, and have the guidance of the Holy Spirit in their studies and ministrations. They consider themselves sent as Jeremiah was to pull down and to root out and to build and to plant. They do not think it strange that the modern rake, Rochester, was converted by hearing a chapter of the ancient Isaiah. Were the elements and the ends of their oratory essentially the same as those of the secular, then would they be manipulated and moulded by the formative age, which they aimed to manipulate and mould. True men of God aim not, by appealing to selfish motives, to rouse dormant passions, but aim by the help of holy teachings, arguments, and persuasions, co-operating with the Divine Spirit and word, to transform men into new creatures, or to assist new creatures to walk in righteousness of life. To persuade men to evil, it is enough that you be on a level with them,

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[1] See Archb. Abbot's Letter in Documentary Annals, II., 204.

[2] The drama's laws, the drama's patrons give,
For we that live to please, must please to live.—*Samuel Johnson.*

[3] Hosea iv. 4–9.

although eventually you will be in subjection to them;—but to persuade them to good, you must be morally above them, and prove that in your character and thoughts, you are more in harmony with the will of God than with the will of man. As are your thoughts, so will be your language; as is your spiritual character, so will be the spiritual properties of your sermons. But if, O, pastor, you discharge your duty to your flock as under the eye of the Chief Shepherd, be not alarmed if some of your flock either forsake you or request you to forsake them. A permanent pastor of a permanent flock, and faithful both—how seldom do these heavenly conditions meet; and yet we rejoice to believe that they do sometimes meet, and that hereafter they will go on meeting more frequently as the divine Son of Mary, still stamping on the head of the old serpent, shall announce each brightening hour that is to herald the millennial day. But our postulate is that the present age is imperfect—I beg your pardon, says the objector; let me state my difficulty in another form: Must you not admit, after all, that a living and efficient ministry will, in many respects, adapt itself to its age and the sphere of its activity. Had Paul, or Isaiah, or our Lord himself, preached to a congregation in this age and land, would he not often have expressed himself very differently from what he did; in brief, would not the peculiarities of his style have been very different from what they were, and as wisely adjusted to us as they were to his contemporaries? This we concede, but we must, at the same time, deny that this adaptation to their respective times and places is any evidence that they were as preachers created by their age, or that in any of the higher qualities of their style, they were conformed thereto. We are also compelled to deny that the adaptation in question makes them unfit to be examples for all modern preachers. Ezekiel is, in the opinion of Hengstenberg, exactly the prophet for our times. Cicero did, indeed, find the style of Demosthenes, in some respects, ill adapted to a Roman, as Lord Brougham also found it ill adapted to an English audience, and yet both of these orators thought it practicable and very advantageous to follow him as an example, and warmly recommended his orations to the study and admiration of all who would excel in eloquence. Demosthenes and Cicero would, in other ages and countries, have delivered speeches very different from those which they have bequeathed to us; but shall we therefore forbid preachers to do what they have done from the days of Father Basil until now, namely, to study and imitate their respective styles, or to teach homiletics, by deducing principles and precepts, and quoting illustrations from

these ethnic orations ?[1] This objection is then levelled against all the best standard works on general rhetoric. Are we to fall before it ? Then so must they.

Against all rhetorical instruction, both secular and sacred, another and similar difficulty has been raised. It may be stated as follows: Of the twenty or more inspired speakers whom you commend to our imitation, each is characterized by a bold individuality. To the student who examines them critically they reveal wide diversities of capacity, temperament and culture. Elijah was constitutionally different from Elisha; Ezekiel could not have prophesied like Isaiah; nor could Peter have preached like Paul. A Luther is not a Wesley; a Count Zinzendorf is not a Jonathan Edwards. These examples, and others such as these, one and all, concur in giving this counsel: Be yourself and not another. You are in some respects *sui generis*. Respect your peculiarities and maintain your independence; then will invention and style and delivery take care of themselves.

In answering this objection we must premise that the majority of those who have attempted to characterise the respective styles of the prophets and apostles, have sometimes been compelled to infer the distinctive qualities of an inspired man's style from the study of only one or two of his addresses. Here some German authors evince a self-destructive dogmatism that is only equalled by their immense erudition. We can, indeed, pronounce with some confidence as to certain peculiarities of the style of Isaiah, or Jeremiah, or of Ezekiel; for we possess a considerable number and variety of their sermons, but to attempt to characterise the general style of a minor prophet after an examination of a single surviving sermon of his, would be uncritical and illogical. The Scripture sermons, be it remembered, touch upon a great variety of subjects and were delivered on very different occasions, and for quite dissimilar objects. They are therefore not to be studied with the view of ascertaining the peculiar qualities of each sacred orator's style, but for the purpose of learning from the example of each, how to adjust our style to our subject, and aim, and occasion, and audience.

This difficulty is raised by those who think that a rhetorical training is destructive of individuality; whereas a right rhetorical

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[1] Cf. chapter on ADAPTATION. The great orators of Greece, were themselves the standards of taste for the people, and not the reverse (Diodorus Siculus, Lib. xii.), and Antonio Vieyra, the most eloquent of the Portuguese preachers, had the courage, both by word and example, to oppose the affected elegance of style which the fashionable preachers of his day cultivated.

training forms a desirable individuality. Any student may, after short practice, learn whether reason or imagination, or feeling or memory or voice, or what combination of these (as yet, perhaps, existing only in their germ and potentiality) distinguishes him from others, but it is only by a methodical and thorough training that he can demonstrate to himself what are the highest actualities of his gifts. Besides, if a man have a just individuality he will desire and choose to develop it; for every real natural talent he possesses holds within itself a principle of life and growth. True genius works much because it works easily; it works well because it works wisely. If, on the other hand, a man have an individuality wholly or partly wrong, either in itself or in its tendencies, or in its relations, the study of Christian rhetoric will teach him where and how far he ought to amend. Jeremy Taylor sometimes reminds you of Isaiah, but you never forget that it is Jeremy Taylor still.

But let us not be understood as wishing to polish away whatever is peculiar to an individual to such a degree as to render it almost invisible and imperceptible. We protest beforehand against such a misconstruction of our design. We wish not to destroy individuality, but to develop it where it is right, and to correct it where it is wrong. Natural peculiarities are oftenest crippled by narrowly copying those of some one fallible preacher, and not by an intelligent imitation of twenty infallible ones, as we herein recommend. A servile imitativeness hampers that freedom which a just individuality demands, while a strict conformity to God's revealed will tends to secure that plenitude of the Spirit's gracious presence whence the best liberty proceeds.[1] The holy prophet said, I will walk at liberty, for I seek thy precepts.[2] Every man's individuality, like its mainspring, the will, is in bondage, and the Holy Spirit alone can release it from thraldom; but when once free it regards divine revelation as the perfect law by which to regulate its liberty.[3] Free is that preacher who has not merely power to speak as he chooses, but power at one and the same time to speak as he chooses, and to speak as he ought.[4]

Another objector may say: For my part, I ought to avoid all artificiality of style and delivery, and to cultivate an easy and natural manner. The prophets spoke under great bodily and mental ex-

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[1] 2 Cor. iii. 17. [2] Psa. cxix. 45. [3] James i. 25.

[4] Robert Hall in after life mentioned Gibbon's Rhetoric, which he had eagerly read in youth, as increasing his sense of the utility as well as the beauty of fine writing, and creating an intense desire to acquire a style at once elegant and perspicuous.

citement. Their inspiration was an extraordinary gift, which expressed itself in highly impassioned language and wild gestures. Now it seems to me that the imitation of these ecstatic and enthusiastic speakers would be very unfriendly to the practice of a natural way of speaking.

This objection owes much of its apparent force, to the current but erroneous notion that ecstacy was the invariable effect of inspiration; whereas this was its effect only on rare occasions, as when the prophet had a vision of Jehovah or of an angel,[1] or a divine disclosure of great sins and their penalties,[2] or when perplexed as to the sense of a divine communication.[3] None but the false prophets habitually worked themselves up to seeming ecstacies and paroxysms. The true prophets, like Jesus, the great Alpha and Omega of their line, commonly spoke with a composure that is natural to minds obedient to God's will, at peace with him, and filled with the all-subduing Spirit. As their words spoke their hearts, so they were calm or animated according to the occasion. To the sensibilities, feelings and emotions they, of all men, have given the most natural utterance.

It has not, perhaps, occurred to this objector that the habit of composing sermons is one of the sources of the unnatural in preaching. During the interval that usually takes place between the conception of the thoughts and their delivery, the preacher's mind has, perhaps, lost its first enthusiasm; and possibly events have brought about some change in the moral or intellectual mood of his expected hearers, if not a revolution in his own views of the text, or of the relative importance of the discussion, or the lawful and expedient application of his subject. But even in cases where invention has been faithful to truth, the pen faithful to the thoughts, and the elocution faithful to the thoughts, to the words, and to a heart deeply affected by the theme, yet it must be admitted that, at the best, such a sermon is more or less formal and artificial.

How then shall we effectually counteract this tendency to artificiality and all manner of formality and affectation? Not by ceasing to ponder or write our preparations for the pulpit, nor yet by confining ourselves to the practice of preaching extemporaneously, but by studying and imitating those who write and speak in the most *natural* manner, that is to say, the most natural for the *preacher*. But what, it will be demanded, is the most natural manner? We could answer this question if we knew a preacher that spoke

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[1] Isa. vi.; Jer. i.; Ezek. i. and xxiii.; Dan. viii. 17. [2] Jer. xxiii. 9; Hab. iii. 3, 16. [3] Dan. vii. 15, 28; x., 8.

spontaneously without any culpable fear, and only from good motives, who had a perfect confidence in his own wisdom as to the choice of all his words and, what is far better, in the truth, importance and timeliness of his declarations, who had none of the faults of those who speak either from memory or from extemporaneous suggestion, who, in short, had no error of the understanding, and no sin of the heart to prevent him from speaking in a holy, sincere, characteristic, warm, easy, vigorous, and lifesome manner; him could we confidently pronounce master of a natural rhetoric and a commendable example of natural preaching. But where can we find any written specimens of such a natural eloquence? The anticipated reply is the true one: in the sermons of our divine Master and his fellow prophets. Here the divine, speaking through the human, and for the time setting aside premeditation and all formal art, realized the perfection of the natural manner. Here inspiration, by moving erring and sinful men to speak infallibly and impeccably, like the second Adam himself, caused them to speak according to nature in the best sense of the word. It is by studying these, therefore, that the preacher is to form that *ideal* of eloquence which Cicero, in his *de Orutore*, has, for the benefit of other speakers, attempted to describe—an ideal, which, if kept clearly and steadily in view, will perfect and transfigure nature.

"And so then," continues the same objector, "you would advise the preacher who must speak in prose to acquire or preserve a natural manner by imitating poerty! Were not the prophets poets, and is not the principal share of their declarations poetry of the most elevated and excellent kind?"

We hope the objector will not accuse us of evasion, if we respectfully ask him what is his idea or definition of poerty. He is probably aware that there is a variety of opinions as to the nature of poetry in general. "Poetry," says James Montgomery,[1] "is *verse* in contradistinction to prose. . . . Poetry, to be complete, must be verse; and all the wit of man cannot supply a more convenient definition. Every thing else which may be insisted on as essential to *good* poetry, is not *peculiar* to it, but may with due discretion and happy effect, be incorporated in prose." This is the best definition of poetry with which we are acquainted. Most scholars have concluded that parallelism distinguishes Hebrew poetry from Hebrew prose. This being a kind of distich, is entitled to the appellation of verse. But authorities differ as to the proper definition of

[1] Lectures on General Literature and Poetry. Cf. Whately's Rhetoric, Pt. ii., chap. iii., §3.

parallelism. Lowth and Gesenius make it consist in the correspondence of one line with another. Ewald, however, prefers to make what he terms "thought-rhythm" its chief peculiarity, "because," he says, "the rhythm consists in such a division of the sentiments as cannot be fully expressed in less than a distich." Dr. Davidson defines it 'a symmetrical proportion between the larger sections, or members of a period, the smaller being neglected.[1] But it has seemingly escaped these writers that parallelism is not peculiar to Hebrew poetry, since it is found in parts of the New Testament that are confessedly prosaic, and in many secular orations, ancient and modern,[2] and especially in the prose of some modern Oriental writers. The parallelisms of Arabic prose are even terminated by rhymes.

Now admitting the above definitions to be tolerably correct, we are not to take it as an established fact that the style of the prophets is poetic. Lowth[3] was of opinion that parts of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Zechariah are prose, that Jonah and Daniel are "plain prose," that Haggai is "altogether prosaic," while "Malachi is written in a kind of middle style which seems to indicate that the Hebrew poetry, from the time of the Babylonish captivity, was in a declining state, and being past its prime and vigour, was then fast verging towards the debility of age!" He also confesses that sometimes the nature of the parallelism is very subtle and obscure. Havernick[4] thought that the Hebrew knew only a rhythmical prose, and that the poetical form is more carefully preserved in the Psalms than in the Prophets, which as to *rhythmus* stand in some sort between poetry and prose. Bleeck[5] pronounces Joel, Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, and Nahum poetic, but the language of the later prophets entirely prosaic, as partly in Jeremiah and still more in Ezekiel, Zechariah, Haggai, and Malachi. The attempt to prove from such authorities that the prevailing style of the prophets is poetic, would be as futile as was that of Theopompus who though he sharply reprehends those who believed that the Pythian oracles were not delivered altogether in verse, yet when he labours to make good his assertion, is able to produce but very few instances

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1 Horne's Introduction, 10th ed., vol. ii.

2 Rev. John Jebb's Sacred Literature; Boys' *Tactica Sacra;* Dr. Forbes' Symmetrical Structure of Scripture.

3 Lect. xix. and xxi.

4 Introduction to O. T., §.29, 33. Keil (Einl. A. B.) excludes the prophets from his list of the poetical books.

5 Introduction to O. T., vol. ii.

in comparison of those that were uttered in prose.[1] Let us, moreover, mark the following particulars:

1. The words and phrases which are thought to be peculiar to the poetic diction are less numerous in the Prophets than in the Psalms.[2] This is admitted even by those who decide what words and phrases are poetic with an uncritical degree of positiveness. In our own language there are some words that have been too dogmatically claimed as sacred to poetry, e. g., the adverb *ere*. The remains of the Hebrew literature are so scanty, and the nature of Hebrew poetry is so vaguely defined, that the critic who declares that the prophets habitually employed poetic words and phrases advances, as it would seem, an unscholarly assumption.

2. The strophes, so called, which are found in the prophets, are very uncritically so denominated. Except in original or borrowed poetry quoted by the prophets, we do not find any stanzas that deserve the name; for something more than a refrain or burden is essential to a strophe. This, as we find it in the prophetic speeches, is a mere rhetorical repetition, such as is nearly as natural to the impassioned orator as it is to the poet.

3. Once more; the prophetic style admits of the quotation of poetic lines either borrowed or original, as already hinted, and the interspersion of plain historic statements; neither of which is allowable in Hebrew poetry. Though Ewald does not rank the prophets among the Hebrew poets, yet he would lift the prophetic style above the level of that of oratory; but is, after all, compelled to acknowledge that this style has certain distinctive qualities. "It is," he says, "on the one hand, too elevated in its subject and its range to sink down into common prose" (although it does so sink, as he concedes, in Ezekiel from the 40th chap. to 48th, and elsewhere), "but, on the other hand, its object is too directly and completely that of practical life for it to retire into anything so remote as the strictly poetical form. Consequently it fluctuates between the two in such a way that as to its inclination and endeavour, it everywhere struggles upward to the height of poetry, while for its expression, it makes use of freer and more usual terms, both that it may be more directly practical, and also not lose the proper fulness and flexibility of oratory. From the fusion of these two elements is produced that peculiar form which prophecy has appropriated to itself. Wherein it differs from strict poetry may be felt more distinctly

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1 Plutarch's Morals; Dialogue on the question, Why the Pythia has ceased to deliver her oracles in verse?

2 Die Propheten des Alten Bundes, von Heinrich Ewald, vol. i., p. 46.

when the two come into immediate contact, as they do in the second and third chapters of Habakkuk." The same author, even while he is subjecting the free prophetic eloquence to his arbitrary prosody, is candid enough to allow that the prophetic poetry "is distinguished by the fluctuating of the rhythm, by its alternations between great strength and great beauty of sentiment, and especially by a verse rhythm that admits of longer lines and more extended and more multiform stanzas."[1] De Wette,[2] an earlier authority, is uncommonly correct when he says that "as the prophets are rather orators than poets, so their rhythm is usually distinguished from that of lyric poetry by the use of longer periods." On such a question the learned Jews also certainly deserve a hearing; the Rabbins have given poetical accents to only three of the sacred books, namely, the Psalms, the Proverbs, and Job.[3] In the prophetic books the poetic matter is always in the form of the lyric or ode; and indeed all primitive verse appears to have been composed solely with a view to its easy and effective utterance in song.

"Granting," it is further insisted, "that the prophets were not poetic in diction and in structure, were they not, after all, very poetic in their ideas, modes of conception, and the use they made of the imagination?" This is a question which men of taste are incessantly answering, and will perhaps go on answering forever, at least to their own satisfaction. Thus much, however, is tolerably clear, that, subjectively speaking, the poet is a creator working in a region above that of the knowable, and that, therefore, the only philosophical antithesis is between poetry and science.[4] According to this criterion Hebrew prophecy is not poetry; for it reveals the primary elements of true theology; the prophets are promulgers of matters of fact concerning God and man, and having furnished the data of theistic speculations, are to be regarded as "our masters in the school of highest reason."[5] "But," it will be demanded, "is there not, as in all poetry,[6] so in Hebrew prophecy, a peculiar richness and arbitrariness in the imagery?" True, the genius of the Occident is taught to pronounce the imaginative combinations of the old Hebrews

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1 Die Propheten des Alten Bundes, vol. i., pp. 49–50.

2 Die Heilige Scrift. des Alten und Neuen Testaments.

3 Keil (Einl. A. T.) includes also Canticles, Lamentations, and Ecclesiastes among the poetical books.

4 Wordsworth's Note to Observations, prefixed to his Lyrical Ballards; Prof. David Masson's Essays, biographical and critical, p. 420.

5 Isaac Taylor's Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, chap. xii.

6 Masson, ut supra, p. 464.

almost excessive and lawless; yet, let us give good heed to this one peculiarity of the prophetic imagination, that, unlike the merely poetic, it is never intent on our pleasure, but always eager for our ethical and spiritual improvement. Isaac Taylor,[1] speaking of this entire subordination of the ideal to the practical in Isaiah, and in opposition to those who aver that his predictive faculty was a mere poetic inspiration, says with force and exactitude: "This hypothesis does not consist with the facts in view. As often as he touches themes that are the most awakening to poetic feeling, Isaiah (and the same is true of his brethren) is brief, and seems in haste to quit the ground on which he has set foot for a moment." . . . . "How much more than a poet is this prophet!" How much more than a poem is a sermon!

Should the objector, unwilling to part with his favourite opinions as to the distinctive qualities of poetry and oratory, still maintain that, in his judgment, the greater part of the Hebrew prophecies is poetry, we may nevertheless be permitted to add that these are not the only inspired models that we ask him to contemplate; and that if the prophets are poets, he ought in justice to himself, as a student of sacred rhetoric, to imbue his mind with their varied and matchless songs. Cicero, Quintilian,[2] and other classic authorities recommend the orator to cultivate a familiar acquaintance with the poets.

But when, asks the impatient reader, will you have done refuting objections? Is it not *prima facie* evidence against your theory that it raises so many difficulties? By his favour we answer, that several of these difficulties have already been raised by learned men with whom the writer has talked on this subject, or whose writings he has read, and that these objections proceed, he is convinced, from the strength of other men's prepossessions more than from the weakness of his own positions. This assertion may strike some as too bold, and others as totally unwarranted by facts—but we are not now up for hostile examination; we only challenge the reader to that free and well-willed discussion without which no new and unconsidered theory, however sound and important, ought to be received. Gladly, however, would we here lay aside the weapons of refutation.

But another objector is stalking out against us, saying: "The inspired preachers were predictors. Their survey of the future and

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1 Ut supra.

2 Quintilian, B. x, chap. i, sec. 27–30; B. v., chap. xi., sec. 39; Cicero de Oratore, B. i., chap. xvi., xxxiv.

the successive visions which were pictured on the broad eye of their imagination necessitated a corresponding elevation, even an oracular dignity of style which, were it possible for him to adopt it, would ill become the modern uninspired preacher."

Here it should be considered that the words rendered prophet in the received version have, in the original Scriptures, a less restricted signification—"But you are threatening us with a logomachy." Be as little alarmed, peaceable reader, as the matter really demands. Far from this is our foremost intention. We only desire the objector to remember that the primary and more common meaning of the Hebrew *Nabi*, and the Greek *Prophetes* is not that of foreteller, but of one who speaks in the name and with the authority of God; to remember also that much of the written remains of the prophets does not, in any strict sense belong to prediction; while such parts of them as are really predictive, are blended with promises and threatenings, narratives and precepts, arguments and consolations, persuasives and dissuasives, as well as prayers and praises. These things we may take as facts,[1] and keep them in mind without disparaging, in the least, the predictions which form the subject matter of many of the Hebrew sermons, and which should be thoroughly studied by reason of their great value in a rhetorical point of view.

Yes, in a rhetorical point of view; for though the Christian cannot claim vaticination as one of his gifts and offices, yet can it be questioned that his mind looks into a clearer and remoter future than was commonly pierced by the ken of the Hebrew preacher? Jesus, by bringing immortality to light, has given the freest scope to the farsightedness of the human imagination. Dr. Manton was of opinion that the true ministers of his time were more properly the Christian fathers, because they stood on their shoulders, and were permitted a wider prospect in several directions than those early preachers enjoyed. To the same purpose wrote Spener concerning Luther: "When a dwarf," says he, "stands upon the shoulders of a giant, he owes his commanding view to the tallness of his upholder. No wonder, therefore, that a common instructor who is far inferior to Luther should sometimes see things the great Reformer himself did not see, and which he could not have discovered if he had not been lifted up so high by Luther." So, too, every Christian preacher that has studied the whole body of Hebrew prophecy has probably *broader* views of the future than any one of those prophets was vouchsafed, not even excepting the last

[1] Rev. J. Davison on Prophecy, pp. 34–67.

of them, unless the last was versed in all the permanent prophetic writings that existed in his time. Our divine Master, by fully revealing the immortality of the soul, and eternal rewards and penalties, has lifted us up and set us upon the shoulders of the prophets, and has thus given us the *largest* possible views of the future. Not only are our visions of the future broader and longer, but they are more affecting also. The Hebrew preacher could only set before his hearers rewards and penalties that were either wholly or mostly temporal; and whenever he foretold temporal blessings and judgments that were not to descend upon his auditors individually, but on the nation in general, or upon their posterity, the success of such appeals to their hopes or their fears depended in the degree of their love for their country or their posterity. But the Christian prophet exhibits before his congregation heaven and hell, and draws thence motives of the utmost momentum. Can he not, therefore, safely imitate the prophetic style? Whenever the Christian prophet declares the future, not of time only, but of eternity as well, and presses home upon each heart an endless hereafter as a matter of personal immediate and supreme concern, the elevation, the fervour, the energy, and the pathos which became the Hebrew predictor, he ought certainly to equal and if possible to surpass.

An error very common and influential is that we have in holy Scripture the principal utterances of all the prophets, that Samuel created the prophetic "order," and that though Moses had in the law provided for that "order," yet it was not developed because there was then no demand for it. But Enoch, Noah, and Abraham, it should be remembered, were prophets, and that in the days of Ahab, a hundred of them were hid in two caves by Obadiah, to say nothing of those who were martyred by Jezebel, and of those who, like Elijah escaped, and ran for refuge to distant mountains. Let any German scholar prove, if he can, that all these did not speak from inspiration, and did not occasionally predict. If they differed at all from those whose writings have come down to us, was it not in this that their predictions concerned none but their hearers or contemporaries? Presumption favours this view. There is no good reason to suppose that the extant writings of Jeremiah, or Ezekiel or those of any other prophet of the Old Testament comprised all of their prophesyings. Why then did these prophets write? It seems probable that the Holy Spirit moved them to commit to writing such of their utterances, and only such, as are of universal application and in their ultimate sense concerned subsequent ages, and as would by their fulfillment be striking evidences of the reality of the perfections and revelations of God. But in

whatever way we account for these things, we may take it as an undeniable fact that those prophetic writings which are not predictive, have a great rhetorical value, because they enable us to form just conceptions of the nature of the more usual and ordinary sermons of the unwriting prophets from the time of Enoch to the day of the death of John the Baptist.

We conclude, therefore, that it is inexact to term the prophets mere predictors, but that even when they spoke as such they may properly be imitated by Christian ministers in their virtual foreshowings.

"But were not the prophets frequently called to utter reproofs and denunciations, even to imprecate curses? Would not the attempt to adopt these comminations and upbraidings have a tendency to overcloud the spirit, to embitter the temper, in short, to make ministers gloomy misanthropes?"

This objection is very specious when, as is often the case, it presupposes that Elijah is to be regarded as a fair sample of all the prophets in this respect. But it should be recollected that he prophesied in the worst times, and was sent of Jehovah to attack the idolatry which Jezebel and Ahab supported in apostate Israel. His first prediction of a judgment, severe as it was, harmonized with the threatening of the Law.[1] It ought likewise to be kept in mind that neither Elijah, nor John the Baptist, nor any other of the true prophets launched these denunciations in their own name, or from the impulses of malice and uncharitableness. Moses, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel certainly did not desire to behold the miseries which they predicted. All the prophets, in so far as they were heralds of God's judgment, felt the weight of approaching woe as a "burden." Of all these holy men Jonah alone entertained any complacency in view of what seemed to him the inevitable execution of a divine penalty; and even he appears to have believed that the veracity of God demanded that the Ninevites should be unconditionally destroyed.

Besides, little as we may think of it, this objection, if valid against the Hebrew prophets, is equally valid against the Hellenistic prophets. "Can any one," says George Gilfillan, "wonder at Ezekiel's burdens, who has read the 23d chapter of Matthew? The spirit of Jude and 2d Peter is essentially the same with the 109th and 137th Psalms; and never be it forgotten that the most fearful denunciations of sin and pictures of future punishment in Scripture came from the lips of Jesus and of the disciple whom Jesus loved.

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1 1 Kings xvii. 1; Deut. xi. 16, 17; xxviii. 23, 24; Levit. xxvi. 19.

It is in the New Testament, not the Old, that that sentence of direst and deepest import occurs: "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God." The Bible is one, and the unity of the Divine Spirit may be proved from that oneness. The triumphant defence of all the sacred writers is their plenary inspiration: and it is just because post-apostolic ministers do not speak directly from God that they have no warrant to utter any other denunciations than those they find in the Holy Scriptures, and those that are either implied in, or deducible from them, for the correction of modern nations and classes of men that commit the oldest sins in the newest forms.

But if we look into this matter a little more closely, we find that the difficulty in question would be easily obviated, if students would only examine these minatory texts in the light of their connections. The prophet speaks just as the Psalmist sings, "of mercy and judgment," always beholding both sitting together on one equal throne in the heart of God, uniting or disjoining their respective messages to men according to the demands of the divine government and of human character and conduct, the one chastising disobedience, and the other shielding against despair, but, after all, rejoicing against judgment in behalf of God's adopted and beloved children, and offering pardon to rebels, while judgment visits final retribution on all such as despise the proffers and terms of mercy. These are, indeed, the merest outlines of the seer's picture; as to the details of light, and shade, and shadow, of colours and tints, from the most cheerful to the most sombre, the more they are studied the more ought they to be admired. Nothing, accordingly, can be more worthy of following than the way the prophets mingle tender and pathetic passages with their reproofs and imprecations. Jeremiah, for example, was compelled through forty eventful years to stand as a fenced brazen wall against his people, and yet how tearfully compassionate are many of his expressions.[1] Our Lord, likewise, after denouncing eight woes against the Jews, concludes with that most affecting lamentation, "O, Jerusalem, Jerusalem," etc.[2] This is neither the manner of the classic orators nor of modern public accusers.

To this should be subjoined the fact that the prophets inspire us with confidence in the future, and in the ultimate triumphs of all good beginnings, however feeble and assailed. It has been justly and

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[1] Jer. ix. 1; x. 23–25; xv. 10, 17; xvii. 16.

[2] Matt. xxiii; cf. Dr. Fairbairn's Revelation of Law in Scripture, pp. 356–364.

happily remarked by Isaac Taylor,[1] that the prophets, as men of hope are the masters of moden thought; for it is they who have suggested, and have supplied the text for those forcastings of the destiny of nations which, in these times especially, have been prevalent in the writings, not of divines merely, but of philosophers. We all, in these days of great movements, have learned to think hopefully of every philanthropic enterprise; and our teachers in this line have been "the goodly fellowship of the prophets." . . . "Certain luminous passages of theirs have been made use of to *jewel* the machinery of modern society. . . . This catholic mood of hopefulness has been derived much more from the Hebrew than from the Christian Scriptures." Thus Isaiah generally mixes his denunciations with promises, while the last twenty-seven chapters of his book are aglow with almost unshadowed hopefulness.[2] So, too, Jeremiah is never so sad as to abandon himself to total despair; even the destruction of Jerusalem and dismal captivity of its inhabitants do not prevent him from speaking words of encouragement to his brethren.[3] Ezekiel is not less hopeful, and, like Isaiah, winds up his prophecies with glimpses of Messianic times and visions of the New Jerusalem. Not with any fairness can they be called mere heralds of evil and haters of their kind, who can thus fling golden sun-glances of hope through the heaviest clouds of despair, and close many a tempestuous day of dolor with the gorgeous sunset of returning blessedness.

Only one objector remains—one who protests against the use of the Hebrew oracles on the ground of their obscurity and vagueness. But it is only the predictive portions of them that can be regarded as objectionably dark, and these are reducible to obscurity either of matter, or of style, or of both. As for the matter, it was, perhaps, the divine intention that each prediction should be rudimental, or, at any rate, incomplete, yet a part of a series of progressive revelations in suchwise that man's vision might not be dazzled by a light too concentrated and intensified. Wrongly, therefore, do we blame the silver dawnings of prophecy because they are not the golden noontides of history. And to refuse to study these prophecies because we do not know when, where, and how they are fulfilled, is much as if we refrained from hearing a sermon for the reason that the preacher did not choose to tell us the number, the names, and the addresses of those for whom the application was intended. Another thing, if this objection is allowed

1 The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, chap. xi.

2 Isa. i. 18–20; ii. 2–6; vi. 13; vii. 14–16; ix. 1, 2; vi. 7; x. 20–22, etc.; chaps. 40–66. 3 Jer. xxvi. 27, 28.

to prevail, it will advance to fight up against that tower of Christian prediction which looks towards eternity; to say nothing of every work of genius the mystery of which is the excellency of its power.[1] And if it comes to that, we must seal the scrolls of Creation by reason of such of their meanings as are ascertainably hid; and stop our ears to all the questions of Providence, on the plea that for many of them we have no answer. Or, again, is it said that their style, particularly their figures, are of the region of the mist? Remember, we rejoin, that both Jesus and his prophets confessedly used that kind and measure of perspicuity which at the same time shows to believers new journeys along the highway of holiness, and to unbelievers some untrodden turn in the criss-cross and devious paths of sin. These figures are, therefore, tests of the heart's grace rather than trials of the intellect's cunning such as the riddle of the sphinx was to Œdipus. Does any one say that none of these answers overcomes his difficulties? Then let him return to the outset and survey those interspaces of prophecy which are not predictive. There will he find many an address that is lucid enough for rhetorical instruction, and that is, beyond question, contributory to real eloquence.

But as it is high time this refutation were ended, the writer will only add a few sentences concerning the source and beginning of this system. Its chief peculiarities are the fruit of endeavours to answer the question which he had often and thoughtfully asked himself: What manner of preaching has the most direct tendency to Christianise any poor, ignorant, common man? This question ignored all thoughts respecting popularity and congregations, whether large or small, that are made up of kindred minds attracted together out of many thousands. It regarded these as extraneous considerations. To learn how the writer answered this question, how the light gradually dawned upon his mind, after what nights, and through what clouds, would be of small interest to most readers. Thus much, however, he should divulge, that some three years after he had conceived, and in part executed this work, he met with those golden words of John Livingstone, which so happily sum up his own that he has adopted them as his motto. This great Scottish preacher of the seventeenth century was the first, so far as the writer knows, to catch a true glimpse of the theory of sacred oratory. He did not, indeed, write many sentences, and never, it would seem, contemplated any treatise on the subject. Only one of his addresses has come down to us; but that is very precious, as it affords

[1] *E. g.* Uhland's *Verlorene Kirche* and our own Spencer's and Milton's best poems.

something like a fragmentary example of his idea. It contains several similitudes of his own, from which and other peculiarities we may infer that he considered the sermons of the Divine Teacher as proper objects of intelligent imitation. But what is far better, he evidently felt that he must imitate the piety if he would successfully imitate the preaching of the Master of the prophets; for we have accounts of his praying all night more than once, and of a single sermon which after one of those nights of prayer awakened five hundred souls at the kirk of Shotts.[1] To find the footprints of such a man on the pathless island was very encouraging.

The writer must, in justice to himself, add that he has sought truth and utility rather than a reputation for uncommon originality From books without number, and many of them most unpromising, he has derived valuable suggestions and maxims.[2] The materials for a system of sacred rhetoric have been slowly accumulating from the day that Moses first opened his mouth and prophesied amidst the wilds of Arabia; and they are the most trustworthy writers on this subject, who, having been guided by the best considered plans, have ransacked those materials most deeply on all sides, and selected therefrom the most judiciously. Other qualifications being equal, they are the safest teachers of the present who are the most largely indebted to the best instructors of the past. "As one country," says George Herbert, "doth not bear all things, that there may be commerce; so neither hath God opened, or will open, all to one, that there may be a traffic in knowledge between the servants of God, for the planting both of love and humility."

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1 Select Biographies, edited by the Wodrow Society, vol. i., pp. 138, 144, 194–212, 287.

2 Bibliographers will not scorn to learn that the method and bulk of the matter of this work, and the composition of the first book were produced as early as the end of 1862.

BOOK I.

INSPIRATION;

OR,

THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DIVINE SPIRIT IN PREACHING.

THIS system of Christian Rhetoric begins with the principle that Invention, Style and Delivery owe their proper life and efficacy to such aid of the Holy Spirit as quickens, directs and enlightens the heart and intellect of the preacher. This principle, in all its practical bearings, it is the object of the First Book to elucidate and discuss. It is here taken for granted that the preacher is regenerated and advancing in grace and in the knowledge of Christ. It is likewise presupposed that he will look elsewhere for answers to his questions concerning *plenary* inspiration, a subject which—as he has to bear in mind—is here investigated only so far as it is related to that of *partial* inspiration.

To the reader who passes by the First Book the remainder will probably prove injurious. The habit of regarding sermons as mere works of art, is hardening both to preacher and hearer; making the former an iron automaton that speaks mechanically; the latter a leviathan to which "sling-stones become stubble." The question of questions is: Dost thou O, Spirit of Life, deny, or dost thou vouchsafe thy gracious presence? For without Thee the greatest of our sermons will be but little better than the Fisherman's sword, or the Son of Thunder's prayer for lightning; but with Thee, the smallest of our preachments will be an authentic successor of the apostle Peter's Pentecost sermon, and thus mightily serve to fulfill the Patmos visions of St. John the Divine. Enable us then, first of all, to answer this life-and-death question.

CHAPTER I.

SOME ACCOUNT OF PARTIAL INSPIRATION, AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE WILL.

PARTIAL or homiletical inspiration is that assistance of the Divine Spirit which our Lord promised to his ministers in the apostolical commission.[1] Different it widely and obviously is from that rhetorical afflatus[2] of some god or demon, under which many ancient orators were, it was believed, moved to speak with superhuman eloquence; but it is less easily distinguished from that plenary inspiration which was given to the prophets and apostles; partly because homiletical inspiration has not yet finished its work, and consequently cannot furnish us with full evidence as to its distinctive qualities and sphere.

The knowledge of the Divine Spirit is progressive, as the knowledge of Immanuel was. The Son of God revealed his divine nature to his disciples but dimly at first, because their eyes were not yet attempered to the blaze of his full divinity. It was not until after his glorious ascension that they were all brought to comprehend the great truth that he who sojourned among them as son of man, was God, manifest in the flesh. And quite as unworthy of the dignity of the Holy Spirit are the views held by not a few at this day respecting him, as the notions entertained by some of the primitive disciples concerning their Divine Master were unworthy of his dignity. Taking, as the Holy Ghost condescends to do, the last place in the apostolic benediction and in the work of redemption, many of us, it is to be feared, give him the last place also in our studies and adorations. The Divine Spirit may, however, adopt the language of Immanuel: "The works that I do bear witness of me." And let us hope that as the years of redemption approach their close, His character, attributes and offices will be better understood and more generally known and acknowledged. The day, we be-

1 Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; cf. Acts xxvi. 18.

2 Plato's Menon; Aristides, *contra Platonem;* Longinus, De Sublim., C. 16; Plutarch, Life of Coriolanus; Cicero De Orat., L. 2, C. 46; *Infra,* chap. iv.

lieve, is coming when his victories and trophies and triumphs will greatly confirm the Scripture testimony as to Him, and cause multitudes in all nations to esteem Him deserving of no subordinate dignity and honour.

The operations of the Holy Spirit may be termed general and special; general as in creating and preserving the universe;[1] special, as in regeneration and sanctification, in raising from the dead the bodies of the saints, in working miracles, in the bestowment of "spiritual gifts," and in inspiration.[2] The special may, again, be divided into two kinds: those called *Charis*, *Charisma*, *Charismata*, and those termed, more specifically, *Charismata*. The former including the *Grace* of regeneration, and sanctification, and glorification; the latter, the *Gifts* of miracle working, speaking with tongues, and plenary and partial inspiration[3]—gifts which enable all true prophets and preachers to discharge the duties of their office—gifts differing indeed, according to the nature and end of their duties,[4] and yet distinct from those of men that bear other offices. To true prophets or preachers in all ages the Divine Spirit has been promised and granted. Thus the Lord promised to be with the mouth of Moses and Aaron,[5] and his Spirit is said to have rested upon Eldad and Medad.[6] One of the seraphim took from the altar a live coal, the emblem of the Spirit's power, and touched therewith the lips of Isaiah.[7] The Lord put forth his hand and touched the mouth of Jeremiah, and said to him, "I am with thee."[8] The spirit of the Lord is said to have entered into Ezekiel.[9] The hand of the Lord was upon Ezra.[10] The prophet Micah,[11] said, "Truly, I am full of power by the Spirit of the Lord, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto Jacob his transgression, and to Israel his sin." Zechariah,[12] about the same time, had a vision of two olive trees, whose oil fed the seven lamps on the golden candelabrum of the temple. When the prophet asked, "What are these?" the angel answered, "This is the word of the Lord unto Zerubbabel, saying, Not by might nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord of hosts." This was intended to show among other things, that as the oil was necessary for the lamps, in order to light-

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1 Gen. i. 2, 26, 27; Psa. civ. 30; Job. xxvi. 13.

2 John iii. 5, 6, 8; Rom. xv. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 11; 1 Peter iii. 18; Rom. viii. 11; Matt. xii. 28; Rom. xv. 19; 1 Cor. xii. 4–11; 2 Tim. iii. 16; 2 Peter i. 21.

3 1 Cor. viii. 1, and chaps. 12, 13, 14; Matt. vii. 22.

4 Matt. xxv. 14–30; Rom. xii. 4–8. 5 Exod. iv. 15. 6 Num. xi. 26–29.

7 Isa. vi. 6, 7. 8 Jer. i. 5–9. 9 Ezek. ii. 2. 10 Ezra vii. 6, 9.

11 Micah iii. 8. 12 Zech. iv. 1–7, 11–14; vii. 7; compare Rev. ix. 3–12.

ing the temple, so the Divine Spirit was necessary for the prophets, in order to the moral illumination of the people. And accordingly when our Lord began his prophetic work at Nazareth, he quoted, as fulfilled in himself, the words of Isaiah, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the Gospel to the poor," etc.[1] The apostles also, when they received their commission from him, were encouraged by the assurance of the continual aid of the Holy Ghost in these words, "Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."[2] Agreeably to this view, Peter informs us that he and the other apostles "preached the Gospel with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven."[3]

All these were by the Divine Spirit supplied with such gifts as they needed in doing the duties of their prophetic office. And as all true preaching is essentially prophetic work, all such men as are called of God to preach the Gospel, may expect that peculiar assistance from the Holy Ghost which their work requires. From the days of Enoch until now there have been prophets.[4] The prophet was before the priest and the apostle, was contemperaneous with both, and is to continue until the close of time.[5] The prophet is not, however, superior in rank to the priest or to the apostle. There is a parity in these three offices, as is apparent from the fact that more than one of them has been borne by the same person at the same time. The prophet could bear the office of the priest, as Samuel and Elijah did, or he could be of the priestly order as Jeremiah and Ezekiel were, or like Immanuel he could be at once prophet and priest and king. All the apostles were prophets,[6] and so have been all the Christian preachers that have come after them, because all alike have been the successors of Jesus as to his prophetic office.[7] The prophetic office is one of service and not of dignity. The Christian prophet is a servant of God, a servant of the word, and a servant of all his brethren. His greatness consists in his humble and faithful ministrations, and not in any rank man has power to confer upon him or his office. But while the office is essentially the same in all ages, its duties, not being always equally important, do not

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1 Luke iv. 16–20; Isa. lxi. 1–3; xi. 2.

2 Matt. xxviii. 16–20; John xiv. 16–27; xvi. 7–16. 3 1 Peter i. 12.

4 Jude 14; Hos. xii. 13; 1 Kings xviii. 4; 1 Cor. xiv. 3; Rev. x. 11; xi. 3.

5 Isa. lix. 20, 21; lxiii. 10–14; Haggai ii. 5.

6 Eph. ii. 20; iii. 5; Matt. xxiii. 34; Luke xi. 49; Rev. x. 7, 11; xvi. 6; xviii. 20; xxii. 9.

7 John xx. 21; Matt. x. 40; 2 Cor. ii. 20; 1 Cor. xi. 1; 1 Thes. i. 6; Rev. xiv. 4.

always need the same measure or degree of the Spirit's assistance. The spiritual power of all is from the same origin, although every one possesses it not in an equal degree. The loadstone, to borrow an illustration from Plato, communicates its virtue first to one ring and then to another, and so to many iron rings; but with gradual abatement: and yet whenever there is any attraction it has proceeded from the same source.

But coeval, and often in company with the true prophet, appears the false prophet, speaking either from a poetic or rhetorical, or even a demoniac, if not a diabolic *afflatus*. Thus always does the counterfeit circulate along with sterling coin, and the slight difference in the weight and the ring cannot always be detected by the expert himself. Does the prophet Elisha follow the armies of the allied kings of Judah, Israel and Edom? So must Alexander in his great expedition have his inspired Aristander. Does Paul in his journeys meet with the true prophet Agabus? Even thus must Telemachus in his voyages encounter the false prophet Theoclymenus.

And even in true inspiration, the plenary and the partial differ from and resemble each other as to several important points. Partial inspiration *differs* from plenary in the following particulars: It does not make any new revalation to us.[1] It is not accompanied with the power of working miracles, or any extraordinary gift, such as that of speaking with tongues, etc.[2] Though it guards against many errors and sins, yet it secures not against all errors of the intellect or sins of the heart, in so far as they effect the act of writing or of preaching or of praying.[3] Another point of difference is this: it does not commonly (although it does sometimes) act on the mind independently, so as to make needless all premeditation on the matter and manner of communication.[4] It is usually a guiding, teaching, and co-operative power.[5] Besides, though it does not move men to reveal and apply divine verities for the first time and on certain occasions alone; yet what is better for them, it is ready at all times to lead them to the further knowledge and fresh application of the truth that is already revealed.[6] Holy men of old, when not under plenary inspiration, were as dependent as we upon

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1 Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; 1 John ii. 20, 27; Rev. xxii. 18, 19.

2 Isa. viii. 19, 20; Matt. vii. 15–20; xxiv. 23–28; 2 Thes. ii. 9; Rev. xiii. 13, 14; Luke xvi. 28–31.

3 1 Tim. i. 3, 4; iv. 6–16. 4 2 Tim. i. 6; ii. 15; 1 Tim. iv. 13, 15.

5 Isa. lxiii. 10–14; John xiv. 26; xvi. 13; Rom. viii. 14; Gal. v. 18.

6 John xvi. 13; 1 John ii. 20, 27.

prayer and study as means of acquiring a clear and full knowledge of the Scriptures then existing. In the 119th Psalm the prophet prays for divine illumination in studying the word of God; and it was by books of prophecy and by prayer that Daniel understood the duration of the captivity and the time and object of the Messiah's advent.[1] In us, then, the lack of plenary inspiration is compensated by the following advantages: We of to-day have the entire volume of the inspired oracles—a treasure which none of the sacred writers except St. John could have possessed. And hence we have means they did not enjoy of deriving from the Old and New Testaments that comprehensive knowledge which is only to be obtained by a comparative study of all parts of them, and by the assaults of error which have made certain doctrines announce themselves with new distinctness and emphasis. We can again study, as they could not, many of the Scripture predictions in the light of their fulfillments in our own or earlier times. Each subsequent generation is also permitted, as they were not, to make and to witness the ever new and ever clear applications of all revealed truth to human duties, dangers, experiences, and privileges.

But to return: this partial aid is not given merely to men of one nation, or one order of ministers, but is accessible to all true preachers of all nations and ranks.[2] Herein is fulfilled the responsive cry of the seraphim:[3] "The whole earth full of his glory!" And yet it carries not with it that distinct and unmistakable evidence of its own presence which plenary inspiration bore to holy men of old, in whom the Divine Spirit was his own independent witness. They received from God such signals and signs of his presence, and ideas in such harmony with the divine attributes, and had such experiences of the heavenly verity, holiness and goodness of the things revealed to and by them, as that they were absolutely certain that the Divine Spirit was moving them, and that the communications they received were given to them by his holy inspiration. We do not say that partial inspiration bears *no* testimony of its presence. Only it is often less distinct and trustworthy than the plenary was, which appears to have sometimes carried in itself its own evidence, not only to the speakers but to the hearers as well.[4] One more point of difference is this: It is not waited for in such a way that we are always to refuse to study or preach or pray, unless we re-

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1 Dan. ix. 2, 25, 26; cf x. 21; 1 Peter i. 10, 12.

2 Joel ii. 28, 29; Acts ii. 17, 18. 3 Isa. vi. 3.

4 2 Chron. xx. 18; Isa. xlv. 14, 15; Zech. viii. 23; John vii. 46; Acts xiv. 12; 1 Cor. xiv. 25.

ceive indubitable dictates and impulses of the Holy Ghost. In partial inspiration we are less guided as to times of speaking and of ceasing to speak than as to the matter, feeling, object and manner of our communications.

Plenary and partial inspiration have certain points of *resemblance*, among which are the following:

Both are from the same source, or *auctor primarius*, though they are given for different purposes and produce different effects. They are the same *ex parte principii*, but diverse *ex parte termini*. And yet no doubt they are theoretically *separable*, though not often practically *separated*, from the Spirit's "inspiration of grace."[1] According to the Schoolmen, we receive from the Divine Spirit gifts, *expedite agere*, in order that we may act easily and skillfully; and grace, *bene agere*, in order that we may act holily and beneficently. And yet gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost in order to be helpful to grace. "When," says Owen,[2] "spiritual affections and due preparation of heart unto the duty do excite and animate the gift of prayer, and not the gift make impressions on the affections, then we are spiritually minded therein. Gifts are servants, not rulers in the mind; are bestowed on us to be serviceable unto grace, not to lead, but to follow it, and to be ready with their assistance in its exercise. For the most part, where they lead all, they are all alone." Again, gifts are said to be *opus ad extra*, or artificial as distinguished from *opus ad intra*, or the proper and natural effects of the Holy Ghost, as in regeneration, sanctification, and consolation. These are the *fruits* or *offspring*, and not the artificial operations of the Spirit.

Both usually work through our natural faculties and in obedience to their laws. As the Holy Ghost has a more thorough acquaintance with our minds than we have, he can influence them connaturally in ways unknown to us. But as while under plenary inspiration, the human mind is, for the time, rendered impeccable and infallible in conveying to men thoughts that are wholly from the Divine Spirit, so the individual peculiarities of the man inspired are less active and manifest than they are in a man who is under partial inspiration, and who consequently is liable to mingle with

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1 Though plenary inspiration acted for the most part through holy men, and the New Testament shows that it was accompanied by faith, charity, boldness, and such like virtues, we are not thence to conclude, that either full or partial inspiration is *always* and *necessarily* associated with eminent piety, much less with a consciousness of the lively exercise of the graces.

2 Works, vol. xiii., p. 250.

inspired thoughts both the sins and errors to which he is most inclined. The operation of the inspiring Spirit appears to be circular; beginning with the will or heart, it thereby inclines and fixes the attention, and so prepares the intellect to receive ideas; it thus describes the first semicircle; the second is described by the inspired reaction of the intellect on the heart or will. The common theory would be more correct and practical, were it not for its halfness. While, therefore, the Divine Spirit works in harmony with the laws of the mind, yet we are not at liberty thence to conclude either that his operations can *never* be distinguished from those of our mental faculties, or that these operations of his go forward in the same way that an accepted Gospel does, namely: first gaining access to the intellect, and next influencing the will by a regular and common process of the understanding. Some may safely exercise caution here; "for," says Turretin,[1] "if the whole work of God consists in a clear and timely proclamation of the Gospel, why is omnipotence required in its behalf? What is there in this to exceed the ordinary powers of man? If God does not work differently from man's mortal and outward working, why is the almightiness which God exerts in us, described by Paul in these splendid words: "The eyes of your understanding being enlightened . . . that ye may know what is the exceeding greatness of his power toward us who believe according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead" (Eph. i. 18–20).

Once more: Each may, in some sense, be called "an inspiration of elevation," as distinguished from that of "revelation," and that of "suggestion" and that of "superintendence." In each the mental faculties, though acting according to psychological laws, may sometimes be invigorated and raised to such an extraordinary degree, that they make communications which surpass in sublimity or beauty, splendor or force, the best productions of natural genius. But while partial inspiration sometimes outdoes the native powers of the most exalted genius, it cannot, for obvious reasons, equal in this respect, the utterances of plenary inspiration. So partial inspiration also bears some, though remote, resemblance to that of "superintendance."

These are some of the more important points of difference and likeness as to these two kinds of inspiration; the recollection of which will assist the reader to understand more clearly the contents of the following pages.

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[1] Institutio Theolog. Elenct., Pt. ii.; Quæs. 4, §33, De Vocatione Efficaci.

We now proceed to examine the co-operation of the Divine Spirit in preaching as it is related to the laws and phenomena of the human mind. It has been said of secular rhetoric that it reposes on psychology. Though we must add that sacred rhetoric reposes on pneumatology, yet we cannot deny that psychology is its pillow.

Partial inspiration seems usually to operate on the mind according to much the same method as the inspiration of grace operates in regeneration and sanctification. Be it remembered, however, that it is not here our purpose to raise the question, In the act of hearing or studying the Gospel, which is primordial, intellect or feeling? We go behind this to consider the question which now more nearly concerns us: Is the heart (or will) before the intellect in bending and fixing the attention in such wise as to render the hearing or studying of divine truth profitable to the preacher. In this mental act the heart it is that receives the first divine impulse, and the intellect the second; but the one is not greatly moved without the other being also moved, though in a less degree; for both Scripture and philosophy regard all the principal mental phenomena as complex.

I. But to avoid taking another step on disputed ground, let us try to illustrate the operations of partial inspiration by examining the first important process in that gracious change termed regeneration. What do the best authorities understand by it? Such a vivification of the will as enables it to exercise faith in God; meaning by the phrase *faith in God*, a consent to and acquiescence of the will or heart in all light coming from God, either through creation or providence or grace, or through all of these at once. But in the exercise of faith does not desire precede the perception of the ground whereon it rests? That we cannot deny; for Pascal has said that we must love in order that we may know, and Thomas Carlyle has asserted, with equal truth, that love is the beginning of all thought that is worth the name. If, therefore, we search faith psychologically, we shall find love hid within it, as Anacreon discovered Cupid lurking in the petals of a rose; while practically we may with St. Paul consider "faith as working by love." The Scriptures teach us that faith depends much on that function of the will which is termed volition or choice;[1] and that if we regard words of wisdom more

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[1] Rom. vi. 11; Eph. v. 5; Rom. x. 10; Mark ix. 23; John v. 44; xi. 30. "Only be willing," says Basil, "and God is in advance." "God draws the infirm will," says Chrysostom; and Augustine demands, "Who is he that runs to the Lord for grace, but he whose steps are directed thereto by the Lord? And, therefore, to seek the assistance of grace is the very beginning of grace." Cf

than the wisdom of words, in speaking to the people, and in persuading them to duty, we shall speak of faith as the foremost of the graces of the new heart.[1] Faith is, by Augustine, called the first-born of the regenerate heart,[2] and the root of all the virtues.[3] We do not think it worth while here to speculate about that which the philosophers term *motus primo-primus*, the first agitation or primordial bias of the will; it is enough for our present purpose to affirm that the gracious act of the Divine Spirit is, in the order of nature, antecedent to the act of the will, and that the first act of the will in regeneration is faith.

Some theologians teach that the first effect of the regenerating Spirit is a gracious illumination of the intellect; but such an opinion does not appear to be well supported by Scripture authority, and is contrary to the views of Augustine, who says, "It is faith which first bows down the soul to God, then come precepts concerning life, by observing which that begins to beam on the sight which before was only believed. . . . . Therefore, before our mind be cleansed, we ought to believe what we are not yet able to understand; since most truly is it said by the prophet, 'Unless ye shall believe, ye shall not understand.'"[4] Calvin also has said that "Faith is the only medium by which the Divine Spirit leads us into the light of the Gospel."[5] Were we here discussing the means and antecedents of regeneration we could not deny an important place to the illumination of the intellect, as a common preparation for regeneration. But it will be remembered that we have been dwelling upon the question whether faith be the first-born of the family of the Christian graces.

It cannot be questioned that one of the most important requisites for preaching is a deep conviction of the reality of divine things, and particularly of the absolute certainty of every word that the Spirit of truth has spoken to us. A prophet says, "I have believed, therefore have I spoken." Paul, speaking for himself and the other apostolic prophets, quotes these words as follows: "We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written, I believed, and there-

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St. Bernard *passim;* Melancthon Loci Theologici, art. *de Libero Arbitrio;* Delitzsch's Biblical Psychology, Tr., pp. 242–244.

[1] John i. 12, 13; iii. 26; Heb. xi. 6; 1 Peter i. 5.

[2] Sermo 8, De Decem Plagis et Decem Præceptis. Opera, tome v.

[3] Id., Epistola, 194.

[4] De Agone Christiano, §14, 15; Isa. vii. 9, according to the Septuagint.

[5] Institutes, B. iii. C. i., sec. 4.

fore have I spoken; we also believe and therefore speak."[1] We are here taught, first, that the true prophets of all ages have the same spirit of faith; secondly, that this faith is the compeller and defender of boldness of speech. We are not to be understood that the prophetic faith is always firm and unstaggering, for Jeremiah, who probably wrote the psalm above quoted, always had a confidence in God that made him very bold and pathetic in his preaching, and yet in times of suffering he was, like the prophet John the Baptist, tempted to unbelief.[2] This *Pistis*, it would seem, is sometimes nearly synonymous with *Parrhesia*, as in Eph. iii. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 13; Heb. iii. 6; x. 35; 1 John iii. 21. Faith greatly contributes to moral courage, and is indispensable to its exercise, especially that confidence or assurance which *Parrhesia*, in one of its senses, imports. It was not self-confidence, but self-conviction that made the apostles and other prophets bold. Let us not, however, as some do, make this self-conviction the soul of all eloquence. A free-spokenness, flowing from a settled conviction of truth, contributes much, but not all that constitutes the soul of eloquence.

It should here be remarked that this faith is something different from that conviction of certainty which results from logical demonstration. When the apostles Peter and John declared to their adversaries, "We cannot but speak the things we have seen and heard," they did not thereby profess that it was their faith that compelled them to preach. They avowed that they spoke as witnesses who were forced to bear testimony as to what they had demonstrated, and not what they merely believed to be true. Hence those ministers who cannot preach on any subjects with confidence and feeling except such as have been matters of actual experience in their own souls, have no just cause to suppose themselves to be men of very strong faith. Far from censuring those who preach from experience (would to God we all preached more from our own experience and had more experience to preach from), we cannot approve the course

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[1] Psa. cxvi. 10; 2 Cor. iv. 13. The "miraculous faith" of Matt. xvii. 20; 1 Cor. xii. 9; xiii. 2, differs from "saving faith" in measure, not in kind. It was not always associated with the gift of prophecy, nor could it be especially helpful to those who, after all, edified the churches by the slower process of public address. Some gather from Rom. xii. 6, that the apostolic prophets received degrees of inspiration varying according to the measure of their faith. They who are worthy can alone receive Him, nor is he merely received in one "measure," but according to the "proportion of faith," he distributes his operations. (*Basil*, de Spirit, Sanct. c. 9.) With this view, as we show elsewhere, we cannot concur.

[2] Jer. xx. 7–9; Matt. xi. 2, 3.

of those who, misled by the example of John Owen and Brown of Haddington, preach from experience almost exclusively; who do not recollect that Owen did not exclusively preach from his own experience, and that the second thing which he prescribed to himself for regulating his ministry powerfully counteracted the tendency of the first, namely, "to press those duties which present occasions, temptations, and other circumstances rendered necessary to be attended to." Many a man is in danger here of preaching himself and not Christ the Lord. No preacher has so deep and varied an experience as to make it safe and good for him to keep within the limits of God's dealings with his own soul. Happily for him and his congregation, they are not limited to the study of their own spiritual exercises, but are permitted to range freely over the inspired records of the experiences of Jehovah and of a multitude of people for thousands of years, to say nothing of post-apostolic history, throughout whose pages the inner life of martyrs, confessors, and other holy men is so often betrayed and revealed. The true doctrine as to this point is summed up in the words of our Divine Master: "Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed."

II. The grace born next after the eldest is "virtue" or personal holiness,[1] or, better still, perhaps, a love of holiness. The next step from acquiescing in the truth, is the *complexus fidei*, or that embracing and acknowledging of the truth which is the beginning of holy living. This would appear to be included in the notion of faith working by love.[2] It is remarkable that this quality, in the lower ethnic sense of *probity*, is the second thing which Aristotle in his rhetoric recommends to the orator in order to inspire the confidence of the hearer.[3] But unhappily, this great pagan philosopher is satisfied if the orator for selfish ends keeps up the appearance of probity. Christian virtue, on the contrary, is sincere before God and man. As it has its source in that Christian love which is satisfied and delighted with every moral excellence and a hatred and loathing of every moral evil,[4] it must entertain a displacency towards all dishonesty and hypocrisy. This love of holiness is one of the regenerate heart's inmost fountains. Christian charity begins at home in the profoundest sense of the phrase. It owes and pays its first complacency to its own kindred moral excellences, and first cherishes, guides, and disciplines them, not by

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1 2 Peter i. 5. 2 Gal. v. 6, 7. 3 Rhet., Lib. ii, cap. 1, sec. 5.
4 Phil. ii. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 12; 1 John v. 2[illegible].

giving attention exclusively to them, but by being chiefly concerned to keep the divine precepts and to do good to all in all lawful ways. This love of all the Christian virtues appears to be the heart of Paul's idea of charity.[1] Of these virtues the perfections of the Lord are the patterns, and the Divine Spirit the parent and the teacher by whom we are changed into the image of Jesus which we behold reflected in the mirror of the Gospel.[2]

And as this transformation goes forward, we are prompted, not to single acts only, but to a series of actions and a habitual and harmonious exercise of all the Christian virtues. The Divine Spirit does not form a holy character as a sculptor works upon a statue, sometimes upon its feet, sometimes on its hands, sometimes on its face, but he proceeds as the Creator does, says Bolingbroke, "in forming a flower, an animal or any other of his productions. He throws out altogether and at once, the whole system of every being and the rudiments of all its parts." This we say is the method on which the Spirit proceeds. And yet we must not fail to observe that by reason of our depravity this method and harmony are disturbed and checked so that the Christian graces do not practically grow in perfect proportion. The first principle of holiness is, according to Baxter,[3] the Divine Spirit. In the unity of this principle there are three radical graces, a Spirit of power (or life) and love, and of a sound mind [4] (or light), which are the immediate effects of the divine influx. As the sunshine on the earth and planets is all one in itself as emitted from the sun, light, heat, and moving force concurring, and yet is not equally effective because of the difference of recipients, so that by reason of their incapacity one may have less of heat, another less of motion, and another less of light; even thus the potentiality of these radical graces may be equal while practically their acts and habits are often very unequal. But still the consideration that they are not only coetaneous but interdependent should move us to their simultaneous and proportional exercise. If the preacher has the love of holiness it will appear in his life, and particularly in his preaching.

It will show itself in the choice of his texts which will be devotional rather than controversial, as George Herbert advises. We cannot, indeed, and ought not always to select such texts. We are

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1 1 Cor. xiii. 2 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.

3 Baxter's Works, vol. xii.; Life of Faith, Pt. iii., chap. xi., pp. 357–363; Edwards on the Affections, Pt. iii., sec. 10; On the Beautiful Symmetry and Properties of Gracious Affections.

4 2 Tim. i. 7.

required to teach the doctrines and duties of our religion in the proportion wherein the Bible exhibits them. To dwell, therefore, on the Psalms or other devotional Scriptures exclusively would lead to sad and dangerous omissions. But in cases where we are free to choose our texts without regard to the foregoing considerations, as in occasional sermons, our santification will often be indicated by the choice of our texts and subjects.

This love of holiness will also appear in his proofs and illustrations. These should not be drawn from pagan[1] or other doubtful sources, if they are liable, as they sometimes are, to be associated in the minds of the hearers with subjects foreign to things sacred. But to refuse to employ all analogies and evidences from creation, history, and common life, were to refuse to follow the best inspired examples. Nor is heathen mythology without some pure and safe materials with which to illustrate and enforce. This love is likewise manifest in the gravity of his spirit and manner. "Of all the preaching in the world (that speaks not stark lies), I hate," says Baxter, "that preaching most which tendeth to make the hearers laugh, or to move their mind with talking levity, and affect them as stage players use to do instead of affecting them with a holy reverence of the name of God." And yet we may well believe that there is a divine laughter which is very remote from levity.[2] Laughter is good or bad in the house of the Lord according to the known character of the preacher, and to the nature of the thoughts and emotions which provoke it. Habitual laughter, however, is a bad sign, for it evinces the absence of every deep Christian affection. "Salt," says Jean Paul, "is a very good condiment, but very bad food."

This love of the holy sometimes throws the mind of the minister into the attitude of an angel on whom the breath of the Almighty has suddenly descended, and turned one wing and one eye towards heaven; and so moving it to make apostrophies to God. We may indeed, if we watch not, thus form a habit of even taking the name of the Lord in vain; but, as George Herbert says, "some such irradiations scatteringly in sermons carry great holiness in them. The prophets are admirable in this. So Isa. 64th, "Oh, that thou wouldst rend the heavens, that thou wouldst come down," etc. And Jeremiah 10th, after he had complained of the desolation of Israel, turns to God suddenly, "O, Lord, I know that the way of

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1 Herein Jeremy Taylor sometimes offends: Paul indeed quotes from Menander, Aratus, and Epimenides, but as Bengel (on Titus i. 12) observes, he does not mention their names.

2 Psa. cxxvi. 2.

man is not in himself," etc. Of Summerfield, Dr. Bethune says, "As the thought of souls perishing in sin pressed upon his heart, he would break his order with an earnest ejaculation. 'Would to God!' 'O, that God!' 'God grant!' were frequently upon his lips, not carelessly, but with an emphasis of devotion that none could doubt. Indeed he not only prayed before he preached and after he preached—for he went to the pulpit from his knees and back to his knees from the pulpit—but he seemed to be praying while he preached. Prayer was so much his breath, that as Gregory Nazianzen says of the true Christian, the breathing went on whatever he was doing, not hindering him but necessary to him." Hence the holy preacher opportunely reminds the people that he speaks in the name of God, or on behalf of his people, truth or cause. He solemnly declares to them that if he held his peace, his conscience would condemn him, or that however painful to him his duty is, yet he is too deeply concerned for their eternal welfare to withhold the divine message from them.[1] Then according to "the Country Parson," in the reading of which Baxter took such delight, "the man of God will often urge the presence and majesty of Jehovah by these and like speeches, 'Oh, let us take heed what we do! God sees us; he sees whether I speak as I ought or you hear as you ought; he sees hearts as we see faces. He is among us; for if we be here, he must be here; since we are here by him, and without him could not be here.' Then turning the discourse to his majesty, 'and he is a great God and terrible; as great in mercy, so great in judgment." Sometimes applause has been reproved by quoting the words of Habakkuk, "But the Lord is in his holy temple; let all the earth keep silence before him." But ejaculations should be made principally with a view to obtain spiritual aid for the preacher himself. It was not for others that Angelico painted in the attitude of prayer.

Finally, this holiness will prompt the preacher to teach and apply the truths of the Scriptures in the beautiful proportion in which they are there revealed to us. If the Spirit is a principle of new life within the preacher, he is impelled by it to an even-paced motion along the path of duty towards the adorable Jesus, amidst the broad and unclouded light of divine revelation. As he lives in the Spirit, so he walks in the Spirit. He exercises all the graces in their proper places, on their proper occasions, and objects, without setting one to fight another, or allowing one to sleep while he is exercising the other beyond moderation. Hence something of the

[1] Ezek. xxxiii. 1–16; Amos iii. 8; 2 Cor. v. 20.

symmetry of holiness will appear in his mode of preaching. He preaches the law but only in conjunction with the Gospel. He preaches doctrines experimentally and practically, and preaches experience and practice doctrinally. A like proportion will be visible in the spirit of his preaching. Has he fervency? It is tempered with wisdom and tenderness. Has he boldness? It is prompted by love; and his sincerity is void of pride and severity. Is he positive and uncompromising? It is not from bigotry, or austerity, or obstinacy, but from that holiness which would either escape or master all error and sin, and defend and advance all truth and goodness. When he was regenerated he received that principle of holiness which leads him to obey from the heart that mould of doctrine into which he was then cast.[1]

III. The inspiration of the Divine Spirit in its operation on the heart or will imparts to it a love of revealed truth,[2] especially the truth as it is in Jesus. It was the promise of our Divine Master that the Spirit of truth should "testify" of Christ, and guide his disciples into the whole truth respecting him. "He shall not speak of himself. . . . He shall glorify me; for he shall receive of mine and shall show it unto you."[3] As the Son came into the world to honor the Father, so the Holy Ghost came into the world to honor the Son. And accordingly we are told that no man can say that Jesus Christ is Lord but by the Holy Ghost.[4] The Spirit alone can enable us to entertain a sincere conviction of the divinity of Christ, and this the Spirit does by illuminating our hearts.[5] He also helps us to comprehend the love of Christ.[6]

This guidance of the Holy Ghost to the nature and character of Jesus is not the sole privilege of Christian preachers. The Hebrew preachers were in their studies and ministrations frequently led up into the watch-tower to look hopefully for the distant coming of the Messiah.[7] And it is worthy of attention, as showing the spiritual intimacy that was maintained between Jesus and the prophets, that in one place the testimony of the prophets is called the spirit of Christ, while in another, the testimony of Jesus is called the spirit of prophecy.[8] When John, as a prophet, communicated to us the inward history of the Church, he had a yet more frequent reference to our Lord. The angel who revealed to him the contents of the Apocalypse, told him that he was himself a prophet and had the testimony of Jesus.[9]

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1 Rom. vi. 17. 2 1 Cor. xiii. 6; 2 Thes. ii. 10. 3 John xv. 26; xvi. 13, 14.
4 1 Cor. xii. 3. 5 2 Cor. iv. 6. 6 Eph. iii. 17–19. 7 John v. 39.
8 1 Peter i. 10, 11; Rev. xix. 10. 9 Rev. xxii. 9.

The preacher, therefore, whose heart is filled by the Spirit with the love of divine verity will dwell copiously and earnestly on whatever is peculiar to the religion of Christ. He will take the facts, the doctrines, the precepts, and promises of the New Testament and carry their light through the Old Testament and into all the paths of private, social, and political life. The Christian system will be the great central light of all his studies and preaching.

The doctrine of salvation by the death of Christ will often be either the direct or the indirect topic of his sermons—direct when he makes the cross, as our atonement, the topic—indirect when he shows the *relations* of all divine teachings to that cross. "I may," says Andrew Fuller, "establish the moral character and government of God; the holiness, justice, goodness, and perpetual obligation of the law; the evil of sin; and the exposedness of the sinner to eternal punishment; but if I have any other end in view than, by convincing him of his lost condition, to make him feel the need of a Saviour, I cannot be said to have preached the *Gospel*." Fuller is here writing about the preaching of the Gospel solely with a view to the conversion of sinners. But if the preacher aim, as he often must, to advance the sanctification of believers, he will be equally careful to keep ever before himself and his hearers the relation between the cross and all doctrines, duties, experiences, and privileges.

If we preach under a true inspiration, our teachings in general will be in harmony with Scripture. The Holy Spirit does not contradict himself. He brings our will into unison with his, as we find it in Holy Writ; "I will," says the Lord, "write my law in their hearts."[1] His inward work is a transcript of his outward work. And hence, as we before remarked, the inspired Scriptures are the standard by which to test the quality of our inspiration.

But we have need of caution here. The knowlege of most divine things is progressive. From the force of early prejudices, or lack of faithful instruction, or want of regeneration, or slow progress in sanctification, the young preacher may at first have failed to gain a full apprehension and complacent love of the divinity and atonement of the Lord Jesus Christ. But if he have the gracious assistance of the Spirit, he will be always searching for the whole truth respecting the Messiah, and he will give himself no rest before he discover it. The kingdom of heaven within him will, according to the parable of the merchantman,[2] assiduously go on seeking what is *good* until it find the *best*, even Jesus "the pearl of price," and for

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[1] Jer. xxxi. 33. [2] Matt. xiii. 45, 46.

his sake, if need be, it will ignore or neglect all other teachings, all other ransoms, and all other examples of moral excellence. It will, in short, account the Lamb of God as the only and all-sufficient sacrifice for sin, and the soul's supreme good.

IV. This inspiration fills the heart of the preacher with a devoted love to his people. It is often overlooked that the apostle Paul's description of charity[1] was written for the express purpose of enforcing a proper and edifying use of spiritual gifts. He begins by saying, "Though I speak with the tongue of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." The whole chapter has a more direct application to Christian ministers than to any other class of men, and shows the total nullity of all inspired gifts, when they are not exercised with love to the souls of such as are committed to our care.[2] What an outburst of ethical feeling is Paul's exclamation before Agrippa in Acts xxvi. 29. Hence all malice and ill-will, all hatred that is not consentaneous with God's hatred, quench the holy fire. The Rabbins[3] believed that anger did, for the time being, deprive the wise man of his wisdom, and the prophet of the spirit of prophecy.

V. The Holy Ghost also inspires *fervency*. This seems to be implied in the vision of the live coal which the angel took from the altar and touched therewith the lips of Isaiah.[4] The Spirit caused the word of the Lord to be in the heart of Jeremiah as a burning fire shut up in his bones.[5] John the Baptist "was a burning and shining light." As some one has said respecting this passage, "The burning comes before the shining; ardor of mind is the light of instruction." The same idea appears to be conveyed by the cloven tongues of fire which descended upon the disciples, otherwise they might have been termed cloven tongues of *light*. The Holy Ghost imparts both light and heat.

There is no one thing that is more characteristic of the prophets than this. Fervor is sometimes another name for prophecy, and the most diligent student who has it not, is incapable of interpreting its utterances. (See example of this quality in Isa. lviii; Joel

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1 1 Cor. xiii.

2 This love will promote invention. "A desire to gain souls will be fruitful in matter. A man who feels unable to quit till he has gained you, will surprise you with new specimens of his invention. When you think he has exhausted his subject, he will bring forward new matter, not forced in, but so necessary that you wonder that you should have thought the subject ended without it." (*Dr. E. D. Griffin*, Ser. on Jer. iii. 15.)

3 John Smith of Cambridge, Complete Works, pp. 9, 10.

4 Isa. vi. 6. 5 Jer. xx. 9.

iii.; Amos i.; Acts xx. 24–38.) Ephraem Syrus, speaking of the Trinity, compares the Father to the sun, Jesus to his radiance, and the Divine Spirit to his heat. "By the heat," says he, "all things are ripened; by the Spirit all things are hallowed. By heat things which the frost hath bound are loosened, as souls which the wicked one hath bound are loosened by the Holy Ghost. The warmth awakeneth the heart of the still earth as the Divine Spirit doth awaken that of the holy Church." This sacred fire manifests itself in a tender sensibility and lively sympathy. It was this that enabled St. Paul to practise a great but honest flexibility in the varied application of gospel truth: "This," says he, "I do for the Gospel's sake, *that I might be partaker thereof with you.*" [1] It is never separated from that affectionateness or true benevolence which is deeply moved by the joys and sorrows of others; and which speaks and acts with such a ready and timeful fellow-feeling as a malevolent zeal counterfeits unskillfully and in vain.

VI. But this ardor is always tempered with peace of mind and manner. That peace which is one of the fruits of the Spirit may be defined with Cicero, "liberty in tranquillity." It is like the stars as characterised by Goethe, "unhasting yet unresting," or better still, in the langauge of Isaiah, like a river, not stagnant but flowing with an equable and unruffled motion. The preacher who is wildly and painfully agitated, may have the Spirit, but he is not wholly under his control: his own passions and affections are trying to assert the supremacy which rightfully belongs to the Holy Ghost. He who prays deliberately as he ought, according to Macarius, is like a man who, in climbing a mountain, puts forward his arms to make a path among thick shrubbery. "God has taught us," observes Tertullian,[2] "that the Divine Spirit, as being of a sensitive and delicate nature, operates with tranquillity, quietude, and peace; but does not agitate with fury, sullenness, and grief." This Christian father, while he was a Montanist, granted that the prophetesses Maximilla and Priscilla spoke in ecstacy, but denied that they fell into any rage, which, he maintained, was the character of every false prophet.[3] Chryostom was of the same opinion; "for," says he, "this is peculiar to the soothsayer, to be beside himself, dragged as a madman. But the prophet is not so, but with sober mind and composed temper, and knowing what he is saying, he uttereth all

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1 1 Cor. x., 10–23. 2 De Spectaculis, chap. xv. He refers to Eph. iv. 30–32.

3 John Smith of Cambridge, Discourse on Prophecy in Watson's Tracts, vol. iv., 310–321. The Holy Spirit of the Rabbinical writers is synonymous with the Shekinah. See Complete Works of John Smith of Cambridge, p. 9.

things." He accordingly maintained that prophecy was voluntary, while soothsaying was compulsory. "The prophecy," says he, "was exercised among the prophets as was proper for their condition, with understanding and with entire freedom. Wherefore you perceive they had power either to speak or to refrain from speaking. For they were not bound by necessity, but were honoured with a privilege. For this cause Jonah fled (Jonah i. 3); for this cause Ezekiel delayed (Ezekiel iii. 15); for this cause Jeremiah excused himself (Jer. i. 6). And God thrusts them not on by compulsion, but advising, exhorting, threatening, not darkening their mind; for to cause distraction and madness and great darkness, is the proper work of a demon: but it is God's work to illuminate, and with consideration to teach things needful."[1]

This serenity and repose of mind pervade the prophetic communications. The prevailing style of these holy men is easy and peaceful. The rhythm, though free and varied, appears but the audible breathing of Peace herself, and it never degenerates into the impetuous and dissonant ravings of the Bacchic dithyramb. What Ewald[2] says of Isaiah's style is not *peculiar* to him but common to all the prophets. "His only fundamental peculiarity is the lofty, majestic calmness of his style, proceeding out of the perfect command which he feels he possesses over his subject matter. This calmness, however, no way demands that the strain shall not, when occasion requires, be more vehemently excited and assail the hearer with mightier blows; but even the extremest excitement, which does here and there intervene, is in the main bridled still by the same spirit of calmness, and, not overstepping the limits which that spirit assigns, it soon with lofty self-control returns to its wonted tone of equability." And it is remarkable that not only Isaiah but Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Zechariah speak in strains of matchless eloquence of that same peace which Jesus left as his legacy to his people. John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards are good examples of the union of inspiration and peacefulness.

The effects of this grace of the Spirit on the style and delivery of the preacher are too manifest to need an extended enumeration. They promote clearness, brevity, continuity, number, gravity and force of style; and distinctness, variety, calmness, melody, and manliness of delivery. On this last quality its effect is very marked. An easy and expressive utterance depends much on beginning with and always returning to the middle tones of the voice. Nothing is more helpful to this than a gracious tranquillity of mind. But more con-

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[1] Homily xxix. on 1 Cor. [2] Propheten des Alten Bundes, vol. i., p. 177.

cerning the influence of the Spirit on style and delivery will be said in a subsequent chapter.

VII. The inspiration of the Divine Spirit acts on the will or heart by restoring and maintaining the supremacy of the conscience.[1] By conscience we here mean that moral sense which approves the right and disapproves the wrong, which is attended with a conviction of the good desert of virtue, and the ill desert of vice, and which results subjectively in the hope of reward or the fear of punishment.[2] The sense of obligation and responsibility furnishes a prevailing motive to faithfulness in preaching. It may operate powerfully when the love of holiness and truth and goodness, has become lukewarm or inconstant, so that the man of God is actuated by the deep conviction of the apostle when he said, "Wo is me if I preach not the Gospel of Christ." By sedulously cultivating it and habitually obeying its promptings, especially in his studies, he will learn how to deal with the consciences of his hearers. He will thereby be enabled to preach from his own experience on subjects that are far more important than is commonly supposed. Yes, for the experiences of the conscience are the most painful, and at the same time the most safe and profitable of all experiences.

The Christian love, before considered, along with the hope and fear which an inspired conscience produces, greatly contribute to the animation and tenderness of the preacher. It is a comfortable thought that if a conscience full of grace is more troublesome than any other, it is also more convincing and persuasive than any other.

VIII. The Divine Spirit acts on the heart or will by inspiring in it right aims. If love and hope and fear are graciously exercised, they will fix our intentions on right ends. We will then act unwaveringly in view of the supreme good. It is partly through the will that we obtain that wisdom which is profitable to direct.[3] The words holiness, truth, benevolence, right, wrong, heaven, hell, will in our vocabulary come to be fraught with a wealth of meaning which no human mind can calculate. The Spirit causes the preacher to intend right words, not only as a moral being but also particularly as a herald of the Gospel—as a prophet speaking in behalf of God, as an ambassador for Christ, as an under-shepherd of the flock of God, as a teacher of divine knowledge, and the servant of the Church for Christ's sake. Gain, applause, power, place, honour, ease—these and other such earthly objects cannot habitually

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1 Rom. vii., viii.; ix. 1; 1 Tim. i. 3; Heb. x. 2. 2 Heb. x. 27; 2 Cor. i. 12.
3 Eccles. x. 10.

direct the studies and utterances of any man whom the Holy Ghost has put into the ministry.

IX. This inspiration affects the will or moral nature of man, by producing fixed and steadfast resolutions.[1] It removes all disposition to waver or delay in discharging the obligations of conscience or acting from the promptings of Christian love. It also supplies the inward vitality and strength which impel to ready and persevering action. "Our Saviour," says John Owen,[2] "calls grace 'the good treasure of the heart' of a good man, whence that which is good doth proceed. It is a principle constantly and abundantly inciting and stirring up unto, and consequently bringing forth, actions conformable and like unto it; and it is also called a treasure from its abundance. It will never be exhausted, it is not wasted by men's spending it. . . . The Scripture speaking of the heart as the principle of men's good or evil actions, doth usually insinuate two things belonging unto the manner of their performance.

"*First*, Suitableness and pleasingness unto the soul in the things that are done. When men take delight, and are pleased in and with what they do, they are said to do it heartily, with their whole hearts. Thus when God himself blesseth his people in love and delight, he says, he doth it with his whole heart and his whole soul (Jer. xxxii. 41).

"*Secondly*, Resolution and constancy in such actions. And this also is denoted as the metaphorical expression before used of a treasure, from whence men do constantly take out the things which they either stand in need of, or do intend to use." The Holy Ghost inspires not only wishing, but choosing, and is not pleased with half-purposes and double-mindedness.[3] Resolute action and decision of character distinguish ancient men of God, and are demanded by them of all who profess to engage in his service. Elijah, Paul, James, and, above all, our Divine Master, exemplify this remark.[4]

The Divine Spirit thus impels the man of God to practise his own teachings. Through love and conscience he moves the minister to follow wherever truth leads the way. Old prejudices, the ties of kindred, the precious memory of the dead, temporal interests, a shortsighted expediency, fond fancies, strong passions, the desire

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[1] Psa. lxxviii. 37; Jer. xxx. 21; Acts xi. 23; Col. i. 23.

[2] Works, vol. xiii., pp. 20–22.

[3] We would not here ignore the fact, that the intellect has an important share in reaching *practicum dictamen*, the ultimate resolution of the judgment.

[4] 1 Kings xviii. 21; 1 Cor. ii. 2; 2 Cor. i. 17; James i. 6–8; Matt. vi. 24; Luke xii. 50.

of originality, the vanity of genius, a love of logical or rhetorical victories, these and other such terrene forces will be overruled by a deep, abiding and practical love of revealed truth.

And this obedience helps to interpret and teach the Scriptures. Ezra, we are told, prepared his heart to understand and to do the law of the Lord before he taught it to Israel.[1] The moral blindness of those degenerate prophets, the Scribes, appears to have been partly occasioned by their recommending to others what they did not do themselves. As the sacred oracles everywhere relate to experimental and practical life, they cannot be thoroughly understood by the disobedient, however gifted and learned they may be. Nor will prayer and study and preaching of themselves suffice to make us accurate Biblical scholars, or profound theologians, or powerful preachers. If we would comprehend the first principles of the Christian religion we must daily endeavour to do all Christian duties.[2] The teachings of Holy Scripture on this subject are comprehended in the saying of Justin Martyr, "There is no true knowledge without life," and that other of Gregory Nazianzen, "Practice is the way to knowledge."

X. Nearly allied to resoluteness is that boldness which characterised the sermons and prayers of the apostles. The Church at Jerusalem prayed saying, "Grant unto thy servants, that with all boldness they may speak thy word." This prayer was answered; for we are told that "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they spake the word of God with boldness."[3] It is clear from this and other Scriptures that this freedom of speech was imparted to the primitive disciples by the Divine Spirit. The apostle Paul expected that this freespokenness would be imparted to him by the Holy Ghost in answer to the intercessions of his converts.[4] Not only Paul but Barnabas, Apollos, Peter, John and others, were endowed with this freedom of speech. In what did this ministerial virtue consist? It did not consist merely in an unembarrassed fluency in extemporaneous preaching and prayer. One text (2 Cor. iii. 17) is often misquoted so as to encourage the conviction that the Divine Spirit gives "liberty," or readiness of *utterance*. The word *liberty* here signifies freedom from the mental blindness of an unregenerate Hebrew. But there is no passage of Scripture which justifies the belief that the Holy Ghost inspires liberty of

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1 Ezra vii. 10.

2 Psa. l. 23; Prov. iv. 18; Isa. lviii. 8; Hos. vi. 3; Matt. xxv. 14–30; John vii. 17., viii. 12; Acts v. 32.

3 Acts iv. 29-31. 4 Phil. i. 19, 20; Eph. vi. 18, 20.

utterance or delivery altogether apart from the notion of boldness and frankness.

This quality did not consist in a fierce, lion-like delivery. It was more intimately related to the confidence of the mind than to any audacity of manner, as is manifest from the texts which mention it as a qualification for acceptable prayer to God.[1] Paul was one of the boldest of the apostles, and yet his voice appears to have been feeble.[2]

This boldness did not partake of the nature of personality or any thing needlessly offensive. Paul employs the word in his speech before Agrippa, where he introduces his subject in the most courtly manner.[3] From this we may infer that the apostle did not regard this strain of compliment as inconsistent with his notion of a bold speech. The Rev. Daniel Moore[4] playfully remarks that the Greek word should not be rendered "baldness."

It did not manifest itself in heterodoxical or irreverent thoughts and expressions. The prayer of the Church was that with all boldness the servants of God might speak his word, not man's word. As this freespokenness was prompted by the Holy Ghost, so of necessity it communicated nothing but the word of God.

Neither is humour any evidence of the possession of this quality. Not a few facetious preachers have the reputation of much boldness; but true boldness has its source in Christian love: and this, like every other deep passion, little as we may think of it, is grave and rather inclined to sadness than to levity. Says St. Bernard, commenting on the words, "The voice of the turtle is heard in our land," "I hear the voice of that teacher with the greatest pleasure who moves me not to clap my hands in applause, but to beat my bosom with sorrow. Verily thou dost exhibit the turtle-dove if thou teachest how to groan, and if thou wouldst persuade thou oughtest to study the art of groaning rather than the art of declamation."

Passing from a negative to a positive view of the term *Parrhesia*, it will be found to signify either fearlessness of speech or publicity of utterance, or else frankness as opposed to all concealment or intended obscurity of language.

Holy Scripture teaches us to expect that the Divine Spirit alone will deliver us from timidity in the hour when we are summoned to declare unwelcome but salutary truths. That which removed all fear from the hearts of the prophets was the assured presence of the in-

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1 Heb. iii. 6, iv. 16, x. 35; 1 John ii. 28, v. 14. 2 2 Cor. x. 10.

3 Acts xxvi. 2, 3, 26; Gal. iv. 16. 4 Thoughts on Preaching (2d ed.), p. 121.

vincible Spirit which was variously called "the hand of God," and "the finger of God."[1] Nor was it otherwise when the Lord Jesus appeared in his heavenly mystery before John who fell at his feet as dead; his glorified Master laid his hand upon him, saying, "Fear not." This act of gracious condescension—this stooping of the Divine to the human reassured the apostle's faith and restored his shuddering frame to something more than its former composure. Without this inspired courage, the greater your spiritual illumination, the smaller is your freedom in utterance;

> "For the echo in you breaks upon the words which you are speaking,
> And the chariot-wheels jar in the gate through which you drive them forth."

This boldness is increased by pastoral labours among the poor.[2]

XI. Distinct from *Parrhesia*, yet working in unison with it, is that power or *Dynamis* which is so often mentioned in the New Testament. Now what are the significations of this word which pertain to the present subject? To answer this question may not be as pleasant as to read supinely the dialogue of Fenelon or some other brilliant essay on sacred eloquence, and so glance at one-sided and dissolving views of this subject; but if we read only such books as stimulate rather than nourish, we may ultimately have to take up the lamentation of the prophet, "My leanness, my leanness, woe unto me! the treacherous dealers have dealt treacherously; yea, the treacherous dealers have dealt very treacherously." Among other things, then, we find that the word means an energy inspired in holy men by the Divine Spirit (Luke i. 17; iv. 14; xxiv. 49; Acts i. 8; vi. 8; 2 Tim. ii. 1). This was wanting in the pagan philosophers, in order to make their teachings widely and permanently useful to others, but in Daniel, for example, it brought his wisdom into full exercise (Dan. ii. 23, Septuagint version). Again it signifies the original and essential efficacy of inspired thought as contrasted with words (1 Cor. iv. 19, 20; 1 Thes. i. 5). Plutarch (de Defectu Orac.) employs the word in the sense of nature or essence. In one instance it imports that fortitude which the Spirit begets and sustains (Eph. iii. 13–16; vi. 10). Let it not, however, be confounded with *Exousia*, "authority," a word applied to the preaching of Christ, and to his dominion. None of his ministers may pretend to or assume any such authority in speaking as He, the one Divine Master, exercised. Even his apostles did not profess to exert it. Power they did indeed claim as coming from the Holy Ghost, but nothing beyond this; a pastoral authority they had, but it was something very different from

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[1] Dan. x. 10–19; Rev. i. 17. [2] 1 Tim. iii. 13.

this, and expressed by a different word; namely, *Epitages* (Titus ii. 15).

All things considered, this power must be regarded as a divine influence imparting and sustaining the strength and energy which were required for doing and suffering the will of God. In some instances the Divine Spirit inspired even physical strength and activity, as in Samson; and in Elijah also, who after the prophetic labours of a day without food or rest, ran before the chariot of Ahab, five miles from Mount Carmel to the gates of Jezreel.[1] That the Holy Ghost can and does give, restore and support physical energy, seems to be implied in the laudatory words of David and Habakkuk, and in one of the predictions of Isaiah.[2] Our Divine Master, after his fast of forty days in the desert, was inspired with such physical vitality and might that, according to the evangelist, he "returned in the power of the Spirit unto Galilee."[3] And on that morning after Paul had preached and talked all night, what was it but the same Spirit that impelled him to walk from Troas to Assos, when he would naturally have reposed in the ship while she was doubling the cape?

XII. This power is often attended with what has been termed self-diffidence as opposed to self-sufficiency. The Apostle Paul confesses the sense of this, generally accompanied with an assurance of gracious aid.[4] His experience in this regard is full of encouragement to the lowly, and of reproof to the proud. It is also similar to that of many other prophets. "I am now an old man," said Luther, "and have been a long time used to preaching, but I never ascend the pulpit without a tremour." John Welch, the Scotch worthy, would sometimes send for his elders before preaching, and tell them he was afraid to go into the pulpit because he found himself sadly deserted, and then ask one or more of them to pray for him. It was observed that these humiliations were commonly followed by extraordinary assistance. John Livingstone, his great cotemporary, was subject to similar humiliations.[5] John Newton used to say he never spoke well till he felt that he could not speak at all. A sermon thus begun with dejection has not uncommonly ended with joy. The same thing is observable of our secret prayers for the Spirit's assistance. Begun, perhaps, like some of the Psalms, with

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[1] Judges xiv. 6.; xv. 14; 1 Kings xviii. 46.

[2] Psa. xviii. 33; Hab. iii. 9; Isa. xl. 29–31. [3] Luke iv. 14.

[4] 1 Cor. ii. 3–5.; xv. 9, 10.; iv. 7–10.; xii. 9, 10.; xiii. 4.

[5] Life and Remains, by the Wodrow Society, pp. 138, 139, 194, 283, 285.

doubts, fears, confessions, lamentations, and deprecations, they have concluded with peace, jubilation, praise, and triumph.

Why should this be so? Some of the operations of the Holy Ghost are mysterious; but this part of the preacher's experience may be explained thus: The Spirit first reveals to us our own natural weakness and unworthiness, with a view to lead us to repose entire confidence in his all-sufficient aid. When he has thus brought us to put our whole trust in him, then and not till then has he prepared us to receive the plentitude of his power. The Holy Breath, by beating down the sacrificial flame, lengthens it, and thus causes it ultimately to rise all the more high. Going forth, perhaps, through midnight darkness to importune of a sleeping neighbour three loaves of bread for a friend, his joy on receiving them is all the greater for his having begged and shivered so long in the cold. By this we do not mean that self-diffidence is now exchanged for self confidence. No, it is as deeply felt as ever; only it now allies itself with the strongest confidence in the grace of the Spirit, in the true sayings of God, and the strength of his cause. A serene consciousness of mental or moral strength is no mark of the Spirit's gracious aid, but quite the reverse. In a company of ministers the following question was once discussed: "To what causes in ministers may much of their want of success be imputed?" The answers, as Andrew Fuller reports them, resolved themselves into a want of personal religion as the principal cause. One reason assigned for this want of success was "our not being emptied of self-sufficiency. In proportion as we lean upon our own gifts, or parts, or preparations, we slight the Holy Spirit; and no wonder that being grieved, he should leave us to do our work alone. Besides, when this is the case, it is, humanly speaking, unsafe for God to prosper us, especially those ministers who possess considerable abilities." Agreeable to this view is the fact that in all works of grace the Divine Spirit disappoints all expectations that are merely reasonable, human and earthly. He aims to convince men of the reality, peculiarity, and supreme excellence of his own work. This he often does either by giving to the ignorant and bashful an illumination and courage they naturally lack, or by giving to the bold and knowing, timidity, unreadiness of mind, and feebleness of speech, such as the possessor is ashamed of, but such as the Divine Spirit nevertheless uses to advance the glory of his grace.[1]

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[1] This accords with the song of Hannah and Mary, with the drift of the prophetic teachings, and with the providential dealings of God in nations, churches and families (1 Sam. ii. 1–10; Luke i. 46–55).

In other cases the preacher is appalled by that which is revealed by the success of the Gospel, or rather by the spectacle of the blinding and hardening effect of the Gospel in some, as it is seen in the light of the neighbouring triumphs of grace over the blindness and obduracy of others; so that like the apostles his rejoicing because of the victories of the Gospel is succeeded by trembling in view of his awful responsibility and utter unworthiness. "Now thanks be unto God, which always causeth us to triumph in Christ, and maketh manifest the savour of his knowledge in every place."[1] During a triumph, or on the approach of a triumphal procession, sweet spices and fragrant flowers were thrown about the streets, and aromatic incense was burnt on the altars of the gods; thus diffusing their blended perfumes far and wide through the homes of the city. The apostle felt that he was like such torn and scattered flowers, trodden as he was under foot of persecutors. Or as incense was consumed by fire, so was he by his arduous labours, and yet all was as acceptable to God as the smoke of a sacrifice that was typical of Christ as the Lamb of God, and as pervasive as the fragrance of that incense which was typical of his grace. But alas! the Gospel has a double working. "For we are unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish; to the one we are the savour of death unto death; and to the other, the savour of life unto life." "Vultures," says Theodoret, "fly from sweet odours of myrrh; yet myrrh is myrrh though the vultures avoid it." "And who," asks Paul, "is sufficient for these things?" His answer is, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves, to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.[2] One-half of the kingdom of Christ, like the terraqueous globe, perpetually rolls forward in darkness, and the self-diffidence of his ministers would soon degenerate into despair, did it not at a certain stage of despondency feel a firmer and warmer grasp of the hand of God. It is through self-diffidence, patience, and other passive graces that the Spirit, like the indwelling deity of Socrates, tells us what we should *not* do and say.[3]

XIII. Inspiration sometimes or in some persons, operates on the will or heart to such a degree as to cause a plentitude of the Spirit. The phrase "filled with the Spirit," occurs in several places in the New Testament. The Greek *Pleres*, and its derivatives, like the Latin *Plenus* is, by euphemy, sometimes employed in the sense of exhilarated and even of drunken. One passage (Eph. v. 18) suggests

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[1] 2 Cor. ii. 14–16. [2] 2 Cor. ii. 16.; iii. 5.

[3] Acts xvi. 7; Zech. ii. 13; Habak. ii. 20; Amos viii. 11; Ezek. xx. 3.

the idea that between inebriety by wine and a plentitude of the Holy Ghost there is some resemblance in the immediate and apparent effects, but a great difference in the causes and consequences of the two; the former venting itself in wild and profane shouts; the latter "speaking in psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs, making melody in the heart unto the Lord."

The Primitive Christians are described as enjoying this plenitude of the Spirit, either habitually or occasionally. Who, let us ask, enjoyed it always or habitually? The seven deacons (Acts vi. 3); Paul (Acts ix. 17); Barnabas, (Id., xi. 24). Cases like these show that the mind is not disordered by this constant fulness. And who occasionally? Elizabeth and Zacharias (Luke i. 41–67); Christ (Luke iv. 1); the Pentecostal assembly (Acts ii. 4); Peter (Id., iv. 8); the apostles (Id., iv. 31); the Church (Id., xiii. 52). Paul, though mentioned above as habitually full of the Holy Ghost is, in Acts xiii. 9, described as if occasionally so favoured. This and other similar apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies may be reconciled by supposing that the *occasional* plenitude imports nothing more than this, that the effects of the *habitual* plenitude were only manifest as occasions demanded, in exhibitions of miraculous power, or displays of convicting or converting grace that followed the declarations of Gospel truth.

This plentitude sometimes designates the fruits and manifestations of the Divine Spirit. Stephen is said to have been full of faith and power (Acts vi. 8). In the church at Antioch this plenitude found utterance in joy (Acts xiii. 52). Once the phrase, "the fulness of God," is used to convey the idea of the possession of all the gifts and graces of the Spirit (Eph. iii. 16–19).

Nearly related to this subject is the question: What are we to understand by the phrase, "a double portion of thy Spirit," in Elisha's request to Elijah? The words "double portion," when traced to the Hebrew originals, mean a ration of two, derived from the custom of setting before the person whom it is intended to honour, a twofold or even manifold portion; also from a provision of the Levitical law, according to which the first-born received a double portion in the inheritance of his father.[1] Elisha did not therefore desire a double measure of the spirit of his prophetic father. He that is departing cannot bequeath to his heir more than he himself has; and the heir, in this case, could not reverently ask a greater spiritual endowment than Elijah, his father, possessed. Elisha asks for himself as the first-born spiritual son, a favourite's

[1] 2 Kings ii. 8–10; Deut. xxi. 17; Gen. xliii. 34; Keil and Bertheau, *in loc.*

portion of Elijah's spirit, such as would be needful and fitting to the successor of so great a prophet.

But let us not wander too far from the subject of the plenitude of the Spirit, as described in the New Testament. The examples of the effects of this plenitude in causing a kind of spiritual inebriety are many and striking. The instance of the Pentecostal assembly is too familiar to need a repetition here. Many of the martyrs and Flavel, Edwards, Payson, Madam Guyon, and numbers more, appear to have enjoyed either occasionally or habitually this exhilaration or inebriety. It has often served to lift believers above the power of pain, feebleness, despondency, fear and sorrow,[1] to transport the soul with unutterable joy, and to inspire the tongue with an overpowering eloquence. It is reported of a certain English martyr that when he was bound to the stake, and the fagots were collecting around him, a skylark mounted on high and sung over his head; at which he clasped his hands together and exclaimed, "Thank God there is still one free creature which can pour forth its gratitude to the Giver of all good, according to the dictates of its own heart." A dangerous man that! And one whom the votaries of Antichrist could ill-afford to allow the liberty of speaking to the common people in such a manner.

Happy in their work are those preachers who seek and trust the fulness of the Holy Ghost. However infirm their health, or persecuted, or otherwise afflicted, they have a sure remedy for all evils, and an all-sufficient stimulant and cordial to invigorate and animate them in their arduous labors. Mr. Arthur, in his "Tongue of Fire," writing about the analogy between the condition of being drunk with wine and that of being filled with the Spirit, concludes his remarks with these words of warning: "Nor do we need to look far for the grounds of that analogy. To men of the world wine is a resort when they want something above their natural strength of mind and body, and in it they seek three things, *strength*, *cheering*, and *mental elevation*. Under its influence they will do more work than they could otherwise. They will cast off their cares, and their mental powers will reach a state which they themselves call 'inspiration.' That worldly orators, even of the highest reputation, often seek in wine such animation of their powers as is necessary to great success is only too well known. The physical tendency to seek elevation in such a source cannot be even slightly yielded to without fatally affecting 'the tongue of fire.'" The last sentence of Dr. Arthur conveys a momentous truth—a truth which he might

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1 2 Cor. vii. 4; Col. i. 11.

have established by the declaration of the prophet Isaiah who confesses that the prophets not only of Israel but of Judah even, had erred in vision and wavered in judgment through the effect of wine and strong drink.[1]

How small is the faith of such preachers in the sufficiency and love of the Infinite Spirit. Very much better is it to say in times of temptation: "I am like a green olive-tree in the house of God; I trust in the mercy of God for ever and ever." We have met with a passage in the works of Augustine which from the deep experience of this father, and his thorough knowledge of Biblical pneumatology is worthy of special examination. "Let us," says he, "taste how gracious the Lord is who has given us as a pledge the Spirit, so that in him we have a foretaste of his sweetness, and long for the fountain of life itself, where with a sober inebriation (sobria ebrietate) we may be overflowed and watered like a tree which is planted by the water courses. . . . For the Divine Spirit says, 'But the sons of men shall hope under the cover of thy wings; they shall be made drunken with the fatness of thine house, and of the river of thy pleasure shalt thou cause them to drink. For with thee is the fountain of life' (Psa. xxxvi. 8). Such drunkenness does not overthrow the mind but lifts it powerfully upward, and gives it an oblivion of all earthly things." (De Agone Christiano, §10, Opera, Benedict. ed., tome vi., 245–262.)

Augustine here quotes from the 36th Psa. of the Septuagint, which agrees, in the main, with the Vulgate, Psa. xxxv. 9. By a bold but beautiful figure the Psalmist represents the saint as drunk with holy oil. The word translated "fatness," is in the Hebrew employed for the oil of the olive (Judges ix. 9), an oil which, when consecrated to the Lord, became the symbol of the power of the Holy Ghost. See also Jer. xxxi. 10–14.

But on the whole, we must here caution the preacher against receiving the impression that the foregoing concomitants of inspiration are either its constant attendants or are confined to the ministers of the Gospel. Our especial aim has been, by exhibiting the method according to which the Spirit operates on the heart and the graces it there creates and nourishes, to illustrate our idea of the secret process and manifest results of homiletical inspiration. In examining a subject so mysterious, we have gained much when we have acquired a knowledge of those things which are collaterally related to it; just as astronomers by discovering an abberration of a planet, or a slight reflection of light upon it, find out that part of

[1] Isa. xxviii. 7.

celestial fields in which to watch for the approach of a new star. And this is the more important since partial inspiration is more nearly allied than plenary to the ordinary exercises of grace or "walking in the Spirit." Here also it is pre-eminently true, that "the secret of the Lord is with them that fear him." It has, indeed, been often and well said, that these graces are not the Spirit, and that it is only the Holy Ghost, and not our faith, our love, and other such Christian virtues, that can of themselves enable us to preach aright. And yet, be it remembered, that these graces of the Christian heart are so many strings of that Æolian lyre whose melodious vibrations teach us the direction, the pressure, and the continuance of the Holy Spirit's motions.

CHAPTER II.

THE RELATIONS OF SEMI-INSPIRATION AND THE INTELLECT.

INSPIRATION seems to affect the intellect through the heart or will. But it should ever be kept in mind that all the actual phenomena of mind are complex. "In our philosophical system," says Sir William Hamilton, "these phenomena may stand separated from each other in books and chapters;—in nature they are ever interwoven. These elements are found, indeed, in quite various proportions in different states—sometimes one preponderates, sometimes another; but there is no state in which they are not all coexistent."[1] And, accordingly, we find that all exercises of faith and conscience, though originating in the heart, are more or less intellectual acts also. The same holds good of all other operations of the will. Were it our purpose to write a philosophical disqisition on the relations of the Divine Spirit and the intellect, it would be necessary, as here, to reverse the general order which psychologists adopt by treating of the heart or "active powers" in the first place, and so passing to the intellect, discuss the intuitive or regulative faculty in the next place, and consciousness in the last place. But as our aim is more humble, special and practical, we choose first to consider the mental phenomenon termed Attention.

I. This mental state is entitled to our first consideration here, by reason of its relation to the problem of the influence of the will on the intellect. "Attention," says Prof. Spalding,[2] "is the concentration of consciousness on certain objects. It is plain that attention is often the result of volition; the knotty question is, whether it is always so?[3] It may be that those are right, who hold that an

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1 From our thus quoting Sir William Hamilton, let not not the reader infer that we accept his division of the phenomena of mind. We prefer for all theological uses, the scholastic division into powers of the understanding and powers of the will; or, as it is less clearly expressed, into intellectual and active powers. Herein we follow Augustine, Calvin, Owen, and Edwards.

2 Art. RHETORIC, Encyclop. Britan., vol. xix., p. 118.

3 Here Hamilton and his disciples have lost themselves in a Scottish mist, by confounding the Arminian *volition* with the Augustinian *will*. Spalding's conclusion is just and important. Cf. Acts xvi. 14; Jer. vi. 10, 17; Isa. vi. 10; Deut. xxix. 4.

instinctive concentration of thought, an attention not determined by will, is a necessary condition of all consciousness; but it is not easy to see one's way through the difficulties which stand between us and that conclusion. At present it is enough to make this assertion:—that attention, strictly so called, a concentration of thought, determined by will, is an indispensable condition of the rise of consciousness above that confused state, of which feeling is the norm. A fact of attention, in this sense of the word, is a mental process, consequent on volition and its antecedents. It must either be constituted exclusively by cognitive facts, or have cognition as its first and determining step; and lastly, it must involve what is usually called abstraction, or the throwing certain objects out of consciousness, and retaining others. Attention, then, and attention which is voluntary and abstractive, is an antecedent and peremptory condition of all cognition that is "clear" (in Leibnitz's sense of the word);[1] "and such cognition must precede all further progress of thought that is available for any practical purpose whatever. . . . For our use here, this doctrine of attention supplies invaluable corollaries. If the doctrine is accepted (and it does appear to be almost a truisum), the process by which volition may be excited, is perceived to have a field infinitely wider than that which at first it might seem to cover. The theory bears directly, not on persuasion only, but on the attempt to generate pure belief; and its applications, not confined to eloquence, range far and sink deep in the realm of poetry."

It is then of the first importance to secure such an ascendency of the Divine Spirit over the will that it may arrest and fix our attention on the most edifying and timely themes, and hold and concentrate our minds upon the principal and subordinate facts of these themes, until they enlighten and move us and our hearers, according to the will of God.

II. The next effect of the inspiration of the Spirit is visible on perception, and the result of such inspiration is termed spiritual discernment.[2] This power is imparted to the intellect through the heart. The method of the Spirit in inspiring this faculty is by creating in the heart or will, a bias or inclination towards divine truth, holiness, and goodness. "Spiritual understanding," says Ed-

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[1] "Clear cognition is such a notion of anything that I may know it when it is represented." (Opera, tome ii., p. 15, Genevæ, 1765.)

[2] Isa. liii. 2; Rom. i. 17–32; 1 Cor. ii. 12–14; 2 Cor. iii. 18; iv. 3–6; Eph. iv. 17, 18; Acts xxvi. 17, 18; Phil. i. 9, 10; 1 John ii. 20–27; Deut. xxix. 4; Jer. xxiv. 7.

wards, "consists primarily in a sense of heart of the supreme beauty and sweetness of moral perfection, and includes, secondarily, all that discerning and knowledge of religious things that depends upon and flows from such a sense."[1] Here and elsewhere, Edwards teaches that a holy relish of the heart goes before the spiritual perceptions of the intellect, and this original relish conveys to us more knowledge than a mere intellectual perception does: "as he that has perceived the sweet taste of honey knows much more about it than he who has only looked upon it and felt it." To this we may add that as the revelations of God in the Scriptures contain that knowledge which is necessary to our santification, Faith also, by receiving this knowledge (which cannot be obtained from any other source, and cannot be acquired through any other faculty), co-works with this holy taste to put us in heartfelt and happy possession of the thoughts and feelings of the Infinite Mind, and of all that it is good for us to know concerning the eternal Past and the eternal Future.

It ought also to be observed that the Scriptures make this spiritual discernment to depend on the cultivation of the Christian graces. The apostle Peter (2 Epis. i. 8, 9) assures us that if we diligently exercise them, we shall be productive and fruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ, while he who lacks these graces shows that he is, in great measure, unable to exercise his intellectual powers on matters of supreme concern. He "is blind and cannot see afar off, and hath forgotten that he was purged from his old sins." Thus he evinces an intellectual incapacity as to the presentative faculty, or perception; as to the conservative faculty, or memory; as to the representative faculty, or imagination, and the elaborative faculty, including the powers of abstraction, judgment, and reasoning. For, as Bengel remarks, such a man is dim-sighted as to *present* privileges (verse 12); he forgets that he was cleansed from his sins *which are past*, and he cannot see those privileges which are far off in the *future* (verse 11).

III. The third result of inspiration as to the intellect may be termed, according to Scripture, Wisdom—a term which in its more general signification means the right moral direction and use of all the intellectual faculties. It is coupled with spiritual discernment (*synesis*, Col. i. 9); with theoretical knowledge (*gnosis*, Col. ii. 3; 1 Cor. xii. 8) and with prudence (*phronesis*, Eph. i. 8), or that good sense which, as Aristotle says, is the first requisite of the orator, in

[1] Treatise on Religious Affections, Pt. iii., sec. 4; cf. Discourse on the True Way of Attaining Divine Knowledge, by John Smith of Cambridge, Works, pp. 1-22.

order to gain the confidence of his hearers which, he confesses, is the most important point.[1] It is also associated with spiritual judgment (*anacrino*, 1 Cor. ii. 13–15). Wisdom, in a profounder sense, denotes taste and, in the Scriptures, that relish for spiritual things which the Divine Spirit imparts to all the powers of the intellect; so that in most cases the signification of the word covers that of all those metaphysical terms with which it is conjoined.

For as much as it is a gift of the Holy Ghost, and was anciently represented by the symbol of a holy ointment, it is sometimes called an unction. Far back in antiquity, wisdom was considered the first requisite of kings and priests. Solomon, the prophet Jeremiah, and the Messiah received from the Divine Spirit that spiritual wisdom of which anointing was the sign.[2] So closely were the Divine Spirit and wisdom identified in the minds of some of the early Greek fathers that the Holy Ghost was by them called Wisdom. Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, gives the Trinity the following titles "The Father, His Word, and His Wisdom."

This Wisdom was a divine magnet which indicated to the primitive converts the direction wherein truth was to be found. As the Holy Spirit inspired in them a love of divine teachings and, at the same time, therefore, an aversion to the mere inventions of men in matters of religion, they were not easily deceived by false teachers. This anointing remained in them as a constant guide to divine truth amidst the manifold and changeful heresies that surrounded them.[3] For as he who was once anointed king or priest was always king or priest, so in this sense, as well as in some others, believers may be said to be kings and priests unto God.[4]

This wisdom was, it seems, exercised by the sanctified minds of the apostles in writing and speaking under plenary inspiration.[5] This state or phenomenon of the intellect, as above defined, was perfected by the inbreathings of the Holy Ghost. This was, however, something different from "the word of wisdom," or wise speech, which was one of the "gifts of the Spirit" bestowed on some of the members of the primitive churches. Some modern German writers have dogmatised in making nice distinctions between this gift and the *charism* of "the word of knowledge." These Teutonic Gnostics teach us many things which the Author of divine revela-

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1 Aristot. Rhet., Lib. ii., cap. i., sec. 5, and Lib. i., cap. ii., sec. 4. Aristotle elsewhere distinguishes this from *sophia* which he refers to things divine and unchangeable. (*Greater Ethics*, Lib. i., cap. xxxv.)

2 1 Kings iii. 5–15; Jer. xviii. 18; Isa. xi. 23.

3 1 John ii. 20–27. 4 Rev. i. 6; v. 10. 5 2 Peter iii. 15.

tion has withheld from us. Thus much we may reasonably infer from Scripture, that neither of these gifts assured the possession of the gift of prophesying, while the latter always contained and displayed the former.[1] The apostles are called *sophoi*, wise men; compare Matt. xxiii. 34; Luke xi. 49. They were also teachers of this higher wisdom.[2]

Its attributes are mentioned by the apostle James.[3] It is "first pure." It is holy, and the opposite of the wisdom which descends not from above, which is "earthly, sensual, and devilish." It is elsewhere (Prov. xxx. 3) called "the knowledge of the holy." The grand defect of all human philosophy, ancient and modern, is the absence of this holiness. Unsanctified itself, it does not really aim to promote sanctification. Even most of our systems of moral philosophy ignore the Gospel doctrine of regeneration. "Then peaceable." How different from the wisdom of the pagan sophists, which was very disputatious. The apostles in meekness instructed opposers; the sophists in pride contradicted them.[4] "Gentle." It is not harsh but moderate and lenient in all cases where the question is respecting the duties which others owe to us.[5] "And easy to be entreated." It is tractable, patient, and forgiving. It yields to sound argument and Scriptural persuasion. "Full of mercy and good fruits." Unlike the pagan philosophy, which was essentially malevolent, it is replete with compassion towards the miserable, and abounds in good works. It is not a passive and feeble virtue, but active and yoked with energy, as it was in Solomon[6] and Daniel.[7] "Without partiality" (or, as it is rendered in the margin, "without wrangling"); "without hypocrisy." This last consists either in concealing what we are, or in assuming to be what we are not, or both. And the righteous fruit of wisdom "is sown in peace of them that make peace." Here is a regression which, going back to the idea of peace first expressed, amplifies and applies it. The ultimate consequences of the heavenly wisdom may not soon appear; but God's times and seasons will cause the seeds of truth that are peaceably sown to spring up and bear good and abundant fruit: for the

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1 1 Cor. xii. and xiv. 2 1 Cor. i. 24; ii. 4–7, 13.

3 Jas. iii. 17, 18. See Abp. Leighton's Sermon on the Nature and Properties of Heavenly Wisdom. Cicero, De Off. L. i., C. 43, calls *Sapientia* the leader of all the virtues.

4 2 Tim. ii. 24–26.

5 *Epieikeia*, Leniency or Equity, is a virtue which the ethnic rhetorician Hermogenes (Peri. Ideon., chap. ii.) recommends to young orators.

6 Eccles. x. 10. 7 Dan. ii. 20–23.

seed is not sown on a battle-field where the marchings and countermarchings of armies crush and destroy much of it, but it is scattered over grounds well furrowed by the gentle and weaponless hand of the farmer in a time of general tranquillity. "Light is sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart." It not only produces its harvest in peace, but it likewise produces peace as one of the fruits of its harvest; for the promise is: "Wisdom and knowledge shall be the stability of thy times." Our metaphysicians would here and elsewhere in Scriptures have given knowledge the precedence, but He who weighs our thoughts is not ignorant of the powers by which wisdom establishes peace as prerequisite to knowledge. Hence wisdom gives right aims and ends to all the preacher's exertions (Eccles. x. 10), more especially in teaching and admonishing (Col. i. 28; iii. 16).

IV. This wisdom regulates the imagination, and this it does by promoting its purity, its humility, and its general usefulness.[1] Secular poetry springs from and excites emotions that are beautiful or sublime, ludicrous or pathetic. "It must," says Mr. Spalding,[2] "be maintained firmly as the central doctrine of all the fine arts, that while their mode of operation is the excitement of the imagination, their end, the result, for the sake of which the operation is performed, is the excitement of emotion, or state of mind which is feeling. If it is admitted that their end is pleasure, this is accepting the doctrine, only specificating it (and correctly) by saying that the emotion is pleasing. If the mental process which it excites shall travel onward even by one step further, in that normal development of consciousness which issues in action, the art has, in its results, trespassed on ground which it cannot continue to occupy without becoming an alien to its native domain. But if it has taken the one step only, its position is easily recoverable; the wish, the desire, the longing, may generate only a new emotion, purely contemplative; and, such flowings and ebbings being successively prompted through successive images, whether suggested by the poem or by the imagination of the reader, wish and emotion may float through the soul on a series of delightful alternations, each impelled and guided by some new image in the train of airy fantacies. None of the emotions can be more than momentary; no emotion can be more. But it is for the sake of the emotion that the images and wishes are cherished; and so long as the poetical mood endures, it is back into that emotion that wish and image will inces-

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[1] Rom. i. 21–29; Judge viii.; 2 Cor. x. 5.

[2] Art. *Rhet.* in Encyclop. Britan., vol. xix., p. 137.

santly fall. That which would most effectually annihilate the poetical mood, would be the development of the wish into a consequent volition. The calm lake which has been darkened by a passing cloud, becomes again the mirror of its woody bank as soon as the sunshine again breaks out; but when the mountain blast has swept over it, its surface, lashed into agitation, can no longer reflect the brilliant shadow. This, then, is what must not happen as the effect of poetry, the transformation of desire into will. If such a transformation should take place incidentally, the mind which is the subject of it has been thrown down into a mood which is anti-poetical, and from which it cannot easily be elevated by the purest poetry which may be presented to it."

Now while it is not the effect of true inspiration to destroy poetic contemplation, its direct tendency is to utilise poetry and every other product of a holy imagination,—to chain together image and desire and volition in such a way that the first inevitably prompts to action. "Religion," says Abraham Tucker, "is the art of disciplining the imagination;" and a greater than he has said that spiritual weapons cast down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ. The imagination is thus made at once the captive and the servant of the Great Teacher. And, accordingly, in each of the prophets, we observe the complete subjection of the poetic genius to the practical aims of the man of God. "Isaiah, we are told, was a man who should rank among the men of genius of all ages; and, as to his prescience, it was that only which is a characteristic of the poetic inspiration: he was a *prophet* just so far as he was a poet. This hypothesis does not consist with the facts in view. As often as he touches themes that are the most awakening to poetic feeling, Isaiah—and the same is true of his brethren—is brief, and seems in haste to quit the ground on which he has set foot for a moment."[1] The true explanation of this prophet's moderate use of poetical representation is found:

First, in the laws of oratorical persuasion which forbid every thing beyond short and occasional soarings into the regions of poetic contemplation. The progress of true semi-poetic eloquence has been compared by Macaulay to that of the ostrich, in which the wings assist, but do not supersede the activity of the feet. Or as Spalding has happily illustrated it by another figure: "It is when the poetic voice is but imperfectly modulated that oratory may

[1] Isaac Taylor's Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, chap. xii.

most freely emulate its tones. Eloquence of all kinds, indeed, speedily grows languid in the rarefied atmosphere which fans the serenely sensitive existence of the highest poetic art; if its breathing is to be free and its action energetic, it must not climb above those sub-Alpine heights, on which the dense air of real life has been relieved but in a slight degree from the superincumbent pressure." The young preacher who is puzzled to decide how far he may indulge his imagination, can resolve his doubts and hit the path between too much and too little by a study of the inspired oratory of Holy Scripture. The Divine Spirit has here exemplified perfectly and abundantly, the method by which the imagination is made in the highest degree helpful to oratorical persuasion.

This explanation is further found in the fact that though the prophetic oratory does not often mount into the region of pure poetry, it keeps the imagination always at work, and that healthfully, because never beyond its strength. Anticipating the caution contained in the German proverb, "Let no one attempt to fly higher than his plumage will carry him," it never fatigues itself, and, what is better, never forsakes that practical benevolence towards which its vitality and energy are ever stooping. The Divine Spirit, therefore, strengthens and develops the imagination by keeping it in moderate but continual exercise. And this accounts for the fact that those imaginations are the largest and most vigorous which are ever intent upon doing all faithful service to God and to humanity.

We cannot dismiss this part of the subject without remarking that there is no amount of culture that can supersede the necessity of a true inspiration. Without this the best disciplined intellect is left a very long distance behind any inspired mind, however ignorant and uncultivated. "When a man speaks," says some one, "as in the sight of God, with an open heaven, with Christ and his angels before him, he catches the true prophetic fire; he preaches a present salvation from a present Saviour; the Spirit of glory and grace descends, and the flame communicates to his audience, and accompanies them to their houses. This is the celestial science of the sanctuary, not to be taught in schools nor learned in books." According to Professor Leechman something more than merely *intellectual* conceptions are demanded. "This divine eloquence cannot be acquired by human learning and skill in the choice and arrangement of words, but by a powerful *feeling* of what is great and good, produced in us by the Holy Spirit of God."

CHAPTER III.

PARTIAL INSPIRATION AS AFFECTING INVENTION, STYLE, AND DELIVERY.

One important difference between plenary and partial inspiration is this: the former communicated to men of old the divine ideas and thoughts as we find them in Scripture; the latter enables us rightly to understand, illustrate, reason upon, and apply the sacred oracles. And yet the two kinds have this in common: that both assist and superintend study—the former sometimes, the latter almost always. Many things in the Psalms, the Proverbs, and other parts in Holy Scripture evidently owe their present form to divinely superintended study and meditation. Daniel[1] understood by books the number of years whereof the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah, the prophet, that he would accomplish seventy years in the desolations of Jerusalem; so also respecting Christ and the work of Christian salvation, we are told[2] that the prophets "inquired and searched diligently." But plenary inspection, be it remembered, never superintended study and research without securing the writer or speaker against error and sin, whilst on the other hand, the matter and form of the divine communication oftentimes were such as obviated the necessity, and even possibility, of mental labor. Here again, by *sometimes* superseding study or supplying its defects, partial inspiration shows its resemblance to plenary.[3]

Legitimably, therefore, may study accompany every kind of divine communication and effusion. The Jews, though they were brought into direct intercourse with God the Son, were, nevertheless, exhorted by him to search the Scriptures in order to find testimony to confirm his own teachings.[4] The strongest motives for the acquisition of religious knowledge are urged by Solomon, who was endowed by the Holy Spirit with supernatural wisdom. In this respect he followed the divine advice he gave, so that, though he enjoyed at times plenary inspiration, yet he was an example of

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1 Dan. ix. 2. 2 1 Pet. i. 10, 11.

3 Thus do inspiration and study conspire to the *continual* progress of the Gospel. True preaching goes forward like the galley, now depending on sails, then on oars, and sometimes propelled by both at once.

4 John v. 39.

studiousness.[1] Maimonides[2] thinks the prophet ought to endeavour after intellectual perfection by study. "It cannot be," says he, "that a man should go to bed no prophet and rise the next day a prophet, like a man who finds something without searching. Such simple children of this world are no more able to prophesy, in my judgment, than an ass or a frog." Paul exhorts Timothy to study, to meditate, and not to neglect the divine gift.[3] Not to study is to wrap our talent in a napkin and bury it in the the earth and leave it there to rust; it is to fill the lamps of the temple with crude, unbeaten oil; it is to offer a lame sacrifice upon God's altar. If the Holy Ghost did not intend we should study the Scriptures, he would not have given them to us. All holy Scripture is profitable to the man of God, in order that he may be complete, fully equipped for all good works.[4] If we love the indwelling Spirit, we shall likewise love the oracles he inspired and the pages he continues to illuminate. Indeed, it were presumptuous to expect that the mind of the Divine Spirit will deign to assist us to understand and apply subjects which we have not considered worthy of the protracted attention of our own minds.

"But if we insist so much on the necessity of study, are we not depending too much on our own works, and like the Chaldeans, sacrificing to our net, and burning incense to our drag?" The view of Paul respecting the relations of the Spirit and of study is not very obscure. We may infer from his teachings that the Spirit alone makes study fruitful.[5] And yet he says that we are workers together with God.[6] If we work not, then he must be said to work *for* us rather than *with* us. Elsewhere he declares to the Philippians[7] that God works in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure. "There are," says Calvin, "two principal points in acting, the will and the power of carrying into effect, both of which he affirms are entirely from God." . . . . "The will is the foundation, the doing is the completed edifice." . . . . God *worketh in us to do.* The pious affections with which he inspires us, he carries forward to their proper ends, lest they fail of their effect; he thus promises by the prophet Ezekiel, "I will cause them to walk

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[1] Eccl. xii. 8–12; Prov. i. 20–33; ii. 1-9; iii. 13–26; iv. 5–13; viii. 1–36; ix. 1–12.

[2] More Nevochim, Pt. ii, chap. xxxii. [3] 1 Tim. iv. 14, 15.

[4] Tim. iii. 16–17. [5] 1 Cor. iii. 6–8. [6] 2 Cor. vi. 1.

[7] Phil. ii. 12, 13. Bengel, therefore, was wrong when he adopted the maxim that "grace begins where natural means can go no further." See his Life by Burk, Eng. ed., p. 77.

in my statutes;" from which we learn that perseverance also is his free gift." But then it should not escape us that the Divine Spirit operates on our living will and body, and that in perfect obedience to the laws of the human constitution. Hence the exhortation, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." That is to say, with feelings proper to the servants of God, with due reverence for his commands and an anxious sense of accountability to him.[1] There is an outer obedience, of which Immanuel in his condescension and humiliation is the perfect pattern,[2] and an inner obedience which consists in the prompt and efficient action of the human will in compliance with the inspired will of the Holy Ghost. These principles are applicable not only to Christian trusting and working in general, but to the believing and studying of the preacher in particular. The apostle Paul is a good example for the preacher in this respect; for he says to the Colossians, that as the Divine Spirit worked powerfully within him, so he strove to the utmost, as one who contends for a crown in the games.[3] And hence the safe maxim to follow is that we should study as assiduously as if we hoped for no assistance from the Holy Ghost, and at the same time trust in the Holy Ghost as confidently as if we depended on him alone for matter, method, style and delivery. But in any emergency to expect that the Spirit of Life will remove the effects of voluntary ignorance and habitual thoughtlessness were almost as absurd as to expect that a rising wind will blow away the darkness of midnight; whereas, it can at best only disperse the clouds and show nocturnal lights.

But how does the Holy Spirit aid invention? To answer this very important question adequately, would demand a review of almost all we have said as to the Spirit's mode of operating on the heart and intellect. A recurrence to the first two chapters of this System will discover much matter that either expresses, implies, or suggests explanations of the process. Among the more obvious illustrations, we find spiritual discernment, and heavenly descended wisdom. As in thinking out a subject, one of the chief difficulties to overcome, is in striking the truth and disrupting and cleansing it from clinging and interfusing errors, so the gifts we have just mentioned, to which unction, in the Scriptural sense of the term, may be added, are the principal agents in selecting proper thought. The Divine Spirit, in producing and acting through these gifts, searches and purifies the materials of invention, like fire: "now if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones,

[1] Compare 2 Cor. vii. 15; Eph. vi. 5. [2] Phil. ii. 5–8. [3] Col. i. 29.

wood, hay, stubble; every man's work shall be manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire; and the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is."[1] Then, on the other hand, the message itself which the Spirit inspires is sometimes termed a fire,[2] and as such reveals the secret counsels of the heart.[3] No one that has any acquaintance with the childish allegories, false doctrines, and lying legends which abounded in mediæval sermons can deny that from some cause large quantities of wood, hay, and stubble have, since the Reformation, been precluded from sermons.

While the Divine Spirit requires and assists study whenever study is impossible, there are, however, certain emergencies when this is out of the question. In such unexpected exigences the faithful preacher may believingly implore the Holy Ghost to supply every want. At such times some men of God have encouraged themselves with the assurance that they could expect the fulfillment of the promise Jehovah made to Moses, that when he stood before Pharaoh and the people, he would be with his mouth and teach him what he ought to say.[4] But it should be remembered that the preacher cannot appropriate this promise to himself, because it was limited by the condition that Aaron was to be his spokesman to the people, was to be to him instead of a mouth, while Moses was to be to him instead of God. Other preachers repose on the promise our Lord made to his disciples when brought before kings and governors.[5] But they do not observe that the disciples were in such cases expressly forbidden either to take thought beforehand or to "premeditate," clearly implying that they were not to do so, even when they *had time* to make some preparation before they were brought before the tribunals of their persecutors. All the support we are warranted to derive from such passages is the persuasion that the Holy Ghost *can* give the ability to speak powerfully without any preparation.

How far on such occasions does this gracious assistance extend?

We may hope that in answer to our prayers, the Divine Spirit will provide us with the *matter* of preaching. We are justified in expecting this in prayer which, in this form of ejaculation and apostrophe and thanksgiving, is often made a part of our sermons. In prayer "the Spirit helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us according to the will of God."[6] If the Spirit takes the

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[1] 1 Cor. iii. 10–15; cf. ii. 10–16. We here follow Augustine and Calvin.

[2] Jer. xxiii. 29; Luke xii. 49. [3] 1 Cor. iv. 5; xiv. 25. [4] Exod. iv. 12–16.

[5] Matt. x. 18–20; Mark xiii. 11; Luke xii. 11; xxi. 14, 15. [6] Rom. viii. 26.

things of Christ and shows them to us, leads us into the whole truth of the Gospel, and brings it to our remembrance, then he may be reasonably said to furnish us with the matter of preaching. "Now," says Dr. Watts, "since the evil spirit is said to 'pluck the good seed of the word of God out of the heart,' why may we not suppose the good Spirit to put good thoughts into the heart."[1] "Since many things," says Augustine,[2] "may be said upon every aspect of faith and love, and said in various ways by those who know them, who but He that searches all hearts understands clearly what it is good for us to utter or hear on any occasion? And who can enable us to speak what and as we ought, but He in whose hands are both we and our words."[3] And the same father adds, "When we have happened to address the people from this subject (that of the "cup of cold water," Matt. x. 42), and God was present to direct us to fitting matter; did not a kind of flame arise from that cup of cold water, which set even cold hearts on fire, leading them to works of mercy, and inspiring them with hopes of future reward?"

If the Divine Spirit supplies us with the materials of preaching on occasions when we have no time for preparation we may fairly conclude that at such times he also decides the *method* of preaching. It is important to make a distinction here. Order differs from method; order is the disposition of two or more things in respect of precedence; method is an arrangement according to any order that is supposed suitably or conveniently to effect a specific end. If the Holy Ghost inspires more than one idea or thought, he must needs inspire them in succession as the human mind requires. It may, according to our judgment, be a logical, illogical, rhetorical, arbitrary succession, but it is necessarily a succession or order of some kind. And as the Divine Spirit never moves our hearts and intellects without such an object as seems good to him, so he will fix the order of our thoughts in so far as any order can further that object. When, for example, he inspires such emotions or affections, as desire, love, hatred, hope or fear, he must move them in connection with other acts of the mind which go before or come after them. All these acts or states may, as phenomena, seem complex, but they will ordinarily take place according to the laws of psychology; and hence in some real, though to us perhaps, cryptic order. And this order will ever be determined by the Spirit's method or procedure towards the end or ends he has purposed to effect.

The Holy Ghost likewise inspires utterance or expression which

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1 Guide to Prayer, chap. iv. 2 De Doct. Christ., Lib. iv., cap. xv.

3 Wisdom, vii. 16.; cf. Bickersteth on Prayer, chap. iv.

may scripturally be said to include both style and delivery. The word of God does not often, indeed, distinguish between style and delivery, and while in theory it may be useful to regard them as separate objects of thought and study, we ought never to neglect to keep in mind their mental relations and the dependence of both on moral and intellectual gifts and acquirements.[1]

If, as Holy Scripture abundantly teaches, the Divine Spirit assists expression, then he must influence style, and if he influences style, then they err who maintain that the Holy Ghost makes communications to us in the peculiar style of this or that sacred speaker or orator; so that the style will vary according to the individual characteristic of the person inspired. Those critics who presume to describe the peculiar qualities of the style of any one of the sacred writers have been more or less guilty of dogmatism.

They have not reflected that we have no uninspired writings of the holy men, treating the same subjects that they handled while under inspiration; for in order to ascertain any man's peculiar style, we always compare two or more of the compositions he has written on the same or similar subjects, or in similar departments of literature. All men naturally and wisely treat different subjects in different styles. But unhappily for these critics, we have no uninspired compositions of these holy men on any subject; so that we have nothing whatever that enables us to determine the distinguishing features of each or any one of these writers' natural style.

Had the sacred writers been inspired to communicate to us different facts or truths from those they did respectively communicate, we have every reason to suppose that they would have been moved to write in a very different style from that wherein they did write. The style of Paul in the epistle to the Romans is not the same as the style of the same apostle in the epistles to the Corinthians; nor is the style of John in his Gospel like that of the same evangelist in the Book of Revelation. The styles of the four evangelists are almost, if not quite, one and the same wherever they record the same facts, while the cases in which they show the widest diversities of style are those in which they were moved to record those deeds

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[1] Exod .iv. 12; Isa. liv. 17; Jer. i. 6; Joel ii. 28; Luke xxi. 15; Acts ii. 4; 1 Cor. i. 4, 5.; ii. 13.; xii. 8; 2 Cor. viii. 5–7; Eph. vi. 19; Col. iv. 3, 4. According to some commentators, Prov. xvi. 1 should be translated, "The preparations of the heart are in man; but the answer of the tongue is from the Lord." They justify this rendering in part from the 9th verse. If this be the correct version, then both words and gestures may be divinely prompted sometimes in cases where the feelings and purposes are of merely human origin.

or sayings of Jesus, which the others were by the Spirit restrained from making known to us.

The difficulty of finding out the natural peculiarities of any prophet is still further increased by the fact that plenary inspiration acted through such men of old as are styled "holy." The salt that was to heal the waters of Jericho could only be carried in a *new* cruse. This principle is not contradicted by two or three exceptions, as Balaam and Caiaphas, whose predictions were very brief: a day may fairly be called dark, notwithstanding occasional sun-glances. The problem is a deeper one than is generally supposed; it involves not merely the question of the interpenetration of the divine and the human, but the operation of the inspiring Spirit on the natural faculties as renewed by grace, and the style thence resulting. As the new birth not unfrequently produces a very rapid and marked change in personal character, the moral qualities of language and style will of necessity be greatly transformed by such regeneration. The new man's style often begins to serve as a more veracious and ready vehicle of his ideas than it once was, but especially will it commence casting away the formality, equivocalness and dissimulation which debased the communications of the old man.[1] It is no longer defiled by willing association with impure thoughts,[2] and such as savour of irreverence and profanity[3] or lightness and frivolity.[4]

Besides, as the inspired speakers and writers grew in sanctification (and some of them were far advanced in personal holiness when they made their sacred communications), they would render our efforts to ascertain their natural disposition, bent of mind, and qualities of heart all the more difficult. Who of us, in discussing the endowments of any eminently pious man with whom we had enjoyed but a brief acquaintance, would have the hardihood to say positively, "This belongs to nature; that to grace?" We should remember, too, that at the time of their full inspiration, they must have possessed more or less knowledge of the thoughts and words of the holy men who wrote and spoke before or during their day. Another thing: the speakers and writers whose communications we find in the New Testament were, no doubt, indebted not a little to the Septuagint which had Hebraized and proselyted many Greek words and phrases, thus making them welcome heralds of the kingdom of Christ. Neither should we leave out of our estimate that power to quicken and glorify style which is imparted by spiritual and eternal themes. "In the views of the most enlightened statesman,"

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[1] 1 Cor. ii. 4; Col. ii. 4; 2 Peter ii. 18. [2] Eph. iv. 29; Col. iii. 8.
[3] Exod. xx. 7. [4] Eccles. ii. 2; Titus ii. 6–8.

says Robert Hall, "compared to those of the Christian minister, there is a littleness and limitation which is not to be imputed in the one case to moral imperfection, nor in the other to personal merit; the differences arising purely from the disparity of the subjects upon which they respectively speculate." But still we should take into account, as we have already suggested, the sunny effects of true piety on the growth and cultivation of the intellectual powers. It must have served to fix attention, to raise reason above the force of prejudice, pride, and malevolence, to dispel clouds from the memory, in short, to give a lawful and elevated direction to all the intellectual faculties, and promote their wholesome exercise.

It is not for us to say, however, that this sanctifying grace, or any of its intellectual fruits, influenced, in the least degree, the inspiring Spirit, or served to dictate one jot or tittle of his communications. Our purpose is less presumptuous, and more pertinent to our subject. Our intended meaning is, that these, and other similar considerations, show what hazards we run in our speculations about the natural cast of mind, or temperament, or modes of thoughts, or qualities of style, that are said to be peculiar to a sacred writer. That the Scriptures contain elements that are thoroughly *human*, as well as divine, who can deny? But let not critics go beyond this to make round assertions as to a sacred writer's individuality, idiosyncracies, natural constitution, bent of mind, education, modes of belief, native bias, and other like things. Why should we leave the beaten path to search for that which is hid from us behind two impassable walls—inspiration and sanctification?

Some skeptics have objected against the claim of the sacred Scriptures to a divine origin, the remarkable uniformity in the style of the many books said to have been composed by many men, and in some instances at long intervals of time. They hence conclude that these writings are the forgeries of one or two men. We conclude, on the contrary, that this is an evidence that the one Divine Spirit is their author, and that we have here the styles in which he communicates with men; his mode of writing history, laws, psalms and epistles, and uttering prophecies; the style being in each instance perfectly adapted to the matter to be conveyed to us. "Which things also we speak," says the apostle;[1] "not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." This and other texts prove that the chief words of Scripture were suggested by the Divine Spirit.[2]

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1 1 Cor. ii. 13.

2 Matt. xxviii. 20; John xiv. 26; comp. Luke i. 70; Acts iii. 18; 1 Thes. ii. 13.

If this is not so, if the Holy Ghost in plenary inspiration did not prompt the chief words and the style of Scripture, then it will be difficult to prove that the Divine Spirit does in any case and in any manner influence the utterance of the preacher. But if we admit, as the divine declarations compel us to admit, that the Spirit did in primitive times inspire utterance, then we have here some antecedent probability that the very words and style of holy Scripture were inspired, and that, *mutatis mutandis*, expression and style may still be assisted and improved by the Holy Ghost.

It may, indeed, be objected that the Spirit gave this utterance to the holy prophets, apostles, and primitive disciples, but that he has nowhere promised it to us, nor can we claim as applicable to ourselves the language that was used as to this matter in writing to the first Christians. To this we reply that Augustine would not have allowed that such an objection has any weight; for his advice is as follows: "God teaches us both what to speak and in what manner to speak. . . . . When the hour of speaking comes, let the preacher, with a good mind, avail himself of the words of our Lord, 'Take no thought how,' etc. (Matt. x. 19, 20). If then the Divine Spirit speak in those who for Christ's sake are called to face persecutors, why should he not also speak in those who preach Christ to teachable congregations?"[1] The Christian predecessors and teachers of Augustine appear to have been of like belief in respect of utterance. When he was yet a young man, he on one occasion expressed reluctance to preach before some bishops; whereupon they replied: "If you are in need of words, remember the assurance, 'Ask and it shall be given unto you;' for it is not you that speak, but you deliver what is given to you."[2]

Other and equal authorities are on the side of this great Christian father. No man has done so much for the language of Christian Syria as Ephraem, and but few men since his day have reposed such confidence in the inspirations of the Spirit, or more often breathed to Heaven ejaculations for divine assistance in his homilies and hymns. Theodoret called him "the harp of the Holy Spirit, and the channel which had refreshed the Syrians with the waters of grace." And Photius says that there are found in the works of Ephraem such strains of eloquence as to leave the reader at a loss to decide whether his discourses derive their chief power from the beauty of his style, or the sublimity of his thoughts. Luther is another striking example of the union of faith in this inspiration of

[1] De Doct. Christ., Lib. iv., C. 15.

[2] Sermo de Tempore; also Chrysostom, Hom.; 1 Cor. i. 4, 5.

the Spirit and power of style. "Upon his lips," says Jonas, "preaching celebrated its resurrection." He elevated a dialect to the majesty of a national language, and so became the father of German literature. German philologists regard his translation of the Bible as the standard of classical expression. Stier points divinity students to it as a pattern of the sacred style, as contrasted with the profane, while Klopstock and other celebrated writers have formed their styles and even their phraseology on the model of this version. Lord Bacon says of Luther that he "did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and 'copia' of speech which then began to flourish."[1]

Regard Milton also from this point of view. He was not a minister in the proper sense of the word; but it was the fault of his times rather than of his heart that he was compelled to preach by his pen and not by his lips.[2] If he was not in some sense a speaking prophet like Isaiah, he was at least a writing prophet like Daniel. No man could well have more faith in the co-operation of the Divine Spirit than he. It is most clearly and eloquently declared in several parts of his prose writings. "Supplication," says he, "is that act whereby under the guidance of the Holy Spirit we reverently ask of God things lawful either for ourselves or others through faith (Zech. xii. 10; Rom. vii. 26, 27; Eph. vi. 18). Praying always . . . in the Spirit (Jude 20); praying with the Holy Ghost is quickening and calling into action as much as possible the gift of the Holy Ghost within us." Hence he regarded liturgies as superfluous, and the Lord's Prayer as a model of supplication rather than a form to be repeated. He believed that having Christ for our Master, and the Divine Spirit for our assistant in prayer, we can have no need of any human aid either for matter or words. His prayer to the Holy Ghost in the beginning of Paradise Lost, and, again in Book iii., lines 51–54, was no formal invocation for the sake of mere poetical propriety. When writing about what he thinks the necessary preparation for such a work, he says: "This is not to be attained but by devout prayer to the Eternal Spirit that can enrich with all utterance and knowledge, and sends out his seraphim with the hallowed fire of the altar to touch and purify the lips of whom he pleases."

These examples may seem more than sufficient; but as the student ought to settle this question deep beyond all doubts, we shall adduce one more instance, that of Dr. Watts. According to

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1 Erasmus wrote a Latin treatise on Copiousness. See *Opera*, *De Cop.*, *Verb.*

2 Masson's Milton and his Times, vol. ii., p. 388.

Dr. Johnson, who recommends his readers "to imitate him in all but his non-conformity, Watts was one of the first authors that taught the Dissenters to covet the graces of language, and to show them that zeal and purity might be expressed and enforced by polished diction. He says that as a devotional poet his ear was well-tuned and his diction elegant and copious, and that as a preacher such was his flow of thought, and such his promptitude of language, that in the latter part of his life he did not precompose his cursory sermons, but having adjusted the heads, and sketched out some particulars, trusted for success to his extemporary powers." Now what did Dr. Watts believe and teach respecting that utterance of which he was so eminent a master? "The Spirit," says he,[1] "may be said to give some assistance towards apt and proper expressions in prayer. For he concurs, in an ordinary way, to the exercise of our natural and acquired faculties of knowledge, memory, vivacity of spirit, readiness of speech, and holy confidence, whereby we express those thoughts which he hath excited in us in a becoming manner. And this he doth also in preaching, and conferring upon the things of God, and this more eminently in the work of prayer; so that hereby a believer is able, at some times, to pour out his soul before God, with a fulness of thought, and variety of expression, to the great comfort of his own soul, and the edification of his fellow-worshippers. . . . I might add also, that as the Holy Spirit frequently, by secret hints, supplies us with the matter of prayer, he by that very means assists us towards expression; for expression is but clothing our thoughts or ideas in proper words. Now in this state, where the soul and body are so united, the most part of the ideas and conceptions of our minds are so joined to words, that words arise, as it were, mingled with those ideas or conceptions, which the Holy Spirit awakens in us. And we may humbly hope, that when he hath given us some secret whispers 'what we should pray for,' he will at least so far enable us to use proper expressions as may convey the same thoughts and matter to those who join with us in worship. Especially when proper materials of prayer are brought to our minds in Scripture expressions, in some sense these are 'words which the Holy Ghost teacheth,'—that Spirit which is promised 'to bring to our remembrance the things which Christ hath taught us.'"

Add that the Divine Spirit is also helpful to our utterance by making our partially inspired communications more veracious, more pure, more reverent, more grave, more devotional, and every way

[1] Guide to Prayer, chap. iv.; cf. Bickersteth on Prayer, chap. xxix.

more consonant with the oracles of God. This gracious utterance may not evince more fluency or more copiousness, but it will assuredly partake more of the savour of Christ, and be more redolent of his perfections. The down that descends to us on the breeze off the mount of God cannot help betraying the sweet odours it has borrowed from the seeds of truth it enfolds, and caught from the spice-gardens of grace over which it was wafted to our hands.

The instances are almost innumerable of preachers who have thought themselves especially assisted by the Spirit on occasions when they could not avail themselves of premeditated matter. The famous Robert Blair relates that he received the extraordinary aids of the Holy Ghost one day during the great work of grace which blessed Scotland in the year 1630. The preacher for the day having failed to be present, Mr. Blair was persuaded to occupy the pulpit. "The Lord," he says, "so carried on the business that only one proposition was offered to me to speak of, and no more until the closing of the point; then another edifying point was suggested from the text, and so various others until the glass was run. In all this I was but the voice of one crying. There was a prompter that suggested to me, even he that sent me to preach the Gospel. But when the hour-glass was ended, three points, all weighty, and all concatenated, were presented to me, the uttering whereof was almost, as I suppose, as much as all the rest." We cannot doubt the testimony of a witness so trustworthy in behalf of the extraordinary assistance of the Spirit.

And besides supplying the want of all preparation, the Divine Spirit may complete such preparation as we have been able to make, by suggesting texts or themes or occasional thoughts. Chrysostom, in his first homily to the people of Antioch, says: "The things about to be spoken are not our own, but such as the grace of the Divine Spirit may inspire." In the next homily, preached seven days later, he says of the first, "I do not think that I then spoke these things of myself; but that God, foreseeing what was coming" (*i. e.* the sedition that resulted in casting down the statues) "put these words into my mind." Augustine, on one occasion, turned aside from the theme he was treating, to reason against the doctrines of the Manichees whom he did not think of when he began his sermon. He thought it was by divine direction that he made this digression in order to disabuse of error a secret Manichee in the audience, who two days afterwards came to him and confessed his heresy. "I have," says Luther, "often reproached myself upon descending from the pulpit, in this wise: Shame on you! How have you been preaching, you have entirely abandoned the plan you had previously

formed! And these very sermons have been most acceptable to the people. A man often preaches very differently after he enters the pulpit from what he had proposed." Calvin was evidently of the same opinion. Beginning to preach by explaining the Scriptures in the houses of his friends, and, for a time, in a cave near Poitiers, he had no need of plans of discourse. As during his labours at Geneva, he preached every day in each alternate week, and read three theological lectures every week, he could have found but little time for writing sermons. In a letter to the Protector Somerset, dated 1548, he writes: "What I have suggested as to the manner of instruction, is only that the people be so taught as to be touched to the quick, and that they may feel that what the apostle says is true (Heb. iv.), that the word of God is a two-edged sword, piercing even through the thoughts and affections to the very marrow of the bones. . . . . Now this preaching ought not to be lifeless but lively, to teach, to exhort, to reprove, as St. Paul says, in speaking thereof, to Timothy (2 Tim. iii). So, indeed, that if an unbeliever enter, he may be so effectually arrested and convinced, as to give glory to God, as Paul says in another passage (1 Cor. 14). You are aware, my Lord, how he speaks of the lively fervour and energy with which they ought to speak, who would approve themselves as good and faithful ministers of God, who must not make a parade of rhetoric only to gain esteem for themselves;[1] but that the Spirit of God ought to sound forth by their voice, so as to work with a mighty energy. Whatever the amount of danger to be feared (from extemporising), that ought not to hinder the Spirit of God from having liberty and free course in those to whom he has given grace for the edifying of the Church." Not essentially different from his opinion was that of another reformer, Peter Martyr.[2] "Let us at that time (while preaching) suffer ourselves wholly, wherever we be, to be ordered by the Holy Ghost." With him holds Dr. Watts, who says: "If you pray and hope for the assistance of the Spirit of God in every part of your work, do not resolve always to confine yourself precisely to the mere words and sentences which you have written down in your private preparations. . . . . Why may you not hope for some lively turns of thought, some new pious

[1] His motto was "Sincerely and Promptly." When he was but twenty-four years of age, Beza says of him that he taught the truth "not with affected eloquence, to which he had always been an enemy, but with such depth of knowledge and so much solid gravity of style, that there was not a man to be found who could hear him without being ravished with admiration."

[2] See his Commonplace Book, Pt. iv., p. 27.

sentiments, which may strike light and heat and life into the understandings and hearts of them that hear you? In the zeal of your ministrations why may you not expect some brief and warm and pathetic forms of argument and persuasion to offer themselves to our lips, for the more powerful conviction of sinners and the encouragement and comfort of humble Christians."

The love of revealed truth and of the souls of men which the inspiration of the Spirit not seldom blows to a powerful flame, melts down things beautiful, sublime, and glorious, into the true, the just, and the expedient; or else, by expanding the mind and purging its dross, causes it more fully and distinctly to mirror the revelations of heaven and the thoughts of God.

We have said that the apostle Paul evidently included Delivery in his ideas of Utterance. Hitherto orators have too much inclined to consider delivery less in its relations to the grace of God than to nature and art. Misunderstand us not; we freely concede that the study and practice of elocution are of great importance—of far greater importance than they are commonly thought to be; but have we all duly considered to what extent, after the best discipline in elocution, a good pulpit delivery is a gift of the Holy Ghost? We think not. Take a few examples: One of the best men of his times was Dr. John Owen, and it appears safe to say that no man among his contemporaries had such clear, deep, and God-given thoughts respecting the operations of the Holy Ghost. We need not wonder, therefore, that his elocution is described as eloquent, and of the first order of excellence, as marked by a voice strong but not noisy, sweet but exceedingly manly, with a certain sound of authority in it; while his gestures, far from theatrical affectation, were always animated, and adapted to his subject.[1] Dr. Isaac Watts was a man of similar grade of spirituality, and of very accurate and profound views of the co-operation of the Spirit in preaching. Hence it is not strange that he is said to have surpassed in the art of enunciation all the other preachers of his times. He even distanced in this particular Dr. James Foster,[2] who for more than twenty years held entranced the genius, learning rank, and fashion, no less than the commonality, of London. That he owed the chief excellences of his delivery to the power of the Spirit might be negatively proved; and particularly from the fact that he never assisted his elocution by any gesticulations. If his

[1] Life in his Works, vol. i., pp. 351–355.

[2] Hawkins' History of Music, vol. v., 325; Johnson's Life of Watts.

practice followed his precepts,[1] his delivery must have been very effective, for the simple reason that both himself and his hearers must have been so occupied with his subject as not to have been able to make his delivery a separate object of thought or admiration.

But still, we have to bear perpetually in mind that the Holy Spirit, who is as free as the wind, which sometimes blows in breezes, and sometimes in gusts and violent storms, does not always inspire such a style or delivery as taste desires or art demands. As our Lord once had need of an ass rather than a chariot, so, as the history of the apostles proves, he has at times more need of ignorance than of knowledge. Does the Divine Spirit uniformly inspire order, propriety, and elegance? Believe it not. Alike in creation, providence, and grace, the great Supreme reveals his power the most majestically and convincingly in crises and interpositions, in things abnormal, unexpected and unaccountable; nay, at the time, perhaps, very unwelcome, and even lamented. Zacharias' silence, no less than his subsequent speaking, was in answer to the whole multitude praying without at the time of incense. He who can loose the tongue can also tie it. Have there not been seasons, O man of God, when you have been so overpowered by the magnitude and mystery of your thoughts, that you felt that the best eloquence was totally inadequate to do them the scantiest justice, and you were reduced to confusion of speech; when your methodical discourse, as it sailed gallantly along over prospering seas, was struck by a tempest from on high, overset, and driven upon flooded rocks that before were landmarks, and there broken up and scattered along the land by a deluging tide; when the very shipwreck of your sermon preached to you the much forgotten doctrine that the Spirit not only condescends to be the servant of man, but is really his master as well? A mere novice, or worse, is he who, in such an event, observes nothing but the splitting of his craft or the blowing away of her paper sails.

Our final and most important caution is: Never attempt to separate style from invention, much less from inspiration. By an almost exclusive attention to style many speakers have enfeebled their powers, and some writers on rhetoric have degraded it as a science. But all experience proves that if a preacher have a divine impulse or guidance and yield to it heartily and fully in the preparation of his subject-matter, he can in some cases safely forego all thought about words. Few, indeed, are the feelings and thoughts of a practical

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[1] Attempt towards the Revival of Religion, sec. iii., p. 4. See also Book iv. on Delivery.

mind that are born without tongues. We have already seen that a true inspiration begets in the heart a love of revealed truth and benevolence towards our hearers. Now if we may believe Milton (and he was, we think, as well acquainted with the Scripture view of inspiration as any other writer of his day), these two things, when the speaker possesses them in a high degree of ardour, ever have in attendance copious and proper language. "True eloquence," as he confesses, "I find to be none but the serious and hearty love of truth; and that whose mind soever is fully possessed with a fervent desire to know good things, and with the dearest charity to infuse the knowledge of them into others, when such a man would speak, his words, like so many nimble and airy servitors, trip about him at command, and in well ordered files, as he could wish, fall aptly into their own places." But beside this, we know that invention itself, when it does its work thoroughly, produces copiousness of diction. Horace has said that when the matter is prepared, words not unwillingly follow it; and how often are we reminded of Cicero's maxim, that a rich provision of matter begets abundance of language. All the more highly, therefore, ought we to prize inspiration when we consider how it influences style, not only through its vital action upon the affections of the heart but upon the inventive powers of the intellect as well. For unless it moves the cogitative faculties, and so makes knowledge available to the hearers, or unless it produces something better than the agitation of the feelings of an empty and unthinking mind, the result at best can be but the solitariness of a dead faith, or the solemn charm that overpowers such as listen to the moaning of the wind through a ruined and moonlit temple.

CHAPTER IV.

CAUTIONS AS TO THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SPIRIT IN PREACHING.

The difficulty of ascertaining the presence or absence of ministerial grace would be less, if the Evil Spirit were not in manifold ways ever fighting against the Holy Spirit, and that never more successfully than when he causes his own counterfeits to pass for the genuine coinage of heaven. Thus, no fact is more clearly demonstrated in the experience of good ministers than this, that they have almost always had the greatest co-operation of that Spirit whose mission it is to glorify Christ, while they were preaching on "the doctrines of grace;" and yet they are equally free to avow that at such times they suffered more from the assaults of Satan than on any other occasions. While, therefore, the inward strife is going forward, and the Divine Spirit is crossing swords with some messenger of Satan, peace of mind is certainly not one of the tokens of the helping presence of the Holy Ghost. Nor is uncommon fluency while we are preaching Christ always to be received as decisive evidence of the aid of the Divine Spirit. Feeling such as overpowers utterance is often far stronger proof of a true inspiration than an unfeeling and unthinking volubility. "A cloud," says Jonathan Edwards, "though to appearance very pregnant and full of rain, if it brings with it over much wind, seldom affords much rain to the dry and thirsty earth; which very thing the Holy Ghost is pleased several times to make use of to represent a great show of religion with the mouth, without answerable fruit in the life."[1] And it is observable that those of whom the Spirit thus testifies were for the most part false apostles and pretended preachers of the Gospel.

The presence of a large audience has such an effect on some preachers that they are liable to mistake it for the special assistance of the Holy Ghost. Even Chrysostom, one of the wisest of the Christian fathers, seems to have sometimes erred in this matter. On one occasion, when he had a large audience, he said, "It is the nature of spiritual things that when they are distributed to many, they increase the more. Since, therefore, I see the table surrounded

[1] Religious Affections, Pt. i., sec. 3.; Cobbett on Prayer, Pt. iii., chap. vi., vii.

with guests, I expect the grace of the Spirit to sound aloud in my mind. When he sees many present then, he is wont to place before them a more plentiful repast, not because he disdains the few, but because he desires to save the many."[1] The eloquent preacher did not bear in mind these words of Cicero: "Such is the power of a large, popular assembly that an orator can no more be eloquent without a listening multitude than a piper can play without his pipes."[2] If, while we are addressing a small audience of plain people, we are carried beyond and above ourselves, we have a better reason to conclude that we have gracious assistance than while we are speaking to an audience of the opposite description.

Not a few men are most fluent and animated while they are speaking under the stimulus of some merely human passion or feeling, or are exercising their reasoning powers in answering a real or supposed adversary, in carrying a point by argument, or discussing some philosophical, or ethical, or political question that is occupying the public mind. At such times the preacher is in the utmost danger of being moved by wrong motives, because the chances are that, as he has begun by turning aside from his proper work, so he has, for the time at least, shut out the assistance of the Holy Spirit.

We may, again, imagine that we are inspired by the Comforter, because our sermon grows more animated and jubilant as we approach its conclusion. We ought in such cases to remember that this is a natural rather than a gracious phenomenon;[3] whereas true inspiration may sometimes make our discourse seem to ourselves more and more lifeless as we advance, and cause us to cut it short with heavy sorrow, or to finish it with lamentations. The mind is naturally warmed by dwelling on any subject in which it has an interest; and this increasing glow is, we fear, sometimes mistaken for the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. And there has been the same misapprehension as to prayer. "This liberty," says Guthrie,[4] "which we call *freedom* or *free speaking* with God in prayer is sometimes much removed from any great confidence in the time of prayer, at least until it draws towards the close of it." Our libility to err here is increased by the fact that we are apt to regard with

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[1] Hom. i., §1. De Verbis Apostoli., tome iii. [2] De Orat., Lib. ii., c. 83.

[3] The speaker is often stirred, not only by his thoughts, but also by the sound of his voice.

[4] The Christian's Great Interest, Pt. i., chap. vi.; cf. Cobbett on Prayer, Pt. iii., chaps. vii., viii., and ix.

complacency whatever ends well, however bad may have been its beginning.

Some pray to God for texts on which to preach, and confidently expect from divine inspiration, both the text and such other Scriptures as they may need for their sermon. They have, as they believe, received very many texts from the suggestion of the Holy Spirit, and can relate in what an extraordinary manner, and with what regenerating, sanctifying and comforting effects such texts have been breathed into their minds. Very far be it from us to deny that in any of these cases the texts were suggested or otherwise inspired by the Divine Spirit. Only let us remember that it is very possible for us to deceive ourselves respecting this thing. Jonathan Edwards has proved that texts of Scripture may thus arise in the mind, not only in a sudden and unusual manner, but even *occasion* elevated and joyful affections, of which not the use but the abuse of those texts is the *cause;* that affections may arise from the right use of the texts and from some influence of the Spirit accompanying the word of God, and yet have nothing of the nature of true religion in them; and that Satan and his emissaries, false teachers, have in these ways perverted every part of the sacred Scriptures to remove salutary doubts, to confirm false joy and confidence, and so effect the eternal ruin of poor deluded souls. To this we may add that so far from texts being always suggested by the Holy Ghost, in some cases they may come from habits of inattention or a wandering fancy, or "the law of casual association," as Isaac Taylor terms it, according to which the succession of ideas is accidental, or loosely connected by trival points of resemblance, or a mere juxtaposition in time or place.

There are those who go farther than this. They do not indeed claim that their thoughts or experiences were suggested by any part of Holy Scripture, but they have an undoubting assurance that they are inspired by the Paraclete, founded on the fact that their minds are moved by some unaccountable power, out of and superior to themselves—a power uninvited and departing unbidden by themselves—a power wholly beyond their own control, working energetically in them, and carrying them far above the reach of their natural capabilities. Some such notion of inspiration may be traced to a very remote antiquity and to nations that had forsaken the worship of the true God. Bacchus, Pan, Apollo, and Æsculapius were believed by the Greeks and other pagans to be the inspirers of ethnic prophets, priests, priestesses, and poets. A person under the influence of an *afflatus* from a god might, it was be-

lieved, become an inventor of some useful or fine art, or do superhuman deeds, or dream dreams and see visions, or know and tell future events. They believed that the person so inspired might likewise be so overpowered by the god as to lose all self-command, all sense of propriety, and all reason, and be driven onward to commit all acts of folly and madness.[1]

Now we cannot deny that this was a kind of inspiration. The origin of the word, to say nothing of the amount and character of the evidence, renders it vain to question the existence of something of the kind. But still we must affirm that it was in general a diabolical inspiration. Satan is as much a mocker as strong drink, and he can imitate the Holy Ghost so closely as to "deceive, if it were possible, the very elect." Admitting that it is possible that some of the pagan *prophets* were on rare occasions moved by the Holy Ghost, we can scarcely believe that the pagan *orators* ever spoke under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit. "It often happens," says Quintilian, "that when ardor and animation carry the speaker along, no study can equal the success of his extemporaneous efforts. When such a flow of language occurred, the old orators, as Cicero observes, used to say that some god had inspired the orator."[2] The Scriptures clearly teach us that false prophets were inspired by evil spirits, such as were invoked in the ethnic divinations.[3] The early fathers accordingly taught that the pagan prophets and priests and priestesses were inspired by dæmons. Origen says that the Pythian god was akin to those dæmons which Christians are wont to drive out by prayers and adjurations.[4] Chrysostom says that the soothsayers were possessed with an unclean spirit, and that the distraction, madness, and great darkness of their minds was the proper work of a dæmon.[5] Not only the Greek but the Latin fathers are unanimous on this question.[6] We see no good reason why we should not as soon admit the fact of Satanic inspiration as that of Satanic miracle working, both of which are with equal clearness acknowledged and recorded in Holy Scripture. Satan sometimes speaks like the Holy Ghost in order, it

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1 Nägelsbach, Homer. Theologie., p. 14. sq.

2 Inst., L. x., C. vii., sec. 14. The critics find not this passage in Cicero's works; Quintilian may have possibly had in mind the words: Pætam . . . quasi divine quodam spiritu inflari, *Pro. Arch.*, §8.

3 1 Kings xxii. 21–23; Jer. ii. 8; xiv. 14; xxiii. 13–27; Ezek. xiii. 6, 7–23; Zech. xiii. 26; 1 John iv. 6.

4 Contra Cels., Lib. vii., cap. iv. 5 Hom. xxix; 1 Cor. xii. 1–3.

6 Tertul. Apol. i., cap. xxii., Aug. Confes. L. x., cap. xlii.

would seem, to gain a more ready access to minds that could not be entered without some plausible show of moral excellence.[1] This may account for the fact that such men as Shakespeare, Burns, Byron, and Moore, have, in imitating religious and even devotional poetry, gone quite beyond the force of their natural genius and risen superior to their ordinary moral level.

Thus much we may affirm respecting that kind of inspiration which is doubtful and mysterious in its origin and effects (we say origin and effects, for these are far more important subjects of examination than that of its mode or process); we may affirm of this, that commonly it sounds through no good instrument and is productive of no beneficial effects; for the origin and effects of plenary inspiration of the Divine Spirit were often unmistakably good. And as to partial inspiration we may be assured that there are almost always some means of detecting it; for this reason among others that its operations are for the most part uniform. "The influence of the Holy Ghost," as Howe[2] says, "is a regular and ordinate influence. I put these together, because they have an affinity, though they may import somewhat diverse notions. The Spirit works according to rule or agreeably unto the word in what it does for the maintaining of the Christian life. 'My Spirit which is upon thee, and my words which I have put into thy mouth shall not depart,' etc. (Isa. lix. 21). The word and the Spirit go together among all this race. And so it is the influence of ordinate, not of absolute power. The latter works so as that there is no proportion between its instruments and its effects. The former works by suitable means, and applies and directs our spirits unto such objects as carry in them a suitable aliment for the maintenance of the Christian life."

There were in the churches of the apostolic age those who were divinely endowed with the power of discerning spirits or superintending the utterances of the prophets. By this gift Peter detected the true character of Ananias and his wife, and Simon Magus; by it Paul also saw through the devices of Elymas the sorcerer.[3] There had been long before, even among the heathen, a race of men called prophets, who were required by the laws to preside as judges over sacred divinations and interpret their oracular words. The word *prophet* in the classic Greek often signifies inter-

[1] Calvin's Inst., B. i., cap. xiv.; Edward's Affections, Pt. i., sec. 4.

[2] The Work of the Holy Spirit in reference to Particular Persons, Sermon x. Cf. Cobbett on Prayer, Pt. iii., chap. iii., and Wesley's Notes on N. T., 1 Cor. xv. 32.

[3] 1 Cor. xii. 10.; xiv. 29; 1 Thes. v. 19–21; 1 John iv. 1; Acts v. 1.; viii. 20, 23.; xiii. 8–11.

preter as distinguished from the insane or sleeping *mantis* or diviner, who is inspired by some god. Plato in his Timæus (§71, 72) makes this distinction in the following instructive passage: "Those who made us . . . . so constituted the evil part of our nature that it might be connected with truth by placing in this part the power of divination. And there is sufficient proof that the Deity has assigned divination to human madness; for no man in his sober senses is gifted with a sacred and true divination. But this takes place only when the reasoning faculty is bound by sleep or disturbed by disease or enthusiasm. It requires, on the other hand, some wisdom to understand the recorded utterances of a divining and enthusiastic nature, whether sleeping or waking, and so to distinguish all the appearances as to be able to explain in what way and to whom they reveal any good or evil, whether future, past, or present. But it is by no means the office of one who either has been or still is insane to judge respecting things seen or spoken by himself. And it has been well observed of the ancients that to transact and know one's own business and himself is alone the province of a prudent man. For this reason the law directs that the race (*genos*) of prophets shall preside as judges over the sacred divinations—judges whom some, indeed, call diviners, through ignorance of the fact that they are only the interpreters (*hypocriti*) of enigmas and visions. On this account they should not be called diviners, but rather prophets" (*i. e.*, interpreters) "of divinations." Here the prophet is at once a judge, an interpreter, and a representer of the revelations of the gods. The *hypocriti* were, it seems, afterwards mere actors who represented theatrically the tragedies and comedies composed by others. In his *Charmides* (§46) Plato speaks of the *mantis* as intemperate or wanting in abstinence and self-control. "We grant, if you will, that divination is the knowledge of what is to be, and that moderation presiding over it, turns away the boastful diviners (*manteis*), and appoints over us the true prophets (*prophetas*) of things to come."[1]

Once Plato speaks of the mad diviner as different from the sober prognosticator (Phœdra §48), thus preserving the idea of the unconsciousness of the *mantis*. Sometimes the prophet is an *exegetes*, an interpreter in the more modern sense, or an expounder of the oracles and omens.[2] And yet the two offices of *mantis* and *exegetes* were occasionally combined.[3]

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1 See also Plutarch's Solon, §12.

2 Herod., B. i., cap. lxxviii., B. vii., cap. iii.; Plutarch, Theseus. xxiv.

3 Euripides, Phœnissæ; Plutarch's Life of Numa, chap. ix.; cf. Book ii., sec. 1.

Now, while we are not authorized to say that we have at present any inspired judges or discerners, or interpreters in either the ethnic or the apostolic sense of these terms, we have what is nearly equivalent, namely, the standard of sacred Scripture, by which we may test the quality of all religious teachers and teachings. To this standard we should bring all our subjective experiences, and then will we at length come to learn the difference between such as are natural and such as are supernatural. To a certain degree, however, this semi-inspiration, like the plenary, is self-evidencing, and he who has felt it once is not very liable to mistake its nature and origin. We say *to a certain degree;* for we are not to imagine that this evidence, though self-evidence, is as clear and convincing as was that of the sacred speakers and writers; if it were, we could speak quite independently of Holy Writ, and would have no further need of searching it either for the proofs of our inspiration, or the truth and timeliness of our teachings. Though a preacher might on good grounds arrive at the conclusion that he was, on a particular occasion, under the power of semi-inspiration, he could not warrantably say that a certain part of his prayer, or his sermon, was certainly inspired in any such sense as to be without any admixture of sin or error. The Divine Spirit, in such cases, leaves us in some salutary doubts in order, it would seem, that we may still be kept studying our own hearts in the light of Holy Scripture. And here we may be cautioned against setting more value on the strength of immediate impressions, such as high transports and ecstatic delights, than on the fruits of the Spirit, which under a true semi-inspiration must needs grow and strengthen. If, for instance, the *afflatus* leave us proud and vain rather than humble and self-forgetful, we may well question whether it came from the Holy Ghost. Herein feelings are to be tested by their *quality*, not their *quantity*.

We are not to be too ready to conclude that semi-inspiration is an infallible proof that its subject is a regenerate person. It is clear that those who were anciently moved by plenary inspiration were almost exclusively regenerate men, and yet Balaam, a soothsayer and an enchanter,[1] was on one occasion under a full divine inspiration. He hated not sin as sin, but only as it was dangerous to himself, and therefore at first he refused Balak's gold and silver while he yet loved the sin of cursing Israel and the rewards of divination which the messengers of Balak carried in their hands. This false prophet sought gain, and yet he could not then bring himself to utter falsehood in order to gratify his covetousness. His veracity

[1] Josh. xiii. 22; Num. xxii. 7; xxiii. 12; xxiv. 1; 2 Peter ii. 14–17.

was well calculated to deceive both himself and the Moabites. Caiaphas was, if possible, a worse man than Balaam, but the Holy Ghost was pleased to move him to utter even a Messianic prediction. These facts do not, however, lessen the value of our Lord's maxim, "By their fruits ye shall know them." It is not Christ's, but Virgil's millennium wherein,

"Each common bush shall Syrian roses wear."

On the other hand, a preacher who is really regenerate, may be so imperfectly sanctified as to be betrayed into a departure from verity, as the old prophet of Bethel[1] was, and while speaking in the name of God, find some plea with which to justify himself before his conscience in leading his hearers away from the truth of God. He may be inspired ninety-nine times, and yet wittingly or unwittingly speak without inspiration the hundredth time.[2] As truth and error sometimes go abreast and often follow each other in quick succession, we are in danger of allowing error to run ahead of truth and take its place.

We may even copy the acts of ancient men of God without being moved by the Divine Spirit who inspired those men, and so deceive ourselves and others as to the motives and passions that actuate us. James and John would call down fire from heaven upon their enemies in outward imitation of Elijah,[3] and many others have uttered imprecations against their personal enemies in the language of the prophet-king of Israel, without any evidence that the Holy Ghost was speaking by their mouth as he was by the mouths of those holy men. We ought to know what spirit we are of before we presume to copy a just God while he is executing his judgments through his inspired servants.

We may exercise the imaginative faculty in an intense and exalted degree, as the holy prophets did, and yet lack even a partial inspiration. Some are naturally gifted with more of this power than others, and abundant facts prove that Satan and his angels can and do represent in the mind images and appearances in the most mysterious and supernatural manner. Turretin, Burgess, and others are of the opinion that the wicked one cannot gain immediate access to the soul except through the imagination. Agreeably to this view, Edwards remarks that when strong affections arise from lively im-

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1 1 Kings xiii.

2 Even Nathan, the prophet, in one instance took a human impulse for an inspiration of God. (2 Sam. vii. 1–17.)

3 Luke ix. 55.

ages and visions, they are worthless and vain as marks of a state of grace, but that lively images or visions arising from strong affections may come from the Holy Ghost. Hence the father of lies frequently apes "the inspiration of elevation," because in that lofty mood of the imagination which it produces, the mind is most plausibly tempted to despise the plain narratives of Scripture and all exact statements of Christian doctrine. But notwithstanding the weight of these authorities, we incline to receive this notion of theirs with a counterpoising doubt whether Satan gains admittance to the mind through the imagination alone. Why should he not, like the Holy Spirit, whom he studies to pass for, sometimes act as the *primum mobile* of the human will? While there is much that is mysterious in the mode of Satan's working, sobriety and vigilance will give us some knowledge of his *devices*.

Again, we may fall into the habit of thinking that a punctual, formal, and self-denying use of what are called "the means of grace," "divine services," and such like, somehow entitles us to a semi-inspiration. We thus persuade ourselves that the Christian graces which such worship exercises are thereby prepared to invite the assistance of the Holy Ghost. But we may at the same time forget that the best means of grace by being perverted sometimes produce the worst feelings, as presumption, for example, and so actually resist rather than welcome the Holy Spirit.[1] And this temptation to presumption is much strengthened when we reflect that to the diligent use of the means of grace we have added extraordinary exertions of the intellect. Let us keep perpetually in mind the sovereignty of God, and then we shall never forget that—

> "The coarsest reed that trembles on the marsh,
> If Heaven select it for its instrument,
> May shed celestial music on the breeze
> As clearly as the pipe whose virgin gold
> Befits the lips of Phœbus!"—*J. N. Talfourd.*

A coarse reed that nevertheless felt how empty it was and was willing to go forth at midnight and beg, saying: "A friend of mine is come to me, and I have nothing to set before him." Every truly regenerate person has a certain spiritual discernment, "an unction from the Holy One," by which he perceives the difference between the works of grace and all their counterfeits. We must be regenerate before we have the first qualification for examining the marks of any operation of the Spirit. The natural man cannot know the things of the Spirit, because they are spiritually discerned. The

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[1] Jer. xi. 11; xv. 1; Hos. v. 6; Isa. lviii. 4; Acts vii. 51.

spiritual man is judged by no natural man. The spirits of the prophets are subject only to such as are themselves prophets. Nay, more than this; a regenerate soul may have such experiences of grace as are themselves incommunicable evidences of their divine origin. "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God."[1]

And yet the rectitude of our judgments in these matters is, as far as possible, to be tested by Holy Scripture. We ought, as far as we can, to resort to the inspired word with the aid of the inspiring Spirit, in order to determine the quality of our very inspiration. Herein we may proceed much in the same way that we do in ascertaining our adoption. "The operation of the witness of the Spirit," says the acute William Guthrie,[2] "is best understood if we produce any syllogism by which our spirit doth witness our sonship; as for example: whosoever loveth the brethren is passed from death to life, and consequently is in Christ; but I love the brethren; therefore I am passed from death to life. Hence there are three operations of the Spirit. The first is a beam of divine light upon the first proposition convincing of the divine authority of it as the word of God. The second operation is a glorious beam of light from the Spirit, shining upon the second proposition, and so upon his own graces in the soul, discovering them to be the true graces, and such as the Scripture calls so. Thus we are said to know by the Spirit the things that are freely given us of God. The third operation is connected with the third proposition or conclusion, and this I conceive to be nothing else but an influence upon faith, strengthening it to draw a conclusion of full assurance upon the foresaid premises." Guthrie thinks that the second operation of the Spirit upon the second proposition to be in the witness of the Spirit. Now, forasmuch as we need, in some cases, the Divine Spirit as an interpreter of the texts we employ as tests of our spiritual state, we must perhaps add a fourth operation of the Spirit, showing us what we are to understand by the phrase, *loving the brethren*. This will come in the order of time next after Guthrie's first operation. It will, of course, be objected by some, that we move in an illogical circle when we judge whether we are inspired by the Paraclete or not, by consulting the Scriptures, and yet say that we cannot without his interpretations understand those Scriptures. We reply that we have just now to do with revealed precepts and promises, and not merely with logical processes. There is here only one instance out of sev-

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 11. [2] The Christian's Great Interest, Pt. i., chap. vi.

eral in which is manifested the circular motion of grace from God to man and then from man back to God. Except in the way of illustration, logic has nothing more to do with the matter than it had with the circular marchings of Joshua and his army, when they compassed the walls of Jericho. In faith they obeyed the divine directions; in faith we do likewise.

Next to our own gracious experiences, as compared with and tested by the Scriptures, comes Providential guidance as another evidence of the co-operation of the Comforter. All three must indeed often be taken into consideration, in order to determine, with any degree of accuracy, the question of the Spirit's assistance. No wise preacher will close his eyes on the concurrence of circumstances which may on any occasion seem to demand a change of themes, or an alteration of his method, or the addition or omission of thoughts. He will observe the mutation of the public mind, the impressions made by catastrophes, accidents, defeats, victories and revolutions; nor will he despise the effects produced by the seasons and the weather, or the number and character of his congregation. All the wheels of Providence move in unison with the Divine Spirit; and occurrences which seem to us very trivial are often employed by him for the furtherance of his regenerating and sanctifying work. But while we are to watch narrowly every instance of particular providence, we are never to lose sight of general providence which is, according to Edwards, "a mighty wheel whose circumference is so high that it is dreadful with the glory of the God of Israel upon it. In the revolutions of this wheel, events come from God and return to God. They are guided by the Spirit of God; where the Spirit goes they go."[1] Judgment follows mercy and mercy judgment. In the harvest of the world Christ first reaps the golden wheat, or his saints, and then his angel goes forth out of the temple to gather the grapes, or sinners.[2] Great works of grace have ever gone before national judgments. If we are truly wise therefore we will study all the operations of the Spirit in connection with the events of Providence. It is indeed one evidence that we have not the Divine Spirit when we are unable to discern the signs of the times in which we live.[3] We are not, on the other hand, to spend the season which calls for out-door work in the observation of the lesser current events of Providence.[4]

The relation of Providence to temptation we have elsewhere suggested.[5]

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1 Ezek. i, iii., x., xi. 2 Rev. xiv. 14–20. 3 Matt. xvi. 1–3.
4 Eccl. xi. 4. 5 Chap. v., sec. 1.

There are, as we have already hinted, some things relating to the assistance of the Spirit in preaching which must be referred to the Divine Sovereignty. But in respect of this matter we should never forget that the Lord Jesus is head over all things to the Church, and that as he sends to every true believer the Spirit from the Father to abide with him, to be the bond of union between him and Christ, so the Divine Spirit is always present in his heart as a principle of sancatifiction; and hence the preacher, in common with all the faithful, may expect that the Lord will evince his sovereignty in continually bestowing upon him renewing and transforming grace, whatever else he may be pleased to withhold or withdraw from him.[1] Even when the arm cannot perform its office, it is an unspeakable comfort for it to reflect that it is still vitally united to and sustained by the head, and is in fellowship with all the other members of the body. The preacher may, moreover, remember that it is as the "Spirit of Truth," and not as a spirit of utterance, that the inhabitation of the Holy Ghost is promised to Christian prophets.[2] Continually ought he to be learning of Christ, but it is nowhere made his duty to be preaching him continually. John Tauler was not without the inhabitation of the Spirit during that year in which he observed an unbroken silence. But may not the true preacher so "grieve" the Spirit that he will depart? No, for, as Witsius acutely observes, the Spirit is sometimes grieved by the sins of Christians, but then he also grieves them in turn, that having brought them to a salutary repentance he may continue to seal them. Do you then affirm that there is an indwelling of the Spirit which is independent of the use of "the means of grace?" It appears very probable; for do we not need this inhabitation in order to a right choice and use of such means? Before we draw this water, must we not first have drank.(?)[3]

Nor is there anything irreconcilable between the ideas of the Spirit's sovereignty and his inhabitation.[4] The latter does not indeed necessarily include a state of uninterrupted comfort and joy; for our Lord in his discourse to the Eleven at the close of the last supper, assures them that the Helper or the Spirit of Truth already dwells in them,[5] although they are to wait until after his ascension for his joy-giving presence. Neither does it pledge constant ability to preach or immediate and continual success in the work of preach-

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1 John iv. 14; vii. 38; viii. 12; 1 Cor. xii. 12–27.

2 John xiv. 17; xv. 26; xvi. 13. 3 2 Tim. ii. 6.

4 Psa. li. 12; Isa. xl. 13; liv. 10; 1 Cor. xii. 11. 5 John xiv. 17.

ing.[1] For different persons who have nearly equal abilities and faith, and have used the same diligence, are nevertheless found not to have been blessed with the same measure of success. And the same persons have observed that the faithful use of means is apparently not so effectual on some occasions as on others. As in these matters the Free and Sovereign Spirit has not laid himself under any obligations to us, so he has made us accountable neither for inward comfort nor visible success, but for faithfulness only.

The sovereignty of God is no where more manifest than in the applications of sermons, where the Spirit sometimes, all unconsciously to us, may cross our hands so that we bless the hearers we intended to curse, and the contrary. What we meant for refutation the Spirit will perhaps apply as exhortation while he transforms our reproofs into consolations.

The sovereignty of the Spirit is further shown in the choice and treatment of themes. Those preachers who are led by the Spirit fear to discourse on subjects which the worldly-wise suggest to them. We say the worldly-wise, not the spiritually-wise; from the latter they receive gratefully both texts and subjects; for they count such the ministrants of the Holy Ghost. Their dependence on the Divine Spirit is so nearly exclusive that they are forced to will and think and speak in almost entire independence of their unbelieving fellow men. They would receive from God that which they address to man, and not from man that which they communicate to man. Herein the true prophet has ever differed from the false; the former rising superior to mundane motives, was moved in conscience by the Spirit of Truth to declare what was often equally painful to himself and to his hearers; but what was nevertheless of supreme concern to both and to all; the latter like a soothsayer waited to be consulted and bribed by some individual in order to pour forth, as from God, what related chiefly to private and temporal interests. The true "prophecy came not in old time by the will of man,"[2] neither has emperor or pope or bishop any authority to *dictate* to any man of God the theme of his discourse, nor has any human power a right to complain if the theme he has *recommended* be quite neglected or ignored.

As there are certain extraordinary effects of the Spirit's influence which are experienced in connection with semi-inspiration, strictly so-called,—effects which sometimes make it difficult to distinguish between them—we ought to refer these also to the sovereignty of

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[1] Isa. xlix. 5; Ezek. xxxvii. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 7. [2] 2 Peter i. 21; Gal. i. 9–12.

the Holy Ghost.[1] In times of revival the preacher may have a flow of sacred eloquence to which he was before a stranger; he may have such a divine illumination as enables him to reach men's hearts, to discover the true nature of their various experiences, and to understand and apply the Scriptures as no mere study could enable him to understand and apply them; may so prevail in intercession in behalf of individuals or in importunity for particular blessings that he may receive more than he asked of the Lord; may experience that special influence of the Spirit, which imparts a happy assurance of the divine favor, and the seal whose motto is Adoption, and all attendant peace, joy and triumph—the preacher may occasionally be blessed with these and other gracious effects of the Spirit's presence, and yet in his ordinary ministrations from year to year be without such evidence as is satisfactory to himself, that he has the constant assistance of the Holy Ghost which is promised to all true preachers of the Gospel. And it is not a little remarkable that many preachers are more desirous of experiencing those rare and extraordinary effects of the Spirit than to obtain indubitable proofs of that continual semi-inspiration on which the genuineness and efficiency of their preaching so much depend; and of that regular and principled growth in sanctification which prepares for all duties here and all felicities hereafter; not considering that these transports of divine love, these precious seasons of peace, and these gracious impulses of the Spirit are bestowed on us in a sovereign way and according to the secret counsels of the all-wise God, and that while we may lawfully seek them, and the Spirit is free to give or deny them, the promises are not conditioned upon them but upon that faith which incites to daily obedience. To behold the high tide rolling up the long beach from the outer ocean may be more sublime, but it is not of such general interest as to see it filling the little inlets and creeks.

Let us not, however, in the endeavour to fix the true relative value of these higher experiences, allow ourselves to depreciate them below their just worth. If these visits of the Spirit are rare and seemingly arbitrary, they are undoubtedly quite indispensable to some sorts of Christians, and even to many Christians in times of great doubt, temptation, persecution, or other affliction. "We may say," holds Guthrie,[2] "that the special operations of God's Spirit

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[1] John Wesley (see his Journal, May 31st, 1771) mentioned that at peculiar seasons he spoke with a "closeness and pungency which are the gift of God and not to be attained by all the efforts of nature and art united."

[2] The Christian's Great Interest, Pt. i., chap. vi.

in any high degree, are usually communicated to people, after much brokenness of spirit, after singular pains in religious duty, or a time of much suffering for righteousness. Or, if they break in as the rain that waiteth not for man, then they do humble and abase a person, and there are found so many evidences of grace in the man. Or, these things do provoke unto holiness and to have everything answerable and conformable to these manifestations of God. The person under them doth loathe all things besides God's friendship and fellowship; and these things carry in them so much authority and divine superscription whilst they are in the soul, that afterwards they do appear sufficiently to be special communications of God and singular gracious operations of his Spirit." Semi-inspiration, even more than the plenary, perhaps, works connaturally, or in subjection to the constitution and laws of the human mind; so that we cannot usually distinguish its operations from those of our own mental faculties. Hence were not these higher experiences occasionally given to us, we might not always bear in mind as we ought, the awful fact that we are co-working with God, and that however wisely or energetically we preach, or however absorbed in the human and outward aspects of our utterances, still we more or less "strive according to the Spirit's working, which works in us mightily."

And it is well for us and our congregations that these more elevated and ecstatic experiences do not often possess us while we are in the act of preaching; if they did, they would seriously interrupt and mar our public services. The most remarkable instances on record, as those of Howe, Flavel, Edwards, Tennant, and Payson, did not occur during public prayer or preaching, though, in some of these cases, the raptures and ecstacies served afterwards to impart new confidence and solemnity to their souls and their sermons.

Preachers, therefore, of long and varied experience have too profound a reverence for the sovereignty of the Divine Spirit to advise a young man very confidently to expect invariable and immediate success. They know that an archer may, in calm weather, or while a breeze is blowing steadily from one point, almost always hit his mark, but that when the gusts and whirls of a tempest are at large, although he point and plume his shaft with all skill, and draw his bow with the utmost force and precision, yet it depends entirely on the will of the wind whether his arrow shall transfix the mark or be tossed high in the air, only to descend and be broken upon ragged rocks. This sovereignty of the Spirit it is that now humbles the pride of the preacher, or else enables him believingly and gratefully to say, "Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me."

CHAPTER V.

THE MEANS AND CONDITIONS OF INSPIRATION.

Most writers on homiletics have thought it sufficient to take for granted that the young preacher is regenerated; and yet if we may believe (and who can doubt?) the testimony of some English bishops, the blind fondness and ambition of parents are continually crowding into the ranks of the clergy, young men who give very dubious proofs of their conversion; many of whom, on the contrary, afterwards give the clearest evidence that they are content to dwell in the city of Destruction while they are avowedly teaching others how to escape from it—men, consequently, whose preaching during a long ministry is of less moral value than the escaping Pilgrim's one plain, honest, earnest cry, "Life, life, eternal life!" It is strange that any intelligent man should set small store by a change which, while it is pre-eminently the work of the Spirit, is, at the same time, the best of all possible qualifications for the ministry. Neither genius, nor learning, nor labor, nor wealth, nor rank, nor all of these combined, can purchase any substitute for it; nor yet are they able to lend to it any thing that can add to its essential excellence; it is like the legendary aureola that shone around the heads of some of the saints, which shed an equal radiance on the gloom of a cell, the darkness of a dungeon, and the curtained chamber of sickness; but the unearthly brightness of the lambent diadem could not be enhanced in the smallest degree by the gorgeousness of palaces, the glory of universities, or the manifold splendours of cathedrals.

Many parts of Holy Scripture show us how near and influential is the relation of the assistance of the Spirit to the experiences and fruits of regeneration. Thus in regeneration the Divine Spirit creates a thirst which he alone can slake, and a hunger which he alone can appease.[1] They that are unregenerate do not mind the things of the Spirit, nor walk in the Spirit,[2] but his grace in the new birth causes us to mind spiritual things, and makes us willing

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1 Matt. v. 6; John iv. 13–15; Rev. xxi. 6; xxii. 17; Isa. lv. 1.

2 Rom. viii. 4, 5.

to be led by the Spirit. He must inspire in us true faith, and yet it is only through faith in Christ Jesus that we can receive the blessing of Abraham, the promise of the Spirit.[1] This circular motion of divine grace is equally manifest in respect of humility and teachableness. Pride lifts itself up like a fortress against the knowledge of God,[2] while humility is a breach in the wall through which grace enters the soul and brings every thought captive into the kingdom of Christ. This humility is ever attended with that felt poverty of spirit, which according to the Great Prophet secures the kingdom of heaven—a kingdom which is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.[3] The Divine Spirit may *visit* the proud, but he *dwells* with none but the lowly.[4] There again regenerating grace must inspire that Christian virtue whose exercise is necessary to the inhabitation of the Spirit.

The means and conditions of obtaining and keeping inspiration will now be considered.[5]

Section I.—Temptation, Humility and Self-Denial, as Preparations for the Spirit.

Luther mentions Temptation among the three things that make a good preacher. By this he probably intended the successful trial to which the man of God may be subjected alike by adversity and prosperity; we say, successful, for the ordeal through which Balaam passed in the court of Balak, did not leave him as faithful to Jehovah as did that to which Amos was exposed at the chapel of Jeroboam. Moses after forty days of direct communion with the God of Israel on the top of Sinai, descends to break the two tables of the law indignantly against the rocks, while Jonah after three days in the whale, with weeds wrapped about his head and going down to the bottoms of the mountains, is cast forth to walk in the path of unquestioning duty. Peter could fish all night on the lake of Gennesaret, but when he was called to observe a vigil on the Mount of Transfiguration he soon became heavy with sleep. Nor should it be forgotten that, among good men, those who are the most deeply afflicted are not necessarily the most inspired. Job stands forth in Scripture history as a typical example of suffering; and yet

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1 Gal. iii. 14. 2 2 Cor. x. 5. 3 Matt. v. 3; Rom. xiv. 17. 4 Isa. lvii. 14

5 Christian Palmer appears to set a small value on these means; he characterises the assistance of the Spirit as a sign of God which cannot be obtained by a homiletical prescription. (Homilet., 5th ed., p. 13.)

his young prophet Elihu, who is perhaps a stranger to grief, speaks under an inspiration as complete as his.

But still, admit we must, that almost all the inspired men of the Hebrew economy were great sufferers, and appear to have been prepared by sorrow for the performance of their divine work as messengers of the Most High. Our space forbids us to say much on this large subject, but less we cannot consent to do than mention the case of Jeremiah, because we may reasonably conjecture that his afflictions moved him to study and obey the word of God with such good success that his prophetic addresses are perfumed with the Pentateuch and especially with Deuteronomy. If the 119th Psalm was composed by him, as we are convinced it was, it serves to confirm our opinion.[1] If his Scripture knowledge thus ripened by his afflictions did not prepare him for inspiration, it did at any rate, provide most precious materials for the Spirit's burden; it covered the mountain with ripe spice plants, so that when the summer breeze swept over them, it wafted into the valleys 'the smell of a field which the Lord had blessed.'

Of nearly all the great Christian leaders it may likewise be said, that affliction helped to discipline them to be the mighty instruments of the Spirit they eventually became. John Knox says that "trouble and fear are the very spurs of prayer." When Ezekiel, tossed perhaps on the Mediterranean in some staunch ship of Tyre, watched the mast as it leaned stiffly away from the Levanter, he might have felt certain that it could not be strained from its base, when he remembered that it was on the sides of Lebanon that winter had taught its gnarled roots stoutly to grasp the crags, its branches to struggle triumphantly with the whirlwind, and its body to lean permanently away, much as he saw it now, from the point whence the winter annually returned. God has sometimes given to the churches men toughened and hardened by a similar discipline; and particularly whenever their cry to him has been: "Let thy hand be upon the man of thy right hand, upon the son of man whom thou madest strong for thyself."

But inviting to the Divine Spirit as adversities often are, we are not thence to conclude that they always are so; when frequent or long continued, they may, if not accompanied by countervailing grace, make a man proud, contentious, jealous, and morose. Melancholy is not attractive to the Holy Spirit. Luther, who knew too well whereof he affirmed, stigmatized it as the "bath of Satan."

Prosperity, too, has its temptations; but these are not, as in the

[1] Psalm cxix., 67, 71.

case of adversity, counterpoised by many advantages. That competence and honour are apt to grieve the Spirit and foster materialism might be shown from the history of Divinity schools; beginning with the school of the prophets which having, it would seem, reached a state of peace and plenty during the closing years of Elijah's rectorship, no sooner had he ascended to heaven than they must needs send a committee of muscular men to search through valley and mountain for his body lying somewhere here below, scathed, sunk together, perhaps dead; his charioteering, like that of Phæthon, necessarily ending in a down-hill road! The trials incident to prosperity may be met by the preacher, who diligently uses the means and conditions of inspiration we here consider.

We have, just two pages back, mentioned humility as a condition favourable to the presence of the Spirit. If therefore we would be inspired we have to wage continual war against pride. We speak advisedly when we say continual war; for when pride is driven from one fortress, it retires to another, and as a last resort it sometimes entrenches itself in the assurance of the co-operation of the Divine Spirit. How soon will the Paraclete leave us if we make his gracious presence an occasion of nourishing pride. For what can be more hurtful to us than the grace which we exercise only for the puffing up of this Satanic enemy of grace. It is this vice that, more than any other, grieves the Spirit; for as by pride cometh contention,[1] so the irascible passions which pride begets and fosters are a grief to the living Spirit of all grace. The injunction not to grieve the Spirit is immediately followed by another, to put away these malignant and vindictive passions.[2] To the humble, on the contrary, the Holy Spirit gives more and more grace because they alone can use it without abusing it.[3] Even the pagan Greeks had some notion of this matter; for they believed that it was on account of his boasting that their prophet Tiresias was smitten with blindness.

The inspiration of the Spirit is also invited by the exercise of self-denial and self-mortification.[4] By this we do not mean self-inflicted pain, but the exercise of moderation in matters of lawful indulgence. "It is surprising," says John Owen, "how a little necessary diversion will unfit the mind for the work of the ministry." For this reason preachers and students for the ministry have to defend themselves against levity and frivolousness. These are among the things that grieve the Holy Spirit.[5]

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[1] Prov. xiii. 10. [2] Eph. iv. 30, 31. [3] Jas. iv. 5–10.
[4] Rom. v. 13; viii. 5–13; Col. iii. 5; Gal. v. 24; Titus ii. 11–14.
[5] Eph. iv. 29, 30; v. 4.

We may indeed observe days of secret fasting as a matter of high moral expediency;[1] but the most difficult and necessary work is to practise habitual self-control and to abstain daily from whatever tends to provoke the passions, darken the mind, or subject the soul to the body. This duty includes not only the subjugation of the appetites and abstinence from luxurious self-indulgence and excess, but a putting away of pride, vanity, discontent, fretfulness, avarice, rancour, uncharitableness, and all other sinful habits and passions. That such was the notion of fasting entertained by the early churches appears from the following extract of a letter from Paulinus of Nola to Celantia, a Roman lady of rank and piety. "Beware," writes he, "lest when you have begun to practise fasting or abstinence, you imagine you are already holy; for this observance is but the instrument, not the completion of holiness. But, above all things, take care that in learning to despise things that are allowed, you do not foster a presumptuous security as to things which are positively forbidden. Whatever we may offer to God beyond what duty requires, should not hinder but further the doing of the duties God has enjoined. What can it avail us to attenuate the body by abstinence, if at the same time we suffer the soul to be puffed up with pride? What praise shall we deserve by making ourselves pale with fasting, if at the same time we become livid through envy? What virtue is there in abstaining from wine, if we suffer ourselves to be intoxicated with anger or hatred? Then and then only is abstinence excellent, then only is the chastisement of the body beautiful and admirable, when the soul is made to keep the fast by renouncing all its sins."

But let us never forget that sin is best vanquished not by the attack up the hill from our mere human forces, but down the hill, from our divine allies; and that far better than occasional seasons of fasting (though these are useful when strictly and wisely observed) is the cultivation of a habit of promptly and regularly obeying the impulses of the Spirit in all things. It is not enough for us now and then to kneel or stand and speak in the Spirit. The apostle says: "*Walk* in the Spirit and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh."[2]

Partial or ministerial inspiration is likewise invited by a timely excitation and constant exercise of our gifts. The inspirations of the Spirit, like the dictates of conscience, must be obeyed, otherwise they will at length cease to move us. David encouraged himself in

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[1] Dan. ix. 3; x. 2, 3, 12, 21; Ezra viii. 21; Neh. i. 4; Luke ii. 37.

[2] Gal. v. 16–25.

the Lord.[1] He said to his son Solomon, "Arise and be doing, and the Lord shall be with thee."[2] And Solomon himself was moved by the Divine Spirit to say: "The soul of the sluggard desireth and hath not, but the soul of the diligent shall be made fat."[3] At a time when Judah had apostatised the prophet Isaiah said to the Lord: "Thou meetest him that rejoiceth and worketh righteousness," but at the same time he had to lament, "There is none that stireth up himself to take hold on thee."[4] God commanded Ezekiel to exert his natural powers when he said to him: "Son of man stand upon thy feet," yet the prophet adds, "the Spirit entered into me when he spake unto me, and set me upon my feet."[5] Timothy was set apart for his work by clear prophetic indications; but this did not prevent Paul from exhorting him to give attendance to reading, to exhortation, and to teaching, and so "not neglect the gift that was in him."[6] On another occasion, when the young man was tempted to take counsel of his fears and refrain from preaching, the apostle again wrote to him, saying: "Stir up the gift of God which is in thee, . . . for God hath not given us the spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind."[7] The word, *stir up*, in the original, sometimes signifies *blow into a flame*. Once more does the apostle exhort him in the words following: "Thou, therefore, my son, be strong in the grace that is in Christ Jesus."[8] To advise one to be strong is, among other things, to advise him to take such exercise as is necessary to an increase of vigour.

And accordingly we read that a contempt and consequent neglect of prophesyings is called a quenching (or extinguishing the flame) of the Spirit: "Quench not the Spirit. Despise not prophesyings."[9] It was through the preaching of Enoch, Noah, and other prophets, that the Spirit of the Lord strove with mankind before the flood.[10] As, therefore, in case we refuse to preach or to hear preaching when we ought, we quench the sacred flame of zeal which the Spirit kindles in the preacher, so when with the aid of the Spirit we exhort men to repentance, the Paraclete within us may properly be said to strive with them, while we instrumentally strive with them, and by striving grow active, stout, and skilful preachers. Jesus wonderfully assists those who preach salvation through his atoning blood. Bunyan testifies that it was while he was preaching justifi-

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1 1 Sam. xxx. 6; Psa. xlii. 5.; lvii. 8. 2 1 Chron. xxii 16.
3 Prov. xiii. 4. 4 Isa. lxiv. 5–7. 5 Ezek. ii. 1, 2.
6 1 Tim. iv. 13, 14. 7 2 Tim. i. 7. 8 2 Tim. ii. 1.
9 1 Thes. v. 19, 20. 10 Gen. iv. 26; vi. 3; Psa. xcix. 6.

cation by faith that it was as if an angel of God stood at his back to encourage him.[1]

The relations of intellectual discipline and the assistance of the Spirit it is somewhat difficult to define; for while it is clear that divine grace is friendly to the cultivation of the intellect, it is not so manifest that intellectual cultivation, when carried beyond certain limits, and pursued for certain ends, is promotive of true piety. The student may indeed be told that by enlarging his intellectual capacities he is spreading wider sails before the breath of Heaven. But he should rather be told that infinitely more important than the question of the extent of sail, is that of the haven he has determined to make, and that of the chart he has chosen wherewith to regulate his voyage. Here, as everywhere else, we ought to seek *first* the kingdom of heaven. "The natural man," though he be thoroughly disciplined and profoundly learned as to mere intellect, "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." There is a spiritual perception which no intellectual training can either plant or cultivate. We do not say that it cannot be cultivated. No, we do not say this. Only it must be cultivated directly, and not indirectly. The education of the astronomer by which he is enabled to discover the golden treasures that are hid in the fields of immensity, is not more different from that of the poet or painter, by which he is enabled to discover the beauties and sublimities of the terraqueous globe, than the education of either of these is different from that of the Christian as such. The sources, rules and means of spiritual culture are, for the most part, quite distinct from, though not antagonistic to, those of intellectual culture. Hence it is only when the intellect is disciplined and stored, as a matter of secondary importance, and for benevolent and other Christian uses, that it can be said to be promotive of piety or friendly to the inspirations of the Holy Ghost.

None are less frequently visited by the Spirit of all grace than those who neglect great intellectual gifts and attainments. The man that has but one talent is the most liable to bury it; but if the man that has ten buries them all, his guilt is greater because his temptation is less. There is a deep and lurid meaning in the oriental belief that vipers brood over buried treasures.

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1 Grace Abounding, §282.

Section II.—The Study of Scripture and Meditation as Aids to Inspiration.

Another means of obtaining this assistance of the Spirit is the study of the Scriptures with a view to our own improvement as *Christians*, and not as preachers. They err who say that the Paraclete operates *only* through the inspired Word of God, and yet it is safe to say that the diligent study of Holy Writ for our own edification is likely to keep the Spirit with us as an interpreter of his own compositions. As it was, perhaps, through the sacred word that he first came to us, so we may hope that through the same word he will continue to visit us. And with what consistency or confidence can they, who neglect the study of the Spirit's compositions pray for his illuminations; if they despise the light he has already granted them, how can they have the presumption to importune him for additional light! The souls to whom the Comforter has given a new birth, naturally turn to the breast of their mother: 'as new-born babes, they desire the pure milk of the word, that they may grow thereby.' Nor can there be any ministerial growth and enduring usefulness without such study and self-application. Truly blessed is that preacher whose delight is in the law of the Lord; and in his law doth meditate day and night. "He shall be like a tree planted by rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither; and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper." His mind shall be supplied with truth from a perennial source. A prevailing spiritual drought shall not cause his sermons to lose their freshness. And though they be not immediately and always, yet they shall be seasonably and ultimately, fruitful and prosperous.

II. To the experimental study of the Scriptures we ought to add deep meditation according to the example of David in the Psalm last quoted, and of Jeremiah in the 119th Psalm. Ezekiel was commanded to eat the prophetic roll before he went to speak to the house of Israel.[1] The busy preacher is continually exposed to the temptation of allowing the most momentous and affecting truths to pass directly from his intellect to his tongue without first baptizing them in the heart. He needs a certain amount of Scripture matter to convey to his hearers every week, or perhaps every day for a season, and he therefore has hardly finished the composition of one sermon before he has commenced another. His reading and study have crowded his mind with a multitude of striking ideas, from

[1] Ezek. iii. 1–3.

which he is anxious to make a judicious selection and to arrange in due order. Thus fully occupied in receiving and forwarding new ideas, he is forming habits which are hostile to those of meditation. He is ready, fluent, various and exhaustless, but not weighty, not in sober earnest, not profoundly stirred by his theme. Nor is this all; after studying and preaching in this hasty and superficial way for a considerable period, the style and delivery become incapable of conveying in a tender, solemn, and moving manner, the more important thoughts which God has communicated to us in the sacred books. But by the opposite practice, that of deeply pondering the Scriptures, digesting their truths, nourishing our own hearts with them, and so making them, in some sense, our own, we preserve that honesty of style and delivery which will do something like common justice to divine thoughts. The inspired advice of Solomon is, "Hear the words of the wise and apply thine heart unto my knowledge. For it is a pleasant thing, if thou keep them within thee; they shall withal be fitted in thy lips."[1] Yes, "they shall withal be fitted in thy lips." These divine thoughts shall be fitted to thy words, as apples of gold are fitted to their net works of silver which are next to them in place and in value, and so skilfully inlaid as to appear to have grown out of them. Luther was more a man of meditation than of action. *Meditatio* was one leaf in that trefoil which, as he believed, constituted the character of the true preacher, and "suggests more, much more, than all our commentators united." It was this meditation which by gradually filling the mind of the great Reformer with a holy electricity, gave occasion for Melancthon to write, "O, Luther, all thy words are thunderbolts!" Of Jonathan Edwards, another man given to habits of meditation, it is said that when he preached "his words were full of ideas and betrayed a great degree of inward fervor." William Bridge,[2] one of the greatest of the Puritan preachers, and whose sermons, lately republished, are still models of Scriptural richness, vivacity, and popular illustration, says of meditation that it is the fruit of Christ's grace, a great help to knowledge, a great friend to the memory, holy conference, and growth in grace, the sister of reading, and the mother of prayer, keeping the heart from sinful thoughts and tuning it for every duty.

But, after all, what avails meditation unless it warms our hearts, and we can say with the Psalmist, "While I was musing, the fire burned." Thomas Aquinas[3] distinguishes meditation from contem-

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[1] Prov. xxii. 18, 19. [2] Works in 5 vols. 8vo., Tegg, London, 1845.
[3] Summa ii. 2, qu. 180, Art. 1 and 4.

plation; the former according to the "Angelical Doctor," is such an attentive consideration of a truth, and such an examination of its various parts and reasonings upon them as to excite wonder; the latter adds to the act of the intellect required in meditation an act of the will, that is to say, an act of love or affection. Let us not fall short of contemplation in the old scholastic sense of the word. Let us hold up before our minds the beauties, the glories, and all the divine excellences of Scripture personages and doctrines, until we admire and love them, until we desire to declare their praises, and to bring all men to share our complacency and reverence. Especially will such contemplation, if directed to the Holy Spirit, enable us to set that high value on his inspirations which, as Robert Hall thought, is the very first means of obtaining them. He admits, indeed, that the first inspiration of grace must procede this sense of its value; "for," he adds, "it can only be possessed in any adequate degree by those who have tasted that the Lord is gracious. 'I am found of them that sought me not;' but in subsequent donations, the Lord seems very much to regulate his conduct by a rule of bestowing his richest favours where he knows they are most coveted and will be most prized."

But then comes the thought that this is but the divine side of contemplation. From thus basking in the eternal sunshine, we do well if we timefully arise and go down into the valleys where rests the darkness, or at best the broken daylight, of guilt or sickness, poverty or sorrow, or death. We do not say that such objects of thought are absolutely best for us; no, to learn of the Master is a better and more enduring part than to serve him and his; but notably that humanity which is most considerate and exertional is ever coming from the presence of the great Teacher, and going back to him again. He who loves the Son of God most, will most love man, and "the love of the Spirit" will most frequently and largely inspire those who serve as internuncioes between the two.

It is another good preparative to regard admiringly the works of Creation.

> . . . . . "Earth's crammed with heaven,
> And every common bush afire with God;
> But only he who sees, takes off his shoes;
> The rest sit round it and pluck blackberries."—*Mrs. Browning.*

And therefore we may profitably follow Moses and Elijah when driven to Mount Horeb, or Amos dwelling among the herdmen of Tekoa, and John the Baptist among the rocks and trees of Judea, or even David and Jeremiah while they could only sigh aloud for refuge in the wilderness.

For the rest, we shall find that musings on the Providence of

God will be of foremost service in piling together and kindling that incense of prayer which we are now to consider.

Section III.—Prayer as Asking the Help of the Spirit.

Over and over again are we told in Scripture that the Holy Spirit dwells in believers; and yet, truth to tell, he may abide in some believers, much as the Greenland missionary lives when driven into winter quarters, where the windows of his hut are darkened by frost-work and icicles, and his door blocked up by snow. Though we cannot pray aright without the assistance of the Paraclete while praying, yet may we warrantably ask that assistance both in praying and in preaching. For when we have his gracious presence we may, at the same time, be deeply sensible that we have not that presence as intimately, as effectually, and as abidingly, as it is our duty and our privilege to possess it. Hence prayer for these objects is always timely and reasonable.

Of the advantages of such prayer the examples are abundant. As our Lord was always full of the Holy Ghost, he needed not to pray for his inspirations, and yet his teachings prove that our Heavenly Father has ever an affectionate readiness to grant the Comforter to our filial requests, and that in this one gift is enfolded all other benefits;[1] agreeably to the words of the apocryphal tradition ascribed to our Divine Master, "Ask the great things and the small things shall be added unto you; ask heavenly things and earthly things shall be added unto you." We have not an example of a prophet asking the Divine Spirit for himself. It is, however, well deserving of note that it was during or after prayer that certain revelations were made to Isaiah and Jeremiah, Daniel and Micah, Zechariah, Peter and Paul.[2] As true prophecy "came not by the will of man," so it was not proper for ancient men of God to desire plenary inspiration for its own sake, nor invoke it at their own pleasure. But some Scriptures express and many imply that these men prayed often and fervently for the fruits of the sanctifying Spirit to prepare them to act, to suffer, and to preach.

The greatest of the Christian fathers were in the habit of praying for the Holy Spirit to enable them to preach. Chrysostom,[3] in the introduction of one of his homilies, says that prayer should come before preaching, and quotes the example of Paul invoking

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1 Cf. Matt. vii. 7–11; Luke xi. 9–13.

2 Isa. xxxvii. 4, 14; Jer. xxxii. 16–25, 26–35; Dan. ix.; Mich. vii. 14–17; Zech. iv. 4; vi. 4, etc.; 2 Cor. xii. 8, 9; Acts x. 9–16; xxvii. 21–26; xxii. 17, 18. 3 Hom. De Incomprehensibile Dei Natura.

God in the beginning of his epistles. Gregory Nazianzen prayed, saying, "Lord, I am an instrument for thee to play upon." And Augustine advises the minister before moving his tongue to raise his thirsty soul to God, that having himself drank, he may possess a supply for others, and be able to pour forth to them from the fulness he has himself received.[1] The same father often invokes the Spirit in his homilies. In one of them he says: "Being thus embarrassed, whither can I go but to the footstool of divine grace. There I now offer my prayer that the Holy Ghost would give me something to speak worthy of himself—something by which I may both do my duty and supply your wants."[2] It was a very common thing for the fathers, at the beginning of their sermons, to offer short prayers, or "invocations," for the assistance of the Holy Spirit in behalf of preacher and hearer.

The Reformers were not ignorant of this great secret of success in preaching. Almost too familiar to quote are those words of Luther, "*Bene orasse est bene studuisse.*" He exhorted Spalatin to begin his studies with earnest prayer: "for," added he, "there is no interpreter of the divine word but its own author." "Very frequently," said he, "in venturing upon something, by beginning the matter with fervent prayer, I have advanced beyond the usual limits; by using them as a bridge, and by the special help of God I have prospered and obtained a happy issue." While he was shut up in the castle at Coburg, having more time for devotion than his public duties had usually allowed him, he daily spent in prayer the three hours that were the most convenient for study.[3] "If," said he, "I should neglect prayer for a single day, I should lose a great deal of the fire of faith." John Knox was as frequent as he was mighty in prayer. John Welch, his son-in-law, considered no day well improved in which he did not spend seven or eight hours in prayer. He would at times retire to the church of Ayr, which was some distance from the town, and there pass whole nights in communion with God—a custom that made his enemies call him a wizard. He would sometimes express wonder that any Christian could lie abed all night and not rise to pray. While pastor of a church in a French village, where he was living in exile, a friar, who lodged two nights at his house, was converted to the Protestant faith by overhearing him as he whispered his midnight prayers. And this holy man's ministerial success was proportional to his prayerfulness. Many years after his death, the famous David

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1 De Doct. Christ, L. iv., c. 15. 2 Hom. De Tempore.

3 Melch. Adam, in vita Lutheris, pp. 138–142.

Dickson, who was enabled to convert great numbers at Irvine, and in adjacent towns, was often heard to say: "The grape gleanings at Ayr, in Mr. Welch's time, were far above the vintage at Irvine in my own day." Rev. Robert Boyd,[1] who knew him well, says, "He was a man filled with the Holy Ghost."

Another celebrated Scottish minister, Robert Bruce, was in the habit of praying most earnestly before preaching. We are told that his chief preparation was lifting up his mind into a holy and reverential mood, and pouring out his heart before God in wrestling prayer. The renowned John Livingstone says that of all the sermons he ever heard and read he was the most profited by those of the three preachers last mentioned.

Of his own preaching Livingstone says: "I never preached a sermon which I would be earnest to see again in print but two; the one was on Monday after the communion of Shotts, and the other on Monday after the communion at Holywood, and both these times I had spent the whole night before in conference and prayer with some Christians, without any more than ordinary preparation. About five hundred were awakened by the sermon preached at the kirk of Shotts."

Among the other illustrious names that united much prayer with study, we may mention John Bradford, the martyr, and the most eloquent perhaps of all the preachers of his day; Joseph Alleine, whose prophetic fire enlightens and sanctifies his imperishable writings; Whitefield, who studied his Bible on his knees, praying as he read and pondered the sacred page; Charles Simeon, who not unfrequently spent whole nights in importunity and intercession, and Edward Payson, who, eminent as he had been as a man of prayer, yet in his last days was heard to declare that if he had to live his life over again, he should choose to spend half of it in prayer. Prayer brings, among other gifts, the needed illumination.[2]

On some mysterious themes the preacher should refuse to speak until he has made them subjects of prayer for many days. He may have to pray the seventh time before the cloud rise out of the sea like a man's hand, and seventy times seven before the sky be black with clouds and a great rain set in. "Is there," says John Wesley, "a doubt concerning the meaning of what I read? Does any thing appear dark or intricate? I lift up my heart to the Father of Lights. Lord, is it not thy word, 'If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God?' 'Thou givest liberally and upbraidest not.' Thou hast said, 'If any man be willing to do thy will, he shall know.'

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[1] Life of Boyd, by Wodrow, p. 263. [2] Prov. xxviii. 5.

I am willing to do, let me know thy will.'" "Study yourself dead and pray yourself alive again," was Adam Clarke's reply to a student who asked, "How shall I prepare my sermons?"

In examining such examples as these (and they might be greatly multiplied), some cautions will not be useless. It is not impossible that hundreds of obscure but very useful preachers have surpassed any of those mentioned, in the fervency, the length, the frequency, and the timeliness of their secret prayers; but they were so fortunate as to keep them strictly secret, and so prudent as not to tell their friends how much time they spent in such pious exercises. Nor from the fact that a preacher is distinguished for his *gifts* in public prayer, should we too confidently infer that he necessarily exercises his *graces* in frequent and long-continued secret prayer. Some of the Pharisees must have possessed very popular gifts in public prayer, otherwise they would not have been so ready and anxious to display them in places of concourse.

Another thing: in his anxiety to secure divine assistance for *himself* the preacher should not forget that little success, beyond the applause of the people, is to be achieved unless the Divine Spirit is not only in his heart but in the hearts of the auditors as well. Preaching wins its greatest victories when the Holy Spirit broods equally over the speaker and the congregation. As the Divine Spirit is very God, he is *essentially* present alike in all, while he is graciously present in those only whom he enlightens, or regenerates, or sanctifies, or in some manner blesses. It is with the latter that we here have to do.

He may sometimes vouchsafe his gracious assistance to the preacher, while he may justly withdraw it from his hearers. Enoch, Noah, and perhaps other faithful prophets, preached righteousness to the antediluvians, who strove with, and successfully resisted the Paraclete, to their destruction. And some of the later prophets preached in vain, because the people would not hear, or if they heard, would not obey the truth. Ezekiel[1] had admiring auditors who listened to his sermons as they would to very lovely songs "of one that hath a pleasant voice and can play well on an instrument." They heard his words but did not heed and apply them. Their hearts went after their covetousness. And according to the vision of the Dry Bones,[2] it was one thing for Jehovah to move Ezekiel to prophesy to the dry bones, so that they shook, and came together, and took upon them flesh; and another thing, while as yet there was no breath in them, for the prophet to say to the wind, "Thus saith the

[1] Chap. xxxiii. 31, 32. [2] Chap. xxxvii. 1–14.

Lord God: Come from the four winds, O breath," etc. And the prophet Micah, being called to rebuke the people for covetousness, injustice, oppression, and idolatry, appeals to them thus: "O thou that art named the house of Jacob, is the Spirit of the Lord straitened? Are these his doings? Do not my words do good to him that walketh uprightly?[1] The only rational cause we can assign for the comparatively small immediate success of our Divine Master's preaching was, that while he was full of the Holy Ghost himself, the people in general were devoid of grace. His warning at the close of his Sermon on the Mount proves that it was possible for some of his hearers to find in his sayings nothing but foundations of sand upon which to build false hopes. Stephen was certainly filled with the Divine Spirit while his murderers were inspired with hatred. The apostle Paul contrasts his spiritual state with that of the Church at Corinth.[2] Then again some, but not all, may be willing to receive the grace of the Spirit, as on the occasions when Lydia, Dionysius, and Damaris were converted.

In other cases, on the contrary, the congregation, but not the preacher, has the gracious presence of the Spirit. When the pastor is graceless, we may reasonably infer that the generality of his flock are in the same state of spiritual destitution; otherwise how are we to account for the fact of their having called, or for their continuing to hear such a preacher?[3] This is the more probable, because in choosing such a pastor they have virtually, if not actually, rejected the ministrations of some true man of God. But this is not (the Lord be praised for it) always the case; and we may well believe that some pastors have been converted in answer to the prayers of one or two of their believing people, while others were indebted to the secret intercessions of such for all their efficiency and success.

A third moral condition has already been intimated, namely, that wherein the Comforter assists neither preacher nor people. The Holy Spirit, in ancient days, spoke through more than one of the false prophets, and in all ages there may have been *individuals* who received occasionally what might be termed ministerial grace, and nothing better. Howbeit, in general must it be affirmed that the Spirit is promised to such *assemblies* only as meet in the name of Jesus; nor can his gracious presence be granted to other meetings except in the way of uncovenanted mercy—meetings that, from indifference to the name of Jesus, may be denied all the blessings,

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[1] Micah ii. 7; [2] 2 Cor. vi. 12, 13; xii. 15.

[3] Hosea iv. 6-9; Micah, ii. 11; 2 Tim. iv. 3, 4.

of which their minister, however godly, might otherwise have been the channel. Some of the holy prophets were left without divine communications on account of the sins of the people.[1] Every true preacher is more inclined to attribute the want of the inspiring presence of the Spirit to his own faults than to the faults of his congregation; and yet to the latter must sometimes be referred the discouragements arising from a want of liberty while conducting divine services.

Let not the preacher, then, imagine that he alone needs the Paraclete, or that, though he may expect ministerial grace, he can monopolise divine assistance. And while the ministry have the promise of that peculiar aid which their holy service demands, yet they cannot claim even this assistance as a permanent help, secured to them by virtue of their office, and independently of the faithful discharge of their duties. The preacher who entertains the delusion that the Spirit resides chiefly with himself, to the exclusion of the greater part of his lay brethren, puffs himself up with a guilty and dangerous self-conceit. How ineffectual will be his best labours unless the Divine Spirit direct not only his preaching, but the people's hearing. Let the preacher, therefore, pray for his hearers.[2] The apostle Paul prayed not only for himself, but for his converts and brethren as well, and begs them to pray that he may have gracious aid in his ministrations. For a pastor not to abound in prayer for the Divine Spirit's co-operation in the hearts of his flock were a great omission and delinquency. If he is a man of faith he will sooner resign his charge than cease to intercede for it; because he knows that the feeblest intercessions are frequently of as much benefit as the most eloquent preaching. He remembers that when a just God visited Judah with various judgments for her sins, one of these judgments was the withdrawal of the intercessions of Jeremiah.[3] Father Augustine counsels the preacher to pray not only for himself, but for those whom he is about to address, and says that if he is heard understandingly, willingly, and obediently, he is indebted for this more to his pious prayers than his oratorical powers.[4] He begins one of his homilies with this invocation: "May the Lord assist me by your prayers to speak what I ought to speak and what you ought to hear." In another homily he requests the

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[1] 1 Sam. xxviii. 6; Psa. lxxiv. 9; Lam. ii. 9; Ezek. vii. 26.

[2] "The minister's immediate work may be divided into two parts: first, dealing with the people on God's behalf; secondly, with God on behalf of the people." (William Ames, Medulla Theologica, L. i., c. xxxv., sec. 10.)

[3] Jer. vii. 16; ix. 14; xiv. 11.

[4] De Doct. Christ, Lib. iv., chap. xv.

people to assist him with their prayers, not only for his sake, but for their own. And Melancthon, in his sermon on the death of Luther, testifies concerning the great Reformer: "I have often happened to drop in when he offered his prayers for the whole Church with tears." And well may every man of God make intercession for his flock with tears when he considers how many good sermons have been seemingly lost because they were not mixed with faith in them that heard them; how few honest and good hearts there are in the largest and best of congregations, and

> "With what cracked pitchers go we to deep wells
> In this world."

A prayerless Church must, in spite of our preaching to the contrary, gradually learn to entertain low views of Christ; but a praying Church will exalt him more and more: while Jacob was wrestling in the night, he thought it was a mere *man* he was trying to master, but when the sun rose on the supplicant, he said, "I have seen *God* face to face."

As to the advantages of such prayers we will advance only a few thoughts and those principally in an indirect way. As prayer brings inspiration, so the neglect of prayer leaves the preacher without inspiration, and consequently a prey to unprofitableness. Mind, culture, genius, study, eloquence, all go for nothing, or something worse, without a gracious inspiration. A legend,[1] often repeated, teaches much the same lesson respecting unction. "A celebrated preacher was expected to hold forth at a certain priory church, but fell sick. The prior being unprepared, was in great distress; but at the moment the time of service arrived, there came to the door of the priory a stranger in the garb of the order, and said to him, 'I hope that God by me will supply your want. Let me go into your library a few minutes.' Walking in, he turned over the *Summa* of *St. Thomasius* and the works of *Albertus Magnus;* and in a few minutes he was ready. He came out, and ascending the pulpit, he talked marvellously well on the joys of paradise, the pains of hell, etc.; insomuch that he melted all to tears by his eloquence. But there was present a holy man who recognized him, and while he wondered at his audacity, he waited to mark the result. After the sermon he went forward and spoke to *Frater Diabolus*, saying, 'O, thou accursed one, thou vile dreamer, how couldst thou take this upon thee?' He replied, 'Think you that my discourse would prevent a single soul from seeking eternal damnation. No, never. The most finished elo-

[1] Found in the *Magnum Speculum*, but borrowed from St. Antonius of Florence.

quence and the most profound learning are worthless in comparison of a single drop of unction. In my sermon unction there was none.'" We suspect that for once the "holy man" was much mistaken; for so modest an estimate of the sermon and so luminous an opinion were less suitable to the prince of darkness than to some good preacher and justly distinguished. At any rate, the moral of this legend deserves to be frequently brought to mind.

One or two things more: prayer serves to counteract the tendency of the studious preacher to form notions of revealed truth that are merely intellectual, theoretical, and lifeless. A busy thinker may fill many of his sermons with apprehensions of Scripture that are beautiful, grand, wonderful, and glorious; but, if at the same time, he expresses little or no relish for the moral perfections, graces, and virtues which Holy Writ exhibits, what is he better than a skeleton holding forth a sword curiously damaskeened, sharp, and wonderfully elastic; but cold, simulated, misplaced, and useless. He says, perhaps, "I must provide beaten oil for the lamps of the sanctuary," and says only this, forgetting the incense demanded by the Levitical law, and that prayer is an incense, and as such is not only acceptable to the Lord Jesus but diffusive of a holy redolence over all the preparations and public services of the minister. He forgets that the high priest was commanded to burn incense on the altar in the morning when he dressed the sacred lamps, and at evening when he lighted them.[1] Why was he required to do this *at these hours*, unless it was for the purpose of deodorizing the oil, the wicks and the smoke. Be this as it may, certain it is that the incense of prayer removes all fetor from the intellectual lamp, both when it is trimmed in the study and when it is lighted in the pulpit.

And this suggests our final thought that not a few preachers are tempted to neglect the duty of *timeliness* in their secret prayers; in other and more explicit words, to go on shortening their time for prayer and lengthening their time for study as the hour for preaching draws nigh. And yet prayer is really more needful then than at any other season, as the incense was more agreeable at evening than in the morning; at the morning service, the perfume rising from opening flowers would many a time have somewhat compensated for the want of it, but after the evening sacrifice, while flowers were closing, the dew descending, and smoke mounting in clouds from the wicks, the holy incense was indispensable to the sweetness of the worship. Go therefore into the pulpit not from study but from prayer.

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1 Exod. xxx. 7, 8; Psa. cxli. 2; Luke i. 10; Rev. viii. 3, 4.

Section IV.—Praise as Waiting for the Aid of the Spirit.

The first office of the preacher is, according to Luther, to show forth the praises of God. This is one of the weapons which in his controversy with the Papists about their pretensions to an external priesthood, the great Reformer drew forth and wielded with his usual power. But unhappily the passage (1 Peter ii. 9) whence he drew this weapon, does not warrant the inference he educed from it, that all believers are priests in such a sense that all are *thereby* authorized publicly to teach the Scriptures;[1] much less the inference of some of his disciples that a congregation is *thereby* guaranteed the right, as spiritual priests, to call men to the work of the ministry. The spiritual priesthood of the Gospel preacher also includes the act of presenting his converts as a living sacrifice to God. (Rom. xv. 16.)

The true doctrine concerning the spiritual and universal priesthood is, as it appears to us, that all men ought to perform the sacerdotal duty of offering themselves as living sacrifices to God, and have a right to join in the public praises of God. They are permitted, as the Levitical choirs were, to offer spiritual sacrifices, that is to say, sacrifices of holy joy, adoration, and thanksgiving.[2] In this spiritual sense all believers are prophets also; for praise was one of the duties of the prophet no less than of the priest. So fully was this recognized that singing divine praise was sometimes called prophesying, and female singers were called prophetesses.[3] In this sense was fulfilled, on the day of Pentecost, when holy women joined in praising the wonderful works of God, the prophecy of Joel, "Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy." Teaching was a work common to priest and prophet with this difference, that the priest taught the Law of Moses didactically and theoretically,[4]

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1 *Opera*, Walch ed., vol. xvi., p. 2791, concerning Councils and Churches; also letter to the Burgomaster Council and Church of Prague. Id., vol. x. p. 1858, and his Commentary on 1 Peter ii. 9; Opp., vol. li., p. 400.

2 Psa. cvii. 22; Hos. xiv. 2; Rev. i. 5, 6; v. 9, 10; xx. 6.

3 Exod. xv. 20; Judges iv. 4; Luke ii. 36.

4 Lev. x. 10; Malachi ii. 7. 8. It has been overlooked that the Hebrew priests had to instruct their younger fellows in the observance of the Levitcal rites. As many a time, in a formative state of society, the prophet would likewise serve as priest, it is likely enough that sacredotal duties engaged some attention in the "Schools of the Prophets." The Vestal virgins of Rome had their lives divided into three parts: in the first, they learned the ceremonies of religion; in the second, they performed them; in the third, they taught the younger Vestals (*Plutarch*, An Seni Gerenda Repub., p. 795, ed. Reiskii). Were a like method now pursued by clergymen it would promote Christian knowledge very considerably.

while the prophet taught that Law not only didactically and theoretically, but experimentally and practically. That the public teaching of Scripture is not the duty of all who belong to the spiritual and universal priesthood and prophetry, may be fairly concluded from the fact that holy women are expressly forbidden to serve the primitive churches as public teachers of religion.[1] Indeed Luther himself,[2] in his later years, came round to much the same position that we here maintain.

These being the spiritual sacrifices which the royal priesthood, as such, have the privilege of offering to God, let us not hold in low esteem this part of divine service. Dr. G. Eberle,[3] in writing on this declaration of Luther, says: "However grating this may sound to many ears, it is nevertheless unquestionably true. It is in harmony with the first petition of the Lord's prayer, and with the seventeenth chapter of John's Gospel: for as God is infinitely exalted above all creatures, so, also, must his honour and praise stand high above even the salvation of the individual man." These words of Eberle are in the main just and important; only he has no warrant to bring the preaching of the Gospel into competition with the proclamation of God's praise. Each is equally important in its time and place. The blessed John Livingstone[4] is nearer the truth when he says, "Alas! for the capital crime of the Lord's people—barrenness of praises. O, how fully am I persuaded that a line of praises is worth a leaf of prayer, and an hour of praises is worth a day of fasting and mourning! Yet there is room enough for both. But O! what a massy piece of glory on earth is it to have praises looking, as it were, out at the eyes, praises written upon the fore-brow; to have the very breath smelling of praises, to have praises engraven on the palms of the hands, and the impression of praises on every footstep of the walk." Of the saintly and very influential Joseph Alleine we are told that the greater part of his public devotions consisted of thanksgiving.

It is therefore as a spiritual priest and as a member of a universal priesthood, that the preacher is to make it his first duty to proclaim the praises of the Lord. And though it is not his exclusive official

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1 1 Tim. ii. 12.

2 Rev. Dr. A. W. Diekhoff has recently proved this from his later writings, Evangelical Quarterly, Gettysburg, 1870, vol. xxi., pp. 182–190. Palmer (Homiletik, 5th ed., p. 2) still adheres to *young* Luther.

3 In Leonhardi and Zimmerman's Law and Testimony.

4 In a Letter to a Friend, Select Biographies, printed for the Wodrow Society, vol. 1., p. 267.

work, yet it is all the more demanded on this account; for it is less blamable to fail in the attempt to perform some of those official duties for which no mortal is fully equal, than to neglect those common duties and privileges to which all the saints are summoned.

But the work of praise can, for other and more weighty reasons, be proved to be the first duty of the preacher. It would seem that from a very early time the inspiration of the Spirit was believed to be intimately connected with holy praise. Saul was told by Samuel that when he should come to the hill of God at Bethel, he would, as a sign, meet a company of prophets coming down from the high place with a psaltery, and a tabret, and a pipe, and a harp before them; and said Samuel, "They shall prophesy, and the Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee, and thou shalt prophesy with them, and shall be turned into another man."[1] In this and another instance in the history of Saul,[2] the praise of God, accompanied by sacred music, seems to have preceded and attended the bestowal of prophetic inspiration. That the gracious presence of the Lord dwelt among, or sat enthroned upon the united songs of his worshippers, is taught by these words of the 22d Psalm: "But thou art holy, O, thou that inhabitest the praises of Israel." Jehovah thus abode in this volume of praise as in an invisible Shekinah. So, on the occasion of the dedication of Solomon's temple, the Shekinah, the symbol of Jehovah's gracious presence, descended and filled the house of the Lord during the very time that the Levitical choir were engaged in the service of praise,[3] and before Solomon offered his prayer of dedication. Here Jehovah signified his especial approbation of the adoration of his goodness and mercy by making the vocal and instrumental service the occasion, if not the channel, of the descent of his glory. Such a manifestation of his power would not fail to to be remembered, particularly by the prophets, who were alike the preachers, the psalmists, and the chroniclers of their people. Thenceforth, if not before, psalmody, accompanied by the harp or other instruments of music, would be associated with the legitimate means of obtaining the impulses of divine inspiration. And accordingly, when Jehoram consulted Elisha respecting a supply of water and an impending battle with the army of Moab, the prophet desired a ministrel, more properly a harper, to be brought to him, "and it came to pass when the ministrel played, that the hand of the Lord came

[1] 1 Sam. x. 5, 6, 10, 12.

[2] Id. xix. 20–24; cf. 1 Chron. xxv. 1; Judges iv. 4 and chap. v; Exod. xv. 20, 21; Luke ii. 36–38; Acts xxi. 9; 1 Cor. xi. 5; xiv. 26.

[3] 2 Chron. v. 13.

upon him."[1] This harper accompanied Elisha while he sang a psalm in praise of that God before whom the allied kings of Judah, Israel, and Edom, and their armies, were as the small dust of the balance; at least so it would appear, if we remember that the prophets sang psalms, either before or after their prose prophesyings, as in the first and second chapters of Amos, and the last chapter of Habakkuk; also in the beginning of Nahum, and the end of Malachi. Much of the Psalter appears to have been composed by prophets to be sung with the accompaniment of instrumental music before the utterance of their communications from God to men. Thus was psalmody an acknowledged part of prophecy, while the sacred musician, more strictly so-called, might at the same time be a prophet, as David was, or only a member of the Levitical choir. These Levites assisted the prophets in their ministrations as early as the time of Samuel,[2] and it is not improbable that the young David was in like manner employed by Saul to accompany him on the harp while "he prophesied in the midst of the house" under the inspiration of an evil spirit from God.[3] In this case, however, the harpings did not perhaps prelude, but rather interrupted the phrenzied utterances of Saul, with a view to silence them and exorcise the maddening dæmon. Analagous is Rabbi Solomon's interpretation of 1 Chron. xxv. 1–3. "When," says he, "they played on their musical instruments, they prophesied after the manner of Elisha, who said, 'bring me a minstrel.' . . . As they sounded upon the harp the psalms of praise and hallelujahs, Jeduthun, their father, prophesied."[4] We agree, therefore, with Procopius of Gaza[5] in the opinion that the minstrel, or rather harper, whom Elisha called for was one of the Levites. The conjecture that he was a mere secular musician, or a semi-religious minstrel, like those of the mediæval Church, would not be in keeping either with the character of Elisha or the purpose for which he summoned him, namely, to assist in the praises of God.

Equally inconsistent with the simplicity of the prophet's piety, and the object of true worship in all ages is the psychological theory advanced by some of the Rabbins, by Josephus, Michaelis, Herder, Hengstenberg, Keil, and others,[6] who think that the object

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1 2 Kings iii. 15. 2 1 Sam. x. 5–12. 3 Id. xviii. 10.

4 Valuable as this passage is, as showing this ancient rabbi's opinion concerning Elisha's minstrel, it does not give us the import of the text in which, and in some other texts, the word *prophesy* signifies *to praise God*. Cf. Joel ii. 28; Acts ii. 11, 17, 47; xxi. 9, and Num. xi. 29; 1 Sam. xix. 20; cf. Exod. xv. 20; Judges iv. 4.

5 Comment. on Sam., Kings, and Chron., Greek and Latin, Lugd., Batav., 1620, 4to.

6 Cornelius a Lapide hastily concludes from the fact that Ezekiel was in-

of the music was either to soothe the grief of Elisha for the death of Elijah, or to appease his anger against the Israelites, or to raise his sensibilities to a pitch that would invite sacred ecstacy, and so prepare his mind for prophetic inspiration; or, according to Keil, to gather in his thoughts by the soft tones of music from the impression of the outer world, and by repressing the life of self and of the world, to be transferred into the state of internal vision by which his spirit would be prepared to receive the Divine revelation. These theories of music, like some psychological theories as to prayer, ignore the Divine Spirit, whose inspiration is at once the cause and the effect of true praise—an inspiration whose holy tributes to God and wondrous gifts to man ought not for a moment to be confounded with the comparatively weak and evanescent influence of musical sounds. Nor ought we ever to confound these sounds with the revealed truths and divine sentiments which they expressed. The history of music demonstrates the fact that the early music of the Hebrews and the Greeks was never divorced from psalms, hymns and songs. Melody and harmony were then more thoroughly subordinated than now to the distinct and suitable expression of the ideas of the prophet or lyrist; the soul shared more largely and the senses far less in divine worship. The plain and honest purpose of the Hebrew saints was by voice and instrument to pour out their hearts before God. It was reserved for a rationalising Knobel to hazard the opinion that the object of the prophet in calling for the harper, was that he might "deliver his admonitory address in a proper strain."

It will be remembered that the Hebrew worship was in its prophetic parts quite of a piece with the foregoing instances. While the holy people were coming from afar to attend the great festivals, they sang psalms accompanied with sounds of cymbals, trumpets, and pipes. There is an allusion to this in the following words of Isaiah, "Ye shall have a song as in the night when a holy solemnity is kept; and gladness of heart, as when one goeth with a pipe to come into the mountain of the Lord, to the mighty One of Israel."[1] At the festivals, the Hallels (113–118 Psalms inclusive) were sung in the morning during the slaying and offering of the sacrifices. The first thing Ezra did after opening the book of the law in the sight

spired while he was on the banks of the Chebar (i. 3) that "the prophets took their station by the side of a river, that in the stillness and delightful scenery around them they might, through the soft pleasing murmur of the waters, be refreshed, enlivened and prepared for the divine ecstacies!"

1 Isa. xxx. 29; Ezek. xxx. 38.

of all the people, was to "bless the Lord the great God," while all the people stood up and answered, Amen, Amen.[1]

Such was the relation of divine inspiration and the praises of God in the Hebrew dispensation. Turning now to the Christian dispensation, we find that the descent of the Comforter on the day of Pentecost was preceded by and attended with holy and jubilant adorations. We are told that immediately after our Lord's ascension the disciples returned to Jerusalem with great joy; and were continually in the temple, praising and blessing God.[2] And whatever may have been the use of the gift of tongues subsequently to the day of Pentecost, certain it is that it was first and often exercised in the prophetic work of praise and thanksgiving.[3] These joyful expressions of reverence and gratitude began before the multitude assembled and before Peter preached to them.[4] And we learn from the correspondence between Pliny and Trajan, that in their time, (beginning of the second century) the Christians had a custom of meeting together before daylight and singing a hymn to Christ as a god. In consonance with these first impulses of the Paraclete in the primitive disciples are the benedictions and thanksgivings which introduce the apostolic epistles with scarcely an exception; for the epistle to the Hebrews omits the usual ascription, only to substitute an exultant argument which is designed to prove the superangelic dignity of the Son of God. It is also wanting in the epistle of James, which like that to the Hebrews, reveals internal evidences of its having been originally delivered orally as a sermon to a Christian assembly. We may add that the apostle in the epistle to the Hebrews[5] speaks of praise as a sacrifice. Now as the Levitical sacrifices were means of securing the riches of divine grace when they were offered in sincerity and faith, so the praises of God, when they are offered in like sincerity and faith, are means of preparing us for and of obtaining for us the inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

In some respects praise is to be preferred to precatory devotion. True adoration and thanksgiving are the highest parts of worship, because they are not and have not the appearance of being the language of selfishness.[6] Almost all men, even the most abject, will play the beggar before God when they are pinched with extreme want or are tortured with severe pain. But Job, while he was yet

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1 Neh. viii. 4–6. 2 Luke xxiv. 50–53.

3 Acts ii. 11–17; x. 46; xix. 6; 1 Cor. xiv. 14–18; cf. vers. 6, 26; Psa. lxxi. 19; Luke i. 49.

4 Acts ii. 4–6. 5 Heb. xiii. 15.

6 Thomas Cobbett's Discourse of Prayer, Pt. ii., chap. vi., §7.

ignorant of the divine purpose in permitting him to be overwhelmed with calamities, wanted not the grace to fall down and gratefully exclaim, "Blessed be the name of the Lord!" The men of this world, on the other hand, though they can cry to God amidst their bodily perils and agonies in order that they may win from his mercy speedy and effectual help, have no heart to acknowledge such instances of divine compassion. When David heard men crying to the Lord, and that successfully, from their various scenes of trouble; in the pathless and unwatered wilderness, in the folds, pastures, vineyards, and olive orchards which drought had desolated; in the tabernacle of sickness and the pass of the valley of the shadow of death; in the uplifted hands of staggering and shouting seas—what time the Psalmist heard all these cryings of the miserable, he too was moved to cry to the Lord. And for what? For this, that these highly favored but ungrateful creatures might learn to crown their importunities with the sacrifices of thanksgiving. Four times in one psalm does his sounding soul repeat the refrain, "O that men would praise the Lord for his goodness and for his wonderful works to the children of men." And such sacrifices of praise must be all the more acceptable to the God of all grace because they declare his glory in the world; and exhibit the power of his Spirit to raise the human heart above all self-love and even superior to the most dreaded of all mortal woes. The thoughtless and the unbelieving can hardly deny the divine origin of an inspiration whose first still small breathings can make those sing who are expected to do nothing but sigh and groan. They think it not strange when they hear a group of the prosperous regaling themselves with music in a cool and peaceful summer evening; but they are compelled to own to themselves that there is something heavenly and God-given in melodies which float to their ears from the lips of lonely, unbefriended and forgotten ones through a mid-winter's night that is moonless and starless and roaring with the storm.

And though we are not to allow the consideration of the psychological effects of sacred praise to occupy the foremost place in the discussion of this subject, yet we may not ignore them altogether; for an apostle has appointed the singing of psalms as a remedy against the temptation to levity.[1] Luther spent much time in singing hymns not only as a simple act of worship, but as an incitement to prayer and preaching. He believed that Satan is a great enemy to sacred music because it is an antidote against evil thoughts, charms away that melancholy which he called Satan's

[1] James v. 13.

bath, and quickens and refreshes the heart. On one occasion when the Passion was sung he listened attentively, and said: "Music is a delightful and lovely gift of God; it has often excited and moved me to such a degree that it has stirred me up to preach." . . . . "Music," said he, "is a fair gift of God. Next to theology, I give the highest place and honour to music. We should not ordain young men to the office of preaching unless they have previously been well exercised and practised in the school of music.[1] The two exercises and diversions I like best are music and gymnastics; the former dispels all mental care and melancholy thoughts; while the latter produces elasticity of body and preserves health." He sometimes recommended good music by contrasting it with bad. "Your wretched fiddlers," said he, "and gut-scrapers serve the purpose of showing us what a fine and noble art music is; for white is more brilliant when set over against black." For the same reason he censured the heartless intonations of the papal singers who, said he, "stand turning over the leaves and howling in the choir like wolves."[2] "The Psalms," he adds, "are appointed to be sung and read daily among Christians in order that the words heard or repeated may raise our devotional feelings to speak or sigh in prayer. Besides we have not a few examples of these outward incitements in Scripture; as that of the prophet Elisha whose custom it was, when he found that he was not sufficiently devout, ready and animated, to call for a minstrel, at the sound of whose harp he was revived and roused to prophesy. And King David for this cause commanded that the Levites should daily sing and play in the temple in order that the people might be moved and cheered onward to the service of prayer."

Milton was also an enthusiastic psalmist. To trace with adequate detail the influence of his practice of sacred music in the inspiration under which he wrote, both his verse and his prose, would carry us far beyond our measured space. His father being a distinguished composer of devotional tunes, taught him in early youth to sing and play the solemn songs with which so many Puritan homes were every morning vocal. He grew up in a psalm-singing age and passed the most of his days in a psalm-singing city; for a contemporary writer has borne witness that in walking the streets of London during the early hours of the day, he would hear family

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[1] Colloquia Mensalia.

[2] *Sammtliche Werke* in 67 vols., by J. G. Plochmann, and J. K. Irmischer. Frankfort on the Main and Erlangen, 1826–1857; *Exegetische Schriften*, vol. xviii., p. 161; Hom. on John xvii.

praise warbling all around. His earliest verses are a paraphrase of the 114th and a translation of the 136th Psalms, both composed when he was only in his sixteenth year. In many of his productions we find allusions to the enlivening power of music; but no where does he describe it better than in one of his early odes, which contains these lines:

"Sphere-born harmonious sisters, Voice and Verse,
* * * * * * *
Dead things with imbreath'd sense able to pierce."

His daily custom was to play on the organ and sing. In his treatise on Reformation there is a prayer which, in intimating his purpose to write a political poem, hints at his love of sacred song, as well as to the rite of congregational singing which was so commonly observed in his day: "Then amidst the hymns and hallelujahs of saints, some one may perhaps be heard offering at high strains, in new and lofty measures, to sing and celebrate thy divine mercies and marvellous judgments in this land throughout all ages." But the reader can continue this inquiry for himself. George Herbert is another instance of the influence of psalmody on the heart and intellect. Of his practice of church music his biographer, Walton, more than once makes mention. During his university course in Cambridge it was his favourite diversion from study; and while he was settled at Bemerton he was accustomed to walk a mile to Salisbury cathedral twice a week to sing there and in private music meetings. He composed many hymns which he set and sang to his lute or viol. He used to say of music that it relieved his drooping spirits, composed his distracted thoughts, and raised his weary soul so far above the earth that it gave him an earnest of the joys of heaven. Nor must we forget the example of Joseph Alleine, whose short ministry of seven years wrought so great a change at Taunton. His "Alarm to the Unconverted" has been instrumental in the conversion of a multitude of souls. "Towards the close of the last century," says Dr. Hamilton,[1] "a minister who was engaged in translating this work for some society, repeated the substance of its pages to his Highland congregation, and the result was a widespread awakening which long prevailed in the district of Nether Lorn." Alleine's custom was, as his widow informs us, to spend the morning from four till eight o'clock in prayer and meditation and in singing psalms. In this last sacred exercise he took much delight.

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[1] Christian Classics, vol. ii., pp. 219–222.

Another advantage which the man of God derives from the service of holy praise is this: it ever keeps near his heart, and fresh in his memory, the most sacred and the most popular notions respecting the divine attributes—notions to which he will need constantly to recur in order to nourish his own faith and that of his congregation. These attributes are, as some good man has said, "the preacher's thunder," and none, we may add, have hurled these bolts with such force as those who have forged them in furnaces of hearts that glowed with the sacred fires of daily praise. It is therefore in the service of *praise* that we can most patiently *wait for* answers to *prayer*.[1]

Let the preacher therefore begin his daily private devotions with either singing or saying the praises of the Lord. Let him sing or read some psalm or hymn. If he can sing, it will be well for him, in imitation of some of the best composers, to sing such extemporaneous tunes as are better adapted to the inspired words of David than most of our popular tunes are—we say extemporaneous; for no student who has studied the Psalms critically and has, at the same time, correct opinions about the province of devotional music, will be quite satisfied with singing many of these divine lyrics to our juvenile and skipping tunes. If he simply and honestly desires to praise God, as an *individual* and not as a member of a congregation, he will best please God and his own heart and conscience by giving voice to his sincere feelings in a free chaunt or recitative;—in such unpremeditated musical tones as most naturally express the grief, joy, hope, fear, and other affections, which the Psalmist sent up as swinging incense before Jehovah.

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[1] Psa. lxv. 1; xxxiii. 20–22; lxii. 1–5; cxlix. 5.

BOOK II.

OF INVENTION.

SECTION I.—THE NECESSITY OF INVENTION.

By invention we here understand the finding, pondering, and arranging of such thoughts as belong to the subject to be handled. But is the study involved in such process necessary?

The New Treatment clearly indicates the point where plenary inspiration ends and partial inspiration begins. It is obvious that Timothy obtained his knowledge of the Gospel and of the way to preach it, not directly from plenary inspiration, but from those who were moved by that inspiration. And accordingly he was directed to "give attendance to reading," and to "meditate" on religious subjects (1 Tim. iv. 13–15). Though reading here may possibly relate to the lections of the sacred writings before congregations, yet it will not be denied that the meditation here required of him was a private and not a public duty. In preparing to teach and exhort, the young preacher was to depend chiefly on the sacred writings, the apostolic teachings, study, and the gracious illuminations of the Divine Spirit. And yet we ought not to infer from this passage that study was unfriendly to plenary inspiration, and that consequently unlettered ignorance is the condition most favorable to the direct conveyance of divine communications. The true view of the matter is, that plenary inspiration superseded the necessity of all study as to the *matter* of the revelations made, but did not always in fixing the *form* of the oracle refuse to avail itself of the intelligence and culture which it found already prepared for it at the time of its illapse. That the prophets and apostles ever preached without a full inspiration we do not know. We do know, however, that Solomon studied (Eccles. xii. 9), that Daniel understood by books the duration of the captivity (ix. 2), that of the Gospel

salvation the prophets inquired and searched diligently, "searching what, or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow" (1 Pet. i. 10–12), and that Paul deliberated on the kind of Gospel truth he would preach at Corinth (1 Cor. 2; 2 Cor. ii. 1). But we have no evidence that this especial search was either introductory or supplementary to any particular communications from the Holy Spirit. The primitive disciples enjoyed indeed for three years the instruction of the Great Teacher. But while his personal teachings were invaluable aids to their own subsequent labours, we have no Gospel warrant for either affirming or denying that such instruction served directly to fix either the matter or the form of those inspired writings which some of them were commissioned to transmit to after times. Our Lord gave them some rules and directions about preaching. The following maxim is pertinent to our subject, and is remarkable for the happy correspondence between the language and the idea which it conveys: "Therefore every scribe which is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old" (Matt. xiii. 52). The word "scribe" belongs to the "old" and the phrase "kingdom of heaven" belongs to the "new." This maxim teaches us that in our preaching we should explain and apply both the Old Testament and the New, and by implication that we should make new applications of old truths.

That teaching of the Spirit which was formerly called "inspiration of suggestion," did not shut out all study on the part of the apostolic disciples. In one place (1 Cor. ii. 13) the words taught by man's wisdom are contrasted with the words taught by the Holy Ghost. Now if we admit that *teaching* here means *suggesting*, yet we must consider that neither words or thoughts can be prompted to those who had not previously acquired a knowledge of them. As philosophical terms would not readily come to the lips of those Greeks who were not before familiar with them, so the religious words which the apostles employed in preaching and writing would not have been suggested to them by the Spirit *directly*, unless the same Spirit had before taught them indirectly through Christ's personal ministry and the inspired teachings of the Old Testament. So now we cannot hope that the Paraclete will suggest texts to us which we never committed to memory, or enable us to illustrate our thoughts from Scripture examples which were not before familiar to us.

One of the counsels of the apostle Paul to Timothy is, "Be dili-

gent to show thyself unto God as one tested by trial, A LABOURER NOT ASHAMED, CUTTING STRAIGHT THE WORD OF TRUTH" (2 Tim. ii. 15). Here the metaphor seems to be drawn from road-making; and Timothy is exhorted to endeavour as a *labourer* to cut *straightly*, *i. e.*, either *broadly*, or *in the right direction*, the way of truth; so that his disciples as travellers might walk in the main road of Christian instruction. (Cf. Gal. ii. 14; 2 John iv; Heb. xii. 13.) This general advice may include one or more of the things following: *First*, Try to make a highway; in other words, preach the great doctrines of "the common salvation," and so avoid the narrow ways and passes and violent collisions of those who contend about words. As the first roads wind about from one habitation or hamlet to another in accommodation to hills, ravines, and rocks, while the common or royal roads of a higher civilization stretch straightly across the country and afford a wide, level, rapid, and safe communication between distant points of the empire. If this be the import, then we are required to devote ourselves to such Christian instruction as vitally and immediately concerns all men every where. Or, *secondly*, endeavour to cut the highway in the right direction: keep the place of destination, the eternal city, continually in view. Preach practically with a reference to holy living and to the four last things. Then will you safely pass and lead by and above the devious paths of false teachers and their followers; whereas, if you give heed to foolish and ignorant questions, verbal disputes and oppositions of the falsely-called knowledge, you will be like one who follows the windings of a brook and hearkens to its empty babblings. You will go and lead on to more and more ungodliness, and your faith and that of your hearers will be overturned. "Among the smooth stones of the stream is thy portion; they are thy lot." If, on the contrary, you lay out and make the highway in the direction of the city of God, you will follow righteousness, faith, love, and peace, with those who call on the Lord out of a pure heart; and thereby prepare the way for the victorious and triumphal progress of the King of Glory.

From this counsel to Timothy, as well as from our Lord's teachings as to the matter of preaching, we may conclude that all post-apostolic preachers are to employ Invention (*Inventio*, εὕρεσις) either in the ancient, limited sense, or in the modern comprehensive sense; either as the art of discovering such matter as is proper to persuade,[1] or the art of finding out that subject, matter, and method

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1 Cicero De Inventione, L. i., C. 7; Partitiones oratoriæ, C. 2; Auctor ad Herennium, L. i., C. 2, 3; Vossius, Orat., L. i., C. 2, §1.

which are most suitable to the object of a discourse. Now, while the first uninspired preachers were necessarily required to exercise their minds in a way that more or less resembled the process of rhetorical invention, we may reasonably suppose that, as the Christian sermon differed as to its subject, its matter, its spirit, and its end from the classical oration, such of the first post-apostolic preachers as were acquainted with the art of rhetorical invention, would modify that art so as to adapt it to the new kind of address. And it is evident that these, as well as those who were totally ignorant of classical rhetoric, allowed their views of the nature and duties of their vocation as revealed in the Sacred Scriptures, and exemplified by their predecessors, to determine their theory and practice of invention. Nor will it be denied that a modern preacher's notions of invention are likely to be shaped by what he believes to be the nature and duties of his vocation, and that of his inspired predecessors. Does he believe that Jesus was only a religious teacher, and that he is a successor of our Lord in his teaching office? Then he will naturally apply invention to the discovery of matter for instruction. Or does he believe that the apostles were mere proclaimers or heralds of the Gospel, and that he is a successor of the apostles in their proclaiming office? Then his invention will consistently occupy itself with the Gospel, as an announcement of a new and perfect way of salvation, and his matter and method will be such as befits the declaration or explanation of good news from the throne of the Most High to condemned offenders who never before heard or understood the terms of the message. He may likewise deem himself authorised by this notion of his vocation to use arguments and persuasives to move sinners to accept the offer of pardon and redemption.

Let us then endeavour to obtain clear and comprehensive ideas of what the Scriptures teach respecting the work of preaching. And let us not confine ourselves to the examination of two or three words, nor allow ourselves to be misled by their etymology; for as some passengers may be going out of one end of a boat or car while others may be coming in at the other end, so the same word may convey at the same time a new idea, and an obsolescent one. Regarding the vocation as religious, indeed, but not depending for its name or existence on the branch of divine truth with which it may at any time more especially have to do, let us first turn to the Hebrew Scriptures for information respecting it. The most ancient preacher was called a "seer" or "prophet," yet he did not merely see visions nor predict future events, but also taught. And accord-

ingly the apostle Peter speaks of some teachers in the new economy as acting the part of some prophets in the old.[1] He also reasoned, pleaded, rebuked, warned and comforted. Nor was his function inconsistent with the duties of convincing, exhorting, and dissuading. Turning to the New Testament, we find the preacher "bringing glad tidings," "heralding," "teaching," and "talking;" "reasoning," "admonishing," "persuading," and "comforting." The priests and Levites of Judah appear to have considered it one part of their work to *teach* the people.[2] But in Israel the prophets acted as priests, and taught not only the people but their own successors; there is, also, a large amount of didactic matter in the prophetic sermons which were addressed to Judah. Moses, the greatest of the prophets of the Hebrews, was likewise their greatest teacher. We teach, therefore, as prophets, and not as priests. "We are not," says Dean Stanley, "like the Jewish priests, we are not like the Jewish Levites, but we have, God be praised, some faint resemblance to the Jewish prophets." John the Baptist was a prophet and herald, yet he taught his disciples; and as all preachers ought, he convinced of sin before he said, "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world."

The sermons which were preached in the synagogues were by the Jews sometimes designated by the term λόγος Παρακλήσεως, "word of exhortation" (Acts xiii. 15, Heb. xiii. 22). The Septuagint, as well as our version, represents the Hebrew prophets as *preaching* (Jonah iii. 2; Psa. xl. 9; Isa. xl. 9; lii. 7; lxi. 1; Neh. vi. 7). The *reading* of the Old Testament in the synagogues is by James called *preaching* (Acts xv. 21). Noah is styled "a preacher of righteousness" (2 Pet. ii. 5). That the vocation of the Hebrew prophet was essentially identical with that of the Christian preacher is also confirmed by the fact that the appellation, "man of God," is equally applied to both (Deut. xxxiii. 1; 1 Sam. ii. 27; 1 Kings xii. 22; 2 Kings i. 9; 2 Chron. viii. 14, etc., etc.; 1 Tim. vi. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 17). The name is also given to the angel who came to Manoah and his wife in the character of a prophet and uttered a prediction. Many have been misled by a habit of adopting the derivative senses of words. The Greek for *herald* is an example of this remark.

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[1] 2 Pet. ii. 1.

[2] Lev. x. 11; 2 Chron. xv. 3. "Though in respect of *mode* and *degree*, the prophets and apostles have no successors, yet in respect of the *essentials* of their administration, ordinary ministers now perform those functions in the Church which the extraordinary once discharged." (William Ames, Medulla Theologica, L. i., C. 30, sec. 4.)

The Homeric heralds were not merely proclaimers, but the chief executive officers of kings.

We have thought it well worth our while to show that, according to the Bible, the prophet is not a mere predictor, nor the preacher a mere proclaimer, or herald, but both substantially followed the same vocation of proclaiming, teaching, exhorting, rebuking, comforting, etc., and that, consequently, William Perkins, Jeremy Taylor, and many other of the early English preachers, were right when they called preaching "prophesying," and comprehended in the term every kind of publicly explaining and applying the word of God. And it is the more necessary that we should examine the import of the words which serve to explain what acts were included in the vocation of prophesying and preaching, because some scholarly and distinguished men, misled by etymologies, or too intent upon justifying their preconceptions, have framed theories of preaching out of misinterpretations of single Greek terms—theories that have had a wide influence, not only among students, but other intelligent and learned persons.

And these theories have, in part, been constructed out of a misuse of primitive examples. We are often told that we are right and safe so long as we copy the pattern set us by Jesus and his apostles; not considering that we ought not to adopt those peculiarities in their ministry which were incidental to the novelty of their message. John the Baptist was a herald, but only in a figurative sense, and yet he, as a herald, realized the literal sense of the word far more nearly than our Lord and the apostles did; and these latter more nearly than any modern preachers can, if we except such missionaries as preach the Gospel to those who were before utterly ignorant of it. If, therefore, we are to confine the term *preach* to a narrow, primary, literal sense, the pastor is not preaching who is teaching the doctrines of the Christian religion[1] to a flock that has for the most part been long familiar with the Gospel plan of salvation. If, on the contrary, we form our notion of preaching from a comprehensive and thorough study of the Scriptures, both Hebrew and Greek, relating to the man of God, and, at the same time, exercise a sound judgment as to our changed relations to the Divine Spirit, to the Scriptures, and to our hearers, then will the example of the inspired prophets of the Old and New Testaments, and the Scripture precepts on preaching, be found of inestimable service to us in

[1] We should remember that it is the Christian *teacher* to whom the taught is directed to "minister in all good things." (Gal. vi. 6.)

every part of our ministry; and their radical and inimitable peculiarities will, after long experience, prove to be surprisingly few.

"But," it will be asked, "how are we to reconcile this more comprehensive idea of the word prophet, with that more restricted one which we find in the 1st Epistle to the Corinthians, where the prophetic gift is described as one of the *Charismata* imparted by the Divine Spirit to the primitive churches. Did not this kind of prophesying pass away along with the gift of tongues and the power of working miracles?" To this we answer, that, for several good reasons, prophesying, as here described, is not to be placed on a level with the gift of tongues and of the working of miracles.

In order to a clear conception of the word *prophet* as here employed by the apostle, we should remember (as we must think he did not forget) the signification which the Corinthians had customarily attached to the term; of one who not merely foretold events but *interpreted* and *reported* the oracles of the gods; of one who from a sudden inspiration explained and applied the mind and will of the gods to the comprehension and feelings of mortals.[1] The Corinthians considered the addresses of trusted prophets as of such great and practical value that the speculations of their philosophers about divine things were, in comparison, held exceedingly cheap. Hence they regarded the prophetic communications only on their human side and in their direct and intimate relation to life, its successes and failures, its joys and sorrows, and all its near and absorbing interests. They were therefore prepared to understand the apostle when he taught them that Christian prophecy was distinct from and superior to other charisms (1 Cor. xii. 7–30.; xiv. 4, 6, 39); and that its express and exclusive end was edification or the building up of church members in Christian grace and knowledge, and adding to their number genuine converts (1 Cor. xiv. 3, 4, 24, 25). This was accomplished by the Spirit of Life through information (1 Cor. xiv. 19, 30, 31; cf. Rev. ii. 20), conviction (Id. v. 24–26), exhortation and consolation (ver. 3, 31), psalmody, per-

1 The Greeks of the time of Plato (Phædrus, §48) sometimes regarded the prophet as an interpreter of the raving Pythia. In another place (Politia, L. iv., 427 C.), Plato styles Apollo himself the interpreter, because, perhaps, the god was held to be the inspirer of the true expounder. Elsewhere (De Legibus, L. ix., 871 D.) he conjoins the god, the inspired diviner (or Pythia), and the interpreter, in the work of counselling as to certain legal proceedings. Plutarch (Vita Numæ, cap. ix.) says that the Pontifix was both interpreter and prophet. The interpreter, therefore, was not an office or work necessarily apart from prophecy, although it was often incompatible with the ravings of the diviner or Pythia.

haps, including prayer (ver. 14–17; cf. ver. 6, 26), where, in the latter enumeration of the charisms, "a psalm" takes the place of prophesying in the former; while from Col. iii. 16, we learn that psalmody was employed to teach and admonish the disciples.

Now these prophets are assigned a rank next to the apostles; (1 Cor. xii. 28, 29; Eph. ii. 20; Eph. iv. 11); but who were next to the apostles in degree according to the nature of their work and the measure of their usefulness? Their inspired successors in the order of time, as Timothy, Titus, Barnabas, and Apollos. The latter perpetuated that prophetic vocation which the apostles had exercised and which was still as much demanded as at first, for the edification of the churches. As the churches would in all ages need the means of edification, prophesying, in its essential character, [1] was to be continued through all mundane ages. Nor was it to be degraded to the level of lay exhortation and teaching, however necessary these are; not every one was to think himself called and qualified to prophesy (Cor. xii. 29, 30.; xiv. 26; cf. Jas. iii. 1). The apostle admonishes his converts not to despise the exercise of this gift (1 Thes. v. 20), and Titus as a minister of the word not to let any man despise him (Titus ii. 15). If this gift, whereby a man might "excel to the edifying of a church," was withdrawn along with that of miracles and speaking with tongues, what other gifts essentially different was constituted in order that the edification of the churches might still go forward?

That these prophets were not very far removed from post-apostolic preachers is further evinced by the twofold superintendence to which they were subjected. Certain persons endowed with the gift of discerning spirits criticised them (1 Cor. xii. 10; xiv. 29; 1 Thes. v. 19–21; 1 John iv. 1, 6). And they moreover needed the regulations which the apostle gave them and which they were to receive as coming from God (1 Cor. xiv. 29, 30, 37). Consonant with the conclusion that they were but partially inspired are the cautions given them by him and Peter to "prophesy according to the proportion of faith," to "speak as the oracles of God," and to "prove all things." Origen, in his comment on Rom. xii. 6, 7, avers that in prophesying the Spirit co-operates with human study.

We have hitherto attempted to show that it is our duty to invent by a reference to the precepts of our Lord and his apostles, and by demonstrating what are the essential qualities of prophecy in all

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[1] The order of the several divine vocations which are mentioned in the epistles of St. Paul is, perhaps, best interpreted *telescopically*, that is, the *apostle* includes the *prophet*, the *prophet* the *teacher*, but not the reverse.

post-apostolic ministers of Christ. Had we space the necessity of exercising invention might be further established by an appeal to admitted facts and principles. It might be proved that by studying the Scriptures, and so doing an acknowledged duty, we are inevitably supplying our minds with materials for invention—that the materials thus furnished cannot be compared, illustrated, confirmed, and applied without some study—that the withholding of plenary inspiration ought to be a hint to us that our profiting is henceforth to appear not through new communications from God, but from the diligent study of those we already possess; that partial inspiration cannot suggest to us external knowledge that was not before in the memory; that the Divine Spirit, who loves all kinds of perfection, has encouraged the exercise of our inventive faculties by setting before us such examples of his own invention as we can always safely imitate, but can never render useless to us; that the Father of Light has not only given us the results of his deliberations in the eternity past, and of the deep thinking to which he moved such wise men as David, Solomon, and Daniel, but wrought the miracle of plenary inspiration in its highest form, in order that the apostles might produce the best effects of homiletical invention in cases where they were not able to avail themselves of the advantages of its exercise;—had we space, we say, we might make good these positions, but we are limited to this brief and condensed statement thereof.

Section II.—The Scripture Element in Sermons.

Concerning few things do preachers differ more than respecting the nature and amount of the Biblical element that may properly be admitted into a sermon. Rudolf Stier,[1] limiting the idea of a sermon to that of a proclamation, fairly inferred from this false premiss that true preaching is a repetition of such passages of Scripture as belong to the matter in hand; while the individuality of the preacher chiefly appears in such comments as serve to connect those passages together, and occasionally and slightly suggest their application.[2] Others would advise the preacher not only to derive his doctrines from the Bible, but to express his propositions and partitions in

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1 Keryktik, *passim* (Halle, 1844).

2 This is examplified in his *Epistle Predigten*, 4vo. (Halle, 1837). From his Life, written by his two sons, we learn that when charged by his critics with preaching altogether from Scripture, and not at all from life, he admitted, but recommended his practice.

Scripture language, to abound in exposition, and to quote freely for illustration, proof, enforcement, and ornamentation. But others, going not so far as these, after selecting their subject, are in the habit of collecting all those parts of Holy Writ which either nearly or remotely pertain to that subject, and then employing them here and there, both for matter, form, diction, and style, as the judgment may choose or the memory provide. A more numerous class are content to draw their texts and proofs from Scripture; while a few, either not habitually studying the Bible, or fearing lest they may lose the favor of their philosophical friends, are very seldom guilty of misquoting Scripture, except as texts or "pretexts."

But what do his call and commission herein demand of the Christian preacher?

They demand that he should make the Bible his only standard of doctrine, experience, and practice. The Bible, and the Bible alone, is to be at once the source and the test of all the matter of his preaching. Now "Rationalism," "Spiritualism," "Mysticism," "Liberalism," "Traditionalism," "Ritualism," and "Æsthetics," are so many crooked and devious paths. If our modern Timothys would be 'workmen that need not be ashamed,' they must, according to the example and precept[1] of the apostle, make straight the road of truth. Even more plainly is this requirement expressed in such passages as these, "Whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith;"[2] "If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God."[3]. In the former text we are enjoined to teach and exhort that which, on a comparison of all the various passages relating to the same subject, we find revealed, either directly, or by implication, or by inference. We say all; for we have the example of our Lord and the apostles for such thorough collation. By the latter we are directed to preach the *matter* thus furnished, to the exclusion of all oracles and philosophies that are merely human. Some,[4] indeed, maintain that the apostle here admonishes Christian prophets to speak Scripture truths in Scripture language. But this would have been to require of them more than their Divine Master or any of the apostles performed. Nor should it be forgotten, as we have elsewhere shown, that the pagan idea of prophet, as related to the pagan oracles, was often not that of one who merely repeated the words of the pythoness, but of one who rendered the *meaning* and *substance* of the supposed revelation into the language which the consulter could either speak or read. Rev. J. M. Neale (Mediæval

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1 2 Tim. ii. 15, 16. 2 Rom. xii. 6. 3 1 Pet. iv. 11.

4 Gerhard's Comment. *in loc*, and Arrowsmith's *Armilla Catechetica*, p. 63.

Preaching, p. 26) has shown that Guarric, of the twelfth century, usually quoted nearly three times as many Scripture texts as John Newton, and yet who of us would venture to say that Guarric was the more Scriptural preacher of the two. Most of these mediæval Bible preachers borrowed much of their matter from the fathers.

The occidental nations are fond of inductive and deductive reasoning: they love to arrange and appreciate testimony; to argue from definitions and hypotheses. They abound in questions, and even their answers they transform into new questions. Such minds are not to be put off with repetitions and comments. It is only where, as in Scotland, their disposition to distinguish, to define, to prove, and to generalise, is carried to excess, that the people often seek a diversion from dogmatic and catechetical teachings by listening to expositions. Let no one infer, however, from these statements that we are averse to expository sermons, to a due interspersion of Scripture quotations through a religious discourse, or a free and frequent use of the facts of Bible history. Our simple endeavour is to show the kind and measure of Biblical preaching which the divine authority exacts, and an enlightened congregation can receive and improve.[1]

As this volume is chiefly devoted to the consideration of the matter, style, and delivery of sermons, according to the patterns we have received from the holy prophets, it is, surely, unnecessary to examine here the question: How far ought we to imitate the manner of our Lord and the apostles and prophets, and what are those qualities of their respective styles which we may interfuse with our own? Nor will the student expect from us any glowing description of the eloquence of the Bible preachers; he is to be here occupied with a more serious, complicated, and gainful business. The diligent study of every part of this work will, it is to be hoped, enable the young preacher to bend the germs of his peculiar gifts in a Scriptural direction.

One way to secure Biblical sermons is so far to honour the Scriptures as to consult them *first* and *fully* on our subject before resorting to any human authority. A due reverence for the God of truth demands that we pursue our sacred studies in this order; nor is our profiting to be otherwise assured. Says the Rev. John Cooke, who was for forty-three years pastor at Maidenhead, England, and who, we are told, never preached a funeral sermon that was not blessed to the conversion of one or more souls: "On one occa-

[1] Read John Foster's Essay on the Prejudices of Men of Taste against Evangelical Religion, and Robert Hall's review of it.

sion I was called to preach a funeral sermon—read Dr. Bates on Death, and was charmed, but did not meet the assistance I expected. I immediately read the book of Job and Ecclesiastes, and found myself presently furnished. This incident has influenced me more than twenty years—always to read, at least, those parts of Scripture in which the subject is mentioned before I read any human author." But we should not, in our enthusiasm to be Scriptural preachers, imitate Stier's sermons, and others of that class, which embody all the texts which, either by implication, inference, or allusion, are related to our subject. This process has been humourously but fitly likened to the course of hound-puppies while hunting hares on old fields; the whelps follow one trail until they meet another scent a little fresher which crosses it, and so another and another; thus they zigzag and yelp about all day long, but run down no game. While it is very serviceable to have before our eyes or in our memory all the texts which prove, illustrate, or apply our subject, yet to quote and explain them all in our sermon is a most unprofitable piece of business.

An abundant use of Scripture quotations, therefore, is not necessarily an evidence of true Scripturalness. The mediæval preachers must take the palm as quoters of texts; many of their sermons were a dark inorganic deep of quotations which they had borrowed from the fathers; they literally stole God's word from their neighbours (Jer. xxiii. 30). If we give an audience the elixir and quintessence of all that the Bible teaches as to our subject we may proceed with the animated assurance that we are preaching Scripturally. And yet some of our hearers will think contrariwise; these are they who count the bee that enters the hive covered with pollen more profitable than the bee that lands full of digested flowers. Nevertheless, let it suffice us to be like the good Pantæus of the second century, who because of his way of extracting sweetness from all the mountain flowers of revelation received the name of "the Sicilian Bee."

Did space permit we might here give many examples of those who have adopted the Biblical style of preaching with various measures of success. But as we must not extend this chapter much beyond its present limits, we shall mention only two or three. Among those who have imbibed some of the best qualities of the Scripture style was Antonio Vieyra, a Portuguese preacher of the seventeenth century. He passed the most of his life at Bahia in Brazil, where for many years he poured forth an eloquence which in some points bears a close resemblance to that of the Hebrew prophets. His countrymen have called him the Lusitanian Cicero;

but he was more imaginative and vehement than the great Roman orator. Though his mind was rather of the Oriental than the Latin type, yet he was so unequal and at times, so ironical and rhapsodical, that it is not an easy thing to determine the class to which he belongs. His *Clavis Prophetarum*, on which he occasionally worked for fifty years, and which at his death he left still unfinished, proves him to have been an enthusiastic student of the Hebrew eloquence, and reveals to us the source of many of the better elements of his sermons. He was more mighty in the Scriptures than any other of the famous Catholic preachers, not excepting Segneri, and consequently he would be for the student the safest model among them all, were it not for the occasional excesses of his enthusiasm which in a cooler climate would be counted madness.

But more purely and intensely Scriptural than his was the style of John Bunyan. The student and minister of but one book, he interfused its spirit and manner with his own. To the Bible and to the Bible alone was his style indebted for its freedom and nobleness, its animated yet holy gravity, its universally human and living interest and currency; all of which is bathed in a clearness that may be likened to a warm and golden sunshine. Bunyan is the only example in history of a first-rate genius which was moulded and finished by no other than the sacred volume.

And yet at the hazard of being misunderstood, we must venture to suggest whether to audiences that are very ignorant of Scripture it is wise to adopt the language of obscure texts, or derive figures from the less familiar incidents of Bible history. Though Nahum intended his prophecy against Nineveh partly for the hearing of Judah, yet, as was to be expected, it abounds in ideas which are level to the apprehension of Gentile theists; and Paul in preaching to the citizens of Lystra and Athens, would have departed from one of his settled maxims (to become as without law to them that are without law) had he alluded to and quoted the sacred books of the Jews as freely as he did in discoursing in the synagogues of his countrymen. Socrates complained of the orators of his time because they did aim to make men wiser than they were; but both he and we are too apt to forget that all mere persuasion must find its fulcrum in the common stock of wisdom and knowledge already in possession. And why, therefore, should we judge severely those preachers to ignorant audiences who while substantially holding forth Christ, compose their sermons after the model of the classic orators, and press much secular matter into their service? If the sermons of such men as Abbe Lacordaire and Frederick W. Rob-

ertson led more clearly and directly to salvation through the Lamb of God, we should be more inclined to think that their adaptation to the mental and moral habits of young philosophers compensated for the want of Biblical matter.

But to Bible-readers nothing is more acceptable and impressive than figurative language and arguments founded on some event in Scripture history Thus Chrysostom: "If the patriarch Jacob, when set over cattle, feeding irrational sheep, and about to render an account to men, passed sleepless nights and endured heat, frost, and every extreme of weather, that none of his flock might perish, how much more it behooveth us," &c. Massillon, inculcating on ministers the duty of retiring from the world as often as their vocation of leading men to Christ will permit, employs this beautiful simile: "Like that star which conducted the Magi to Christ, and which was a type of pastors; it showed itself as far as Bethlehem, whither it was to conduct those sages of the East; but the moment they found, acknowledged, and adored the infant Saviour, it disappeared, became eclipsed, and entered again into the clouds of the firmament." Again, Matthias Claudius: "Whether the prayer of a moved soul can accomplish or effect anything, or whether the *Nexus Rerum*, the fixed connection of things, does not allow of that, as some learned gentlemen think,—on that point I shall enter into no controversy. I have great respect for the *Nexus Rerum*, but I cannot help thinking of Samson who left the *Nexus* of the gate-leaves uninjured and carried the whole gate, as every one knows, to the top of the hill." See also the sermons of Thomas Watson, of St. Stephens, Walbrook, London.

And, after all, whoso examines this matter fixedly and sharply, will find that there is a false scripturalness, no less than a true; and that it is only as we are led by the Holy Spirit into the wilderness of trial that we can vanquish Satan with oracular weapons.

Section III.—The Subject-matter of Sermons as found in Scripture.

"The matter of preaching," says Rosencranz,[1] "is in the abstract the whole Faith, in the concrete the whole Life." More specifically the substance of each sermon is to be determined first by the relative importance of subjects as measured by the way they are emphasised, repeated and amplified in the sacred Scriptures; secondly, by their various aspects when studied in their organic and

[1] Theol. Encykl., p. 366.

inspired relations to other subjects; thirdly, by their adaptation to the capacities and necessities of the hearers. As the result of applying the first two tests we arrive at the following conclusions, the discussion of the last test being reserved for a subsequent section.[1] Here we wish to be understood as never ignoring or forgetting the fact that Christ is the water-mark in every page of the Holy Book, and visible to every believer whenever he holds it up to the light.

1. Those subjects take the first place which relate to *God*, his works, his attributes and his nature.

2. Next come truths respecting the origin, nature, works, state and relations of *Man*.

3. The *Law of God* in its relations to Man.

4. *Christ as the Mediator*. Very many evangelical preachers would have chosen to give this subject the first place, on the ground that it is practically superior to all others. But it ought to be considered that the Scriptures have raised it to its deserved pre-eminence in our minds and hearts by first dwelling more largely and more emphatically on the subjects which serve either directly or indirectly to prove that a Saviour is necessary and every way desirable. Those, who like the apostle Paul, are called to "evangelical," or missionary, rather than pastoral work, may deem it their sole duty to "preach Christ crucified." But even they should not forget that this apostle likewise preached both to Jews and Greeks repentance towards God.[2] But of the permanent pastor the danger is that, by preaching almost *exclusively* on the doctrine of salvation by the death of Christ, he leave his flock without any distinct, comprehensive, and practical views concerning the nature, attributes, and acts of God the Father; and consequently exposed either to the seductive and, so far as it goes, more full and sound preaching of deistical theologians, or to the allurements of such heretical but eloquent declaimers as delight to travesty and ridicule that grand system of Biblical theology of which they and their hearers are alike profoundly ignorant. Space forbids us to enlarge on the injury done to the consciences of our hearers and to the churches we serve, by neglecting to instruct them in the knowledge of God and his law with a view to their exercising an intelligent faith in Jesus, and then adorning the teaching of God our Saviour by all holy and obedient living. Let the pastor, therefore, remember that the "man of God" is the foundation on which he is to build the true minister of Christ; in other words, that the theistic ideas with which the Hebrew prophets had so much to do, underlie and sup-

[1] Sec viii. [2] Acts. xx. 21; cf. xxiv. 25; Rom. viii. 13; Matt. vii. 13, 14.

port the grand central scheme of mediation which is so often and so justly the theme of all Christian preachers.

(1.) In preaching Christ we should give the preference to the doctrine of salvation through the death of Christ.

(2.) Next in importance is the doctrine of the *way* of salvation through Christ, and the *grounds* of vital union with him.

(3.) Of less consequence is the biography of Jesus as it is given to us by the evangelists, unless we view his wonderful life upon earth in the light of the teachings of the apostles and prophets. Modern deists, rationalists and pantheists love to write and discourse about the man Christ Jesus as they find him in the Gospel narrative alone. Unregenerate readers of secular poetry and demoralizing romance are never wearied and, alas! are never converted by these word-pictures.

(4.) As the object of love, hope, and devotion, Jesus Christ our Lord cannot be preached with much advantage except to true believers and sincere inquirers. The apostolic epistles which were almost wholly addressed to real Christians exhibit to us the relative proportions wherein we should dwell on such themes.

(5.) Nor should we forget to treat all Scripture subjects in their *relation* to Christ, or, in the words of Andrew Fuller, "There are various important truths *supposed* by this great doctrine, and these require to be illustrated and established. There are *various branches* pertaining to it, which require to be distinctly considered; various *consequences* arising from it, which require to be pointed out; various *duties* corresponding with it, which require to be inculcated; and various *evils* inimical to it, which may require to be exposed. All I mean to say is, that as there is a *relation* between these subjects and the doctrine of the cross, we must introduce them *in that* relation if we would introduce them in a truly evangelical manner." Yes, when we examine the heart of any one of these subjects we shall find there a crimson cord binding it to the cross.

(6.) We should make Christ the *end* of all our preaching. The subordinate end is the extension of his kingdom by seeking the conversion and edification and sanctification of men. The ultimate end is the personal glory of Christ.[1] According hereto is the observation of Mr. Davison,[2] that in proportion as the prophets enlarged their predictions concerning the Messiah, did they at the same time the more unfold the duty of repentance and other practical doctrines, and open more widely the prospects of eternal life.

[1] Read Rev. John Jennings' "Of Preaching Christ."

[2] Discourses on Prophecy, pp. 61, 503.

5. *The person, offices, and works of the Holy Ghost.* "Represent," says Dr. Doddridge, "our need of him; describe his work in enlightening the mind, convincing the judgment, renewing and sanctifying the soul; quickening to duty, fortifying against temptation, assisting in prayer, and comforting true Christians, witnessing to their adoption, etc. This is an exceedingly popular subject, and, what is of still higher importance, it is a useful and Scriptural one. When you enlarge upon it, however, it is necessary to add cautions against grieving the Spirit, and directions for walking in the Spirit, and being filled with the Spirit." We have only to add that we must consider not merely the Scripture account of the Spirit, but also his later and present miracles, if we would clearly and fully understand his character; and that we should avoid expatiating upon such subjects to the eclipsing of Christ; ever remembering that he came not to speak of himself but to glorify Christ, and that hence it is our duty to keep our hearers in remembrance of his present subserviency and loving devotion to the Lord Jesus. This and the preceding subjects are of supreme importance, and appear to have been included by Paul under the term "kingdom of God," or "all the counsel of God." (Acts xx. 24.)

6. *Devotional* subjects or such as are intended to call forth adoration, confession, petition, and thanksgiving. We should not be satisfied with confining these exercises to prayer and praise. The large space which matter of this kind occupies in Scripture, and the tendency of congregations towards an irreverent and indevout hearing of the word, ought to admonish us to treat devotional subjects oftener than we are naturally disposed to do, and to suffuse all our sermons with prayerful sentiments. Hereto belong lectures on the *postulanda*, or expositions of the prayers contained in Scripture; it is an error to confine such expositions to the "Lord's Prayer."

7. *Experimental* subjects, or such as relate to the truth and grace of God in the heart of man. Holy Writ furnishes us with numerous texts which illustrate the effects of divine grace on the religious affections. When Christian experience is made a subject of meditation apart from its relations to doctrines and duties, and especially to conscience, it is apt to foster indolence, self-conceit, and presumption.

In order to preach experimentally with profit, we have, first of all, to study the experimental parts of Scripture devotionally and for our private edification. If we would gain broad and trustworthy views of this subject, it will be necessary for us to compare all the passages that relate to it, otherwise we will be liable to dwell exclusively on such texts as we have experienced the truth and

preciousness of. We are to preach from the heart of God and of his inspired servants, rather than from our peculiar experience and, it may be, egotistic inwardness.

But still as to these matters we are not to confine ourselves to Scripture, for the very good reason that the Divine Spirit has for these eighteen hundred years been carrying forward his work in the hearts of Christians, and so accumulating vast evidences of his power.

As temptation is an important qualification for this kind of preaching, mature Christians are, for the most part, the best prepared for it; but if the young preacher will frequently examine his own heart and preach his sermons to himself, as was the practice of Mather and Doddridge, if he will talk freely with those whose experience is very different from his own, and whose temperament, education, and religious opinions are unlike his—if he will learn to classify the various kinds of real, false, and equivocal experience which come under his observation—if he will read Christian biography with a view to a profounder and more methodical knowledge of spiritual phenomena and, at the same time, discriminate between such as are extraordinary and unprofitable, like those of the Quietists of France, and such as are more ordinary and tend towards practical life, like those of the common people; yet never forgetting to bring them all to the sure test of Scripture (for the Spirit never contradicts himself) and that as we live in the dispensation which is distinctively his, and are therefore to expect some phenomena which have not been recorded in Holy Scripture—if, we say, the preacher who is still young, will do these things, he will prepare himself to preach from experimental texts with an intelligence and persuasiveness not to be surpassed by the aged preacher who has contented himself with that measure of heart knowledge which he has found in his own experience, or in that of his pious acquaintance.

8. *Doctrinal* subjects—by this we mean, *credenda*, or things that are to be believed, as distinguished from *postulanda* and *agenda*, or the things that are to be prayed for and to be practised. Doctrinal sermons are authorized by the large amount of Scripture matter which is obviously intended by the Divine Spirit to support and confirm a genuine faith. It is remarkable that the doctrines of Holy Scripture are never inculcated philosophically or systematically or symbolically, but always either didactically or controversially or experimentally or practically. And yet we may not hence conclude that systems of theology, or creeds, or philosophical discussions of Christian truth are in themselves unnecessary and useless. All we need to remember, in this connection, is that doctrinal

truths are to be treated by the preacher after the manner of Scripture and not after the manner of the dogmatic and polemical theologians, much less confined to the range of symbolical books whose articles were mainly designed, as Whately says, to serve as so many breast-works for the defence of Christian churches at those points, where they were besieged or attacked. New invaders, advancing on other and perhaps more exposed points, are to be met by new munitions; but the preacher who should limit his doctrinal preaching to his "Thirty-nine Articles," would resemble any defender of a city who should devote all his resources to the restoration of old forts which successfully resisted the attacks of ancient enemies, while he gave no heed to the movements of a hostile army that was daily hovering about the unfortified approaches to the town.

Some there are who maintain that the true theory and central idea of all preaching consist in the argumentative discussion of theology. But while we are by no means to neglect the distinctive and fundamental doctrines of Christian Theology, we are not, on the other hand, to suppose that doctrinal sermons must be mainly *argumentative*. "Some of them," says Schott, "may be chiefly such; others may be principally devoted to unfolding the nature of the truth discussed, and others to the exhibition of its appropriate influence on the feelings and conduct. Sometimes these three characteristics may be united in one and the same discourse."

Beware, however, of the puerile habit of attempting to explain all doctrinal mysteries and commending them all to common sense. Reinhard says that the illuminating theologians of his day had succeeded in rendering the doctrines of Christianity so clear and intelligible that nothing was left but pure rationalism. Some of the mysteries of divine revelation, when received by an intelligent faith, serve as so many keys to unlock all other mysteries.

We should likewise eschew the *tendency* or *habit* of dwelling on the evidences, apologetics, and polemics of Christianity. These subjects, like all others, are profitable in their time and place, and more especially as handled by meek, candid, and truth-loving men. Very young preachers and very old ones (the former by tilting against the dayflies of heresy, the latter by caning the bleached skeletons of misbelief) are too apt to "smell the battle afar off," while the man of knowing zeal and self-recollection goes not forth to the strife until dangerous errors appear on the field. But let us turn to a few positive canons.

(1.) To anxious inquirers and new converts the cardinal doctrines of Holy Scripture are to be preached experimentally, that is to say, with a view to ascertain the nature and depth of their religious ex-

perience. For, if after a professed convert has once come to a clear apprehension of any fundamental truth of the Gospel, he cannot believe it, and has a decided aversion to it, his regeneration is, to say the least, a matter of reasonable question.

(2.) But in order to obtain the believing assent of the new-born soul to a doctrine which it understands, it is important that the doctrine should be taught in the *connections* in which it is exhibited in the Scriptures; e. g., when preaching on Election, we should observe how the apostle makes it include the means as well as the end; how he "connects prayer with predestination, precept with promise, principle with example, justification with penitence, faith with works, and redemption with renewal."[1] This process is easier and more profitable than that of showing what relation any doctrine has to a complete system of Christian Theology.

(3.) And yet it would be very instructive to advanced Christians to study, e. g., the doctrine of the Atonement in its relation to the other necessary doctrines of Biblical Theology. "It is," says Andrew Fuller,[2] "to the doctrines and precepts of the Bible as the life-blood to the animal system. . . I wish to begin with the centre of Christianity—the *doctrine of the cross*—and work round it; or with what may be called the heart of Christianity, and trace it through its principal veins and relations, both in doctrine and practice. . . The whole of the Christian system appears to be *presupposed by it, included in it, or to arise from it.*"[3] The cross stands between Jerusalem and the Sepulchre—between the sin that crucified Christ and the newness of life which he symbolized in his resurrection; between the Sepulchre and Mount Olivet; between our risen life, with all its conflicts and defeats, and our ascended life, with all its triumphs and its eternal joys.

9. *Pathetic* and *Persuasive* subjects: The amount of excitatory matter in Holy Scripture is very large, but less in the sermons than in the psalms of inspired men. The hortatory matter is in greater quantity, and yet the prophets very seldom devote entire addresses to such matter, and then exhortions are directed more frequently to the people of God than the children of this world. Very many professors, for obvious reasons, will like their pastor exceedingly so long as his chief endeavours are used to exhort sinners to repentance. On the other hand, be warned by the effects of the

[1] Rev. Dr. A. Reed on Human Systems, and Bridges on the Ministry, Pt. iv., c. 4, sec. 1.

[2] Essay on Truth, and Letter iii. on Systematic Divinity.

[3] Dr. John Edward's Preacher, Pt. ii., London ed., 1706.

earlier ministry of Berridge and Chalmers, who found that the preaching of mere morality was very demoralizing; he also warned by the effects of such preaching in the Roman and French Catholic churches. It was recommended by the mediæval fathers, Guibert of Nogent, St. Francis, and Alanus de Insulis, to make preaching consist very much in dissuasives from the vices and persuasives to the virtues. Compare, too, the preaching and morals of France and those of England during the reign of Louis XIV. and the protectorate of Cromwell.

10. The principles and precepts of *Christian Ethics* stand next in rank as themes for the preacher. We do not here mainly intend the great primary duties and obligations of men, such as are enjoined in the Ten Commandments, and other moral precepts of the old Law. These demand an earlier regard in our inculcations, and yet they should always be viewed in the light of our Divine Master's fuller and deeper teachings. Neither do we we chiefly intend the principles of moral science or moral philosophy. Systems of ethics ought, certainly, to be studied, but they are principally useful as teaching us how to think, not as furnishing us with matter. We mean those ethical principles and precepts which have their basis in Christian doctrine, and teach and enforce such virtues and duties as are the fruit of faith in, and love to, Christ, as derive their motives from the doctrine of Christ, their life and activity from the grace of Christ, and their acceptableness from the merits of Christ.[1]

It is, perhaps, worth while to repeat here certain important maxims, the substance of which is found scattered *passim* in many works. The originators of not a few of these maxims it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.

(1.) Doctrinal themes may often be treated ethically, and ethical themes doctrinally. It was the neglect of the first part of this suggestion by the Calvinists of Switzerland that prepared the people for the moral sermons of Francis de Sales. Analogous facts are not far to seek.

(2.) Never consider a grace or virtue abstractly. The subject of Robert Hall's last sermon was the sin and absurdity of covetousness. It was observed at the time that probably not one of his hearers would take the discourse as at all applicable to himself, because he employed his whole force on the love of money *as a pure and absolute principle.* John Foster adds as to this incident, that a sermon on the love of money, to be useful, should seize and expose it in those modes of its operation under which it hides and palliates its

[1] See again Rev. John Jennings' "Of Preaching Christ."

true quality; otherwise it might even do mischief, for every hearer who could say he did not *so* love money, would confidently infer that, therefore, he was not guilty of covetousness.

(3.) And yet, in individualising characters and discriminating among the practical forms of sins and vices, we must be on our guard against an exclusive tendency towards eloquent descriptions, both because they may be construed as personal, and because they may inflame the very passions we are endeavouring to quell.

(4.) Some ethical subjects are too unimportant to furnish matter for entire sermons, and should, therefore, be touched upon incidentally. Such are the minor virtues of courtesy, magnaminity, etc. It is not easy to say in every instance where virtue ends and mere expediency begins. Christianity, as Vinet says, has a hand which is as delicate as it is powerful.

(5.) Other ethical matters are too special and individual for any mention in public addresses. Such are the duties of lawyers, physicians, and teachers, and many cases of conscience. These are best discussed in private interviews.

(6.) In cases where congregations have come to be hardened under bold and ill-tempered reproofs, it might be advisable to stop preaching *against* sins and vices, and more gently and compassionately to recommend the opposite graces and virtues. Dwell less on those things which Christian morality *forbids*, than on those things which it *teaches*.

(7.) Let not any hearers be indulged in such spiritual aspirations as tempt them to overlook and neglect those moral and worldly virtues which the natural conscience approves, as temperance, chastity, honesty, veracity, fidelity, kindness, etc. "If," says Professor Atwater,[1] "they may and often do exist without piety, piety cannot exist without them."

(8.) "It is useful," says Schott, "to exhibit the virtues of the Christian as forming a complete system; as intimately combined one with another, so that no one may feel himself justified in selecting a portion of these duties for practice, and neglecting the remainder." See "Religious Progress; Discourses on the Development of the Christian Character," by Rev. Dr. Wm. R. Williams.

Here we might mention *political* subjects; but we reserve them for another section.

11. *Historical* and *biographical* subjects. The Old Testament and the New furnish a multitude of events and characters to

[1] In his valuable article on "The Matter of Preaching," in Princeton Review, vol. xxviii, and inadvertently reprinted in Alexander's "Thoughts on Preaching."

illustrate and confirm the doctrinal and devotional parts of Scripture. And however tempting may be themes from ecclesiastical history, from the general history of religions, and from the lives of good and holy persons as written by uninspired men, it is nevertheless safe to limit ourselves to the sacred narratives and parables. For the selection and treatment of such subjects, Knibbe,[1] Reinhard, and Schott lay down the following rules: The subjects should have an obvious connection with Christian doctrine or duty. They should be spiritual and not secular in their final impression on the mind. They should be in some degree familiar to the audience, or at least such as may be easily made familiar to them. We should be careful not to fill up too large a part of the sermon with narrations, and not to be too minute in our historical or geographical delineations. We should never distort the truth of history, nor allow the imagination or feelings to supply what the authentic narrative has not fairly implied. And yet we ought to know how to find our position in two different worlds, namely, that which the text describes and that to which it is to be applied. We should be modest in our interpretations of those events which the Bible leaves unexplained. We ought not to ascribe *legislative* authority to the examples of imperfect men. The law of God and not the example of man is our rule of duty.

12. *Addresses to the young;* partly ethical, partly expedient, partly persuasive. The Scriptures contain much matter of this description.

13. *Types.* "In these," says Dr. Doddrige, "there is so much room for fancy, that it is difficult to speak judiciously upon them; and more difficult to please if they be not drawn to excess. But for a pastor, especially on a sacrament day, those things that are allegorised[2] in Scripture, may be very profitably enlarged upon, provided the similitude and difference be shown." Most preachers appear to admit these differences with great reluctance; as if an antitype were not really exalted by showing its dissimilitude to its type.

14. *Nature,* material and mental. These subjects occupy a wider space in the Scriptures than the superficial reader is apt to suppose, and therefore deserve a higher rank than we have assigned to them, and would have assigned them had we not recollected the proneness of young preachers to dwell on some of them too frequently and too copiously, as well as to treat some of them either

1 Knibbe's Manuductio, p. 150; Reinhard's Confessions, Letter x.; Dr. Park's Trans. of Schott.

2 Erasmus, Ecclesiastes, L. iii.; Opera, vol. v, pp. 1010–1051

poetically or scientifically. It is nevertheless true, as Luther has said, that "all the works of creation are marks and symbols, under which Jehovah conceals himself, and through which he communicates with us," and after some allowance it is also true, as Mrs. Browning has sung, that

> . . . . "Nature comes sometimes
> And says, 'I am ambassador for God.'"

These subjects have been called *philosophical*, and such of them as relate to the passions, intellect, and will, *psychological*. Vinet would also include *Sociology* under the head of Psychology. Paul assailed the philosophy which was taught in his day, while he intimated that there is a true philosophy. All these subjects furnish less of principal than of subsidiary materials for sermons. We should all join Lord Bacon in praying "Thy creatures have been my books but Thy Scriptures much more. . . We beg that human things may not prejudice such as are divine; that there may be given unto faith the things that are faith's." The speculations and language of Philosophy when habitually carried into the pulpit make the cross of Christ of none effect (1 Cor. v. 1, 2).

15. The *Privileges of the Children of God;*—the pardon of their sins, the renovation of their nature, adoption, perseverance through divine grace, God's providential care over them,—all things working together for their good,—access to God through Christ,—communion with him, believing views of glory, etc. "These subjects," says Doddridge, "will impress the hearts of sinners (as a lancet concealed in a sponge),—as well as raise the devout affections of true Christians."

16. Subjects of *Consolation*. The provisions of Gospel redemption supply many themes of this description. A volume might be profitably devoted to the New Testament modes of administering comfort.

17. *The Four Last Things* must be treated opportunely yet, for the most part, in a subsidiary way; courageously yet compassionately, but above all, in an evangelical spirit and manner; e. g., we should not forget that Christ has the keys of hell and of death, that he will judge the world, that his glorified presence is the believer's heaven, etc. The New Testament always contrasts these subjects as light and shade, reward and punishment being set over against each other. They afford profitable matter for parts of sermons on many very different subjects. But nowhere is it more important to observe and follow the movements of the Divine Spirit in us and in our hearers, lest our stated congregations become at

length hardened to such considerations, just as the blacksmith's dog, according to Richard Baxter, learns to sleep soundly under the sharp sounds and burning cinders which hammer and sledge are continually flinging at him and around him.

Upon this entire subject it is necessary to repeat an important caveat. The *missionary*, and every other preacher who has to address those who have never heard the true Gospel of Christ proclaimed, should begin and continue to explain and apply to them the doctrines of grace exclusively, until they are either all converted or are in danger of coming to be "Gospel hardened." We are too unmindful of the fact that such men of God, and such only, are in a vocation and field similar to those of the apostles, and are, therefore, to make salvation through Jesus their one and all-absorbing theme in obedience to his great commission, and to the words and example of the apostles.

Dr. Burgon[1] advises the young pastor to keep a journal of his themes, and from time to time to notice his omissions. As every man is liable to be influenced by his partialities and aversions in dispensing the Gospel, he ought, at least, to take himself to task betimes, and solemnly inquire whether he be preaching all parts of divine revelation in their due proportion and intimate correlation, on the one hand; and, on the other, whether the kind, combination, and amount of Scripture matter preached be adapted to the average capacities and wants of his congregation. It is necessary, therefore, that he should not only keep a record of his texts and subjects, but closely and constantly watch the moral and spiritual state of his flock. In order to invent proportionately, he should, according to Aristotle's advice, consider not only who speaks and what is spoken, but the people spoken to. Nor is the first requisite of small importance. The speaker may be ever so careful to gain and convey a proportional knowledge of sacred Scripture to the mere *intellects* of his congregation; and yet, if he does not view all his subjects *experimentally* and *practically*, a sad disproportion will eventually appear in his and their life and character. It is a great thing (we do not say the only thing), as Keckerman suggests, to make our whole invention contribute to devotion. If we lead our hearers to the throne of grace, we put them in the way of understanding, believing, applying, and obeying the word preached.

But may we not for the sake of variety occasionally compose a sermon out of materials that are not to be found in the Scriptures, or suggested by them? In other words, are there not many mod-

1 Pastoral Office, p. 182.

ern churchly political and social questions, whereof, indeed, divine revelation is totally silent, which do nevertheless enable preachers to gratify in a profitable way the popular love of change and diversity? To forget or ignore our commission is dangerous; and he who secularises in order to popularise, is the father of him who will profane in order to destroy. But every reasonable demand for variety can be answered without making secular appendices to our Bibles. Each truth of Scripture may be presented to the mind in as many aspects (we do not say all equally important) as a copy of the sacred volume may be exhibited to the eye.

Those who are in the habit of neglecting Christian theology and of speaking contemptuously of creeds and dogmas, are, for the most part, either novices, men-pleasers, or are dangerously ignorant of church history. Does any man think that Christian doctrines are of small value? Let him read the history of the martyrs, and so learn what sufferings those doctrines have cost. Does any man think that Christian doctrines have no relation to holy living? Let him read the history of heresies and there behold their demoralising fruits.

Section IV.—Of Political Subjects.

Many distinguished ministers of God have discussed important questions in politics. Gregory Nazianzen preached political sermons against the Emperor Julian. Augustine, in his "City of God," illustrates the principles of human government; Thomas Aquinas, in his commentaries on Aristotle, and in his other writings, lays down political maxims of considerable value. Bossuet, in his Discourse on Universal History, denies the pope's claim of infallibility and his assumed right to depose kings; and in a large work on Scripture Politics,[1] he attempts to establish monarchical governments on divine authority. The gentle Fenelon, however, is said to have written his Telemachus as a satire on the character and reign of Louis XIV.—a monarch whom Saurin preached against, both while he lived and after his heath. Calvin devotes the last chapter of his Institutes to the discussion of the nature of civil government. Owen and Baxter have left us some political tracts; Jeremy Taylor wrote on Toleration; Roger Williams on Religious Liberty; and Jonathan Mayhew's great political sermon, preached in Boston, has been styled the "Morning Gun of the Revolution."

In times of high political excitement, no sane preacher will advo-

1 Politique Tirée de Ecriture Sainte, tome xxxvi. (ed. Versailles, 1818).

cate the principles and measures of a party, unless he has an unequivocal call, either from Scripture or conscience, benevolence or humanity; for he knows that if he do he must suffer as a confessor or die as a martyr. The adverse party will, for the sake of defending themselves or attacking "the partisan preacher," lay down the broad principle that the man of God should never meddle with politics in the pulpit. It was on this plausible ground that Burke assailed Dr. Price, and Milton censured Dr. Griffeth; while the professed loyalists of Latimer's time brought to bear against him and his followers the assertion that all reformatory preaching caused sedition and rebellion. However, let the young preacher hearken neither to the calumnies of enemies nor the flatteries of friends; but proceed according to the Scripture guidance and light which we desire now to offer him.

The Hebrew prophets often spoke about the political affairs of their nation; but they did not limit their teachings to the theocracy, nor were any of them the court preachers of Hebrew monarchs. So far from it, they taught that Jehovah is the moral and providential Governor of all men. When Jonah, in his zeal for God's veracity, let this truth escape his memory, it was brought back to him in the vehicle of a most striking symbol.[1] Is not our God, God over all? was the cutting appeal of Isaiah and Amos[2] to their unfaithful countrymen: Is not Samaria as Damascus? Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me? Is not our God, God over all? Hence the prophets taught that all nations, whenever they either kept or forsook the moral part of the laws of Moses, would, with due allowance for the proportion of light, be either rewarded or punished accordingly. When, therefore, they predict the overthrow of Gentile kings or nations, they attribute their downfall to moral causes, and the justice of Jehovah.

They likewise believed that God made his providential government of all nations subservient to his moral government, and the spiritual welfare of his people, wheresoever their lot was cast. Hence, neither their themes nor sphere were shut up within the landmarks of Judah and Israel. Elijah[3] adventured as far as Zerephath in Zidon, and went to Syria to anoint Hazael king of that idolatrous people. Elisha's[4] inspiration and miraculous powers were not unknown at Damascus before he visited that city. Jonah, and probably Naham, went on prophetic missions to Nineveh. As their messages would seem to imply, so we are at liberty to sup-

1 Jonah iv. 10, 11. 2 Isa. x. 9; Amos ix. 7. 3 1 Kings xvii. 9–24.
4 2 Kings v. 10; vi. 12; viii. 7.

pose that the mass of the Ninevites, like the Persians,[1] believed in one supreme God, and that Nahum who compares the city to a pool of water on account of the confluence of its inhabitants from adjacent lands, found many of his own countrymen in that city to whom part, if not all, of his discourse may have been personally delivered. And it may fairly be inferred from Jehovah's commission to Ezekiel,[2] that such missions were neither uncommon nor comparatively unsuccessful. Witness Daniel in Babylon, and Mordecai in Shushan.

Apart from captivity and divine command, several causes conspired to attract Hebrew prophets to Gentile cities. The principal foreign nations being familiar with the vocation of the prophet, and accustomed to resort to him on occasions of doubt and perplexity, were always prepared to welcome him from whatever land he might be sent to them. Besides, the travellers, merchants, and mariners of Greece and other western nations, could hardly fail to hear the prophets of Jehovah at Sidon, Tyre, and Joppa, while the caravans of Egypt, Nineveh, and Babylon must have listened to them while resting on the oases of eastern Palestine. Not a few of the pagan prophets were evidently but the degenerate sons of the Hebrew prophets. Their great ancestor Noah was a preacher of righteousness. And the fame of the Jews as a holy nation and a kingdom of priests[3] must have paved the way for the coming of their prophets into Gentile lands long ere philosophers and sophists partly usurped their power in pagan nations. More than six hundred years before Lycurgus, the prophet Moses gave his laws. Three hundred years before the fabulous heroes, Orpheus, Hercules, and Theseus sailed for Colchis, Moses led his people through the Red Sea and the desert of Arabia, demonstrating the divine wisdom to be superior to that of the Egypt he had left behind, and the divine inspiration that was in him to be triumphant over the diabolical *afflatus* which was in the false prophets of the tribes that retired before his approach. Six hundred years before Pindar, the king of the Hebrews composed his psalms. All the minor prophets had delivered their messages before Pythagoras of Samos arose, and Esdras flourished before Socrates and his disciple Plato taught at Athens.[4] Even philosophically speaking, the scattering of these holy tribes proved to be "the riches of the Gentiles."

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[1] Sir Henry Rawlinson's Memoir on the Persian Cuniform Inscriptions, vol. i., *passim*.

[2] Ezek. iii. 5, 6. [3] Exod. xix. 6; Deut. iv. 6–8; Isa. xliii. 2; cf. 1 Peter ii. 9.

[4] Augustine, *Civ. Dei*, L. xviii. C. 38. Tholuck's Hints on the Importance of the Study of the O. T., c. i., in Bib. Cabinet, vol. ii.

Add to this the purpose of God and the teachings of his prophets concerning other nations. Whoever among the Gentiles would forsake his idols and "cleave unto the God of Israel," was counted a brother and fellow citizen.[1] In the reign of Solomon the Hebrews became morally, what the Greeks afterwards became intellectually, the teachers of all mankind. The diffusion of the pure faith among all men was the promise of the prophets and the song of the congregations.[2] And often did those men of God make the destiny of foreign nations a theme of warning or encouragement to all men. For many ages did the light of the holy nation thus pour its steady effulgence into the darkness of the adjacent nations, until the successive captivities of Israel and Judah, as it were, broke the Shekinah into many stars, and fixed them in the great centres of paganism, there to shine unclipsed and unequalled by the tapers of soothsaying and false prophecy. Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Mordecai were perhaps only representatives of a large class of similar men who through divine inspiration and grace were enabled in foreign lands to convert kings, to rise superior to prejudices and persecution, and advance to posts of wide moral and political influence.[3]

We should, on the other hand, as already suggested, guard against the error of supposing that the Hebrew prophets were the court preachers and counsellers of state in the palaces of the Hebrew and other monarchs. If we consider the relation Samuel sustained to Saul, Gad and Nathan to David, Elijah to Ahab, and Elisha to the king of Israel and of Syria, Isaiah to Hezekiah, and of Jeremiah to Zedekiah, we must conclude that they acted before kings as impartially and exclusively as before their subjects in the character of ambassadors of God.[4] They sometimes rebuked in kings sins that had not any direct bearing on their policy, and interfered with the administration of affairs only so far as the law, honour, and inspiration of Jehovah compelled them to do. "With what propriety," asks Tholuck, "can those be denominated demagogues who manifested their zeal towards the kingdom, because the worship of God was sinking or rising; who threatened wars only as the punishment of ungodliness, who promised peace only as the reward of piety, who never sought their own interest, who foretold the future, and still

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1 Lev. xix. 33, 34; 2 Chon. vi. 32; Isa. lvi. 3, 6, 7.

2 Isa. ii. 2–4; Micah. iv. 1–4; Psa. lxvii.; lxxxvi. 9; xcvi. 97.

3 The prophets of Homer in some respects strongly resemble those of the Hebrew Scriptures; cf. Mr. Gladstone's *Homer and Homeric Age*, vol. iii. 178; *Juventus Mundi*, 200, 288.

4 Rev. John Davison on Prophecy, pp. 202, 203.

continued herdsmen (as in the case of Amos), and who on account of their severe correction of apostasy must have been in continual danger of being slain with the sword, or of being sawn asunder?"

The law was given by a prophet, and all other communications from Jehovah were made through prophets (Deut. xviii. 18; Zech. vii. 12; Heb. i. 2). "The prophetical ministry," says Dr. Manton, "is a kind of chancery to the law." It is erroneous, therefore, to suppose that the prophets were the reformers of the law of Moses. So far from this, they expounded and applied that law as God saw the state and condition of the kings, the priests, and the people demanded.[1] They likewise taught men the relative *value* of the various duties which the law exacted.[2] Their utterances are in perfect consonance with the Pentateuch; their teachings flowed from the law, says Calvin, like streams from a fountain. And yet like the Great Teacher, they were moved to oppose the false interpretations and misapplications of that law.[3] Thus Ezekiel (xviii. 20, 23), in exploding the common proverb as to hereditary retribution, shows that the law (Exod. xx. 5) comtemplated such retribution only in the case of those who did not repent. Jeremiah (xxxi. 27–40) had before predicted that in the new dispensation, men would respect that proverb no more; and Moses himself, speaking as a prophetic teacher (Deut. xxiv. 16), cautioned the people against the notion that this retribution was legal, such as they might themselves inflict, and not providential, such as Jehovah alone would administer. The prophets, like their great Master and ours, also showed that some laws were rather permitted than approved of God (Ezek. xx. 25; Matt. xix. 8). "God may," says Dr. Smith, of Campelton,[4] "sometimes deal out measures to his people that seem to be what he himself terms his laws, 'not good,' but this is to be understood of either, as spoken in a relative sense, implying that they are, however, *the best* which their situation and circumstances can bear. And 'this is the sponge' (says Montesquieu, citing the text), 'that wipes out all the difficulties that are to be found in the law of Moses'—and with equal propriety we may add—in many of the ways of Providence."

As to distinctive *matter*, Hebrew prophecy is the day-star, twinkling between the departing night of the law and the advancing day of the Gospel.[5] It heralded progress. The prophets were

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[1] Matt. iv 3. [2] 1 Sam. xv. 22.

[3] Dr. Fairbairn's Law in Scripture, pp. 195–207.

[4] Summary View of the Writings of the Prophets, in Ezek. xx. 25.

[5] Rev. John Davison's Warburton Lectures on Prophecy, pp. 35–69.

reformers not of the law but of the people. Theirs was a progress which drew constant supplies from conservatism. The law was typical of the future kingdom of God and the observance of its rites, and the keeping of its precepts were needful preparations for advancing the people from a material to a spiritual economy. The prophets saw that in the law were wrapped up the germs of great truths regarding the Messiah, and that whatever of prosperity or adversity befell the chosen people was but preliminary to the unfolding and development of the scheme of redemption. And hence these prophets were hopeful for their nation and for all the world, and the most hopeful in times of general despair, and the most confident amidst the greatest discontent and alarm. They never see "the star of Bethlehem" except when the night of some great judgment returns to their people, and it is only when the eye is fixed on its march through the midnight sky that they step forward most firmly, and their countenances glow most angelically with the prescience of the birth and death and victory and benign dominion of their Immanuel. They were, therefore, pre-eminently sons of consolation and not mere awakeners and revivalists. They were rather, indeed, each of these by turns according to their various avocations as pastors.[1]

The foregoing principles must be borne in mind by all who would comprehend the relations of the prophets to politics, and determine how far their example may justly and safely be followed by the Christian preacher. Let us now examine their political relations and example historically.

Under the *Theocracy*, strictly so called, which continued from the time of Moses until the coronation of Saul, we first find a prophet acting as law-giver and civil magistrate as well as religious teacher. Then we find Deborah at once a prophetess and judge[2] moved of God to command the Israelites to go to war against Jabin, the king of Canaan, to accompany the Hebrew army in the field, and to celebrate their victory in a song of triumph. Samuel was, at first, prophet, priest, and civil magistrate. Among his first prophetic acts was an exhortation to the people to return to the Lord as a means of deliverance from the Philistines.[3] Jehovah was their King, and it was by returning loyally to him, and not by imitating the monarchical governments of their pagan neigbours, that they were to become mighty and victorious.

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1 Isa. lvi. 10, 11; cf. Ezek. xxxiii. 7; Jer. ii. 8.; iii. 15.; xvii. 16.; xxiii. 1–4, 9–40.

2 Judges iv. 4, 5. 3 1 Sam. vii. 3.

Under the *Monarchy* we hear Samuel remonstrating in the name of the Lord against the political act of choosing a king, but when Israel had fully resolved on modifying their form of government, Samuel was commanded of God to yield to the popular voice and anoint Saul their captain and king. Though he had warned them of the consequences, yet he proceeded to secure, so far as possible, the obedience of the king to the law which Moses had provided for a monarchy.[1] One of his earliest acts under the new power, was to forbid the execution of certain recusants.[2] Still serving the people in the character of prophet and priest, Samuel reminded them that their national prosperity depended on their obedience to the divine law,[3] repeatedly rebuked Saul for disregarding the commands of Jehovah, executed Agag with his own hands before the Lord, and anointed David king in the place of the apostate and rejected Saul. We have no space to mention the several political acts of succeeding prophets. Nathan, Ahijah, Shemaiah, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zechariah, Azariah, Oded, and others, were inspired to counsel, reprove, or encourage kings—inspired, we say, for it is demonstrable that these prophets spoke to monarchs, not as mere sagacious statesmen, but almost exclusively as men of God. In one instance Nathan[4] did, we concede, mistakenly suppose that David was following the divine guidance, and so he hastily approved his project of building a temple—a project that seemed reasonable, benevolent, and in accordance with the divine will and purpose; but before another day dawned upon the prophet, a revelation from God corrected the error. This should teach us that we ought not to advise kings concerning even spiritual matters without authority from the word of God. Nathan was afterwards called to interpose in order to secure the anointing of Solomon, in pursuance of David's oath that the son of Bathsheba should succeed him: upon which Matthew Henry observes, "When crowns were disposed of by immediate direction of Heaven, no marvel that prophets were much interested and employed in that matter; but now, that common Providence rules the affairs of the kingdom of men (Dan. iv. 32), the subordinate agency must be left to common persons; and let not prophets intermeddle in them, but keep to the affairs of the kingdom of God among men."

The prophets Elijah and Elisha afford admirable examples of moral courage. The instances of their firmness and boldness in withstanding the idolatries of the court and people of Israel, and in

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1 1 Sam. x. 25; Deut. xvii. 14–20. 2 Id. xi. 12, 13.
3 Id. xii. 12–14, 20–25. 4 2 Sam. vii. 3, 5–17.

rebuking monarchs, and of their success in defeating the enemies of the ten tribes, are so familiar to all that they need not be repeated here.

We have already alluded to the relations of these two prophets to the kings of Syria. We have likewise a remarkable instance of Elijah's concern for the spiritual prosperity of the rival kingdom of Judah in the letter[1] written by him to Jehoram, and which was not to be employed for the reproof of the king of Judah until after the death of the prophet. It is a proof of the divine legation of these prophets of Israel that they did not share the antipathy of their nation towards Judah, and it is, therefore, probable that Jehovah moved Elijah to communicate this prophecy in a posthumous writing, in order, perhaps, to put it beyond the power of Judah to suspect that it was dictated by party spirit, and composed in the interest of the king of Israel. The advice a prophet[2] gave to Amaziah, that he should not employ the mercenaries of Israel whom he had hired to fight his battles, was not prejudicial to the honour of all the ten tribes, but only to that of the children of Ephraim, who had already, on several occasions, shown themselves signally wanting in faith and obedience towards Jehovah, and the ravages these hirelings afterwards committed on the cities of Judah must have convinced every candid man in Israel that this prophet of Judah spoke the truth of God. And when Jehoshaphat became a partner with the wicked Ahaziah in a commercial speculation,[3] the prophet Eliezer predicted that the Lord would wreck his ships. As, however, the storm in the harbour of Ezion-geber proved alike disastrous to the two kings, and the calamity affected but remotely and, perhaps, not unfavourably the popular interests of the tribes of Israel, none could reasonably say that the prophecy was dictated by a clannish spirit. Equally superior to the conduct of an ecclesiastical factionary was the humane counsel of the prophet Oded[4] in behalf of the Judaic captives, whom the men of Israel had purposed to reduce to bondage. He reminds the victors that the prisoners are their brethren, and that it is because the common *Lord God of their fathers* was angry with Judah, that he has delivered these families into their hands. Amos was sent to prophesy against Israel, and, though he was a native of Judah, he nevertheless does not spare his own nation, but tells them that they, in common with Moab and Samaria, are to expect the judgments of the Lord.[5]

No less liberal was the charity of Isaiah, when in the days of

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[1] 2 Chron. xxi. 12. [2] Id. xxv. 7–13. [3] Id. xx. 35–37. [4] Id. xxviii. 9–15.
[5] Amos ii. 1–5; vi. 1–6; see also the prophecy of Hosea, his contemporary.

Hezekiah, as the spiritual guide of that king, he officiated at the Passover which was kept in the second month at Jerusalem.[1] For who can doubt that he was inspired of Jehovah to counsel Hezekiah to invite to this Passover the remaining inhabitants of the land of Israel, and that it was during the fourteen days when for the first time after many years, the men of Judah and the men of Israel stood side by side in the courts of the temple that Isaiah preached to them the sermons which are contained in the last twenty-seven chapters of his prophecy? Some German scholars have denied these chapters a place among the genuine prophecies of Isaiah, principally on the ground that they do not find in the life of this man of God any occasion that befitted such themes and called for such applications of them. But let them not overlook, as they all have done, this occasion. Let them study well the true conditions and prospects of Judah and Israel, and study again from this new standpoint these chapters which they have learned to ascribe to "the Great Unnamed." This is not the place to discuss this question; nor is it necessary that we should settle it here; for whichever side we take it must be evident to any one, after a careful examination of these chapters as to this point, that the prophet has by turns, with admirable impartiality and timeliness, reproved and comforted both Israel and Judah.

Notice here by the way, that when Judah is in danger of being too highly elated by the fruition or prospect of prosperity, Jehovah inspires this prophet to foretell some calamity that is calculated to teach them their dependence on Jehovah. Thus after allaying the fears of Ahaz with the predictions against Syria and Ephraim, allied enemies of whom he had stood in fear, the prophet proceeds to tell him that his doom is to be executed by Assyria: thus again while Eliakim is told of his future exaltation, he is likewise warned of his downfall because of his nepotism,[2] and when Hezekiah had sung his song of thanksgiving for recovering from a deadly sickness and had in his ostentation shown his treasures to the son of the king of Babylon, the man of God is immediately moved to foretell him of the Babylonian captivity.

Jeremiah, like Isaiah, endeavours to dissuade the kings of Judah from reposing any confidence in alliances with foreign powers, or their own martial resources. This prophet has been unjustly

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1 2 Chron. xxix., xxx., xxxi. May we not say that it was by the mouth of Isaiah that Hezekiah spoke comfortably to the Levites? (2 Chron. xxx. 22; cf. Isa. xl. 2.

2 Isa. xxii. 24, 25.

charged with a want of patriotism for recommending to the kings of Judah submission to the Babylonian yoke. But it should be remembered that none can speak thus of this prophet without ignoring at once the inspiration and providence of God. Nor should we forget that while Jehovah ever moved his prophets to forbid the forming of alliances with Gentile powers, yet after those alliances had been consummated and treaties made, he inspired the prophets to enjoin the most plain and scrupulous discharge of all the obligations those treaties exacted. Now the king of Judah had sworn fealty to this foreign monarch; so that Jeremiah, or rather his divine Inspirer, was thus preventing a breach of faith which is of all things the most unpatriotic. But so far from a lack of public spirit, this prophet underwent inexpressible sufferings in dungeons and imperilled his life in behalf of his countrymen. After the fall of Jerusalem, being offered a refuge at the court of Babylon, he chose rather to live with the remnant of his people, first amidst the anarchy of Judah, and finally exposed to famine and sword in the land of Egypt. The persecutions he suffered from the princes of Judah, and the consolations he at that time derived from the study of the Scriptures are described with wonderful amplification of thought and feeling in the one hundredth and nineteenth Psalm, which, in our judgment, bears many traces of its authorship.

Not only against kings but also against the aristocracy, male and female, both Isaiah and Jeremiah are called to speak. The latter is very bold[1] in his declarations as to their character and doom; as to Isaiah[2] he seems to be describing the aristocracy of to-day, and what is remarkable as an unfulfilled prophecy concerning them, it is said that the day is coming when they shall cease to be flattered, and nobility of rank give place to nobility of character.

The *Exile* created political problems which none but inspired prophets could have solved so readily, and with such superhuman wisdom. Jeremiah, in opposition to the advice of the false prophets, counselled the captives in Babylon to devote themselves to the pursuits of peace in the capital of the Chaldean empire, saying, "Pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof ye shall find peace."[3] Now that the last vestiges of the theocracy were no longer traceable, the prophets announced that principle of pious, loyal, and obedient subjection to foreign masters which was henceforth to prevail both among Jews and Christians, whether slaves or freedmen, whether tributary colonists or provincial citizens. The political

1 Jer. v. 5–9, 25–29; ix. 2–8, 23, 24, etc. 2 Isa. chaps. iii., iv., v., xxxii.
3 Jer. xxix.

conduct of the Hebrew exiles is narrated in the books of Daniel, Ezekiel, Ezra, Esther and Nehemiah. The history of this people contains no chapters more honorable to them as subjects than these; nor can we doubt that had it not been for the counsels and sermons of those divinely inspired prophets with which they were now blessed, these captives would have left to subsequent ages no other record than the ruins of cities among which our ethnologists are seeking the monuments of "the Lost Tribes."

As to the political relations of Job, they appear to be those of the ever-existing patriarchal life of the East, as modified by the influence of the high civilization of the Hebrew kingdom, and of Egypt. Job was a Hebrew chief, who perhaps about the time of David and Solomon, led a pastoral life in Uz, a region in the north of Arabia *Deserta*, between Idumea, Palestine, and the Euphrates, and near a city through which lay the route of the caravans of Tema and Sheba, and where he was by turns exposed to the inroads of both Arabian and Chaldean marauders. His political opinions, and those of his neighbours and of the young prophet Elihu, are every way deserving of our study.[1]

But to return: we should not let it escape us that the prophets did not enjoin and inculcate the duty of passive obedience to idolatrous powers, without at the same time strengthening and encouraging the captives with the hope of deliverance from the yoke and the ultimate punishment of their oppressors. Jeremiah and Daniel foretold the duration of the captivity, while the former[2] sends to Babylon a prediction concerning the fall of Babylon for the consolation of the Hebrew exiles. His book of Lamentations also encourages them to hope in the divine mercy, and ironically foretells the retribution that is to be inflicted on their neighbouring enemies, the Edomites. Ezekiel likewise aims to dissuade his fellow exiles from discontent and envy by predicting the judgments which are soon to fall upon Jerusalem and the remaining inhabitants of Judah; also from a distrust of the faithfulness of God by foretelling the distractions of adverse powers, their own deliverance from captivity, and their ultimate prosperity under the reign of the Messiah.

It also deserves our attention that it was during the period of the captivity that God's people first exemplified that principle which limits and yet honours the authority of the civil magistrate—a prin-

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[1] Job iii. 13–15; ix. 24, 33; xii. 6, 16, 25; xiii. 26; xv. 34; xx. 4–29; xxi. 7–33; xxix. 2–25; xxx. 1–9; xxxi. 28; xxxiv. 17–30; xxxvi. 7–23, etc. Those who give the earliest date to the book ought to regard its astronomy as prophetic.

[2] Jer. chap. l. li.

ciple which the Christian martyrs maintained and consecrated with their blood.[1] Daniel and his fellow captives were required by the commands of Jehovah to disobey the decrees of the king of the Chaldeans, but they nevertheless submitted meekly to the civil penalties that were visited upon them, and so did all that they conscientiously could to support the majesty of human authority. The neglect of these principles made many of the later Jews such insurrectionists that they were expelled from Rome and some other ancient cities.[2]

Another new lesson taught by the Captivity, or rather repeated with new emphasis, is the principle that all good government, whether civil or ecclesiastical, proceeds from men "anointed" or set apart for the service, and assisted therein, by the Holy Spirit. In Zech. chap. iv., Joshua, the high priest, and Zerubbabel, governor of Judea, are symbolized by the two olive branches which conveyed the oil from the olive trees to the chandalier; these "are the *two anointed ones* that stand *before the Lord of the whole earth*." As according to the Hebrew custom both the sacred and the secular authorities were publicly anointed in token of their spiritual call and endowment, so here the high priest and the governor are alike ordained and qualified by "the Lord of the whole earth" not by the God of Judea merely, but of all lands, even those in which the Jews lived as captives or vassals, yes, moreover, of all ages; for in Christian times it was still to remain true that the best governments and administrations, whether in Church or State, are equally to be reverenced and obeyed as God's witnesses and illuminated by an unction from the Holy Ghost (Rev. ix). During the Middle Ages these existed in a miserable dead-alive state, and for a short time actually defunct, although not buried; but at the Reformation they were both honoured with a resurrection and ascension. Such is our deeply pondered conjecture about these ideas as reproduced in Christian prophecy.

And this suggests the important observation that ideas of the prophets of the Captivity often reappear again in their higher and wider application in the Apocalypse—a book full of political philosophy.

Thus much for the example of the Hebrew prophets as exhibited in various circumstances. It is but incidentally that we have mentioned the *matter* of their more political addresses. To discuss all

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1 Ezekiel (xliii. 7–9) foretells the end of political encroachments in ecclesiastical affairs.

2 Acts. viii. 2; cf. a Suetonius, *Claudius*, 25–30; 1 Peter ii. 16.

the political teachings of these prophets would demand volumes. Here we can do but little more than bear testimony to the inestimable value of the political principles and lessons they embody. Raleigh, Clarendon, Milton, Coleridge, Umbreit, Bunsen, Tholuck, and other great names have regarded the prophets as the best of all teachers of the science of politics. It is to be lamented that the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone[1] should have endeavoured to set aside this verdict by declaring that he can never read without pain the disparaging account of the Greek mind and its achievements as compared with those of the Hebrew prophets which is given by Milton in the fourth book of his "Paradise Regained." But we humbly submit the question whether Milton was not by genius and attainments as capable of rightly appreciating both Homer and Demosthenes as any modern scholar is? Not only as a poet but even as a political writer, may we not safely say that he has no fellow in the present generation? As to the Hebrew prophets, he partook so largely of their spirit, teachings, and aims, that his competence to judge of their relative excellence as "statists" cannot, at this late time of day, be reasonably called in question.

If we look into the thing more closely we discover that the whole matter resolves itself into this question: Has the all-wise God revealed to us more about political science than the orators and poets of ancient Greece? Mr. Gladstone's more recent experience in solving a politico-religious problem will, we doubt not, lead him to endorse the opinion of Edmund Burke, that "religion is the basis of civil society and the fruitful source of all blessing and comfort in human intercourse." Proudhon, the socialist, in his "Confessions of a Revolutionist," owns that it is surprising that as soon as we go deeply into politics, we stumble upon theology. He begins his "System of Economic Contradictions" with the investigation of the idea of God; and Guizot makes this thought the foundation of his "Discourse on the English Revolution." The latter says: "All political and social questions refer for their ultimate solution to the religious principle." "In questions purely political," adds Dr. Chr. Ernst Luthardt,[2] "religion belongs to no party; it is neither monarchical nor republican, neither absolute nor limited; and that because it is only religion and not politics. But it is the guardian of the sanctuary of law, and of those everlasting and divine appointments which form the immovable foundation of our whole temporal

1 Homer and the Homeric Age, vol. ii. pp. 5, 25–30.

2 Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Christianity, pp. 153, 334 (Translation).

life and social condition; the advocate of those eternal moral principles and rules by which even political science must be guided and enlightened, if it would form a political creed or choose a line of procedure based upon the relations and necessities of fact and justice."

All this is true; and yet we must subjoin the qualifying remark that matchless as the Hebrew prophets are as guides in all that relates to the higher and more difficult walks of statesmanship, they should always be studied in connection with the prophets of the new dispensation, and especially with him who is the Alpha and Omega of all true prophecy. For though Jesus and his apostles pursued the same course in the main as their Hebrew predecessors did in similar circumstances, yet the former were, in certain regards, placed in new political situations. While under Oriental supremacy there had, indeed, been extended over Judah a provincial form of government, but there were not then, so far as we know, two such parties as corresponded to the Pharisees and the Herodians under the Roman proconsular dominion in that country. At any rate, there was nothing theretofore to call forth from the lips of a prophet such a golden sentence as that of Christ, "Render, therefore, unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." The Jews had under the exile ordered their lives according to the spirit of this precept, and Guizot is wrong, therefore, when he asserts that this grand principle of the distinction between man's religious and civil life was unknown to all history, and to every state of society previous to the advent of Jesus. He is, however, so far right that this principle is of divine origin, and that it had never before taken the shape of an inspired maxim.

Now observe how the case stood. Our Lord in the early part of his ministry was aware that the Pharisees would seize every opportunity to make it appear that he was really an enemy to the true Hebrew faith and worship; and hence he wrought a miracle to pay the half shekel of the temple tribute. Though he mildly and privately protested against the injustice of the exaction, yet, to avoid giving offence, he resorted to extraordinary means for obtaining the required stater.[1] It was also the aim of the Pharisees, along with the Herodians, to fasten upon him the charge of sedition by attempting to prove that he pretended to be the king of the Jews.[2] When, accordingly, he was asked in the most flattering words, to decide as to the lawfulness of paying tribute to Cæsar, he shaped his answer so as to put it out of the power of the Pharisees either to pro-

1 Matt. xvii. 24-27. 2 Luke xxiii. 2; John xix. 14-22.

claim him an enemy to the law of Moses and the freedom of the people of God, or to join the Herodians in stigmatizing him as an instigator of opposition to the Roman authority and a disturber of the public peace.[1] But his reply was intended not only as an ensample to us of the wisdom and prudence we are to exercise in difficult circumstances, but of our duties with reference to politics. From the words he spoke on this occasion, the preacher is authorized—

I. To rebuke the vices of politicians of all parties: "But Jesus perceived their wickedness and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites?"

II. When needful, to teach and exhort Christians out of the Scriptures to perform their political duties: "Render, therefore, unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's."

III. As occasion requires, to teach and exhort politicians out of the Scriptures to perform their Christian duties: "and unto God, the things that are God's." And especially that they should not, by paying that homage to Satan which belongs to God only, seek to obtain from the former an increase of political influence.[2]

Our Lord's conduct on another occasion instructs the preacher in all legal and civil controversies, that he should not forget to regard every question *as a religious teacher* ought. When a person,[3] interrupting his discourse, said, "Master, speak unto my brother that he divide the inheritance with me;" he not only replied, "Man, who made me a judge and a divider over you," but proceeded most opportunely to warn all of the danger of covetousness, and to inculcate upon them the duty of contentment. His conduct to men in authority was such as became the divine Prophet,[4] who never flattered and never vilified them.

Though he announced the great two-edged truth, "My kingdom is not of this world," yet he acted on the principle[5] inculcated by the prophets on the Hebrews of the captivity and by the apostles on the Christian converts, that we should be obedient to civil authority for God's sake.

As to War our space compels us to take for granted what has so often been proved, that the prophets and Jesus and his apostles do not condemn all wars and warriors. This is the place to make a

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[1] Matt. xxii. 15–22. [2] Matt. iv. 8–10. [3] Luke xiii. 1–34.

[4] Luke xiii. 31–33; John xviii. 19–21; Luke xxii. 67–69; John xviii. 34–37; Luke xxiii. 8–11

[5] Jer. xxvii. 6; xxix. 7; Rom. xiii. 1; 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14.

few suggestions as to the best manner of preaching on war and other related subjects.

For one thing; in inculcating the proper duties of rulers in time of war, and particularly in preaching against retaliation, we must be on our guard against making any reserve, either expressed or implied in favour of governments, or magistrates, or commanders, or armies, as bodies of men.

We must, for another thing, consider whether though a war be just, yet the nation ought not to regard it as a chastisement of a holy and righteous God for national sins. When Luther wrote to the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, concerning the war against the Turks, he asserted that right was on the side of the Emperor and the German nation, and yet he does not fail to add that the Turk is "God's rod," and that 'the quarrel must begin with repentance, and that the Germans must consider their ways or they will contend in vain.'

We are, again, after the example of John the Baptist, to preach to the soldiers repentance and the other duties required by their vocation and condition (Luke iii. 14). This is better than the most eloquent secular war speeches, because more worthy of the preacher and every way more advantageous to the soldier and his country.[1]

Finally, in funeral sermons for fallen soldiers it might sometimes be advisable to show what kind of patriotism, or of heroism amounts to a Christian virtue, or to set forth the teachings of Scripture concerning sudden death. As to these subjects there is much of dangerous error and superstition afloat in the public mind.

In general, the preacher who reads his commission correctly, will oftener find occasion to teach men their civil and political *duties* than their civil and political *rights*,[2] especially the duty of opposing bribery,[3] oppression, and other such political sins.

To adapt civil policy, law, and administration to the unforeseen course of Divine Providence, is one of the greatest achievements of the profoundest statemanship. Herein thorough knowledge of Christian ethics is of essential service; and it is remarkable that in the most mysterious labyrinth of affairs it generally happens that one plain principle of morality is our only and our sufficient clue.

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1 "Every minister," says Jeremy Taylor, "ought to preach to his parish and urge their duty: St. John the Baptist told the soldiers what the soldiers should do, but troubled not their heads with what was the duty of the Scribes and Pharisees." (Rules and Advices to the Clergy.)

2 Applications de la Morale à la Politique, par Joseph Droz (Paris, 1825), p. 20.

3 Isa. i. 23; Amos v. 12.

The study of history will also enable us to understand some of the fixed methods according to which the King of kings governs all nations. Almost proverbial have become these words of Schiller: "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht," the world's history is the world's judgment. But it should not be forgotten that the prophet is still, as of old, the best interpreter of history; for he discloses to us the more secret, higher, and more general purposes of God. The student of history, as it is now commonly written, may trace the stream of civilization in many of its meanderings, and tell the causes of its bends, falls, and eddies; and explain those convulsions of the earth which notched for it a path through the Creator's walls: but his point of view is low and his horizon invaded by fogs or storms. The prophet, on the contrary, stands high above storms and even clouds; he is on a mountain tower where he is the first to say All hail! to the rising, and the last to say Farewell! to the setting sun; he is the first to hear the thunder of every snow-break; the sources of the stream of history lie revealed at his feet; known to him are "the balancings of the clouds," and the temperature of the glaciers, and the workings of other mysterious agencies that either madden or tame its career; he can show us the uses even of the drift-wood which rides on its current, and of the ice-floes which the freshet left high on its banks, he can, moreover, enable us to behold for ourselves clearly and afar the sea into which its waters ultimately roll. And these things are of principal service to us, whether we are considered as "hithersided" or "yondersided." The common task of the mere student of history may appear the more practical and the more useful. This is, however, a great mistake. It is of the utmost utility to me who am choosing a rock on which to build my home, to be able to ascertain how high the passing waters may rise, and whether their sources are perennial, or whether causes are at work which will in a few years leave their channel perpetually dry. Nor am I unconcerned to learn whether they empty into navigable tides, or only into some dead sea, or, dividing into a hundred shallow ditches, are finally lost amidst desolate sands. The forces, impulses, and results which are continually showing themselves in politics are moral rather than intellectual or physical. This lesson, which Jehovah taught to the human race while it was yet in its infancy, it accounts too childish for its manhood. "It clearly appears," says Heeren,[1] "from the history of politics that religion maintains a higher political im-

[1] Ideen über Politik der Alten Welt, B. i., pp. 18, 22. Cf. his Essay and that of Villers on the Political Influence of the Reformation in Germany.

portance the further we trace back the annals of the world." "Anciently," adds Tholuck, "mankind lived in a more immediate connection with the world above than they do at present. Hence, this lively sentiment that nothing could de done *sine Numine*." The monarch was chosen and anointed by the Lord, and was his temporal representative, while the Lord himself was still acknowledged to be the universal King. It was believed that every event depended on the divine will and purpose. And assuredly it evermore remains true, as Richard Baxter has forcibly said, "Nothing can be rightly known, if God be not known; nor is any study well managed nor any great purpose where God is not studied. We know little of the creature till we know it as it standeth in its order and respects to God; single letters and syllables, uncomposed, are nonsense; he that overlooketh the Alpha and Omega, and seeth not the beginning and end and him in all who is the all of all, doth see nothing at all. All creatures as such are broken syllables, and they signify nothing as separated from God."

But as it was the fatal error of the ancient pagans, so it is of some modern statesmen, to regard the Supreme Being, as to his providential purposes merely, irrespective of his moral law. In vain do we study the relations of the divine government to public affairs unless we likewise study its constitution and laws, its rewards and retributions; for these are, in part, the rules on which the Divine Being conducts his providential administration. And as nations must necessarily be finally judged in Time, if judged at all, while individuals are finally judged in Eternity alone; herein we find the reason why there is less mystery in God's providential dealings with nations than with individuals. In the former, the virtues and vices, as well as their connection with their rewards and penalties, are exposed to the observation of all. But it is not enough to adore God as the disposer of all national events unless we forecast the future posture of affairs in the light of those principles of eternal ethics, according to which he always did and always will proceed. The Hebrew people were constantly taught by their prophets that the events to be expected were coming either as national rewards, or as national penalties of the holy laws of Jehovah, and, therefore, they were guarded against a superstitious belief in an unreasoning Fate and a blind Fortune. They exercised faith not only in the omnipotence and omniscience of God, but in his commandments also. "Our system of laws," says Josephus,[1] "was far more useful than that of any other nation; for Moses regarded all the virtues as

1 Contr. Api., c. ii., §16.

subordinate parts of piety to God, and not piety as a mere subdivision of virtue. In his legislation he recognizes all our actions as having a relation to God." Some of the pagans did, it must be admitted, believe in a Fate who ruled Olympus itself, and in a *Nemesis*, or goddess of justice, who punishes human pride and arrogance; nor were they without some other notions respecting divine rewards and penalties. But in general, their opinions concerning national prosperity and adversity as coming from the gods, were not associated with the principles of ethics. Nor are the opinions of most modern statesmen in this respect very different from those of the ancient pagans. They do indeed recognize the hand of Providence in imparting to the people certain *intellectual* notions, and giving and preserving to them *material* wealth; they will even proceed so far as to admit that it is *rational* to conclude that virtue has an inherent tendency to promote national prosperity, and vice has the opposite effect. This is, however, very far from an experimental and practical persuasion that a holy and just God does actually reward nations for their virtues, and punish them for their vices, and that these are the *providential* acts of his moral government. The study of the Hebrew prophets along with the book of Revelation is necessary, in order to illustrate, impress, and enforce this great principle—a principle that did not pass away with the theocracy, and that was in nowise dependent on peculiar religious privileges and miraculous interpositions.

But then we ought to consider that, in order to interpret aright the signs of the times, we must study them not only in the light of the divine *laws*, but likewise in the light of God's *purposes of mercy* in the work of redemption. To determine the nature of the events of our day without the Sun of Righteousness, were as difficult as it would be to define the laws of light without any reference to its celestial fountain. And there is no hour in our passing history so gloomy that we cannot trace up through the opening clouds more than one shadowy beam to that Sun where they concentre and point to the stage of his progress through the heavens, even when we cannot behold his unscreened and benignant face. And yet when we see the Lord Jesus sparing a nation at a time when it apparently deserves punishment, or punishing it while it seems to us needful that it should be spared, let us beware that we do not mistake the design of him who "is head over all things to the Church." It is undoubtedly his purpose to order the affairs of nations so that they shall subserve the spiritual prosperity of his people. But then we may err by underrating the complexity of the problem we are to solve. It must be remembered that where

the greater portion of the inhabitants are ungodly, but poor and ignorant, they may be permitted to advance in material prosperity, in order that they may be able to sustain churches and schools; in this manner does the goodness of God sometimes lead a nation to repentance. Or, where a nation has, for the most part, apostatised from the religion of Jesus, and has come to be fixed in unbelief, its inhabitants may, before the day of retribution shall arrive, enjoy remarkable material prosperity and every kind of animal and many sorts of intellectual pleasure, simply because they are to have their good things in this life only; while a people truly Christian may be denied these things to the end that their graces and virtues may be exercised, or their negligences and misdoings punished; for, like nations, true Christians are punished in this life only. Kingdoms or empires that are mainly as to politics and common life unfriendly to Jesus, may be subject to changes on account of the true Churches or Christians they contain. "What a weight," says Andrew Fuller, "lies upon the religious part of a nation; who either prove like Paul the salvation of them that sail with them, or, like Jonah, the principal cause of the storm." Nor does the problem always end here. It may extend to the relations one nation sustains towards several other nations. And hence the study of the history of Egypt, Syria, Assyria, Chaldea, and other idolatrous powers, in their relation to Judah and Israel, and of the various predictions concerning these nations and the causes of their political changes, is indispensable to those who would comprehend the operations of Providence in public affairs. Were some preachers to ponder these and other such things more deeply, they would not so often nor so confidently put themselves forward as interpreters of "the signs of the times." Happily for the preacher, it is no part of his duty to foreknow the political times and seasons with prophetic, much less historic accuracy. It is enough for him that he acquaint himself and his hearers with the prophetic and historic records of those vices and virtues on which the fortune of a nation depends, and to use those records as the grounds of admonitions and warnings.

If we examine closely these relations of God's laws, and purposes, and providences to every nation in the light of the example and utterances of the prophets, we cannot, as many preachers have done, refuse politics a place in sermons on the plea that the kingdoms and nations of this world are merely material and temporal interests, and therefore cannot be proper themes for those who are to occupy themselves wholly and exclusively with matters of spiritual and eternal concern. With equal reason might a preacher refuse to

apply the principles of Christian ethics to social and commercial life. These relationships and pursuits are temporal, and are doomed to pass away with the world, and yet the man of God does not excuse himself from explaining and inculcating the Christian duties which these states, relations, and employments require. A due reverence for the laws of God and a pious attention to its individual, social, and civil rewards and penalties, the devout study of his revealed purposes and of every department of his providence, to say nothing of a benevolent regard for the welfare of the poor, the ignorant, and the ungodly, will demand of the preacher an examination of all such political questions as touch and affect these objects.

But let it not be imagined from anything we just now advanced, that we recommend the preacher to cherish a party spirit, or to take a side in party politics. It must be remembered, however, that if he keep on his own ground and only discuss the religious, moral, and philanthropic aspects and bearings of party questions, he will sometimes, of necessity, lean more or less to one side, and consequently be exposed to the displeasure of the opposite side. In such cases he is ever to consult the dictates of Christian expediency, and so determine what course is most likely to promote the holy, disinterested, and benevolent object he has, or ought to have, in view, and yet he should always dissever his notion of Christian expediency from the mere mundane interests of himself, or the Church or denomination to which he belongs. Now some would practically separate this notion of a high and Christian expediency from the notion of duty. They say, "It is sufficient for me to know that a cause is a just and good cause, and when I have ascertained that it is so, my duty is at the same time ascertained." And yet these preachers would be very unwilling that their hearers should thus summarily dispose of most other questions of duty, because in almost all cases where we have decided that a certain good end ought to be effected, we are expected so far to respect the oracles of God as to inquire in their light, "*What* ought I to do about this? From what *motives* ought I to act? *When* ought I to speak out? *In what manner* should I proceed? What *means* ought I to employ?" And if human passions and earthly interests are involved in these questions, the more studiously and the more prayerfully are we expected to occupy ourselves with their solution. So peculiar are the motives, and methods, and means required by the Gospel in bringing about the public welfare, that they will never be identical with those by which the mere demagogue would accomplish the same object. We ought, therefore, in maintaining or winning what is right in itself to beware of affiliating with those who are endeav-

ouring to effect the same end by unjustifiable means. Then, again, human passions and party spirit may be so unreasonably inflamed in the advocacy or defence of a good cause that sober minds are sometimes in danger of concluding that the questions at issue are themselves the offspring of party animosity, or the mere productions of selfish and artful politicians, when in fact they may have had their origin in true public spirit, in a deep sense of right, in humane sentiments, or something of the like description. Nor is this all; at such times we are too apt to confound causes with instruments or necessary attendants. Thus blindly did Ephraem Syrus take up this lamentation, "Because the priests have fallen into disputings, therefore kings are thrown into war." This is a very ancient blunder. Ahab was guilty of it when he said to Elijah, "Art thou he that troubleth Israel?" It must always be borne in mind that every party, whether political or religious, has adherents who are conspicuous because they are fussy, talkative, and unreasonable, but who really do little either to forward or retard its principles. The petrel is not the cause of the storm, neither is the halcyon the cause of the calm.

Much mischief has been made by misapprehending the proper relations of theology and political science, and of the Church and the State. We are often told that because the State should not meddle with ecclesisastical affairs, the Church and its ministers should not meddle with political matters; that as the provinces of religion and politics are different, so the sphere of the Christian is distinct from that of the statesman, and that consequently the ministry have properly as little to do with politics as politicians have to do with theology. Such assertions are grounded on the error that the religion of Christ in its spiritual and ethical forces ought not to reach and pervade every department of human society. The Church, as such, and her ministry, by virtue of their office cannot, we admit, claim any share in acts of legislation or administration. Neither, on the other side, has the State or any of its politicians a right to destroy the freedom of Christ's truth and grace—a right to strike at the two-edged sword of the Gospel which goes out of the mouth of Jesus, and is wielded by the hands of his servants, even when they therewith "execute vengeance upon the heathen, and punishments upon the people; to bind their kings with chains, and their nobles with fetters of iron" (Psa. cxlix. 6–9; Rev. i. 16). "This honour have all his saints," and no mortal power can rightfully deprive them of it. It was no arrogant boast but a vindication of the moral supremacy of the true prophet in all ages, when Luther

replied to the Prince Elector: "*You* cannot protect *me* by your might, but *I* can protect *you* by my prayers."

"O, but does not all experience prove that a very good Christian may make a very poor politician, and, on the other hand, a very shabby Christian make a very good politician? Will the mere piety of a man insure the correctness of his political opinions, or enable him without study and practice to apply those opinions to all the details of legislative or administrative business?" There has been, it must be admitted, too much of that fanaticism which, without any knowledge of the science of government, or any careful attention to the merits of political questions, presumes to judge and decide them not only for itself but for others as well. We deprecate this religious fanaticism as much as we do that political fanaticism which has the hardihood to pass sentence on all theological questions without having examined any one of them. It must, nevertheless, be conceded that in all cases where questions of right are involved, that man is the best judge who, other things being equal, has a knowledge of the divine attributes, government, and laws, and of the evangelical plan of salvation; that where most men are failing to examine the merits of a political opinion or measure because of passion and self-interest, he is most likely to determine impartially who has crucified his affections and lusts, and learned to live unselfishly for the welfare of others; and that where any ethical principle is concerned in any issue, he can act most intelligently who has both a theoretical and practical knowledge of Christian morals. "Godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." It not only sanctifies that political knowledge which we already possess, but enables us to acquire more, and that of the most excellent quality. Other things being equal, the most advanced Christian will be the most intelligent citizen and the wisest statesman. To deny this were to deny that the Christian ages and nations have made better governments and laws than the old pagans constructed. Christian piety has made the largest contributions to all the sciences, and if it has not always discovered, yet has it improved almost every useful invention. The saintly John Tauler was right when he declared that a man ought to be a better shoemaker for being a Christian, and Luther probably had his words in mind when he sang:

> "Not more devout the priest can be,
> Than Christian housemaid with her broom,
> Her work pursuing faithfully."

As, moreover, the Christian is, or ought to be, more benevolent

and humane than his unbelieving neighbour, he is more competent than the latter rightly to understand all laws which concern the poor and the afflicted part of the people. Few things are more plainly revealed in holy Scripture than that God and his prophets and his people side and sympathise with the destitute, oppressed, and suffering classes. Indeed, the mass of true believers have hitherto belonged to these classes. Now, we presume that no one will deny that very many political problems, as those relating to taxation, currency, tariff, emigration, education, suffrage, etc., do often vitally affect the physical, mental, and moral condition of the poor. When any of these problems are put forward for solution, the true Christian will take that side which he believes to be most friendly and helpful to the poor. Wanting in knowledge and judgment he may be sometimes; but lacking in philanthropy hardly ever. The Hebrew prophets taught reverence for the Lord's anointed, whether king or priest, and dutiful subjection to constituted authority; but when either king or priest afflicted the poor by oppression or extortion, those prophets dared to alarm him with warnings and solemn denunciations. Political reforms are in this respect a severe but instructive test of the character of churches and their pastors. "During the agitation of the reform bill," says Gresley,[1] "however strong the feelings of the preacher, it was his duty to refrain from touching on a subject on which good men as well as bad were divided, and which it was impossible to mention at the time without an excitement of worldly passion. But when Bristol was in flames, Derby and Nottingham in the hands of a mob, then it was time to preach peace, and to put men in mind 'to be subject to principalities and powers,' and to obey magistrates" (Titus iii. 1). But Dr. Arnold of Rugby[2] took a more appropriate and a more Christian ground. "No one," he writes, "seems to me to understand our dangers or to speak them out manfully. One man, who sent a letter to the *Times* the other day, recommends that the clergy should preach subordination and obedience. I seriously say, God forbid they should; for if any earthly thing could ruin Christianity in England, it would be this. If they read Isaiah and Jeremiah, and Amos and Habakkuk, they will find that the prophets in a similar state of society in Judea did not preach subordination only or chiefly, but they denounced oppression and amassing overgrown properties and grinding the labourers to the smallest possible pittance; and they denounced the Jewish high church party for countenancing all these iniquities and prophesying

[1] Treatise on Preaching, Letter xxii. [2] Life and Correspondence, chap. vi.

smooth things to please the aristocracy." Speaking of the want of sympathy between the rich and poor, and the distress of the latter, embittered as it was by seeing the former living in luxury, he says: "This is the plague spot to my mind in our whole state of society, which must be removed or the whole must perish. And under God it is for the clergy to come forward boldly and begin to combat it. If you read Isaiah iii., v., and xxxii.; Jeremiah v., xxii., and xxx.; Amos iv.; Habakkuk ii., and the epistle of James written to the same people a little before the destruction of Jerusalem, you will be struck, I think, with the close resemblance of our state to that of the Jews; while the state of the Greek churches to whom St. Paul wrote was wholly different, because from their thin population and better political circumstances, poverty among them is hardly noticed, and their duties to the poor are consequently much less prominently brought forward. And unluckily our evangelicals read St. Paul more than any other part of the Scriptures, and think very little of consulting most those parts of Scripture which are addressed to persons circumstanced like ourselves." To this we may add that as most of the Christian converts were much in the condition of the Jews of the captivity, living in subjection to pagan rulers and masters, they were likewise required to yield the same passive obedience as the captive Hebrews, waiting, however, in hope for deliverance, not by insurrection and armed resistance, but by the providential interposition of the Lord. To Christian slaves Paul wrote:[1] "Art thou called, being a servant? Care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather." He reproved fraud and oppression where they were practised among the brotherhood.[2] It should be considered, on the other hand, that the apostles had but few opportunities of rebuking kings and masters for oppression, but when they had they did not fail to improve them, as we learn from the example of James, also that of Paul, who before that rapacious taker of bribes and booty, Felix, reasoned in the first place concerning righteousness, and who did not fear to write a letter to Philemon, asking the freedom of the slave Onesimus.

It is not sufficient, however, that we extend our inquiries to both the prophets and the apostles. A comprehensive view of the benevolent and humane tendencies of all true prophesying can only be gained by including also the utterances of our Divine Master, and particularly the woes by which he rebuked and warned the Scribes and Pharisees, the dominant ecclesiastical power, and, as the account of the crucifixion proves, the prevailing influence in the

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1 1 Cor. vii. 21. 2 Id. vi. 7; 1 Thes. iv. 6.

political life of Jerusalem. The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus was spoken in reproof of these covetous deriders of his teachings about mammon. What woes does he pronounce against them for their lack of judgment and mercy, and for being full of extortion. Read also what he says concerning their oppressive and partial exactions: "They bind heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers." And again: "Wo unto you, for ye devour widows' houses, and for a show make long prayers."[2] Thus spoke Jesus to and of the politico-ecclesiastical rulers of the land and oppressors of the people.

But to return to the consideration of some other objections that are often urged against preaching on politics. It is said again, that as the preacher should always aim to select such themes as are applicable to the moral condition of his audience, so if he preaches on politics he must frequently censure and denounce the conduct of the absent, and even strangers and foreigners whom his sermons are not likely to benefit, and that therefore his political preaching is, to say the least, entirely useless. Such objectors have reason on their side whenever they can prove that these absent persons or distant nations are not in some way politically related and accountable to the congregation addressed, and that a Christianized public opinion has no influence on distant nations or persons and communities which are politically independent of us. Many of the Hebrew prophets preached concerning foreign nations, although less frequently than their writings would at first view appear to show. Reproofs and warnings administered orally to their immediate hearers were not always written. But these warnings, accompanied by predictions which were intended for the absent, were committed to written rolls, in order that foreign nations and subsequent generations might perceive and believe that the predictions and their fulfillments were alike from Jehovah.

Another objection is, that as preachers are the professed ambassadors of the Prince of Peace, and as peacemakers are declared to be the blessed friends of God, it does not become them to kindle, but rather to quench the fires of party strife. This would be very good counsel if it did but proceed a little farther, and tell them that these fires are best quenched by depriving them of their fuel, namely, error, prejudice, wrong, and all the vices that produce popular dis-

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1 Luke xvi. 13–31.

2 Matt. xxiii. 1–39; Luke xx. 47; compare Isa. x. 1, 2; Ezek. xxii. 25; Hosea iv. 8; Micah ii. 9.

content and suffering: "The work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance for ever" (Isa. xxxii. 17). We cannot discharge our obligations nor gain any permanent advantage by concealing from ourselves and our congregations, the causes and cures of political epidemics, and saying, "Peace, peace, when there is no peace" (Jer. vi. 14; viii. 11). We are, to be sure, bidden to "follow peace with all men," but alas for all advocates of false peace, we are in the same breath also commanded to follow "holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord" (Heb. xii. 14).

A more powerful objection against partisan preaching is, that as most Sunday congregations are, in great part, composed of women who cannot reply to the speaker, they are not the proper assemblies for determining the comparative justness of the claims of different men and measures.

The question here arises, *When* ought the preacher to begin to instruct his people respecting the moral or religious bearings of a political principle or measure; when the subject is first agitated, or later when every body is talking about it? As a general rule it is no doubt best, if possible, to prevent all great errors and misdeeds of this nature, by early teachings and warnings; before all men have taken sides and have entrenched themselves in strong prejudices. And, in order to this, it may not be unwise to anticipate the turn political affairs are to take, not by foolishly proclaiming presentiments and the results of a fallible foresight, but by laying down and applying such Scripture principles as will fortify the people against a political invasion from the point whence we entertain a silent persuasion that it is advancing. But we should beware of being mere stormbirds, as the false prophets almost always were. "Amid the miserable and manifold distractions which we find from Jeremiah to have ushered in the last days of apostate Judah, they were invariably the false prophets who put themselves forward in public agitations; the true prophets never came forth with their claim upon obedience except when they had a distinct message from above, and could utter the awful summons to attention in these words, 'Thus saith the Lord,' and then their message was never welcome either to high or low; they spoke therefore from the necessity of a painful duty, and not for the gratification of a carnal feeling."[1]

And yet, we repeat, politics, in so far as it relates to the creed and spirit and policy of a *party*, should be kept out of the pulpit.

[1] Rev. Robert Wilson Evans, "Bishopric of Souls," p. 251.

In order that it may be so precluded, the preacher will need that gracious discrimination which 'tries the things that differ' (Rom. ii. 18). Many and various are the pretexts which partisan preachers employ in their own defence. Among the most specious are these: "I was a citizen before I was a minister, and therefore my political duties should take the precedence of my clerical." To this it has been retorted: by parity of reason he might say, I was a child before I became a man, and therefore I ought to reserve to myself the right of behaving childishly. The ministerial office and function may also be degraded by this other sophistical plea, "I can with a good conscience pray for the triumph of such a man and such measures, and therefore I think consistency requires that I should in my preaching aim to bring about that triumph." But what is this but exalting the desire of the creature to an authority equal to the oracles of the Creator? what is this but to speak a vision of our own heart and not out of the mouth of the Lord? (Jer. xxiii. 16, 26). Others still there are who, when one general political impulse moves the people and there are few or no dissenting persons, exclaim, *Vox populi, vox dei!* Why this unanimous movement of a whole people unless it be the will of God that such measures should be adopted and such ends be pursued? Hence they conclude that to be consistent they have little to do but to be interpreters of the popular will, and echoes of the popular voice. At any rate, they cannot be stigmatised as partisan preachers; for all men are of their opinion! Beware of thus making the people and their demagogues your oracles, lest you be finally numbered among the prophets who, to please the people, prophesied smooth falsehoods (Isa. xxx. 9, 10; Jer. v. 31; Mich. ii. 11). Let young prophets be on their guard against these wild gourds that hang upon the wild vine. Let them not think to neutralise their poison by mixing them with lentiles, nor presume that the Master will always come at their request, to render wholesome the deadly pottage. Robert Hall[1] set a good example to those ministers who

1 Works, vol. i., pp. 198, 199; cf. Greene's Reminiscences in vol. iv., Amer. ed. Rev. Dr. Mather Byles, being privately asked why he did not preach politics, replied (*not from the pulpit*, as one writer implies), "I have thrown up four breast-works behind which I have entrenched myself, neither of which can be forced. In the first place, I do not understand politics; in the second place, you all do—every man and mother's son of you; in the third place, you have politics all the week; pray, let one day out of seven be devoted to religion; in the fourth place, I am engaged in a work of infinitely greater importance. Give me any better subject to preach upon than the truths I bring you, and I will preach it on the next Sabbath." (*Sprague's Annals*, Trinitarian Congregational, vol. i, p. 378. Compare *American Anecdotes*, vol. i., p. 256.)

think they ought to espouse the cause of a political party. He wrote for the press on the subject; but studiously and avowedly kept it out of his sermons.

While, therefore, the preacher has the best authorities on his side when he undertakes to treat of the higher elements, relations, and applications of politics, yet, all things considered, he can hardly help concluding that neither the highest dignity of his office nor the greatest utility of his work appears in such sermons. However necessary such discourses sometimes are, and though severe tests of his moral courage and self-denial, still he will ever regard those sermons which are instrumental in converting and edifying individuals as more directly and lastingly useful. Nor can he hide from himself the fact that those ministrations which effect the conversion, edification, and sanctification of his congregation are none the less powerfully, though less directly influencing public affairs and contributing to the political welfare of the nation. This more obscure and more ordinary work he will in his best hours account his chief joy and rejoicing. He will love to recollect the just and pithy saying of Thomas Adam, that "a poor country parson fighting against the devil in his parish has nobler ideas than Alexander had." And whenever tempted by subtle and near-sighted demagogues to speak in behalf of a party, he will resist them with something even beyond the lofty spirit of the philosopher Anaxagoras, who when blamed for neglecting politics to observe the stars, and asked if he had no concern for his country, replied, "Yes, the greatest for my country, but it lies there," pointing with his finger to the starry heavens. Lest he should too often be censued for a want of patriotism or humanity, or an unchristian neglect of civil duties, he may reply: "Yes, the greatest for my country, but it is broader than some suppose. It is not only visible and temporal, but also invisible and eternal." Consider, too, that we of this human world owe our light and orbit to a Luminary that rides immeasurably ahead of us.

Section V.—Of Demonstrative Subjects.

The custom of eulogising saints has been so enormously abused, that some enlightened and conscientious preachers now make and pronounce but very few panegyrics. The history of homiletics contains the materials for a pretty heavy verdict against all this business as hitherto conducted. The vast quantity of lying legends (some of them very beautifully told) which have grown out of this practice, have been as thorns which have choked the harvest of the

true words of life. Dante was a Catholic, and yet he deemed it his duty to lift up his voice against them:

> "Christ did not to his first disciples say,
> Go forth and to the world preach idle tales."

Panegyrics were often delivered by the ethnic orators of Greece and Rome; but it is a striking and significant fact that we have no express authority for any other Christian eulogies (apart from those which we pronounce in memory of the Lord Jesus himself) than such as we make in honour of Mary, the sister of Lazarus.[1] Not a few instances of short and incidental commendation we do indeed find in holy Scripture. Moses[2] makes honourable mention of Caleb, Joshua, and the sons of Levi; David[3] in his lamentation over Saul seems to forget for a moment his own preference for Jonathan; Jeremiah[4] commends the filial obedience of the Rechabites; Zechariah exalts Joshua and Zerubbabel, the high priest and the governor of Judah, in the estimation of the people.[5] Our Great Teacher praised the faith of the Centurion[6] and of the woman of Canaan,[7] and the open-heartedness of Nathanael,[8] to say nothing of the Marys and the poor widow. Paul praises Priscilla and Aquila[9] and Onesiphorus,[10] while he commends the obedience of the Church of Rome,[11] the benevolence of the Churches of Macedonia[12] and of the Hebrews;[13] and in exhorting his converts to faith, takes occasion to commemorate the names of those ancient saints who had displayed this grace.[14] The only thing that looks like the germ of the Christian panegyric is the simple, veracious, and affecting act of the widows, who stood by the body of Dorcas, weeping and showing the coats and garments which she had made while she was with them.[15] This occurrence teaches us that nothing is more profitable and more consistent with Christian principle than the pathetic statement of what the deceased has either done or suffered for the sake of God or man. In cases where the deceased had exhibited an example of singular moral or spiritual excellence, it is no doubt in consonance with the words of Jesus and his apostles, to describe his laudable qualities and actions. Particularly will it be Christ-like for the preacher to commend to the admiration and holy emulation of his congregation, examples of real but unacknowledged worth, to brighten the memory of the calumniated and persecuted,

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1 Matt. xxvi.; Mark xiv. 2 Deut. i. 36–38; xxxiii. 9. 3 2 Sam. i. 23.
4 Jer. xxxv. 5 Zech. iii., iv. 6 Matt. viii. 10. 7 Id. xv. 28.
8 John i. 47. 9 Rom. xvi. 3, 4. 10 2 Tim. i. 16. 11 Rom. xvi. 19.
12 2 Cor. viii. 13 Heb. x. 34. 14 Id. xi. 15 Acts ix. 39.

the despised and the forgotten. Almost every faithful pastor has occasion to make the acquaintance of poor, unfortunate, and afflicted persons whose sanctified tasks, temptations, and sufferings have made them great and exemplary in the virtues and graces which are imitable and unspeakably serviceable in the common and humble walks of life. Let him give to the people beautiful and animated narratives of those whose example shone in such obscurity, lest otherwise they will be lost upon the most of a community. And herein the preacher has need to hearken to the apostolic precept, "Mind not high things, but condescend to men of low estate." What are the funeral orations which Bossuet and Flechier pronounced over the remains of princes and marshals, in comparison of any common funeral sermon that in subject and spirit reminds us of Leigh Richmond's narrative of "The Dairyman's Daughter." When we hear undistinguishing and unqualified eulogies uttered over the remains of the rich or the honoured for the gratification of a family or a society, or a partisan junto, we cannot but think that if Immanuel were to appear in the assembly, he would say to the encomiasts, as he did to the minstrels whom he found making a noise in the house of Jairus, "Give place."

In composing funeral sermons of the honorific kind the following rules should guide us:

1. The explanation of the text and context need not be attempted unless it can contribute in some way to the illustration of the character which is the subject of the eulogy. Nor is it wise to discuss the theme suggested by the text, where such discussion may require considerable space.

2. Nothing should be the subject of panegyric but moral excellence. Other qualities may indeed find a place in a discourse of this kind, when they are introduced not for their own sake but in order to set off real virtues. Thus the high birth of a person may be mentioned in order to add the greater lustre to his humility; his riches, in order to show his moderation and his benevolence; his poverty to recommend his patience, contentment, and even his beneficence and self-denial for the good of others; or his want of early education to enhance his genius and his application to study in later years.[1]

For the *methods* of treating such subjects, see *Disposition*, Sec. IV., and for *style* see *Explication* and *Excitation*.

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[1] Quint., L. iii., C. vii.; Dr. John Ward's System of Oratory, Lect. vii.; Campbell's Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence, Lect. xi.; Theremin, Eloquence a Virtue, B. ii., C. vi.

Section VI.—Rules for the Choice of Texts.

The first inspired preachers did not *begin* their discourses by quoting a passage of holy Scripture; for the obvious reason that they spoke directly from Jehovah. Enoch, Noah, and Moses made divine communications to men before the greater portion of our sacred writings existed. The earliest instances of discourses *founded* on Holy Writ are those of Moses in the book of Deuteronomy. In one of these he enjoined a repetition of his sermons at the end of every seven years in the solemnity of the year of release (Deut. xxxi. 10–13). The prophets often quoted the books of Moses, and particularly the divine commands they contain. We find a nameless prophet in the time of the Judges repeating a command before given but not before written (Judges vi. 10). We have in the book of Nehemiah (chap. viii.) a full account of the manner the Jews observed the duty Moses had commanded of publicly reading the divine law. The command was (Deut. xxxi.), "Thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing, . . . that they may hear and that they may learn." And accordingly we are told that the Levites read in the book of the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense and caused them to understand the reading. This took place, as Moses had enjoined, at the Feast of Tabernacles (Deut. xxxi. 10). It did not consist in exposition but in the translation of the Hebrew text into the current Chaldee.[1] After the synagogue was established, it became the custom first to read and translate the holy writings in the hearing of the assembly, and then to deliver a topical address or exhortation founded on a few of the words that had been repeated and interpreted. Sometimes one man read and another translated. At first considerable license in exposition was allowed the extemporaneous interpreter; but at a later period hermeneutical rules were established which served to limit this license.[2] Our Divine Master taught in the synagogues (Luke iv. 16–31; Matt. iv. 23; John xviii. 20), but he did not confine his teaching to the exposition of the Scriptures. The apostle Peter, on the occasion of the choice of Matthias, quotes in the middle of his address Psa. lxix. 25, and Psa. cix. 8; and in the exordium of his Pentecost sermon he quotes Joel ii. 28–32. The speech of Stephen (Acts vii. 2–53) was a brief exposition of the sense and design of Hebrew history. Paul, in Hebrews 1st and 2d chapters, quotes as proofs, certain parts of Deuteronomy, 2d Samuel, the Psalms, and Isaiah. The apostle

1 Havernick's Intro. O. T., pp. 410–412 (Clark's Trans.). 2 Id. 328.

James embodies in his leading proposition (i. 19) texts from Proverbs and Ecclesiastes.

From these instances it will be seen that we have no Scripture examples of the modern custom of quoting a text at or near the beginning of sermons as a textual or a topical basis of discourse. And yet these sacred precedents directly warrant us in founding our religious discourses on one or more texts cited informally in the manner of quoting argumentative proofs. When, moreover, we remember that the holy prophets began their sermons with the phrase, "Thus saith the Lord," we may fairly infer from their example that it is lawful to quote texts before the exordia of our sermons. As every true sermon has its foundation in the word of God, so either expediency or necessity usually demands that the preacher limit his discourse to one or more portions of that word. But the formal quoting of select passages of Scripture, either before or after the exordium, is, as Palmer[1] has remarked, a mere matter of ecclesiastical usage. The early Christian fathers usually quoted texts at the beginning of their topical sermons, but very seldom adapted their themes to them. The mediæval preachers very frequently discoursed without Scripture texts, especially when the festivals of saints required them to deliver demonstrative sermons. Peter of Blois preached from an *Antiphon*. Venerable Bede and Peter of Celles selected their texts from Latin hymns, just as modern Russian preachers not uncommonly found their sermons on a *Troparion*. Clerke, one of the translators of the Bible, and other Protestant divines of that age, on some occasions took their texts from catechisms.[2] Nevertheless, the learned Keckerman[3] informs us that the evangelical church of his time preferred the taking of Scripture texts; among other reasons for this, that the apostle Peter says: "If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God." Our Lord's instructive *talks* sometimes sprang out of, and were illustrated by, occasions and circumstances then present or recent,[4] but the beatitudes which introduce the Sermon on the Mount are unfoldings of the inner significance of several texts of the Hebrew Scriptures.

We have thus far traced the origin of the use of texts; let us now examine some of the maxims which are followed by those who choose their texts wisely. But before all rules, and in order to the

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1 Evangelische Homiletik, p. 315.

2 Rev. J. M. Neale's Mediæval Preachers, pp. xlii., 54.

3 Rhetorica Ecclesiastica, chap. i.

4 Abp. Newcome's Observations on our Lord's Conduct, Pt. i., chap. ii., sec. 6.

right use of them all, implore the Holy Spirit to direct you in selecting your text. Among the valuable rules which writers on homiletics have left us, we find two classes, negative and positive. 1. Never take a text you do not fully understand, nor one that you are not likely to make intelligible to your auditory. Very obscure texts may, however, be reserved for your expository sermons. 2. Do not frequently, except in expository discourses, preach from poetic and sublime texts. When necessity seems to require a departure from this rule, let an apologetic exordium go before the taking of the text. 3. Avoid the temptation of using as texts passages which, when broken from their connection, or employed in an arbitrary sense, appear quaint or ludicrous. "But we are to distinguish," says Dr. Ripley, "between a smile occasioned by the special appropriateness of a text in given circumstances, and the lightness of mind which is produced by the perception of oddity." 4. Never take a text out of its connections in such a way that it may be made to convey almost any sense, and to yield an application to everybody in all conditions, as "Adam, where art thou?" "Whatsoever things were written aforetime, were written for our learning;" "Is there not a cause?" etc. 5. A preacher may really appear disingenuous in choosing his text, if through passion or prejudice he misinterpret or misapply it. With Ehud he says, "I have a message from God to thee," but immediately puts forth his left hand and takes the dagger from the right thigh. 6. Seldom use a text as a mere motto of a sermon. 7. A text should contain a complete sense; we do not say a complete sentence, for our Lord chose for a text the first half of a long sentence (Luke iv. 18, 19). We mean a complete sense of the inspired writer from which it is taken. Claude goes further and insists that the text should include all the particular clauses of the longest sentence. 8. The text should contain the subject of the sermon, and if possible that view of the subject which the sermon is intended to exhibit and apply; it is also desirable that the text be so full as to express the whole of the subject; but, on the other hand, a sermon which attempts to exhaust a very long text is liable to exhaust the audience. 9. Other things being equal, choose weighty texts, expressing the great leading doctrines of the Gospel. Next to these in rank belong striking texts, because they preach for themselves and will be remembered long after the sermon is forgotten. It is doubtful, however, whether the second place may not justly be claimed by fitting texts, by which we mean such as are so suitable to the subject that they evermore remind your hearers of your sermon. 10. It is prudent to preach occasionally from an uncommon text. "We are struck," says Vinet,

"at the constant recurrence of certain texts, as if the generality of preachers considered themselves under obligations to repeat them." Mr. S. Baring-Gould tells us, that on three successive Sundays, in three different churches, he heard sermons on Felix waiting for a more convenient season. Having mentioned this curious fact to a clerical relation of his he forgot the circumstance. Five years after this clerical relation was prevented from preaching on the same subject in another church by discovering him in a pew as he was going into the pulpit. Next Saturday, at the other end of England, he related this incident to a county parson, whereupon he replied, "I am really very sorry, but I had prepared Felix for to-morrow, and what is more, I do not see my way towards changing the subject."

Section VII.—Topics, or Loci Communes.

Claude, in imitation of Aristotle and Cicero, has left us twenty-seven valuable topics or hints "to open sources of observation," as he says; but both he and his disciples have too narrowly restricted their helpfulness. They are, indeed, of great service in determining the subject and matter and arrangement of most kinds of sermons; and yet it is possible for the young student to expect too much assistance from them. As Dr. Watts has said, "it is only the man of sense and judgment that can use them well; for, among the variety he only knows what is fit to be left out, as well as what is fit to be spoken." When he further says that "a man of moderate genius who has made himself master of his theme, has seldom need of them," it seems not to have occurred to him that these topics not unfrequently enable even the man of genius to perform the often difficult task of mastering his theme. Learn to despise them as he may, every good sermonizer must employ them, if not consciously, yet unconsciously. But if he would use them the most profitably, he must keep filling the lamp of genius with the oil of knowledge. "Without a knowledge of philosophy in general," says Reinhard, "and an intimate acquaintance with many parts of it in particular, as psychology and ethics, for instance, a man never can succeed very well in the invention of subjects. . . . He who is deficient in these respects—who does not always look upon nature with philosophical eyes, and make it his constant study—should not wonder if he generally fails of obtaining good subjects for his sermons, and in a text which has been selected for a discourse, finds it impossible to perceive what experienced eyes discover at a single glance." Augustine was familiar with Plato, and is said to have incorporated all his ideas in his own works. The subject-matter

of Bourdaloue's and Tillotson's sermons evinces a close observation of current opinions and vices.

The order of these topics might be advantageously changed. The last two might be placed first, and these be followed by the twenty-third and the fourth successively, and so other changes; but for facility of reference we choose to preserve their original order. Our limits compel us to condense them.

I. "Rise from species to genus," or from particulars to generals.

II. "Descend from genus to species," or from generals to particulars.

III. "Remark the divers characters of a vice which is forbidden, or a virtue which is commanded," *i. e.*, the qualities, characteristics, and concomitants of vices and virtues.

IV. "Observe the relation of one subject to another."

V. "Observe whether some things are not supposed which are not expressed," *e. g.*, when we speak of a change, the *terminus a quo* necessarily supposes the *terminus ad quem*, and so the reverse.

VI. "Reflect on the persons speaking or acting," on their office, country, education, name, character, etc.

VII. "Reflect on the state of the person speaking or acting," *i. e.*, the condition, or circumstances, or mood of mind, of the person.

VIII. "Remark the time of a word or action," including the time when a precept is to be observed.

IX. "Observe place."

X. "Consider the persons addressed."

XI. "Examine the particular state of the persons addressed," *i. e.*, the circumstances, temptations, provocations, etc.

XII. "Consider the principles of a word or action," *i. e.*, from what motive, affection, passion, or conviction, the person spoke or acted.

XIII. "Consider consequences," *i. e.*, the uses or abuses of a doctrine, the applications or perversions, the influence or tendency of truths or errors, etc.

XIV. "Reflect on the end proposed in an expression or action," *i. e.*, the aim, purpose, or scope, of it.

XV. "Consider whether there be any thing remarkable in the manner of speaking or acting," *e. g.*, "More than conquerors;" "Before Abraham was, I am."

XVI. "Compare words and actions with similar words and actions," *i. e.*, of another person in order to show the difference.

XVII. "Remark the differences of words and actions on different occasions," *i. e.*, those of the same person on different occasions.

XVIII. "Contrast words and actions," of different persons by

way of antithesis, as, the agonies of the dying Jesus and the joys of the dying martyrs.

XIX. "Examine the grounds, or causes of an action or expression; and show the truth or equity of it," *e. g.*, if preaching upon the text, "The word was made flesh," we may show from Scripture the *reasons* why the Son took upon him a real humanity; or when preaching upon the destruction of Jerusalem, we may show how the divine *wisdom* was exhibited in that event. The Pharisees complained that the disciples of Jusus did not keep the traditions. We may here *justify* the disciples by showing what are the principles of Christian liberty. So when Jesus said to the paralytic, "Sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee," we may show the *justness* of the expression by stating what probable *grounds* he had in the former sins of the man. So of the grounds, reasons, and principles on which rest our obligations to practise all virtues.

XX. "Remark the good and bad in expressions and actions." We may sometimes correct bad expressions, as "Silver-Tongued" Smith does in preaching on the words of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. iv. 29, 30): "He should rather have said, 'Is not this Nebuchadnezzar's folly?'" etc.

XXI. "Suppose things."

XXII. "Guard against objections."

XXIII. "Consider characters of majesty, meanness, infirmity, necessity, utility, evidence, etc.;" *e. g.*, marks of *majesty* and *tenderness* in the words of Jesus, marks of *infirmity* in the words of his disciples, the *necessity* of Christ's advent, of the mission of the Divine Spirit, and his abiding with us; the *utility* of the miracles of Christ; the *evidence* of the truths which are already disputed or are likely to be contradicted. This evidence may be in some cases drawn from those Scriptures where the truths are set forth with great prominence and distinctness; in other cases it may be derived from many passages, "so that, all together, they may diffuse a great brightness upon the text, and clearly show its true sense."

XXIV. "Remark degrees," *i. e.*, in error, ignorance, and guilt, as exemplified in the Scriptures and particularly in the writings of Paul, who does not always use the same vehemence in speaking against error. (Compare Gal. i. 8, 9; Rom. xiv. 2–4; 1 Cor. iii. 15, 17; Acts xvii. 16.)

XXV. "Observe different interests." Thus when the Lord Jesus healed the withered hand in the synagogue on the Sabbath, the Divine Healer, the afflicted man, and the Herodians and the Pharisees had different interests in the miracle. Each regarded it

in the light of his own character and desires. Cf. Tholuck's vol. of sermons, entitled "The Light of the World."

XXVI. "Distinguish. Define. Divide."

XXVII. "Compare the different parts of the text together." If Rom. viii. 1 be the text, we may compare the first part and the last, and show from the one what God does for the faithful, and in the other what the faithful do for the glory of God. So again if the text be Eph. ii. 4, 5, we may compare these two phrases, "dead in sin" and "rich in mercy," as being two extremes—extreme misery and extreme mercy, one in us and the other in God.

Commentaries on these commonplaces of Claude have been written by Robinson, Simeon, and Sturtevant. See also *Arte di Predicar Bene*, by P. Segneri, in *Opere*, tome iv., pp. 982–985 (Milan ed., 1847).

Section VIII.—Adaptation.

Very comprehensive is this remark which Gregory the Great makes in one of his homilies,[1] "An instructor ought to consider what, to whom, when, in what manner, and how much he speaks."

In discussing the matter of sermons we suggested that the choice of it will depend partly on the necessity of adapting it to the capacities and needs of the hearers. The rhetorical canons of adaptation have usually been applied in composing and teaching *all* the principles and precepts of homiletics. And it would indeed be more philosophical to assign them no separate place in a system of rhetoric. But as they often afford invaluable assistance in the choice not only of the texts but of the subject-matter of sermons, we have thought good to consider them as being among the foremost of those things that belong to invention, without denying that their jurisdiction reaches every part of homiletics.

Not a few modern writers and teachers proceed on the supposition that the public addresses of Christ, the apostles, and other prophets do not furnish the proper basis on which to build a system of sacred rhetoric, for the reason that they lack adaptation to modern occidental minds and temperaments. This we cannot allow. On the contrary, we hold firmly and boldly the ground that no productions merely human are so well adapted to the minds and condition of the mass of mankind. Few things in these addresses are more instructive than these very adaptations, whether we consider their kind or their degree.

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[1] Hom. in Ezek. iii. 19.

1. They spoke the language of their unrefined hearers; not the words and phrases that were peculiar to a cultivated few, or to men of any particular vocation, but the language of the common people. Herein their example ought to be imitated at the present time.

2. They always preached on subjects which were of immediate personal concern to their hearers—subjects which they took every opportunity to apply to the heart and conscience. Their applications were interstitial, or made at irregular intervals, after the manner of attacks in running fights. So intent on experimental and practical effects were they that they indulged in digressions, repetitions, parentheses, ejaculations, and exclamations, in order that they might make these ever-running and ever-returning applications. Is there anything of this kind in uninspired examples of eloquence, whether sacred or secular, that is so worthy of our imitation in this respect?

3. They derived their similes, metaphors, illustrations, and images from things that were either familiar or visible to their hearers. The works of creation, the arts, occupations, and customs of common life, well known historical persons and events, and true religion, idolatries, and things usually and publicly connected with them were the sources whence they borrowed their figures. The modern student should mark and digest the fact that they never drew their imagery from such mysteries of art, discoveries of science, or such other matters as were or could be known only to the learned few. Agreeably to these views, the sermons of Antony of Padua, the most popular preacher of his time, and those of Latimer and Whitefield, are illustrated from the occupations and general knowledge of their audiences.

Besides those *exterior* adaptations, which they share in common with the less instructive oratory of classic antiquity, these inspired sermons show *interior* ones peculiar to themselves, which they owe to their direct and vital relations to the Divine Spirit, who not only *suggested* proper thoughts and words in every emergency, but also *taught* beforehand the knowledge of the Hebrew religion.

1. As they who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost were "holy men," *i. e.*, regenerate and more or less sanctified, their language and style were such as were to be expected from their renewed hearts and enlightened understandings. Even the uninspired utterances of such men, when they spoke on a religious subject, would be more grave, animated, reverent, clear, and forcible than the utterances of unregenerate men when they spoke on the same subject. Here, therefore, exterior adaptations were held in check by the demands of interior adaptations; in other words, sanc-

tifying grace transformed the speech of these men of God so that it ceased, in some respects, to be conformed to the speech of their unrenewed hearers. The prophet Isaiah appears to have felt that the prevailing style of his people needed to be reformed before it could properly embody divine revelations.[1] And it is reasonable to infer from his deep-felt want, and the assurance he received of a gracious supply, that he was enabled to raise his style far above the requirements of an exterior adaptation.

2. The inspiring Spirit sometimes exacted such an adaptation to himself as occasioned aversion or surprise in hearers who judged of speaking according to common desires or expectations. Isaiah, or rather the Holy Ghost, who spoke by his mouth, was wearisome to some critical persons by reason of the repetitions and want of connection they detected in his utterances.[2] The people complained that Ezekiel spoke parables.[3] The disciples asked our Lord why he spoke to the multitude in parables.[4] Peter was in doubt whether a certain parable was intended for the disciples or for all.[5] Our Divine Master was also observed by the Jews to speak in a different manner from those degenerate prophets, the Scribes, and by Roman officers to speak with more than human eloquence.[6] The apostle Paul purposely disregarded the rules of the rhetoricians and sophists of his day, and exhorted Timothy to avoid their contentiousness and profane and vain babblings.[7] And yet he proved the truth of the saying of Pascal, that "eloquence is the contempt of eloquence;" for the citizens of Lystra, who had no doubt heard some of the best secular orators of their time, were so carried away with the preaching of the apostle, that they mistook him for Hermes incarnate, the god of eloquence himself.

These, and other like instances, show an imperfect adjustment, if we, the imperfect, view them merely on their human side, and test them by nothing better than secular standards of taste. But if we could view them on their divine side we should find that there the adaptation is perfect, and that it is our depravity or our ignorance that prevents a perfect accommodation on their human side. Nor are these observations without their modern uses. They inform us that the sermon should, first of all, and at the hazard of transgressing the laws of an earth-born taste, be conformed to the teachings of sacred Scripture, the new life of the preacher, and the inspirations, revelations, and teachings of the Holy Ghost.

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1 Isa. vi. 5–7. 2 Isa. xxviii. 9–13. 3 Ezek. xx. 49. 4 Matt. xiii. 10.
5 Luke xii. 41. 6 Matt. vii. 29; John vii. 46.
7 1 Cor. ii. 4; iv. 2; 1 Tim. vi. 20; 2 Tim. ii. 24, 25.

The study of these interior adaptations is the more instructive when we reflect that they were the work of Omniscience. "The Inditer of these books," says Lord Bacon,[1] "knew four things, which no man attains to know, which are: the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages."

The kind of adaptation we here maintain and inculcate, must, however, be received with due allowance for what we have said in the Introduction, and in the chapter on Naturalness concerning the difference between copying and imitating. At the same time, we admit that as the intellectual and spiritual state and circumstances of modern men differ in some places and in some respects from those of the men to whom the inspired preachers first spoke, so the style of modern preachers should sometimes, and in some respects, be unlike that of the Hebrew and Hellenistic preachers. We also admit that many passages of Scripture had a *local*, but we deny that they had either a merely *local* or a merely *temporary* application. We further concede that the character and mission of some of the Scripture speakers authorised them to employ a mode of address which we cannot adopt without irreverence and presumption.

This position is not essentially different from that taken by such rhetoricians as Schott and Theremin. The former,[2] in a paragraph which is mainly directed against those who, like Stier, *copy* rather than imitate the inspired speakers, and quote Scripture excessively, propounds it as a rule that the style of pulpit eloquence as well as the substance of it should be distinctly Christian; that although the modern preacher may write in a more systematic manner, and prepare himself more elaborately for his discourses than the sacred penmen chose to do, still he should make frequent use of their phraseology, and should present their doctrines in the form which was originally given them, so far as that form is congruous with the uninspired character of modern writing, and with the necessities of the present age. The votary of any science will prefer to express himself, if he can do so with perfect propriety, in the language of those who originated the science; for this language is apt to have an unequalled freshness, vivacity, and pertinence." Theremin,[3] writing on "The Law of Adaptation," gives a less qualified support to

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[1] Advancement of Learning, B. ii.

[2] Theorie der Beredsamkeit. See condensed trans. by Dr. Park, Bib. Sac., vol. ii., p. 38.

[3] Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend, Dr. Shedd's trans. (revised ed.), p. 172.

our opinion. "I would recommend to all sacred orators the frequent employment of the expressions and images of the sacred Scriptures as a highly adapted and effectual means of exciting affection, provided only they be not brought in merely to fill up empty space, but are fused into the discourse, retaining their whole dignity and force. They are highly adapted; for the language of the Bible can never become antiquated, because it affords so many deeply significant expressions for the manifold conditions of human life and states of the human heart, many of which appear as proverbial phrases in the language of common intercourse; and however much religious education and the reading of the Bible may have been neglected, the orator may yet, in the case of the generality of hearers, reckon with certainty upon a thought being understood sooner in a Biblical than in a philosophical dress. But the great power of Bible language in awakening affection, consists principally in this: that in it the expression for the understanding and the expression for the feelings are not different, as in merely human representations, but are always one and the same. The figures, so frequent in the Bible, while they have all the precision of an abstract terminology, at the same time transfer the idea into the web of human relationships, and clothe it with all that can have an influence upon the mind; they are a ray which unites in one both light and heat, and passes over from the mind into the heart, thus kindling the whole man."[1] To this we might add that these figures are like the rays of the sun in that they possess a photographic virtue; even where they do not enlighten or warm they are sure to impress.

All preachers have not the same natural power of adaptation. Those young men who find themselves constitutionally wanting in a safe and beneficent versatility, may be encouraged by the thought that the temptations, persecutions, and other adversities of life, will conspire to improve them in this particular. Maturer years will perhaps find them, like Paul the aged, hammered into Damask hardness and flexibility.[2]

Both these qualities are now demanded, especially the former. Great is our temptation to consult and provide for the taste of our hearers in matters that are far from indifferent. Woe to the preacher who, as to the matter of his sermons, adopts the maxim

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1 Cf. Erasmus, Eccl., L. iii. *ad fin.;* Dr. John Edwards' Preacher, Pt. i, pp. 290–304; Abp. Sumner's Ministerial Character of Christ, chap. vi.; Christian Palmer's Homiletik, 5th ed., pp. 470–508.

2 See 1 Cor. ix. 19–23.

of Hippocrates, "The second-best medicine is better than the best if the patient likes it best." But may we not always innocently adopt the prevailing taste as to *style?* Believe it not. Some of the great Anglican divines of the seventeenth century would have been more useful if they had abandoned the Latinized, formal, and lifeless style then in fashion. How soon would Vieyra's genius have perished and been forgotten if he had not forsaken the *estylo culto* which polished away the strength of Portuguese preachers not a few. Herein Satan says to every young preacher, "Worship me and I will give thee the world." Blessed is he that can in the strength of the Almighty reply, "It is by walking over thee that I am to vanquish the world."

It is to be lamented, is it not? that popularity and edification can be so seldom united in the same preacher. 'Nothing,' says Chrysostom,[1] 'more effectually raises a man's esteem, not only among Gentiles but Christians, than a copious and florid eloquence.' But this popular fecundity is scarcely compatible with the sober and less attractive qualities which belong to the successful Christian *teacher*. The edifying rural pastor is too wise to take his pattern from the popular city preacher who has picked a great congregation out of a vast community of changeful residents and strangers, where this proverb ever holds good, "Birds of a feather flock together." Reinhard[2] had the good sense to confess that his university sermons were not suitable for mixed assemblies and country congregations.

It demands divine wisdom to determine the emotional tone proper to different congregations. An enterprising, commercial people, like Edward Payson's in Portland, did not need many consolatory sermons. Those who have much leisure, persons living in opulence and retirement, suffer most from affliction; because in them a tender sensibility and a powerful imagination often create worlds of trouble out of nothingness. Evening congregations of young people do not always, as some preachers suppose, desire, much less need, a tone of cheerfulness which occasionally descends to levity. Everything considered, the preacher may safely follow Rückert's advice to the minstrel:

> "Wouldst thou seek, within man's heart
> To strike each secret string?
> To thy song sad tones impart,
> Not strains of gladness sing.

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1 De Sacerdotio, L. v., C. vii. *Cf.* St. Jerome's Comment on Eccles. ix. 11.

2 Confessions, 12th Letter.

Many a man hath lived on earth
Whom joy hath seldom blessed;
None but bears, from earliest birth,
Some grief within his breast."

THE REV. W. W. SKEAT'S *Translation.*

But quitting these more general considerations as to the adaptations of the Scripture matter and style, to men of every nation, class, and condition, we find ourselves in the presence of this question which every pastor has daily to meet: What are the different kinds, and what are the varieties of spiritual state and experience among my own hearers?

"He preaches best," says Jean La Placette,[1] "who best supplies the spiritual wants of his hearers." Now in order to accomplish this grand object, it would be well for the young preacher to keep before him certain memoranda or commonplaces: *e. g.*, There are among my hearers three general classes: the converted, the unconverted, whom I may hope to lead to Christ, and the hardened sinners, to most of whom the Gospel seems to be but a savour of death unto death. Among the first class, how many are there who are evidently regenerate, but have troublesome doubts about the genuineness of their conversion? How many have a comfortable assurance of their gracious state? Who are among the backsliding and the fallen? Who are afflicted with the temptations of Satan, and who with bereveaments and other temporal adversities? Who are evidently neglecting the duties they owe to their relatives, to their business, to the Church, to the poor, to the sick, or to works of Christian benevolence? And so of the other two classes. Then what is the average general intelligence of my congregation? What the kind and the amount of Christian knowledge among them? Are any of them ignorant of the plan of salvation through the Lord Jesus Christ? Or of any of the distinctive doctrines or duties of the Gospel system? This is but a specimen of such memoranda; and it would be well, as one of the results of the daily study of the Bible, to place over against such items, on the same or opposite page, references to the example of Christ, the apostles, and prophets in handling similar cases. To carry such a plan into execution involves two, or rather three, things: the study of the life and times of each inspired preacher; the application to each of his addresses of the maxim of Gregory with which we open this section; and the determination of the kind and measure of its adaptability to the preacher and his congregation. When the Scriptures are examined rhetori-

[1] Avis sur la Maniere de Precher, Rotterdam, 1753.

cally, they throw on the preacher's way a light more clear and more broad than that which is emitted by a criticism, however valuable in itself, that ends with the mere interpretation of texts and words.

As we have already said more on this subject than the majority of our readers will thank us for, we hasten, in conclusion, pointedly to guard the classical student against the malign effects of a long habituation to the study of classical eloquence, unless he shall neutralise them by the concurrent study of the sacred and inspired oracles. Truly has Tholuck said that, "it is by no means unimportant for the preacher that he acquaint himself with the lever by which the orators of the old world have moved so powerfully the minds of men." Let him study their speeches and welcome; but let him remember that if he rises from such study intellectually stronger, he as certainly rises therefrom spiritually, if not morally, weaker: if the fabulous Antæus received fresh energy from the earth as often as he was cast down upon it, he also, as we may fancy, brought up to each new struggle, limbs more widely besmeared with clay, or more deeply embrowned with dust; and he is slain at last by a more erected giant, who sought no such cumbering assistance.

PART I.

THE MATTER OF SERMONS AS DETERMINED BY THEIR OBJECTS.

ARISTOTLE[1] makes a difference between the *ergon*, or function of the orator, and his *telos*, or final purpose; his function being to convince, persuade, or praise, and the object he aims at and strives to attain being expediency, or justice, or honour. The teleological aspects of public speaking in general, or of preaching in particular, we do not think it worth while to survey; of the final causes of the various kinds of preaching, the Scriptures do not leave us ignorant. As this system is practical, intended to vitalise, invigorate, and train the young preacher for actual and effective service, it may be pardoned for ignoring all abstract speculations on the *ultimate* ends of preaching. This division of our work (Parts first and second) treats of those subject-matters which subserve the *immediate* objects of the preacher. On some occasions his several immediate objects will be to explain, convince, excite, and apply; at other times his one immediate object will be either to excite or to apply, or otherwise. It may, indeed, be said that his *mediate* object or objects will then be to produce the moral and spiritual effects of explication, conviction, and application. Be it so; only let not the reader misapprehend the contents of this part of our system.

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[1] Rhet., B. i., chap. iii.; cf. Rhet. ad Alex., chap. ii., sec. vi.; Cicero De Orat., B i., chap. xxxi.; De Partit., chap. iii.; De Invent., B. ii., chap. v.; Auct. ad Herenn., B. iii, chap. iii.; Quint, B iii., chap iv., sec. 14.

CHAPTER I.

EXPLICATION.

THE mass of Scripture texts demands neither explication nor confirmation, but simply a declaration of what they contain, immediately followed by a varied and thorough application of the same. Let not this be lost sight of while we are studying this chapter, much less while composing sermons.[1]

SECTION I.

Explication has for its object the conveyance of clear comprehensive and impressive ideas of the text or subject of discourse. It may, therefore, relate either to the words or to the matter of obscure passages of Scripture. We have here to do, not with the principles of interpretation, but with the manner of didactically presenting to the hearers the results of studies hemeneutically conducted.

The examples of inspired elucidation are not very numerous, for the obvious reason that it was the office of the primitive preachers to reveal the truths of our religion, and not to explain them. And we may add that they revealed these truths so clearly to those who first heard them that elucidation was but seldom necessary. We have, however, in the Deuteronomy of Moses, in the sermons of Ezekiel (chaps. xvii. and xxxiii.), in Christ's discourses, and in those of Peter, Stephen, Paul, and James, a few instances of popular explication. In respect of these, however, we must consider that their elucidations were likewise inspired; so that they show none of those marks of critical inquiry and of elaborate discussion which the modern uninspired expounder of difficult texts is sometimes forced to exhibit. While, therefore, the sacred writers and speakers were not exposed to the temptation of appearing learned, or of

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1 It is well to teach the people not only to apprehend such texts as can be explained, but also what is more difficult, to relish, admire, and reverence such texts as they cannot comprehend. The ultra-practical Francis de Sales, after hearing from another in his own pulpit a sublime sermon that greatly delighted his mountaineers, asked some of them what they had gained from it. One of them, more frank than the rest, replied: "This preacher teaches us to esteem more highly the grandeur of the mysteries of our religion." De Sales was forced to confess that this man, at least, had profited by the sermon (Camus, Pt. v., c. iv.) Those states of the affections which the Spirit of Truth inspires, are notably requisite to a right understanding of figures (see pp. 404, 406, 418, 420). By the way, in the Index of Figures and elsewhere, we have rendered Greek letters into their Roman equivalents after the manner of the Latin lexicographers. The difference between the diphthongs *æ* and *œ*, where thus printed in *Italics*, is too apt to be overlooked.

needless and prolix commenting, they nevertheless furnish us some imitable points of excellence.

The inspired speakers and writers were not the slaves of mere words. Our Lord and the apostles quoted freely from the Septuagint, which was far from being a perfectly critical version of the Hebrew Scriptures.

They do not endeavour to make each word and sentence understood as soon as it is communicated. On the contrary they not unfrequently teach parabolically; they speak at first obscurely but attractively, in order that they may at once excite curiosity and fix attention; that they may follow the common habit of thinking synthetically, or of ascending from particulars to generals. Their method of explication is substantially that of Socrates. "To Socrates," says Aristotle, "we may unquestionably assign two novelties —inductive discourses, and the definition of general terms." He aspired to create earnest seekers and analytical intellects, capable of forming conclusions for themselves and teaching others. After puzzling novices with negative questions sufficiently, he desisted from embarrassing them, altered his tone, and addressed to them clear, positive, and practical exhortations. The general resemblance of the Socratic inductions to the parables of our Lord may be traced by an examination of our rhetorical analysis of the latter, which will be found under the head of *Style*.

They conveyed divine knowledge progressively. According to the rules of a sound didactics, the teacher is not only to let himself down to the capacity of the learner, but to remember that the laws of the human mind demand that it should receive all instruction gradually, because, as Quintilian says,[1] disciples are like narrow-necked vessels which reject a great quantity of the liquid that is suddenly poured upon them, but are filled with that which is poured into them by degrees.

They do not make explanation a formal part of their sermons, but mix elucidations with argumentative, excitatory, and persuasive matter, without regarding any other method than that which the Spirit of Wisdom inspires. They never give "a running comment" on holy Scripture.

Subsection I.—In explaining *texts* the following canons may be of considerable service:

Certain texts have a "double sense," *e. g.*, Gen. xxviii. 12 relates historically to Jacob, but typically to Christ (John i. 51). So Psa.

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[1] Inst. Orat., L. i., chap. ii., sec. 28; Sumner's Ministerial Character of Christ; chap. v., On the Gradual Teaching of Christ.

lxxii. has for its subject both Solomon and the Messiah. In such cases this rule of Augustine may be followed: "When a text of Scripture may be understood in two senses, we are permitted to adopt either, provided no rule of faith forbids."

Other texts have not a "double *sense*," but a double, yes, sometimes a manifold *application; e. g.*, Psa. xcvii. 11; Luke xvi. 8.

We here intend those texts which naturally suggest an alternative or disjunctive division of a subject.

It contributes to a clear understanding of many a text to state the cause of difficulty or ground for doubting. Nothing, again, is more satisfactory than to show either where the obscurity rests, or why the Divine Spirit permits it still to remain. Hence the exposition in the same sermon of two or more texts that are apparently contradictory is sometimes advantageous. (See examples of this kind in the works of Andrew Fuller and Archbishop Whately.)

Ascertain not only what the text *expresses*, but also what it *implies*. *Inferences* belong to the application; *implications* to the exposition.

Preachers often make two mistakes. The one is that of taking for granted that, because the majority of their congregation have been instructed in Sunday-schools, Bible-classes, and families, they must require no elucidation of texts. The other is that of presuming that most auditors know nothing about the Scriptures, and that consequently we are always in danger of preaching beyond the comprehension of the generality. Those who make the first mistake are, for the most part, declaimers on topical subjects, and in their high-flying disdain of critical studies, love to quote the old adage, "*Aquila non captat muscas.*" The other class, ever busy with roots and etymologies, grow indifferent to principles, systems, and their many and various applications. Finding mountains of meaning concealed under every part of the received version, they timidly creep from one clause of the original to another; and while they are ferreting out critical errors here and there, they are lost sight of by the common auditors, and so come habitually to speak as the scribes, and not with authority.

Read and read a passage before you publish from the pulpit your dissent from the common acceptation of it. Young men are apt to make wonderful discoveries in exegesis. Gesenius did so in his earlier career, but his last revisions of his works evince that he had already given up not a few novelties, and was gradually returning to the more orthodox interpretations. Even Tischendorf has lately retracted some of his earlier textual criticisms. "The art of criticism is," as Longinus somewhere says, "the last offspring of long experience."

Temptations and afflictions are the best commentators on experimental and devotional texts. Baxter says that, shut up to sickness and his Bible, he discovered more in one week than he had done before in seventeen years' reading, hearing, and wrangling. And yet let us beware of taking it for granted that "the most obvious sense of such texts is always the true sense."

Do not imagine that every sort of comment on the context will elucidate the text. "When the sentiments of the context," says Dr. Campbell, "do not happen to have any coincidence with those employed by the preacher, it is by no means necessary to take any notice of the context at all. Nay, it often proves in fact rather a digression from the subject than a constituent part of the discourse." Study the Scriptures *rhetorically*. Some of the blunders of Biblical critics and commentators have resulted from a lack of the knowledge or of the application of the rules of rhetoric.

Subsection II.—In the elucidation of *objects* or *events* we may employ *description* and *narration*. Description is proper in explaining material objects existing in space, or spiritual objects which may be conceived of under relations analogous to those of space; in brief, all objects or acts which may be regarded irrespectively of the idea of time. A "description," says Schott, "may be *prosaic*, designed merely to give to the intellect a clear idea of the events or acts described; or it may be *poetical*, designed to bring these acts or events into our ideal presence, and to excite the imagination and feelings; or it may be *oratorical*, designed to influence the whole soul and especially the will." It is very evident that prosaic description is to be chosen rather than either of the other two sorts for purposes of mere explication. Narration is the explanation of material or mental objects or events in their relation either to succession of time or of cause and effect. Theremin admits narration into discourses, but entirely excludes description as being destructive of rhetorical progress. Schott thinks that narration is better adapted to sermons than description, but admits the latter, provided it be not such a vivid delineation of circumstances as to divert the hearer's attention from the main subject, and do not "allow him to lose himself among pictures when he ought to be occupied with the great reality." Thus much is manifest, that description is better placed in the explication than in the discussion or in the application, seeing that oratorial progress or movement is not so much demanded here as at more advanced points. The public addresses of Moses, and some of those of the other Hebrew prophets, are composed largely of narration. The same may be said of some of our Lord's discourses, and those of Peter, Stephen, and Paul.

Even in refutation biography is often the best weapon. Truly has Dr. A. C. Tait[1] said, "It might at first sight appear strange, if dangerous errors were prevailing amongst ourselves, that the answer to them should be, not any directly polemical attack on the arguments of the false teachers, nor any distinctly explanatory statements, like the Apologies of old, of that truth which its antagonists first misrepresented and then denied, but a history of those holy men by whom the truth we love was taught; yet observe that with the difference of its being a history of the Lord, and not of any holy men, that lies before us, this is the very form by which the Spirit of God guided St. John to resist error."

Subsection III.—In the explication of *ideas* or *subjects*, we may adopt one or more of several processes.

We may elucidate by *exemplification*. General truths may be explained by particular truths, as a general principle of conduct by an individual act, abstract notions by such as are concrete, general facts by particular instances, a genus by a species, etc. The Scripture parables furnish many specimens of happy exemplification. The preacher may also sometimes (1) personify an idea, or (2) appeal to the experience of some hearers, or (3) by association formally in speaking for himself when he in effect speaks for others or for all. (See Vinet, Pt. i., sec. ii., chap. i.)

We may likewise cause an idea to be comprehended by means of either *comparison* or *contrast*, either direct or analogical. "While in *exemplification*," remarks Mr. Day, "a more generic truth or fact is explained by a more specific or an individual truth or fact embraced under it, in *comparison* and *contrast*, a truth or fact is explained by another of the same class." Here, also, the parables of Scripture are our best rhetorical teachers. Gregory Nazianzen, in his 37th oration (the 5th on Arianism), while illustrating the Trinity, shows at the same time the imperfections of all his comparisons.

Virtues and vices may sometimes be elucidated by their *signs* and *manifestations*. Ideas may be explained (1) by definitions, as in Heb. xi. 1. The definitions of the preacher should be as brief, apt, and rememberable as a proverb. Here, as elsewhere, he should consider that he handles matters that are 'not weighed in the sensitive balances of the goldsmith, but on the platform scales of public opinion.'[2] Never attempt to define revealed truths by the terms of philosophy. (2) By propositions which by known and

[1] St. John's Gospel the Model of Controversy, in "*Suggestions*," etc., p. 30.

[2] Cicero De Orat., B. i., chap. xxxviii.

plain language convey ideas that were originally couched in unknown and obscure terms. (3) By distinctions, if not too exact and too numerous. Luther remarks, that he who can distinguish well is an able divine. Nor are obvious and useful distinctions unpopular. The homilies of Aquinas are full of them, and yet peasants flocked and crowded to hear him. (4) Hence by an analysis sometimes, not of words and texts alone, but of ideas as well; *e. g.*, Mr. Bowen (in his Daily Meditations, p. 102), analyses 1 John iv. 11, as follows: "Two sublime arguments here present themselves. The first is this: God hath loved *me;* therefore, beloved, I must love you. The second is: God hath loved *you;* therefore, beloved, I must love you." (5) By questions and answers, when so arranged that each answer naturally suggests another question, until the subject is clearly and fully understood. Or the *same* question may be repeated with *different* answers. (See John Foster's 4th Lecture.) Or again, inquiries may concern the *causes* of things. When they introduce reasonings to convince men that the causes assigned really produce admitted effects, or that admitted causes are adequate to produce the effects in question, then they are of the nature of arguments; but in cases not a few these inquiries are only intended to assist simple investigation. We study to answer many a Scripture "Why?" for the sole purpose of gaining a clear, distinct, comprehensive, and impressive knowledge of a text or subject. (See Richard Watson's sermon on the Grounds of Paul's Confidence in the Gospel, text Rom. i. 16, 17). Lacordaire's Conferences are full of "views," consisting of forcible statements of facts, which are finally *accounted for* in a novel and brilliant way.

Explication, when demanded, belongs near the beginning of the sermon. We say near, for the Anglican divines and many New England preachers, as Jonathan Edwards, too often devoted their *exordia* to dry explanations. But need it be added that but few texts and congregations will bear this; generally those sermons are the most effective wherein the unsealing of mysteries is reserved for the body of the discourse; either taking the place of or joined with illustrations, proofs, and arguments. When a sermon is expository, the exordium should very seldom be composed of comment.

As Scripture knowledge which has been forgotten leaves the minds of an audience as much unprepared for applications as if they understood it not, we are often doing what is rhetorically equivalent to explication while we are putting them in remembrance. The prophets and apostles esteemed it no unimportant part of their work, to keep their former instructions passing in review; and

especially such of them as were frequently serviceable for excitation and reproof. Did our space give us leave, we could prove and illustrate this assertion abundantly; beginning with the teachings of the prophet Moses, and ending with the words of the venerable John, "ye know that our record is true." Clothed with divine authority though they were, they nevertheless often spoke as humble prompters, and as witnesses who appeared to confirm common reports, or to repeat their own former testimony—but why do I give to these mortal men the honor which belongs to the Divine Spirit who inspired them, and who condescended, then as now, to serve as a remembrancer?

It must be accepted as a fact (and we commend it to the attention of those who cherish romantic ideas concerning human nature) that the more weak and ignorant men are the less inclined are they to receive instruction, unless it is in somewise concealed or made to pass under another name. In proof of this we need only mention the incessant return of the phrase, "you know," in talk and correspondence. As this always has been the case, and probably will be for a good while to come, the preacher, and especially if he be young, may wisely, as often as he can, administer doses of the didactic in the vehicle of reminiscence.

Take heed lest your habit or manner of exposition convey the impression that the Bible is so fraught with mysteries and difficulties that it does not permit itself to be understood by a plain unlettered reader. You may convey this impression by frequently choosing hard texts, by choosing texts foreign to your subjects, and then "explaining them away," and by indulging a propensity to find allegories in all parts of Scripture. Archbishop Hort says of those who always fetch out of a text that which nobody imagined could be in it, that "they would do something miraculous, like bringing water out of a dry rock in the wilderness, in order to surprise their auditory." This temptation is especially strong to those who consider it their duty to find all their texts in "the lessons for the day."

This discussion of Explication naturally concludes with an examination of that kind of religious discourse in which a moiety of space at least is usually given to exposition—the *homily*.

Section II.

The ancient Christian homily probably bears some resemblance to the septennial expositions of the Levites. It is very different, we need scarcely say, from the homily of the Anglican Church, which is strictly a topical discourse. The homilies of Chrysostom, which are, perhaps, the best of this kind of discourse, are without

unity or method; the first half is usually occupied with the exposition of several verses of Scripture; the latter half is devoted to the "Ethicon," or moral lesson, which is often an application of the rambling kind, and sometimes totally foreign to the sense of the passage explained; here he often abandons himself to his feelings, or rather to those of his audience; but with such a persuasive effort as to confirm the maxim of Quintilian, *Pectus est quod disertum facit.*

But they are much mistaken who suppose that "the Christian Fathers" made exposition their chief business. Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, and Augustine had been thoroughly taught and disciplined by rhetoricians; and hence they never allowed their interpretations to interfere with the duty of adapting the matter and form of their sermons to the capacities and wants of their various audiences. Nazianzen commends this as a capital excellence in the preaching of Athanasius that it was always appropriate to the assembly he addressed, whether illiterate or learned.

And yet it cannot be denied that the homily had a wide and deep influence during the fourth century; and a still wider and deeper subsequently, when the homilies of Chrysostom and some of the other fathers were read as lessons in many churches. One reason perhaps for this was, that both Jews and Christians had come to regard it as a discourse that was distinctively religious. "Preaching," says Lactantius, the Christian Cicero of the fourth century, "is a divine institution, to the end that the simple and undisguised truth which is itself sufficiently adorned, may shine forth more brightly." But he and others of his time were content with narrow and indistinct views of the ordinance of preaching.

There are four kinds of homilies. The first is a running comment on a chapter or the lessons for the day, beginning perhaps with some account of the writer and his scope, with occasional remarks and applications, or else concluding with a brief exhortation. In this kind method is little regarded. Of this description are most of the early homilies. The second differs from the first chiefly in this; the latter half is devoted to applications; such are many of the homilies of Chrysostom. The third reduces a chapter or one of the lessons for the day, as some large portion of Scripture, to a single proposition, treats the whole context as one subject, and then proceeds to comment, reason, and apply much after the method of a topical discourse. Of this sort are Massillon's homily on the raising of Lazarus, and Bourdaloue's on "Divine Grace as shown in the Conversion of the Woman of Samaria." The fourth takes for a text some short but obscure passage, and then explains and applies it. Here unity may be preserved without following a studied arrange-

ment. A good example of this kind is Abp. Whately's homily on the name, Immanuel. Another sort of homily, though many would prefer to call it a Biblical way of preaching, consists in an assemblage of the principal texts that relate nearly or remotely to one subject. This suggests matter for analysis, comment, argument, reflection, and various "uses." Rudolf Stier's sermons in his *Epistel Predigten* exhibit striking specimens of the abuse of this mode of preparation; the sermons of John Bunyan, on the other hand, show how its legitimate use may enrich, enliven, and practicalise discourse. Spurgeon's sermon with seven texts belongs to the same class.

Subsection I.—The advantages of the expository manner of preaching, as set forth by its advocates, may be briefly stated as follows:

1. It secures the greatest amount of Scripture knowledge both to preacher and hearer. The topical preacher passes by many texts, because they do not suggest matter enough for an entire sermon, but the expounder does not neglect such texts.

2. It is well fitted to communicate the knowledge of the Scriptures in its due proportion, relative position, and real connection.

3. It gives the preacher opportunities to inculcate *all* Scripture doctrines and duties. We may fail to declare all the counsel of God from an undue fondness for some part of it, or from an unwillingness to lower the dignity of the sermon by too familiar an application, or from a fear of offending individuals by too personal an application. "But in homilies," says Charles Bridges,[1] "short occasional hints naturally arising from our subjects, fall with a weight of conviction for which our hearers are often wholly unprepared. There is no time to take the alarm, and to fortify the mind against conviction; as when the main subject is directly levelled against known sins." The same writer says, that instruction on the subject of divorce would not perhaps have occurred in his village ministrations except in a regular course of exposition on Mark x. 2–12, in which he somewhat reluctantly introduced it, but with unexpected effect. In such cases exposition serves as a low but needful diet for those who are morally and spiritually sick.

4. It has a tendency to correct the errors incident to the topical mode of preaching, among which are the choice of a text as a "pretext" or motto, the wresting of texts from their meaning by way of accommodation, want of Scripture matter, an ignoring of the oracles of God, and the secularisation of the pulpit. "Those times

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1 Christian Ministry, Pt. iv., chap. v., sec. 4.

are past," as Tholuck happily remarks, "when the Scriptures were trodden under foot. But let us take heed lest, in our modern agility, we leap clean over them."

5. This is the most natural way of conveying to the hearers the import of the oracles of God. "Suppose," it is said, "a volume of human science were placed in our hands as the sole and standard text-book, which we were expected to elucidate to an assembly; in what way would it be most natural to go to work? Certainly not, we think, to take a sentence here and there, and upon these to frame one or two discourses every week. No interpreter of Aristotle, of Littleton, or of Puffendorf, or of Paley ever dreamed of such a method." This argument, as a defence of expository preaching, presupposes that exposition is the principal work of the preacher.

6. This mode of preaching is, it is said, adapted to make the truth and not the preacher the principal object of attention. Here, according to Chrysostom, God speaks much and man little. Summerfield was led to employ himself much in simple exposition, in consequence of the popular applause his sermons had elicited. This, he thought, threw the preacher more into the shade, and more brightly displayed the pure truth of Scripture. In seasons of awakening grace this is a matter of no inferior concern, as every preacher of large experience knows.

7. It is best adapted to some hearers, because it conveys the truth not in the abstract but in its more concrete and popular forms. It has been truly observed that some doctrines are abhorrent to a prejudiced mind when they are set forth in their naked theological form, which are by no means so when presented in their Scriptural connection, and, we may add, in the light and shade and colouring which distinguish the Scripture style. When so presented they often become more acceptable by becoming more intelligible.

8. It condescends to the feebleness and vagrancy of an undisciplined attention. Those who can listen uninterruptedly to a topical sermon are few. The greater part of a common assembly are compelled to allow their thoughts a wide and various range. If we would be in the highest degree useful to wandering minds, we must do as Rowland Hill acknowledges he did—"wander after them." A weak capacity may take in an entire division of a desultory homily—a part that has suffered nothing from the feeble mind's failure either to attend to or to understand the rest; whereas it loses all parts of many a sermon because it either cannot understand or cannot give attention to that part which constitutes the key of all the remainder.

9. This mode of preaching, beyond any other, conveys the truth to all believing minds in all its holy freshness:

Gratius ex ipso fonte bibuntur aquæ.[1]

Lord Bacon compares the systems of Scripture knowledge to cisterns, the Scriptures themselves to springs: the former are more convenient, the latter more pure.

10. The homily is better remembered because it affords more assistance to the faculty of association. The pious hearer, while reading the Scriptures in the family, the Sunday-school, and the closet, will not fail to recall needful interpretations and still more needful applications, which hang as so many inseparable pendants to passages which he had pondered at church.

Subsection II.—Such are the advantages of expository preaching. But a full and practical examination of this subject demands that we should now look into the background of our picture and survey its disadvantages:

1. Expository discourses are not countenanced by the example of the primitive and apostolical preachers. Deuteronomy is not an exposition of the Law. None of the prophets have left us running comments on the Levitical statutes. When in the days of Nehemiah (viii. 7, 8) the priests and Levites read the law publicly, they did little more, according to Havernick, than translate the Hebrew into Aramaic. Our Great Teacher's first sermon at Nazareth was not an exposition of the sixty-first chapter of Isaiah. Only a fragment of what he intended to say remains; but what he did speak was wholly in the topical strain, stating two facts as an argument from analogy in support of the proposition that "No prophet is accepted in his own country"—a proposition evidently founded on the words, "He hath sent me," etc. Most of his subsequent sermons evince not a merely didactic intention, but an aim that is earnest, timeful, and practical. Read his Sermon on the Mount and his discourse at the close of the Last Supper; how far are they from expositions of any kind! His long talk to his two disciples on the way to Emmaus was argumentative, consisting of proof texts "from Moses and all the prophets" in support of the proposition, "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into his glory?" Need we add that the addresses and epistles of the apostles afford as little support to the custom of expository preaching as do the sermons of Christ and the Hebrew

[1] Water is drank with greater pleasure at the spring itself. (Ovid, Epist. iv.; Ponto, L. iii., Epist. v.)

prophets? A better argument for occasional exposition could be framed out of the fact that the sacred writers gave so little space to interpretations. Hence we may infer that they left this work for us to do for our own age and people. As the obscurities of divine revelation are relative and variable, so all expositions of them must be more or less of a local and temporary value.

As to the expositions of the Rabbins in the old synagogues, they were little more than the hemming and adorning of the veil of tradition, which to this day blinds the eyes of the Jews whenever they read the Scriptures. Assuredly they are no patterns for us.

"O, but do we not find expositions in the *epistles?*" Not one entire epistle, nor any large portion of an epistle, do we find devoted to the exposition of one passage of Scripture. Neither is there a running comment on a chapter of the Old Testament, or a considerable part thereof, nor elucidation intended for the promotion of mere Biblical knowledge, apart from its applications, nor yet discussions of questions in Oriental geography, history, chronology, manners, and customs, for the sake of ministering to curiosity and a mere thirst for information. In how short a time and space could the first preachers and writers of the new economy have cleared up many a mystery of the Hebrew Scriptures. Ah, my blessed Master, how soon, by a brief comment on Genesis, couldst thou have guarded all geologists against the liability of casting stones at the Cross! and thou, Paul, why didst thou put us off with the remark that it is by faith that we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God? Had the apostle James lived in our day, would he have been satisfied with an allusion to the patience of Job without any mention of the probable time in which he lived? At any rate, no one will question that the primitive preachers quoted and explained texts with a direct and continual view to doctrine and duty. They ever proceeded on the principle, *Christ in the Scriptures; not first the Scriptures, and, secondly, Christ; or, to go more deeply into the matter, first in themselves the Holy Ghost, the only infallible interpreter of Scripture, and the universal giver and defender of unity in faith and love.*

2. At what time the homily made its appearance in the early churches we cannot now determine. Thus much is certain, however, that if the earliest homilies existing did not teach such enormous errors in doctrine and practice as they do, and were they not heard with so much applause by churches that had more or less departed from the primitive faith, they would be more deserving than they are of our imitation. Homilies, as original compositions, be-

long neither to the best periods of the Church, nor, indeed, to the worst; for in the latter there was little preaching of any kind and that partly consisted of the mere repetition of the homilies of the Christian fathers.

3. We do not deny that expository sermons were even to the apostate churches beneficial—yes, beneficial, just as certain medicines may be to a man that is known to be incurable—especially to the catechumens who were not admitted to the audience of sermons on the creed and mysteries.[1] But it should be considered that a modern expository discourse abounds much more in theological terms than the ancient homily did, and is therefore not adapted to neophytes. Few modern expository preachers take time and trouble to define the many theological terms they employ, so that, as the case now stands, either catechetical training or topical preaching is in fact a necessary preparation for being edified by expositions. One of the things which make expounding so profitable to Scottish hearers, is the fact that when they were children they were all instructed in the catechism.

4. When in any church exposition becomes the rage, to the neglect of topical sermons and catechetical instruction, its tendency is to multiply the number of those who teach, but sadly to diminish the number of those who learn and those who pray and exhort. As superficial expounding is a very easy task, many set themselves up as teachers, and many more make a merit of knowing and interpreting the Scriptures. In the primitive church at Corinth the apostle Paul had to correct the abuse of two or more teachers enlightening an assembly at the same time; and the apostle James dissuades his brethren from the ambition of becoming religious teachers on account of the dangers of volubility, and the reckoning they must render for any errors they might disseminate. Assuredly the present age, abounding beyond all parallel as it does in comments both oral and written, has cause to fear "greater condemnation" than any that went before it.

5. Even in times and churches which most applauded homilies, they were not the objects of exclusive admiration: three other kinds, namely, the panegyrical, the festival, and the doctrinal, claimed their proper share of attention.

6. Much and frequent expounding creates and diffuses the false impression among ignorant people that the Bible is a very obscure if not quite incomprehensible book—containing a revelation

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[1] Bingham, Eccl. Antiq., B. i., chap. iv., sec. 8; B. x., chap. v., sec. 4. Cf. Bunsen's Hippolytus, vol. iii., p. 14.

in name but not in fact; and among the intelligent that exposition alone is able to "make them wise unto salvation," whereas none but the Divine Spirit received in answer to prayer can cause them to understand the Scriptures. Learning may yet do a great deal; but the one Inditer must evermore remain the chief Interpreter.

7. "Very well; but we might mention preachers who are by their expositions attracting multitudes to hear them." Remark, however, that the revivalists who, like Summerfield, adopt expository addresses, do not rely on them but on their subsequent narratives and appeals for carrying their point. Or they preach topically in the morning and expound in the afternoon, and so give the people a pleasant variety. Novelty, too, has not seldom done exploits that were mistakenly attributed to supernal powers. Far be it from us and from all to set small store by the rhetorical maxim, *Non nova, sed nove;* and yet novelty is proverbially short-lived, and we ought not to confound the transient interest awakened by a change from doctrinal preaching with the popular effect of expository preaching itself as a regular and permanent service. Even Chrysostom, whose homilies were often half topical, complained that the people would not well attend his daily homilies, while they came in throngs at the great festivals.[1]

8. "But how pure and refreshing is water drank at the fountain-head." This we admit, and more than this: it is sometimes medicinal, especially in cases where the people have been misled either by false doctrines or by true ones unapplied, or where there is a surfeit of that dry and systematic preaching on the articles of faith, which starves the imagination and the heart, and leaves the life fruitless. In such cases the effect of a return to a study of the Bible has been compared to that of the mineral springs of Orezza in Corsica, which are popularly believed to afford a specific for the malarious fever produced by the stagnant waters on the plains below. Yet, on the other hand, the Creator never intended that all the water we consume should be drawn directly from fountain-heads. We would not like to do without water as it moistens our daily food and as a constituent of the air we breathe; as distilling in dew and falling in showers; as rising in perfumes from the furrow and the swath, the garden, and even the wild flowers of the wood. And do not all relish it as it reappears in the juice of the strawberry, or the apple, or the grape, or the peach? Even so must we mortals always desire that every great revealed truth should come to us through the living individual preacher, conveyed to us

[1] Villemain, Eloquence Chrêtien, au iv. Siécle, pp. 181, 182.

in the vehicle of his chosen peculiarities, not merely expounded, but reasoned upon, deeply contemplated, and viewed in all its present relations and current applications.

9. Especially is exposition to be shunned when it is the refuge of such as hate doctrines and duties. There are throngs who, being unwilling either to exercise an evangelical faith in the cardinal doctrines of the Gospel or to experience its power, or to obey any of the commands of the Lord, are nevertheless always thirsting after Scripture knowledge. They could sit docile all their life long at the feet of an able expositor; alas, "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." Supremely selfish, they are by turns greedy of filthy lucre and of divine lore; and in many points answer the description given of similar characters by Paul the apostle.[1] From such turn away.

10. And with this remark another should be connected. When exposition is heard to the exclusion of all other kinds of preaching, it has a tendency to form such characters as are above mentioned. Scripture knowledge without faith and without obedience, or without the preaching that fosters and invigorates them, works in the hearts of the hearers all manner of evil desires. "But who," it will be asked, "recommends exposition *exclusively?* Nobody approves that." Is Archbishop Whately[2] nobody? What is his mature conviction and emphatic advice? "Our first, second, and third object should be to put the hearers of Scripture as nearly as we can (entirely we cannot) in the same position with the illiterate multitude whom the apostles addressed, and who were quite familiar with many things that are made out by diligent study of the learned among us." Other authorities, but none more eminent, on this side of the question, might be quoted.

11. In many points topical sermons are superior to expository. They are better for nourishing the health, strength, and activity of the mature Christian. Such instruction on one great subject as is distinct, complete, and comprehensive; the keeping abreast of the spirit of religious inquiry, and the gratification of a lawful desire to account for things *sequari vestigia rerum*, which often leads to the deepest and most lasting impressions; the thorough discussion and just decision of important questions; even the expositions which are remembered the longest and are the most profitable; the amplifica-

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1 2 Tim. iii., 1–7.

2 Life, vol. ii., p. 331. His earlier opinion was that sermons should be *didactic*—occupied chiefly in *explaining* Scripture, with a very little direct exhortation (Rhetoric, Pt ii., chap. ii., p. 1, *note*).

tions that fill the imagination and kindle the feelings; the persuasives that determine the stubborn will and urge dead-alive powers to action—all these demand steady and protracted attention to a single theme. Deprive us of topical sermons, and how you do cripple and disarm our pulpit forces; nay, how many victories and triumphs do you wrest from us and give to skeptical lecturers.

12. A pastor may so give himself to exposition as to grow indifferent to the immediate wants of his flock. By studying Biblical criticism more than he does the moral state of his people, he fails to make opportune and thorough applications of Gospel remedies; thereby, as of old, the prophet may degenerate into the mere scribe.

Exposition, therefore, is not to be preferred exclusively, always, everywhere, and by all preachers and hearers. Much will here depend on the ability of the preacher and of the hearer, as well as upon the portion of Scripture expounded, to say nothing of the observance of the law of proportion and the necessity of some variety in the ministration of the Word.

For a very intelligent flock the best expositions would be lectures on the principles of interpretation, and on rules for applying Scripture to all the varied experiences, duties, and providences of common life. Our great aim should be to enable the people profitably to search the Scriptures for themselves. It was for this very purpose, as Chrysostom says in his first homily on Matthew, that he sometimes presented difficulties without solving them.[1]

Though the ancient homily observed no rules, and the modern is bound by none, yet the following hints might be of considerable use to those who desire to excel in this kind of preaching; for, as Vinet declares, it certainly is more easy to make a homily than a sermon, but a good sermon is made with more facility than a good homily.

A. In imitating the excellences of the best ancient homilies, we ought never to forget the times in which they were delivered. Manuscripts were then costly; but, had they been cheap, very few were able to read them, and consequently catechising and preaching were the principal means of conveying Scripture knowledge to the people. As the Bible is now possessed and read by all, and as the majority of our congregations have been taught in Sunday-schools or Bible-classes, our Biblical expositions may be less

1 In treating the negative aspects of the subject, as it will be seen, we have quoted no authorities in our support. Most, if not all, of the writers with whom we are acquainted have been content to set forth the advantages of expository preaching. But those who are in theory against us are for the most part practically with us. (See Dr. J. W. Alexander's Thoughts, pp. 272–313.)

juvenile and more broad and deep than the early Christian fathers could advantageously give.

B. And hence we do well to consider how many verses are already understood by an ordinary hearer. As the ancient homilist was the chief source of all Biblical knowledge, he had to read, explain, and illustrate every passage in order to give his hearers some general information as to every part of holy Scripture. To pursue the same course now would appear like doing what Whately says the regular paraphrase does: "It applies a magnifying glass of equal power to the gnat and to the camel." But in order that the Lord himself may be first heard, read the entire passage before you expound it.

Γ. On the other hand, we ought not to imagine that the homily is now adapted merely to the exposition of the most difficult passages.

Δ. It will be found profitable to give an analysis of the contents of the passage to be explained. Indeed, a good analysis is itself expository. Thomas Aquinas's homilies are in this respect worth studying, if not imitating.

E. In preaching to congregations among whom the homily has from any cause come to be disliked, it may be prudent to follow the advice of Archbishop Secker. "Instead," he says, "of taking a text which comprehends within itself the whole subject of which you would treat, it may often be useful to choose one which has a reference to things preceding or following it, and expound all the context." Though Campbell condemns this method because the other verses are thereby "awkwardly ushered into the discourse," yet it should be considered that it prevents the needless repetition of long familiar passages, and that where, as is often the case, the text is a sententious premiss or a weighty conclusion of the rest of the paragraph or chapter, it is necessarily the most graceful and engaging method of ushering in the whole context. Aversion may sometimes be prevented or conquered by an exordium of a topical nature.

Z. The kind of homily which is limited to the exposition of a single difficult verse or clause may have most of the excellences of a topical discourse, while it guards against the objection of Ammon, that the homily militates against unity[1] by handling different subjects, and that it leaves too little space for the development and application of a particular truth. Some of the discourses of Paley, Horsley, Whately, and Trench are good examples of this kind

[1] Cf. Palmer's Homiletik, p. 453.

of homily. Their principal fault is that they occupy too small a space with the application.

H. And yet it is the neglect of unity that constitutes one of the popular attractions of the homily. The transition from verse to verse and from one subject to another affords that variety which always chains the attention of undisciplined minds and of those students who are daily employed in the thorough investigation of subjects. He who, in these respects, takes the intellect as he finds it, may hope to leave the heart better than he found it.

Θ. There may be, however, such quick and measured transitions, and such an easy and superficial solution of each verse, as appear intended more for the recreation of the preacher than for the edification of his audience. He thus resembles one of those street musicians who walk from door to door so rapidly that they leave us in doubt whether they are playing for the children or merely for their own amusement.

I. The expositor should carefully avoid pedantry by giving the results without the process and the details of his learned investigations. Consider this well.

K. The application should never consist of cold, short, and general observations and reflexions. It should rather be composed of practical and direct inferences and remarks, coming warm from the successive verses. Here uniform or continual applications are best. But in making them the preacher should vigilantly guard against an affectation of feeling and of earnestness. "Quick transitions," as Campbell says, "from the warmth of pathos to the coldness of criticism, from the moral and persuasive to the abstract and argumentative, or inversely, from the critical to the pathetic, and from the abstract to the persuasive, are neither natural nor easy." It may be wise, therefore, to make up the uniform or continual application of such "uses" (and the greater number are of this kind) as do not demand transporting passion, reserving as far as possible the more pathetic appeals for the peroration. We say as far as possible; for the pathetic, being often spontaneous, unexpected, and of short duration, is not always subject to the laws of arrangement. Yet, after all, the experience of every preacher of tender sensibility proves that such transitions are more natural and easy than Dr. Campbell seems to suppose. Besides, it should be remembered that neither the homily nor the lecture is required, like the sermon, to be of one colour and tenor throughout. Add to this the important considerations that most of the pathetic parts of Scripture do not call for the critical, the abstract, and the argumentative—they speak a language intuitively and universally understood—and that

they are frequently found in places where the homily will naturally conclude.

A. It is said to the praise of Vitringa that his explications are short and his applications long. He felt that a knowledge of human nature is necessary not only to a proper interpretation, but a faithful and effective application of Holy Scripture. To attempt expository preaching without an intimate acquaintance with human nature, both regenerate and unregenerate, is like attempting to practise the healing art with a knowledge of therapeutics, but in ignorance of pathology. The same may be said of theology. "You need," says Nitzsch (Prac. Theol., §99), "a knowledge of the whole system of Biblical theology in order to make a single verse of Paul manifest and fruitful."

M. Beware of the temptation to glide too soon from illustration to reasoning. The trained logician or debater is much exposed to this allurement. This is as if an architect were so intent upon providing a sufficient number of columns and buttresses as to shadow and even hide objects that ought to have stood forth in clear and central light.

N. Hence the counsels of the Rev. John Mason to his son should be heeded by young ministers, and especially by our young but profound Biblical scholars: "Do not meddle with the exposition of the Scriptures, which we commonly call lecturing, for two years at least after you have appeared in a public character. Meanwhile, prepare yourself for it by diligent reading and close attention to the connections of Scripture. When you begin it, select such passages as have a peculiar fitness for fixing impressions upon the consciences of hearers. Let this be your practice for one year. After that you may expound a chapter or a book as you may think most for edification." How, then, shall the young preacher thus find matter for his sermons? We will tell him. Let him select at first the most important, and consequently plainest texts, and devote himself to their *application*. Herein nearly all our best preachers are the most frequently weak and delinquent. At any rate, let him save himself from this generation of youthful expositors who, without holding the words of God in any very deep reverence, are only intent on getting at the core and seed of divine things, but who really suggest to us a vision of apes that having found a flask of water lying by the side of a sleeping traveller, are using their best endeavours to break it as they would a cocoanut, and quoting for their mutual encouragement this maxim of Plautus, "Qui e nuce nucleum esse volt, frangit nucem," whoso wishes the kernel out of the shell, must crack the nut.

CHAPTER II.

CONFIRMATION.

Section I.—The Prophetic Logic.

The principles of the oracles of God are not against, but only above, the laws of general logic. They are best understood by considering their origin and their end. They had their source not in human reason, but in the Supreme Mind, or, more strictly speaking, Heart; the Author of all truth and all its evidences, the Maker of the human intellect and its powers and modes of argumentation. Why can it be thought strange that our Heavenly Father should reveal to us far-shining assertions instead of glimmering syllogisms, and loving assumptions rather than the iron processes of dialectics? And then we should recollect that the ends of all inspired reasonings are practical. The conclusions of this higher logic are acts of obedience such as lead to knowledge, which in turn leads to more complete obedience. "The sacred writers," as Diodati has well observed, "follow the method of prudence. Often in a concealed syllogism they begin with the minor proposition, and in an enthymeme leave us to supply the consequence; now they use several mediums of arguments, and then suddenly break into rhetorical interrogations, exclamations, and amplifications." After these, perhaps, they return to their argument.

As faith always supposes some reason,[1] so also does the divine logic; and its superiority to, does not require it to calcitrate against canons of *rhetorical* reasoning. So far from it, the holy prophets are the best masters in the school of popular logic; yes, and of that spiritual logic, also, of which Stier[2] writes. "There is," says he, "a higher logic of the renewed spiritual speech, which restores the words of man to their proper order, and is therefore the only logic that deserves to be called by that beautiful and deeply significant name." The apostle Paul's method of reasoning about the cross seemed foolishness to the Greek philosophers, and Longi-

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[1] Augustine, Epist. cxxii. [2] Keryktik, p. 23.

nus,[1] the Neo-Platonic sophist, says of him: "Paul of Tarsus was the first, within my knowledge, that put forth his opinion without supporting it by argument." And yet Longinus thinks that the name of Paul is worthy to be added to those of the eight Greek orators who are the glory of all eloquence. Had this sophist read, or heard read, the epistles to the Romans and the Hebrews, he would probably have changed his opinion respecting the apostle's skill in dialectics. Chrysostom[2] commends St. Paul's reasonings to the imitation of the Christian priest, and his inspired logic has the approval of the great metaphysician, John Locke, while Dr. Emmons[3] has proved that he was an argumentative preacher.

The extent to which the Great Teacher appealed to the reason of his hearers and proved the doctrines he taught has been very generally underrated. It should be recollected that his miracles were of the nature of indisputable proofs; that he was clothed with authority as the Divine Mediator and as an inspired prophet who spoke instead of the Father and the Holy Ghost. Nor ought we to overlook the fact that almost all his sermons were ethical rather than doctrinal, and that, consequently, trains of argument were unnecessary. To have attempted to inculcate the principles of morals on the people by means of, or even with the aid of, close and dry reasoning, would have been useless. Here, therefore, his chief business was to illustrate and impress.

But we may go farther than this, and take positive ground. It cannot be questioned that the Divine Master sometimes gave the reasons on which his commands were founded (Matt. v. 34–36, 45, 46; vi. 7, 8, 19–21; vii. 12; Luke xii. 15). Nor are the instances few in which he addresses his sermons to the reason of his hearers, but always briefly and popularly, as befits the preacher (Matt. ix. 12, 13; xii. 3–6, 7, 8, 11, 12; xvi. 2–4; xix. 3–6; xxiii. 16–22; Mark ii. 19, 20, 27; iii. 4, 23–27; viii. 34–36; xii. 26, 27; Luke v. 36–39; xi. 11–13, 19, 20; xii. 54–57; xiii. 15, 16; John x. 35. See Archbishop Newcome's Observations on Our Lord as a Divine Instructor, Pt. i., c. ii., sec. 3, 4, for excellent comments on these passages).

In the following section on the various kinds of arguments, evidence may be found that the arguments thus employed by the Great Teacher were also various and level to the capacities of those for whom they were intended.

Augustine, in his *De Doctrina Christiana* (L. iv., c. v.), concurs

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[1] Fabricius, Bibliotheca Græc., L. iv.; cf. Hug's Intro. N. T., Pt. ii., c. ii.

[2] De Sacerdotio, L. iv., c. v., vi. [3] Sermon on Acts xvii. 2.

with Cicero[1] in the opinion that wisdom is to be preferred to eloquence. We call attention to this here because it has, we believe, been generally overlooked that this Christian father here makes the former synonymous with sound reasoning.

Some modern writers have attempted to disparage and discredit the use of abstract reasoning in religious matters. Among these, one of the most distinguished is Isaac Taylor,[2] who, in his introductory essay to Edwards on the Will, puts forth several specious but sophistical arguments against "the intrusion of logic upon the ground of theology." He ignores at the outset the fact that Edwards, like Augustine and his disciples, dichotomizes the understanding into heart or will, and mind or intellect. Mr. Taylor's genius is not of the dialectical type, and consequently here he does injustice to his own reputation, to the great work of Edwards, and, what now chiefly concerns us, to the utility of logic as applied to divine revelation. Were preachers to receive and carry out the conclusions of this essay they would expose themselves to that reproach of which he so happily writes in another essay[3] in the same volume: "When ministers of religion allow themselves to accept freely those warm testimonies of regard which their female hearers and followers are so prompt to render them, they are liable to pass into an ambiguous mental condition, which intercepts the free exchange of thought between themselves and the men—the laymen—of their social and pastoral circles. Thus it comes about that sermons are composed and delivered which women eagerly applaud, but which men listen to with far less than thorough satisfaction: they too may applaud, for the preacher is eloquent, and they believe him to be sincere; yet these educated laymen come out of church convinced on no one questionable point; and they feel that while the slender and soft experiences of female religious life are understood and are duly treated by the preacher, the hard, the arduous, the perplexing, the Titan realities of *man's* course through this difficult world—the strong things—are either not grappled with at all, or they are always misunderstood, as a man misunderstands things which he has never seen otherwise than at a distance, and through a mist." But still, on the other hand, a preacher may be so addicted to argument as to be very bewildering and unedifying to most women. May I say it? It is an important fact, account for it as we will, that the reasonings of Paul which made Felix tremble gave no noticeable uneasiness to the equally guilty Drusilla. Of the intuitive conclusions and hasty deductions of women (with which

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1 De Partitione, Pt. xxii., xxiii. Logic in Theology. 3 Paula.

regular arguments seem often to interfere), Mrs. Browning has given an accurate description in "Aurora Leigh:"

> "You generalise
> Oh, nothing!—not even grief. Your quick-breathed heart,
> So sympathetic to the personal pang.
> . . . . . .
> The human race
> To you means such a child, or such a man
> You saw one morning waiting in the cold
> Beside that gate, perhaps."

Other preachers and writers deprecate the use of every kind of reasoning in matters of religion, on the plea that they are thus imitating the practice of the sacred writers and the inspired prophets, who, say they, were mere witnesses. Now the latter, it must be very evident, did always commend themselves to the reason of their hearers and readers, not always indeed by chains of argument; for this would sometimes have been very improper in those who professed to communicate revelations from heaven, and often very foreign to the matters they were commissioned to make known; but they first did all that could have been justly expected or demanded, that is, they demonstrated their divine call, and then not unfrequently they showed the reasonableness of the contents of the messages themselves.

Not only does Paul reason on several public occasions, and in more than one of his epistles, but he directs Titus to ordain such elders as would be able to silence and convince gainsayers and deceivers. Peter exhorts his converts to 'be ready always to give an answer to every man that asked them the reason of the hope that was in them.' And as they were to do this "with meekness and fear," it is implied that these excellent graces are not inconsistent with the vigorous exercise of the argumentative powers. Luther in his Table Talk says that the preacher ought to be both a logician and a rhetorician.

"But is it not true, after all, that theology lies beyond the reach of logical demonstration?" In a certain sense, we reply, it is true. It is undeniable that the fundamental principles and facts of divine revelation, upon which this peerless science is built, cannot be established by a process of logical proof. Supernatural and infinite realities properly address themselves to our belief in unimpeachable testimony. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that it is the office of logic to demonstrate the truth of its own fundamental propositions—the intuitions, beliefs, and assumptions with which every process of sound reasoning must begin. In this view, as Dr.

Gerhart[1] has proved, theology transcends the sphere of logic no farther than does any other science. For the logician, therefore, to complain of the ground on which the theologian stands is virtually to complain of the ground on which he himself, and every other scientist, stand, since both alike plant their feet on the assumption of principles or the belief of fundamental facts. In all respects theology bears the same relation to logic as every other science does. True logic is blind to the quality of the foundations on which it so solidly builds. Hence, as Dr. Gerhart has admirably shown,[2] an illogical theology is a false theology, while, on the other hand, a logical theology is not necessarily a true theology.

Even were it otherwise with any theology as a scientific system, it could not invalidate the conclusion that the matter of divine revelation, in almost all its homiletical applications, is properly within the sphere of the science of deductive reasoning.

Section II.—The Different Kinds of Arguments.

Various attempts have been made to classify arguments according to philosophical principles, with a view to simplify the subject of rhetorical reasoning; but the habit of philosophising on arguments has had the same effect as philosophising on figures. It has left the student ignorant of the names and uses of many of his rhetorical tools. For practical purposes, therefore, it is better to acquaint ourselves with the nature and offices of the several kinds of arguments which have been discussed by those rhetoricians who have preferred utility to profundity.

As all recent works on logic have omitted matter which formerly served as a bridge from that science to rhetoric, we think it necessary to begin with such matter. Let us first define and illustrate some of the meanings of the term *cause:*

Causes are of four kinds—*final, efficient, material,* and *formal.*[3]

The *Final Cause* is the end for the sake of which a thing is. There are "principal ends," which are mainly regarded, and "accessory ends," which are only indirectly considered. That which we undertake to do or obtain is called *finis cujus gratia.* Thus health is the end of medicine, since it undertakes to procure it. He for whom we labor is called *finis cui.* Man is the end of medicine in this sense, since it is for him that it seeks to obtain a cure.

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1 Intro. to Philosophy and Logic, pp. 178–188. 2 Id., p. 187.

3 Aristotle's Metaphysics, L. i., c. iii., sec. 1; the works of Thomas Aquinas, *passim,* Port Royal Logic, translated by Mr. T. S. Baynes, Pt. iii., chap. xviii.; B. Keckerman's Systema Logicæ, de Causa, pp. 120–174.

The *Efficient Cause* is that which produces another thing. There are different kinds of efficient causes. God in creating Adam was the "total cause," since nothing had co-operated with him; but the father and the mother are only "partial causes" (*con causes*) in relation to their child, since both are needed. The sun is a "proper cause" of light, but it is only an "accidental cause" of the death of a man killed by its heat, since he was weak before. The father is the "proximate" cause of his son. The grandfather is only the "remote" cause. The mother is a "producing cause;" the nurse only a "preserving cause." The father is a "universal cause" in relation to his children, because they are of the same nature with him. God is only an "equivocal cause" in relation to creatures, because they are not of the divine nature. A workman is the "principal cause" of his work; his instruments are only the "instrumental causes." The air which fills an organ is the "universal cause" of the harmony of the organ; the particular disposition of each pipe, and he who plays, are the "particular causes" which determine the "universal." The sun is a "natural cause." Man is an "intellectual cause" in relation to that which he does with judgment. The fire which burns the wood is a "necessary cause." A man who walks is a "free cause." The sun shining into a room is the "proper cause" of its light; the unbarring of the windows is only a cause, or, as it is now usually termed, "condition," without which the effect would not be, *conditio sine qua non*. The fire which burns the house is the "physical cause" of the conflagration; the man who set it on fire is the "moral cause." The "exemplary cause" is the model according to which a work is made, as he who sits for a portrait, or as the plan by which an architect erects a building; or, in general, that which is the cause of the objective existence of an idea or of any other image whatever.

The *Material Cause* is that of which things are formed, as gold is the matter of which a golden vase is made.

The *Formal Cause*, or form, is that which renders a thing what it is, and distinguishes it from others, whether it be a thing really distinguished from the matter, according to the schoolmen, or, as is held by more modern philosophers, simply the arrangement of parts. It is by the knowledge of this form that we are able to explain properties.

It is common to derive arguments from the consideration of the "final cause," or end, either for the purpose of showing that a thing is not adapted to the end proposed, or in order to show that a man has done or will do some action because it is conformed to the end which he is accustomed to propose to himself, or to show, on the

contrary, that we ought not to suspect a man of such an action, since it would have been contrary to his purpose. There are still many other ways of reasoning from the final cause. We may derive arguments from the "efficient cause" by showing that an effect is not, since there has not been a sufficient cause, or that it is, or will be, by showing that all the causes are present. If these causes are "necessary," the argument is necessary; if they are contingent and free, it is only "probable."

There are as many different *effects* as there are causes, these words being reciprocal. The common way of reasoning from effects is to show that if the effect is, the cause is, since there can be nothing without a cause. We prove, also, that a cause is good or bad when its effects are good or bad. This, however, is not always true in respect of accidental causes. These distinctions are important and still employed; *e. g.*, "The original cause of the justification of a sinner is the absolute mercy of God; the meritorious cause of his justification is redemption by Christ; and the instrumental cause is faith in the Redeemer" (Sermon on Rom. iii. 25, by Rev. B. W. Noel). They are also useful in expounding and citing as proofs such passages as Rom. xi. 36.

I. Logic and rhetoric possess in common those forms of reasoning which are generally called *sorites*. This name is given to all such syllogisms as are composed of more than three propositions. Of these, Arnauld and Nicole distinguish three kinds—*Gradation*, *Dilemma*, *Epicheirema*.

1. *Gradation* or *Climax* is a complex argument, in which the predicate of the first proposition is made the subject of the next, and so on to any length, till finally the predicate of the last of the premises is predicated of the subject of the first; *e. g.*, avaricious men are full of desires; those who are full of desires want many things; those who want many things cannot satisfy all their desires; those who cannot satisfy all their desires are unhappy; therefore avaricious men are unhappy. The inspired reasoners employed the Gradation in a free rhetorical form. See Rom. viii. 29, 30; x. 13–15 and the term *climax* in list of figures.

2. *Dilemma* is a compound argument in which, after having divided a whole into its parts, we conclude affirmatively or negatively of the whole what we had concluded of each part. Our Lord employed a free and informal Dilemma on the occasion narrated in Matt. xxi. 25–27; again xii. 25–28. Dr. F. W. Krummacher, in his lecture on the Lamb that was Slain (text Mark xiv. 65), discusses his subject by Dilemmas, *vide* chap. on Plans. Another argument of this kind may be found in Bishop Sherlock's sermon on Acts ii. 22, 2d head.

3. *Epicheirema* is an argument in which either one of the two first propositions, or both, is immediately followed by proof. When we advance doubtful propositions, it is often necessary to connect the proofs with them in order to restrain the impatience of those to whom we speak. The inspired preachers frequently reasoned in this manner. An admired example of this kind of argument is quoted in the Port Royal Logic, from Augustine, where he is proving original sin:

"Consider the number and greatness of the evils under which children labour, and how the first years of their life are filled with vanity, with afflictions, with illusions, with fears. Then when they grow up, and when they begin even to serve God, error tempts, in order to seduce them; labour and pain tempt to weaken them; lust tempts to inflame them; sorrow tempts to cast them down; pride tempts to lift them up; and who can represent, in few words, all the various afflictions which weigh down the yoke of the children of Adam? The evidence of these miseries compelled pagan philosophers, who knew and believed nothing about the sin of our first father, to say that we were born only to suffer the chastisement which we had merited by crimes committed in another life, and that thus our minds had been attached to corruptible bodies as a punishment of the same nature with that which Tuscan tyrants (*e. g.*, Mezentius in Virgil) inflicted on those whom they bound, while alive, to dead bodies. But this opinion that our minds are joined to bodies as a punishment for sins previously committed in another life, is rejected by the apostle. What, therefore, remains, but that the cause of these appalling evils be either the injustice or the impotency of God or the penalty of the first sin of man? But since God is neither unjust nor impotent, there only remains that which you are unwilling to acknowledge, but which you must acknowledge in spite of yourselves—that the yoke, so heavy, which the children of Adam are obliged to bear from the time in which their bodies are taken from their mothers' wombs till the day when they return to the womb of their common mother, the earth, would never have been, had they not deserved it through the guilt which they derive from their original."

This kind of argument is in one respect the opposite of the enthymeme, which has been defined a syllogism, perfect in mind but imperfect in expression, since some one of its propositions is suppressed as so clear or so well known as to be easily supplied by the mind of the hearer. In the epicheirema the propositions are so doubtful that it is necessary to subjoin the proofs which establish them; in the enthymeme, on the contrary, some one of its propositions is so evident that it is suppressed. This last kind of argument is of all others the most rhetorical and the most common. (For discussions on the nature of the Enthymeme, *v.* De Quincey, Essay on Rhetoric; Sir W. Hamilton's Logic, sec. 20; Cope's Intro. to Aristotle's Rhet., p. 103.)

II. The argument *à priori* may be defined that which proves the effect from its cause—as I prove that the Scripture is true because

it is the word of God, who cannot lie. The term is generally applied to any argument drawn from an antecedent, or forerunner, or tendency, and to any truth which the mind possesses before and independent of experience. Archbishop Whately would limit the term to such arguments as may be employed to *account for or assign the cause* of a fact or a principle, supposing its truth granted. He calls it the argument from *Antecedent Probability*, since we here reason from what is plausible, reasonable, or what we would naturally have expected. Scripture examples of this kind of argument may be found in Isa. lviii. 3–7; Jer. viii. 22; Ezek. xxv. 3–5; xxviii. 2–10; xxxi. 10–14; Matt. xix. 26; Acts xxvi. 4–8, 9–11; Heb. vi. 18. (For other later examples see Dr. Barrow's discourse on the Divine Impartiality; Tillotson's sermon on the Reasonableness of a Resurrection; Joseph Butler's sermons on the Love of God; John M. Mason's sermon on the Gospel for the Poor.)

III. Arguments *à posteriori* infer causes from effects—as I infer that there is a God from the works of creation. Tulloch's invaluable essay on Theism is an elaborate series of *à posteriori* arguments. They have also been termed arguments from *Sign*, or *Condition*, or *Symptom*. The word "cause" is here usually employed in the sense of *conditio sine qua non*, or necessary occasion or circumstance. "A fact being known," says Dr. Wm. Spalding, "which is conditioned by facts unknown, each or any of the conditioning facts may be inferred" (Isa. ii. 4; xli. 21–24; Ezek. xiii. 10–15; Habak. ii. 9–16; iii. 17–19; Hag. i. 9; Matt. vii. 16–20; John viii. 39–43; Acts xvii. 29; Heb. iii. 17, 18; xi. 5, 16; Dr. Barrow's discourse on the Divine Impartiality; Bourdaloue's sermon on the Passion of Jesus Christ, text Luke xxiii. 27, 28; Robert Hall's sermon on Modern Infidelity; Vinet's sermon on text Rev. xiv. 6, entitled a Characteristic of the Gospel; Van Der Palm's sermon on the Necessity of Divine Grace to change the Heart, text John vi. 44).

1. To this class belong arguments from *Testimony*. Here the truth of what is attested is a *condition* of the testimony having been given. Testimony in any case presupposes that the fact is as it is testified to, *otherwise* the testimony would not have been given. This argument rests upon one or more of the following kinds of moral evidence: The testimony may relate (1) either to matters of fact, or (2) matters of intuition, or consciousness, or experience, or (3) matters of authority or of opinion.

As the argument from testimony is more frequently used than any other by the preacher, his success will depend not a little on his skill in adducing this kind of proof, particularly in quoting and reasoning from Holy Scripture.

It is an important question, How ought we to quote the Scriptutes? (*a*) Our Lord, the prophets, and apostles generally quoted but one text of Holy Writ in proof of each assertion that needed its support. And yet have we the example of the apostle Paul in the epistle to the Hebrews for quoting two, and in one instance three texts in confirmation of a single proposition. (*b*) The inspired preachers sometimes quoted *ad literum*, sometimes *ad sensum*. (*c*) They not unfrequently added to their quotations such explanations as showed their meaning or their application to the argument used. (*d*) They evince no small vivacity in their manner of quoting. They introduce texts in a great variety of ways; sometimes in the form of animated interrogation. Instances under these several heads will readily occur to every student of the Bible. In Dr. J. M. Mason's sermon (Messiah's Throne, Pt. i.), there is a very successful imitation of the interrogatory way of quoting Scripture. See paragraph beginning, "I cannot find in the lively oracles," etc.

2. The argument from *Concurrence* of *Testimony* seems entitled to a separate head; for here, as Campbell says, the probability arises from the concurrence itself, it being morally impossible that the fact of many coinciding in their testimony should spring from chance. This has been called a "galaxy of evidence" (Acts iii. 24; x. 43; Heb. xi., xii. 1, 2). See Bishop Horne's Eighth Discourse, The Case of the Jews, Pt. iv., text John i. 11.; Davison's Discourses on Prophecy, pp. 23, 266, 375, 396.

3. In some degree resembling the last is the argument from *Progressive Approach*. Here the combined force of a series of proofs results from the *order* in which they are considered, and from their *progressive* tendency to establish a certain conclusion; *e. g.*, if we project a ball along a rough surface, its motion is soon stopped; if along a smoother surface, its motion is not so soon retarded; hence we infer that if all the resistance could be taken away, the motion would be perpetual. Dr. Whately, the inventor of the name of this argument, remarks that great use may be made of it in arguing for the existence and moral attributes of the Deity from the authority of men's opinions, *so far forth* as they are wise and well instructed. (See Butler's argument from the necessary tendency of virtue, Analogy, Pt. i., chap. iii.; John Wesley's sermon on the General Spread of the Gospel, text Isa. xix. 11; also Vinet's sermon, A Characteristic of the Gospel, in which he proves that of all religions the religion of Jesus alone has a necessary tendency towards universality and perpetuity.)

IV. Arguments from *Resemblance*. Under this general term we

include all those proofs and reasons which are derived from a comparison or contrast of the properties or relations of different objects. By Isocrates and his disciples arguments of this class are termed *probable*.[1]

1. The argument from *Example* is one in which we "consider a known object or instance, of a certain class, as a fair *sample* in respect of some point or other of that class, and consequently draw an inference from it respecting either the whole class, or other less known individuals of it." The preacher finds this kind of arguments to be very popular and effective; but he should never overlook the difference between examples used for proofs and those which are merely employed for illustration—a difference as great as that between a column and a window of a cathedral (Isa. vii. 21, 22; xlix. 20; Amos vi. 13). Chrysostom often employs this kind of reasoning.

2. The argument from *Induction* is one in which from several individual cases we argue to the whole class, or to a general conclusion. Paley's Horæ Paulinæ is an argument of this kind, and so is a part of Dr. Tulloch's Theism. Of this nature likewise are all arguments from *Intuition; e. g.*, if from the natural elements of our spiritual constitution we infer the nature and perfections of God. Thus Dr. Tulloch proves that the Divine Being has personality from man's intuitive sense of his own personality; from a self within we are carried to a self without and above us. From the human conscience he demonstrates the divine righteousness; and from our intuitive apprehension of things beyond the region of the visible he argues the divine infinitude. (Cf. Dr. M'Cosh on Intuitions.) Of like description are arguments from *Experience*. As proof from intuition so proof from experience can never amount to moral evidence except when it is an induction from such a number of cases as proves that the experience is essentially that of the whole class, and not of one or two individuals. In arguing from Christian experience, the major proposition is that Scripture ascribes certain virtues and graces to the Holy Spirit. To this class belongs the argument from analysis, or that process of reasoning whereby we establish a proposition by proving it by one of the several assertions that are either expressed or implied in its terms. (See example in Plans and Divisions, by Dean Young.)

3. The argument from *Deduction* is the proving by marks, conditions, or criteria the character of a person, the claims of a system, the truth of a doctrine, or the qualities of a thing. Here the pro-

[1] Rhet. ad Alex., chap. vii., §4–7.

cess is the reverse of that of induction; *e. g.*, Rev. Charles Leslie, in his Short and Easy Method with Deists, begins his demonstration of the truth of the Christian religion by laying down such marks as to the truth of matters of fact *in general*, that where they all meet, such matters of fact cannot be false. He then shows that all these marks do meet in the matters of fact recorded as to Moses and Christ. Many popular "searching" sermons and treatises are composed on the same general method. (See Bourdaloue's sermon on the Christian Character, text Matt. xxii. 42, and John Wesley's sermon, Marks of the New Birth, text John iii. 8.) Vinet, in his sermon on Imaginary Perfection (text Col. ii. 20–23) shows that a false perfection is characterised by the appearance of a voluntary worship, the appearance of humility, the appearance of a holy contempt for the wants of the body, while the reality of each of these things is essential to true Christian piety. (See Matt. xi. 8, 9; 2 Cor. xi. 22–28.)

This process of determining a question by a few test principles may be as decisive as it is summary; *e. g.*, Charles de la Rue, in his sermon, The Dying Sinner, proves that his deferred conversion is liable to be false, *first*, from the disposition of God towards the sinner; *secondly*, from the disposition of the sinner towards God.

The argument from Induction is really a subordinate process of deduction, since it always begins with the tacit assumption of some principle.

4. The argument from *Analogy* is reasoning from that kind of resemblance which involves a similarity or identity of relation. Resemblances in appearance, according to Drs. Copleston, Whately, and others, in incidental circumstances, or even in properties, form no sufficient basis for analogy. But Locke, Butler,[1] and Mill give a wider meaning to the phrase "argument from analogy," and employ it to designate an argument founded on resemblance of any kind. Dr. James Buchanan[1] takes the term in a stricter sense, "not as denoting *any* kind of resemblance, but *such* a resemblance as may be applied in argument or made a ground of inference. It may be described as consisting in a real and radical likeness between two or more objects of thought, which is made manifest to us by their being observed to possess the same characteristic properties, or to exhibit similar relations, or to produce the same or similar effects." He prefers this description of analogy, because it "serves to guard equally against two distinct errors—the error of those, on

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1 Dr. Angus's ed. of Butler's *Analogy*, p. xvii.

2 Analogy as a Guide to Truth and an Aid to Faith, p. 65.

the one hand, who hold that it consists *merely* in a resemblance of relations, and implies no resemblance between the objects themselves; and the error of those, on the other hand, who imagine that any apparent resemblance, however superficial or unimportant, may be applied equally with every other to the purposes of argument or proof."

The same author[1] shows what are the different uses of analogical reasoning: (1) Where it affords little or no proof it is often sufficient to *neutralise objections* and remove adverse presumptions; (2) It has the power of imparting an aspect of *verisimilitude* or *likelihood* and *congruity* to truths which might otherwise seem strange and even incredible; (3) Analogy yields in many cases a *presumption* or *a probability* in favour of certain conclusions such as admits of every variety of degrees; (4) It affords in some cases a valid ground of inference, and produces the highest certainty of which the human mind is capable, except in the case of demonstrative or necessary truth.[2]

The young preacher would do well to read, in connection with this work, Albert Barnes's Introductory Essay to Butler's Analogy, in which he very ably defends the doctrines of the evangelical system against those who assert that these doctrines are in opposition to the established principles by which God governs the world. Thus, in neutralising objections against the doctrines of total depravity, of a Mediator and atonement, of regeneration, of the Trinity, etc., he appeals to facts and principles already learned from the constitution and course of nature.

One kind of analogical proof is that of *Congruity*.[3] Though a very effective method of reasoning, it is now much less frequently used than it was formerly. When employed negatively it is sometimes termed *argumentum ad inconvenienti*. Thomas Aquinas,[4] in his homilies, employs it; *e. g.*, in his homily on Luke vi. 36, he gives three reasons to move us to show mercy: (1) Necessity; (2) Utility; (3) Congruity. Again, in his homily on Matt. vi. 24, he shows "that we ought to serve God on the ground of congruity; for all things serve him, whence it is sufficiently congruous that man also should serve him" (Ps. cxix. 91). Davies, in his sermon on the Dan-

1 Analogy as a Guide to Truth and an Aid to Faith, pp. 162–178.

2 Prof. H. L. Mansel defines reasoning an act of comparison between two concepts (Art. *Metaphysics* in Encycl. Britan.).

3 Dr. Buchanan's Analogy, p. 170.

4 Aquinas does not here employ the term in the restricted sense given it in the scholastic *theology*. Since the above was written, Professor Potter (Pastor and People, pp. 36, 37) has published some excellent hints on congruity.

ger of Lukewarmness (text Rev. iii. 15, 16), considers lukewarmness in respect of several objects, particularly towards God, towards Christ Jesus, towards a future state, and towards the duties of religion, showing how unsuitable a temper it is towards all these objects.

On the general subject see, *e. g.*, Isa. i. 3; v. 1–7; xxviii. 23–29; liv. 9; Jer. iv. 3; vii. 12–15; xiii. 23; xviii. 6; Zech. i. 2; Malachi i. 6; Matt. xviii. 21–35; Heb. chaps. iii. and vii.; James iii. 3–6, etc.; Howe's sermon on Sleep, 1 Thes. v. 6, and his sermon on the Vanity of Man as a Mortal; Hall's sermon on Substitution; Jortin's sermon on Luke xvi. 8; Davison on Prophecy, *passim;* Vinet's sermon on the Necessity of Becoming Little Children; the Force of Congruity, etc., in Isaac Taylor's Restoration of Belief.

5. The argument from *Supposition* or *Construction* is that in which an invented case or a conceivable hypothesis is employed as proof. "We create," says Vinet, "with the hearer's consent, a fact apart from real and known facts; we make what is called in geometry a *construction;* we are assisted by this *dotted line*, which we instantly erase, in testing the regularity of the figure which we first traced." Or, to use the language of Dr. Whately, "this mode of reasoning corresponds to a geometrical demonstration by means of a diagram, in which the figure placed before the learner is an *individual*, employed, as he soon comes to perceive, as a *sign*, though not an *arbitrary* sign, representing the whole class." Some of the parables of our Lord are of the nature of supposed cases employed either for impression, conviction, or illustration. (See Bourdaloue's sermon on the Birth of Christ, near the close of Pt. ii.; also his sermon on an Erroneous Conscience, Pt. i., first subdivision; Saurin's sermon on the Worth of the Soul, near the end; Wolfe's Remains, 10th and 11th sermons—Wolfe in these instances appears to have followed his own rule: "Throw your congregation upon arguing against themselves." Dr. Chalmers and Dr. Buchanan have effectually neutralised objections by "hypothetical solutions;"—John Foster's lecture on Access to God.)

6. Arguments from *Contraries* are founded on resemblance. To arguments of this class the term enthymeme was applied by Isocrates and his disciples.[1] They are of the following kinds:

(1) The argument *a fortiori*, or *a majore ad minus*, or *ex minus probabili ad magis*, proves that some other less probable proposition is true, and thence concludes that the original proposition is true because it is more probable than the former. No oratorical

[1] Mr. Cope's Intro. to Aristl. Rhet., 104–425.

argument is more popular. The prophets, our Lord, and the apostles often reasoned in this manner (Isa. vii. 13; Jer. xii. 5; Ezek. xv. 5; xxxiii. 24; Mal. i. 8; Matt. vi. 25–34; vii. 11, 12; x. 25; xxvi. 30; Luke xxiii. 31; John x. 35; Heb. ii. 2, 3; ix. 13, 14; xii. 25). This argument was a favorite one with Chrysostom. (See his 3d homily on the Statues, §18, 19; 3d sermon on Lazarus, §2; 5th on Lazarus, §1, 2; Edward Payson's sermon on Job xxii. 5; Augustus Wm. Hare's sermons, *passim*.)

(2) The argument *ex adverso* opposes one fact to another fact which occurred in parallel circumstances. Thus Pascal in his 14th Provincial Letter contrasts the maxims of the Jesuits on homicide with the rules which legal justice follows in such cases. Under this head Vinet places arguments founded on Contrast and Difference, particularly on proofs of essential differences which are generally overlooked, and of essential resemblances where we are wont to perceive only differences (Deut. xxxii. 18; Jer. xiv. 22, and chap. xxxv.; Matt. v. 46–48; Saurin's sermon on the Advantages of Revealed Religion, text 1 Cor. i. 21, Pt. i.).

(3) The argument from *Ablation* shows the nature of one thing by the nature of another thing which is opposed to it, or by the effects of its absence. It is by Schott termed the apagogic argument or demonstration, which proves a thing by showing the impossibility of the contrary. It is in such cases a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*. We may in this way prove that a knowledge of the Scriptures is very beneficial by showing the effects of our being ignorant of them. Thus Massillon, while preaching to ecclesiastics on the necessity of setting a good example, dwells chiefly on the results of their being bad examples. So we might show that if man can save himself, the death of Christ is not to be justified or accounted for. This negative way of reasoning is very popular, but it is better occasionally to pursue the opposite course; *e. g.*, to show the advantages and blessings of a proper observance of the Christian Sabbath, rather than to show the evils of Sabbath breaking; and so it is better to preach upon Christian beneficence rather than upon covetousness. Thus Bourdaloue, in his sermon on the Last Judgment, instead of dwelling on the wrath of the Judge and the terror of sinners (as he might Scripturally have done), adopted the equally Scriptural and, to "a gospel hardened" audience, the equally effective course, of proving that in the Last Day, God will do justice to himself and to his chosen. Saurin reasons from Ablation in his sermon on the Judgment (text Heb. ix. 27), where his first argument for a general and final trial is drawn from the present disorders of human society. (See Walker's sermon on the

Desire of Pleasing God, Pt. ii., 1 Thes. ii. 4; Richard Watson's sermon, Promises obtained through Faith, Heb. xi. 33.)

V. The argument *Reductio ad absurdum* or *per impossibile* is one by which the truth of a proposition is proved by showing the absurdity or impossibility of the contrary, or the proposition of an adversary is in like manner shown to be absurd or impossible. When the argument provokes laughter it is sometimes termed argument *a cachinnatione*. Vinet has classified the various methods of reducing a proposition to an absurdity. This may be done (1) by stripping it of verbal disguises; (2) by showing the principle it involves; (3) by exhibiting its consequences (Isa. x. 15; xxix. 16; xl. 12–26; xliv. 6–20; xlvi. 1–7; lv. 2; Jer. x. 3–5; xxii. 15; Malachi i. 8. See Bourdaloue's sermon on the Resurrection of our Lord, Pt. i., 3d subdivision; also two examples in the sermons of Tillotson, "Will chance fit means to ends, and that in ten thousand instances and not fail in one," etc., 1st sermon, vol. i.; "Suppose I came a Stranger into England," etc., 21st sermon; Bishop Sherlock, sermon on Acts ii. 22; South's sermon on Covetousness, Pt. ii., text Luke xii. 15; Saurin on the Vanity of attempting to oppose God, Prov. xxi. 30).

"If prayer did not actually operate as means of procuring divine favours, then it would be as proper to pray for divine blessings *after* as *before*," etc. (Dr. Emmons's sermon on the Design and Influence of Prayer, text Gen. xxxii. 28; Daniel Baker, sermon on Vain Excuses, third excuse, text Luke xiv. 18.)

VI. The argument *ex consequentibus* is that by which we prove a principle or conclusion to be erroneous, absurd, or injurious, by showing its logical or moral consequences. It not unfrequently takes the form of a *reductio ad absurdum* (Bishop Sherlock's sermon on John xx. 30, 31; also his sermon on Matt. xiii. 29; Robert Hall's sermon on Modern Infidelity).

VII. *Argumentum ad verecundiam* is one by which we bring forward as proof the opinions of wise or good men. Locke does not set the highest estimate on this argument, for the reason that a man may from modesty or out of respect or the fear of being accused of impudence, or any other consideration except that of conviction, refuse to stand out against approved authorities. But it should be considered that this argument derives its value from the nature and amount of authorities on which it is founded, and from the character, talents, and attainments of our opponents. That preacher, however, would be unfaithful to his trust who should not himself entertain, and should not teach others to entertain, a profound reverence for the divine authority. Errorists pursue a different course.

They endeavour to exaggerate the talents and acquirements of their leaders, and then demand for them a homage as profound as the images they have set up are tall. Saurin, in his sermon on the Enemies and Arms of Christianity, text Eph. vi. 11–13, answers those "objections against the truth which derive their force from the superiority of the genius who proposes them."

VIII. Argument *ad ignorantiam* is one by which we ask an adversary either to receive what we bring forward as proof, or himself to find better proof. The same term is applied to any argument drawn from any insufficient medium whatever, and yet the opponent has not the skill necessary to refute or answer it. The latter is often no better than a sophism. The argument has its legitimate uses, particularly in rebuking the presumption, ignorance, and self-conceit of the adversaries of evangelical religion. The argument *ab silentio*, *i. e.*, from the silence of the Scriptures, may also be used for the same purpose (Deut. xxix. 29; Isa. lv. 7–9; Hos. iv. 6–11; vii. 8, 9; Amos vii. 14; Matt. xi. 25–30; John iii. 7, 8; Bourdaloue's sermon on the Christian Religion ii. (1); Saurin's sermon on the Incomprehensibility of the Divine Mercy, text Isa. lv. 8, 9; also sermon on the Deep Things of God, text Rom. xi. 33, and on Obscure Faith, John xx. 29; Chillingworth's argument proving that the Bible is easier to understand than the councils of the Church, Relig. Protes., chap. ii.; Dean Young's sermon, Of Nature and Grace, Pt. i.; Butler's Analogy, Pt. i., chap. vii., Pt. ii., chap. vi.; also his 15th sermon upon the Ignorance of Man; John Wesley's sermon on the Imperfections of Human Knowledge, 1 Cor. xiii. 9; Robert Hall's sermon, the Glory of God in Concealing, text Prov. xxv. 2; Richard Watson's sermon on Deut. xxix. 29; Vinet's sermon on the Precautions of Faith, text Col. ii. 8, 9, and the Gospel Comprehended by the Heart, text 1 Cor. ii. 9). Dr. Chalmers (Works, vol. ii., pp. 286, 325) has employed "hypothetical solutions" to show that certain difficulties *might* "be satisfactorily accounted for were our knowledge more extensive and more precise."

IX. The argument *ad hominem* is founded on the known or professed principles or opinions of those with whom we reason, whether those principles or opinions be true or false. In popular language the phrase signifies any address to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of any individual or party (Jer. iii. 1; xxiii. 23–25; Jonah iv. 10, 11; Matt. v. 46, 47; vii. 3, 5; Luke xii. 54–57; xiii. 15, 16; John iii. 12; vii. 22, 23, and often elsewhere; James ii. 14–26). The apostles John and Paul, as Dr. Tait[1]

[1] St. John's Gospel the Model of Controversy; the first of five discourses, entitled *Suggestions*, etc.

has acutely remarked, met errors by recognising the truths which were mixed up with them, and by entering into the feelings which led to those errors (cf. Lücke on John). And accordingly we should remember that for many, as Tholuck says, Shakespeare is a higher authority than Paul, and a single distich of Goethe has more weight than the whole epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. F. W. Robertson too often sought and magnified the germs of truth which he had discovered in false systems of religion. Satan himself has great vigilance, industry, etc.; but no preacher could commend these virtues as exercised by Satan (Vinet's sermon on Natural Faith; Whately's Errors of Romanism).

X. The argument from *reminiscence* is reasoning from the hearer's remembrance of former thoughts or experiences. It is of the nature of the argument *ad hominem*, and the phrase might not improperly be used to designate all arguments founded on any materials that are treasured in the memory of the auditors, whether derived from consciousness, observation, testimony, or even from other arguments. The Scriptures abound in arguments of this kind (Andrew Fuller's sermon on the Remedy for Mental Dejection, Pt. ii., text Psa. xliii. 6).

XI. The argument *ex concessio*, or *e concessis*, is one by which a proposition is proved upon which it was before agreed to yield the original question. The term is also applied to arguments drawn from the concessions and professions of an adversary. It is often confounded with the argument *ad hominem* (Jer. xviii. 1–10; Mal. i. 6; John i. 50, 51; see Bourdaloue's sermon on Adversity and Prosperity, text Matt. viii. 23, 26; John Foster's 4th lecture).

XII. Argument *ad fidem* is founded on things believed, or on our belief in testimony. According to Aristotle (L. i., chap. i., sec. 3), "the means of producing belief can alone come within the sphere of rhetoric;" and accordingly this argument is a reasoning from what we believe in order to remove grounds of doubt. For faith always supposes some reason; for, as St. Augustine says, we could never have been led to believe that which is above our reason if reason itself had not persuaded us that there are things which we do well to believe, though we are unable as yet to comprehend them (Port Royal Logic, Pt. iv., chap. xii.). This argument may sometimes be founded on that interior assent, conviction, or trust which is, according to St. Bernard, "the basis of our reasonings, not their conclusions; not an inference from our investigations, but in itself an absolute certainty."

Do not attempt either to illustrate or to demonstrate all matters

of faith. That old artist went too far who represented Jonah looking out at a window in a side of the whale.

XIII. The argument *in a circle* is one in which the premiss implies the conclusion. It has until lately[1] been regarded as a kind of fallacy—a *petitio principii*, or begging the question; and Aristotle condemns its use, although he sometimes employs it unawares (De Soph. Elenc., chap. xxvii.). In some rare cases an inversion of a proposition has the appearance of being a circular argument without being necessarily so on both sides; *e. g.*, Plutarch (De Pyth. Orac.) says that some in his day denied that the oracles were in good poetry because they came from Apollo, while others denied that Apollo was the author of some oracles because they were composed in bad verse. This reminds him of the story of the painter Pauson, who, having received an order to paint a horse rolling, depicted him galloping. His patron, seeing it, was dissatisfied; whereupon Pauson smilingly turned the picture the other side up, when the horse appeared rolling. So again Segnari (Quaresimale sermon 11th, sec. 6): "You say that God will protect you in death because he is merciful; and I reply that because he is merciful he will not protect you in the hour of death."

The preacher has frequently to beg the question, and when his auditors are believers he will seldom beg it in vain; for they will observe that although he reasons in a circle, yet it is a circle a large segment of which is capped with clouds of mysterious verity (John v. 31–36). To prove from Scripture the inspiration of Scripture is to reason in a circle.

XIV. The argument from *Common Sense* is based on such knowledge as is not produced by experience either external or internal, but on cognitions which have their origin in the thinking principle itself. "The mind," says Sir William Hamilton,[2] "has the power of being the native source of certain necessary or *à priori* cognitions, which cognitions, as they are the conditions, the forms under which our knowledge in general is possible, constitute so many fundamental laws of our intellectual nature. The criterion of *necessity*, or the impossibility not to think so and so, was first declared by Leibnitz. But philosophers do not concur as to what cognitions ought to be classed as necessary or ultimate. (See Dr. M'Cosh's "Intuitions of the Mind.")

The argument from common sense is popularly understood to be any appeal to a plain understanding, or "good sense" applied to

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1 Grote's Aristotle, vol. i, p. 255; Mills's Logic, B. iii., chap. iii., sec. 2.

2 Metaphysics, Lect. xxxviii.

common and familiar things, in opposition to refined reasonings founded on science and theory. It is often mistaken for arguments from antecedent probability, from concurrent testimony, from resemblance. In strictness, however, it is an argument founded on our intuitions, or else on those principles which are *self-evident*—*i. e.*, not to be proved on the one hand nor doubted on the other (Isa. v. 3–6; x. 15; xxviii. 24–28; xxix. 16; xlv. 9; xlix. 15; Ezek. xxxiv. 2–31; Amos iii. 3–8; vi. 12–14; Matt. xvi. 26; Bourdaloue's sermon on the Law of Christ, Matt. xvii. 5, Pt. i.; Tillotson's sermon on the Wisdom of being Religious (near the end); Robert Walker's sermon on Psa. xix. 13; Dwight's Theology, *passim*).

XV. The argument from *Conscience* is that which reasons from or appeals to our sense of moral right and wrong. Here those arguments are the most weighty which are drawn from the consciences of all men, or the universal consent of mankind, and from the consciences of those who are the most intelligent and the most active of Christians. The inspired preachers often appealed to the moral faculty in their hearers (South's sermon, Natural Religion without Revelation Sufficient to render us Inexcusable, text Rom. i. 20; and his sermon on the Fatal Imposture and Force of Words, Isa. v. 20).

There are other terms to designate real or fancied arguments, as the *argumentum ad judicium*, or proofs drawn from the nature of things, or from probability. Locke invented this term to distinguish direct arguments addressed to reason from the arguments *ad verecundiam*, *ad ignorantiam*, and *ad hominem*, which may be addressed more or less to the feelings. Some motives for excitation or persuasion, and even fallacies, have passed under the name of argument; *e. g.*, *argumentum ad passiones*, an address to the passions of men; and *argumentum ad populum*, an address to the passions or prejudices of the people.

Never employ a weak argument, remembering that the strength of a chain of reasoning is the strength of its weakest link; such at least is the popular opinion, which ignores the fact that a weak argument can never *really* enfeeble a strong one.

Some writers on homiletics, as Schott, Vinet, and others, treat of what they term indirect or lateral proof or argumentation, *i. e.*, reasoning drawn from some fact or principle outside of the nature of the object itself, apart from causes or effects, experience or authority. Others call proof indirect when it is applied to the refutation of objections. Professor Potter, Francis de Sales, and Francis Borgia[1] employ the term indirect to designate a peculiar

[1] Pastor and People, by the Rev. T. J. Potter (Dublin, 1869), pp. 27–36.

method of answering and converting heretics. 'The preacher seems to be simply engaged in explaining and sustaining some Catholic doctrine, not appearing to suppose that there is any objection which can be brought against that doctrine, thereby leaving the impression on his adversary's mind that nothing is further from the intention of the preacher than such a wish or mode of proceeding. Thus in preaching on the "Real Presence," instead of attempting directly to establish the proposition that "Christ is really and truly present in the Eucharist," he is to conceal his design, and in words full of sweetness and charity, he is to prove, *ostensibly*, that "Christ Jesus has shown an infinite love to man in instituting the adorable sacrament of the altar." By proceeding in this manner the preacher can actually and effectually prove every point of the Catholic doctrine in question; whilst his adversary is thinking that he is wholly taken up in demonstrating the goodness and bounty of Jesus Christ.' This precious precept originated with the degenerate "Society of Jesus," or rather, as their later history compels us to style them, the Society of Judas. It is, observe, of the later Jesuits that we say this. The earlier members of this order did not sin against meridian light; nay, in many instances they even adopted the reformed kind of preaching, and that too so successfully as to regain for a season, and in some countries, the ground that Protestantism had won. It was, as Macaulay says, playing over again the fencing match in Shakespeare: "Laertes wounds Hamlet; then in scuffling they change rapiers, and Hamlet wounds Laertes."

The subject of Refutation is not undeserving of a few suggestions. Determine the meaning and application of the objection to be refuted. Very seldom attempt to answer all objections; but when several important objections are raised they are best refuted, either by stating them one after another, and then showing that they all rest on one or more common principles, which we finally prove to be false; or, what is more oratorical, by answering them one by one in an animated, rapid, and forcible manner. Single objections may be refuted by showing that they owe their apparent weight to some omission, addition, or misapprehension; by denying the principles or conclusions on which they rest; by showing that if admitted, they would prove too much; by opposing high and broad principles to low and narrow maxims; or by first dividing an objection, and then refuting in succession each error or fallacy it contains. The Jesuits recommend a total silence as to objections. Such evasions are Satanic.[1] We may sometimes turn an objection into an argument contradictory of it and the principle on which it is founded.

1 Gen. iii. 1–5.

It is, however, liable to be regarded as a sign of weakness when we appear too ready to turn a defence into an attack. State objections fairly; but remember that some unanswerable objections neither prove nor decide any question. Let obsolete errors alone, and reason against such only as are great, prevalent, and dangerous. Refute in a frank and candid manner, and keep your heart and tongue free from all acrimony and uncharitableness. It may be necessary to refute erring *brethren;* but consider that while in a civil war victory may be lawfully won, it can never be honourably crowned with a triumph. Never raise a devil you cannot lay. To name opposing writers and leaders of sects sometimes has the effect not to pillory but to enthrone them. Avoid as much as possible figurative language in reasoning with unfair and unprincipled errorists.[1]

An uncultivated congregation may comprehend the logic of the heart and the logic of the conscience, but it very rarely comprehends the logic of the intellect. Therefore teach, excite, and exhort such; but unless you are a bold man, do not adventure further. It is only the really intelligent and cultivated that can attentively follow a train of reasoning; but the superficially refined and fashionable far less easily than plain, hard-working people. Remember that in argumentation you should give not only *reasons*, but *illustrations* as well. Most hearers are convinced most effectually by arguments that are informal and mixed with other subject-matter; and we must put forth our reasons in a very meek spirit, or else they will suspect and declare that we would blame or scold them, or would seek some occasion to quarrel with them. In general, therefore, keep in mind the distinction Zeno[2] was in the habit of making between logic and rhetoric: "When he had compressed his fingers and made a fist, he would say that dialectics were like that; but when he opened his fingers and expanded his hand, he would say that eloquence was like his open palm."

Every argumentative sermon should be either interspersed with, or concluded by, suitable "uses." The torch of logic should not only reveal and consume, but should betimes chase and intimidate, guide and encourage.

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1 Among those who excel in Refutation, we may mention Bourdaloue, Massillon, Saurin, Vinet, Tillotson, Sherlock, Paley, Horsley, Andrew Fuller, Emmons, and Chalmers.

2 Cicero's Orator, c. xxxii.; cf. what Thos. Fuller (Holy State, B. ii., c. v.) says of Campion.

CHAPTER III.

OF APPLICATION.

USES were not improperly divided by the old writers on homiletics into two classes: the uses of Information and Refutation, which were called *theoretical*, and the uses of Reproof, Exhortation, and Consolation, which were called *practical*. Under these five heads, which are collected from 2 Tim. iii. 16 and Rom. xv. 4, we may conveniently class applications of every possible name.[1] Though these five uses have been assailed by Schott and others, and have been ignored by all recent writers on sacred oratory, yet a thorough study of the old Latin writers on this part of homiletics, and of the effect of the present neglect of uses, must convince the student that it is worth his while to make himself familiar with their nature and varieties, for much the same reason that he acquaints himself with the Topics of Claude, namely, because they serve to suggest untried and suitable ways of bringing home a text or subject to the hearts of all kinds of hearers.

It was the error not so much of the old homiletical writers as of their disciples, that every sermon should have five applications, and that all these should be systematically reserved for the conclusion of the sermon. It was also a mistake to announce them with formality, especially the use of exhortation. After all, however, their elaborate system of application, and their unconcealed way of making it, renders it all the more instructive to us. Had they not been guilty of some of the errors whereof they have been accused, they would not have been able to bequeath to us so valuable a mass of uses. The English and American divines of the seventeenth century justly regarded the application as "the life and soul of a sermon," and therefore, in spite of a few faults as to form, they have in this respect surpassed all other preachers, ancient and modern. We have not quoted any examples of their uses, because it were better to omit them altogether than to fail to give an accurate and comprehensive view of them—a view which can only be obtained by reading the applications of such preachers as Baxter and Man-

[1] See also Ezek. xxxiv. 4, where the Lord rebukes the careless shepherds who neglect the different modes of tending the flock.

ton, Bates and Flavel, Charnock and Goodwin. The uses of these great preachers ought to be studied for many reasons, especially for their pertinency, originality, and method. The sermons of Bishop Wilkins are remarkable for the variety of the phraseology with which he introduces the parts of his applications.

These and other illustrious preachers of those times ever kept in mind the declaration that "all Scripture is profitable." Their philosophy was practical, which, as Lord Bacon says, soars into the clouds like the hawk, only to return with spoil, while the philosophy of not a few modern preachers is speculative, which the same author compares to the lark, because she mounts into the sky with sprightly song indeed, and circling flight, but descends with nothing for her young.

As every plan of a sermon should be as practical as the end proposed will allow, it is advisable to make as many as possible of the general heads of discourse heads of application. Thus Samuel Davies, in a sermon on Heb. xii. 14, shows *secondly* what means we are to employ to obtain holiness, and *thirdly* urges the use of these means from the consideration of the absolute necessity of holiness. These two heads are "uses."[1]

Section I.—Use of Instruction.

This use is one by which we apply the doctrine of the text or the principal subject of discourse for teaching or confirming some article of the Christian faith. This kind of application will natur-

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[1] Here it may be well for the young writer of sermons to learn to employ discriminatingly the following terms: By a *lesson* is commonly meant a head of application, but is more properly either a use of doctrine, or a use of refutation or of direction. An *observation* or *remark* is a thought suggested by foregoing matter and embodied in a single sentence and its amplifications. It generally follows explanations, but is sometimes mingled with them, and in didactic lectures often serves as a conclusion. An *inference*, or "consectary," as the Puritan preachers occasionally expressed the idea, is a *practical* conclusion drawn from a doctrine or proposition previously maintained. In applications a *deduction* is synonymous with an *inference*. It differs from an observation or remark in not being *suggested by*, but *in arising* out of the subject. An *implication* is something involved in, though not directly expressed by, a text. This term belongs to explication and conviction. A real implication has the same authority as that which is directly and fully expressed. A *reflection* is a use the object whereof is to assist meditation on the subject, or on our experimental or practical relations to it. It is sometimes termed *recollection*. It may, as in Dr. Watts's sermons, take the form of an address to one's own soul by employing the figure "Association." As it is by reasoning that uses are found, the preacher should keep in mind the different kinds of arguments.

ally find a place in many expository and doctrinal discourses. Some of the old Puritan divines included in their idea of this use not only *credenda*, but those *agenda* which are made subjects of articles of faith and the practical bearings of doctrines.

The most important maxim as to this use is: Never make any deductions or draw any inferences that are remote or collateral, but only such as are obviously contained in the text, and such as are necessary to a clear and comprehensive knowledge of the things that are to be believed; *e. g.*, from the text Micah v. 2, we learn, 1, the *eternity* of Christ; 2, we may from his eternity infer his *divinity*. But if we were to be content, first and solely, to deduce from the text this last application, we would depart from this maxim. Charnock furnishes good examples of this kind of application. Though the Scriptures never introduce this use in a formal manner, yet the substance of it is found in passages not a few: Ezek., chaps. i., iii., x., xi., xvii., xx., xxxiii.; Matt. v. 17; vi. 1–24; John iii. 1–21; Heb. x. 35; xi. In this application, as well as in every other part of a sermon, eschew all one-sided views, for to these Satan and all his ministers and synagogues are confined.

In this use be not greatly afraid of iteration. He who knows not how to repeat knows not how to teach.

Section II.—Use of Confutation.

By this kind of application we either correct erroneous opinions or refute such as are totally false. In general this use is employed for the direct removal of every sort of delusion and prejudice. Scripture examples of this may be found in Ezek. xii. 21–28; chap. xviii.; and xxxiii. 17–20; Matt. v. 17–48; xii. 25–30; Acts xvii. 29–31. Our Lord not unfrequently began his addresses with refutation, and so prepared the way for teaching the principles of his religion, *e. g.*, Matt. xv. 1–14; xxii. 23–32; and chap. xxiii.; Luke vi. 7–9; xi. 37–44. Let the pastor herein imitate the Good Shepherd, who watched his sheep by night in order that he might feed them on the following day.

But shun as a pestilence the example of those spoilt children of the Church who admire much but believe little; who out of one corner of their mouth magnify the virtues of their orthodox ancestors, and out of the other first misrepresent and then ridicule the creed of the same; who accord with the Church while she sings of the strength and beauty of her adorable Jesus, except when she makes melody of the words, "His mouth is most sweet; . . . his lips like lilies dropping sweet smelling myrrh." They do indeed,

for the sake of the music, vocalise this part of the canticle; but how can they heartily extol the mouth and lips of "the chiefest among ten thousand" while they either doubt or deny his professions?

Object not that we set too much store by dogmas and creeds. The articles of our belief are the necessary fences of the Church, and as such should always be kept in good repair, and, above all, confined to the boundaries; for though thornbushes make an excellent hedge, yet, alas for the field that is all grown over with thorns. Nor is it necessary to strip the hawthorns of their leaves and honeysuckles. This were to make the gardener an imitator of drouth or winter in exhibiting thorns.

Under the head of Confirmation may be found some suggestions for composing this part of a sermon. Only let it here be kept in memory that when confutation is made a part of an application it should always be brief and animated, and, what is better still, expressed with unusual meekness and gentleness. "I have perceived," says Richard Baxter, "that nothing so much hinders the reception of the truth as urging it upon men with too harsh importunity, and falling too heavily on their errors; for hereby you engage their honour in the business, and they defend their errors as themselves." Hence we should not often attempt to expose the false without exhibiting at the same time the true, as Paul did (1 Cor. ii. 6–16).

On some informal occasions, as on the evenings of lectures, it might sometimes be advisable to spend much time in answering questions and refuting objections. In the more difficult cases the questions and objections might be composed beforehand, and formally stated by members of the audience. But on no occasion, however familiar, take any notice of or repeat errors that are blasphemous or indecent.

We have to make a difference between the doubts of those who are in the main orthodox and the dangerous opinions of those who love to disseminate tares by night. "A shepherd," says the Gulistan, "once asked his father to give him a maxim worthy of his old age:

> "Use gentleness, he said, yet not so much
> That the wolf be emboldened thee to clutch.'"

Section III.—Use of Excitation.

At the outset, we warn the reader against the notion that excitation belongs exclusively to the application, or to a particular part of it. It may often be employed advantageously as introductory to explication, or confirmation, or to the use of information or consolation.

Under this head we may include all those uses which are particularly addressed to the imagination and feelings, without aiming directly to persuade the will. Of this class are those uses which were formerly termed Use of Meditation, of Recollection, of Lamentation, of Commendation, of Congratulation, and of Praise. We find the word *Excitatio* employed by Solomon Van Till[1] to designate that part of exhortation which consists in urging motives to Christian duty. But we concur with Principal Campbell[2] and Professor H. N. Day[3] in the opinion that there is a rhetorical process which is less intended to persuade than to move the feelings, either by creating some new emotion or by awakening one that already has a dormant existence. "In the pathetic," says Dr. Campbell, "properly so called, the rousing of suitable affections is apparently the ultimate end." Whole sermons may be devoted to excitation; *e. g.*, sermons on the Passion, preparatory to the Lord's Supper, such as we find in Krummacher's Suffering Saviour; also panegyrical, and commemorative, and other demonstrative discourses.

The present very important subject may be conveniently considered in its relation, first, to the imagination, and secondly, to the feelings; but it should be kept in mind all along that the Divine Spirit anticipates sometimes the slower operations of the mind by working on the imagination through the feelings, and then again powerfully affecting the heart without addressing the imagination. It has been observed[4] that compound abstract words such as honor, justice, liberty and the like, excite feeling, not by a picture of the thing signified, but by suggesting affecting associations, and that pathos is often produced by displaying the effect of things on the mind of the speaker or the hearts of others, rather than by presenting a clear image of the things themselves.

Now excitation is especially serviceable where the object is to produce a deep *impression* of a subject either before or after conviction. It was for the former object that our Lord adopted his peculiar mode of teaching, particularly in the early part of his ministry and among those who had not witnessed his miracles. Thus in his Sermon on the Mount he aimed to make a salutary impression, leaving it chiefly to his subsequent miracles to convince and

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1 Methodus Concionandi, chap. xi., p. 3.

2 Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence, Lect. xii.

3 Art of Discourse, Pt. iii., chap i.; cf. 2 Pet. iii. 1.

4 Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful, Pt. v., sec. iv., v.

persuade.[1] We must not, however, overlook the fact that, even in those earlier sermons of his, there was great self-evidencing power. But with us excitation will be found of most frequent service at the close of explanations and arguments, when the hearers are ready to confess that a truth has been well illustrated or strongly established, or that a duty has been defined and proved obligatory, and yet they feel no interest in it, have no relish for it, and see nothing desirable in it. At such a stage in a sermon we should endeavour to show that the matter is of great or vital or supreme interest or concern. And when excitation has thus exhibited the excellence and importance of the subject, the work of application is already begun. "It must be always remembered," says Bishop Butler,[2] "that real endeavours to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action."

These words of Bishop Butler were written by him to qualify his celebrated remarks on "passive impressions"—remarks which have, unhappily, been quoted against attempting to excite feelings without at the same time persuading to action. Many zealous men are but too apt to concur with Francis de Sales in saying that he did not find that a sermon was good unless the preacher had for his purpose "the building up of some corner of the walls of Jerusalem." The Port Royalist Nicole subjoins to this rule some strictures which confirm what we have already said on the province of excitation: "Nevertheless it is a fault to have so strict a piety. Christian virtue has a larger extent. . . It is sometimes forgetful of itself in order that it may be raised absolutely to God, to admire him, to praise him, to consider his mysteries in themselves, without any reflection on itself, to contemplate the works of his mercy and justice; to rejoice also in the graces he has bestowed on his saints." Let us not, however, be misunderstood. We decidedly favour persuasion where it is admissible. What we maintain is, that there are entire discourses, or parts of them, which may be properly devoted to such excitation as cannot wisely be followed by exhortation.

The capability of exciting and being excited is not the same in every individual and in all classes and races of men. Those young preachers who are naturally sedate and cool-minded are sometimes advised to avoid all endeavours after skill in this kind of eloquence, while others of the opposite temperament are encouraged to abandon themselves to ecstacies and paroxysms of the better passions. But still it is notable that self-discipline has in many cases remedied these defects and excesses. "Highly valuable are the men," says

[1] Paley's Evidences, Pt. ii., chap. ii. [2] Analogy, Pt. i., chap. v.

Prevost Spalding, of Berlin, "who are able by their eloquence to kindle the soul into a flame without fanning it into a conflagration." Highly-cultivated audiences will not bear much passionate preaching. Nor should we ever forget that the Germans, the English, and the Anglo-Americans are the most effectually moved by such appeals to the imagination and the passions as are drawn from knowledge, reason, and the conscience. There is little of the extravagance of fanaticism in the preaching of Spurgeon, Finney, Edwards, and Wesley. The latter has been justly styled "the quiescence of turbulence;" and the models on which he confessedly formed himself—South, Bates, Howe, Dean Young, and Jeremiah Seed—were none of them fond of excitement, or sensational in style. Hence French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian preachers are dangerous models for those of us who are already sufficiently ardent. Wesley justly opined that the English imitators of the best of the French preachers, Massillon and Bourdaloue, had lost their way. We should also mark it well that Italian writers on homiletics are very liable to misguide us here. Thus Borromeo and Segneri[1] taught their disciples that as the blood circulates in every part of the body, so in every part of a sermon there should be something to excite the feelings.

After all, there are mysteries in the art of excitation which one mortal cannot teach another. In this and other things the Divine Spirit often outwits us. He may cause us to melt the hearts of others while we are lamenting our lack of warmth, and at the very time that we are really cold and shivering servants, we may be kindling a fire for our Master.

Subsection I.—Of the Imagination.

It appears to be true, as Isaac Taylor[2] affirms, that the imagination is no separate faculty, but it is an exercise only of its rudimental power at the impulse or under the guidance of a particular class of emotions or tastes or sensibilities. In the process of excitation, therefore, it may be supposed that the feelings deserve our first attention. Indeed, the imagination of the preacher must, other things being equal, owe much of its excellence and its utility to the state of his moral sensibilities. Herder, for example, is thought to have been deeply indebted for the achievements of his imagination to his deep religiousness. "Herder," says William Humboldt,[3] "was

1 Opere, tome iv., p. 990 (Milan, 1847). 2 The World of Mind, lec. xv., § 533.

3 Hagenbach's Church History, 18th and 19th centuries, and Humboldt's Letters to a Female Friend, vol. i., p. 232.

certainly inferior to Schiller and Goethe in compass of mind and poetical talent, but in him there was a blending of soul and imagination, by means of which he accomplished what both could never have done." This is practically true in many cases, and yet it is, we think, more philosophical and useful to treat of the imagination in the first place, and of the feelings in the second.

In excitation we prevail, not only by warmly appealing to the reasoning faculty, but also by addressing either emotional imagination, or, as some may prefer to say, imaginative emotions. The imagination, which Sir W. Hamilton has safely and happily termed the "Representative Faculty," the kind of imagination with which we are here concerned, does not operate independently of some feeling or passion. The emotions also are here supposed either to be born of or to beget images. But it is necessary to make some distinctions as to the difference recent writers make between Imagination and Fancy.

1. The difference between them is one of feeling. Fancy is playful and amusing, or if ever tender and pathetic, it is so from caprice or accident. Imagination, on the other hand, is excited by and excites passion and strong feeling. It speaks the language of the active powers and invests subjects with a human interest.

2. They commonly differ as to subject-matter. Fancy deals with common and familiar subjects, with small and evanescent objects, with the thoughts which are prompted by humour, vivacity or frivolity; but imagination exercises itself with great and profound subjects, with objects beautiful, sublime, and glorious, with thoughts brought forth and nursed by meditation.

3. Wit and conceits are the offspring of fancy, but not of the imagination.

4. Fancy admits of a rapid succession of incongruous and unrelated images; imagination either dwells on one image or runs along a succession of related and harmonious images. The former is often content with juxtaposition; the latter demands combination.

5. Or fancy sports with the near or remote resemblances of things, while imagination prefers analogies founded on the obvious nature and qualities of things.

6. The former, again, does not modify nor associate its images, but takes them as so many pretty shows passed through a magic lantern. The latter exaggerates and transforms its images, modifies their colours and shapes, and lifts them up to hold communion with shining visitors from heaven.

7. Fancy is too often satisfied to hover over the imperfect, the local and the temporal; imagination is always longing to mount,

with unhooded eye and uncased wing towards the perfect, the immense, and the eternal.

It must be here remarked that not a few writers formerly not only ignored the distinction between imagination and fancy, but supposed that the power which they called by either of these names is influenced, not by passion, but by mere æsthetical emotions at best, and very seldom by any emotions whatever. Thus it is said of Robert Hall that "only a few months before his last illness, in classifying the different natures and respective effects of the eloquence of reason, of passion, and of imagination, he selected his principal illustrations from Demosthenes, and endeavoured to show that where the two former kinds of eloquence existed in due proportion, the third was of very minor consequence." Here imagination is used almost synonymously with fancy. It is fancy dealing with important subjects indeed, but dealing with them dispassionately and coolly. The imagery in the orations of Demosthenes is, it must be admitted, a slender force when viewed separately; but it is never *practically* separated in them from passion, and as a necessary ally of the Demosthenic passion it is of very major consequence. But Hall and many other distinguished men are wrong in making these ethnic orations, fraught as they are with legal and political matter, the standards and tests of the eloquence of Christian sermons, which has much to do with those spiritual and eternal objects which it is the highest province of the imagination to represent.

Some have attempted to make a difference between a rhetorical and a philosophical imagination. The former is, according to De Quincey,[1] "most excited by mere seeming resemblances, and such as can only sustain themselves under a single phasis, while the latter rests on real analogies." True as it is that rhetoric is often satisfied with a single point of resemblance, yet it is a very faulty rhetorical imagination which is most excited by *mere seeming resemblances*. He appears here to have had in mind Jeremy Taylor, whom he so much admires; but he ought to have recollected, for he could scarcely have been ignorant, that it is the use of these "mere seeming resemblances" that so often enfeebles the imagination and lowers the eloquence of Taylor. An example of this blemish we find in an admired passage where he compares the declensions and apostacies of old age to the canes of the Nile, which multiply their knots and joints most rapidly at the end. It would be easy to make conundrums of this and many other such similies of

1 Essay on Rhetoric.

this great preacher; we say great, for in spite of this weakness Jeremy Taylor has left us very many illustrations of the way in which the imagination may be productive of a manly and effective eloquence.

Many exceptions may be taken to these as to all other *general* distinctions.[1] Our aim has been to be as discriminating as will serve the practical purpose of this work. It is a fact, however, that few men possess either of these faculties to the exclusion of the other, and that, in works of genius, it is not always easy to fix on the point where fancy ends and imagination begins. Whoever wishes to observe how they may act, either in sympathy or rivalship, will do well to read the sermons of Ephraem Syrus, Jeremy Taylor, Cardinal Wiseman, and Spurgeon.

A good deal has been, and promises to be, written on the difference between prose and poetry, and it may be reasonably expected that we will not pass the subject in silence. The whole matter may be dispatched in few words. Poetry is distinguished from prose by verse, and by verse alone. "Fitness," says Leigh Hunt, "fitness and unfitness for *song* or metrical excitement just make all the difference between a poetical and a prosaical subject; and the reason why verse is necessary to the form of poetry is, that the perfection of poetical spirit demands it; that the circle of enthusiasm, beauty, and power is incomplete without it. I do not mean to say that a poet can never show himself a poet in prose; but that, being one, his desire and necessity will be to write in verse; and that if he were unable to do so, he would not, and could not, deserve his title."[2]

The hazy confusion which has been produced by writers not a few in respect of Hebrew poetry may likewise be dissipated without many words. The Bible itself has indicated clearly enough its own lyrics; and if future writers on this fruitful theme will enter upon, and keep within, the field which the Creator Spirit has himself fenced off, they will be most likely to produce treatises of real and permanent value. There can be no practical question among those who have no philosophical theory to maintain as to

[1] Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets, by Henry Nelson Coleridge, Esq., pp. 9–15; Wordsworth's Preface of his Poems; Imagination and Fancy, by Leigh Hunt; Art. in the Edinburgh Review for April, 1842, on Moore's Poetical Works.

[2] Various futile attempts have been made, particularly by French and German critics, to prove from Aristotle's Poetic (chaps. i. and ii.), that a composition not in metre may be a poem. It will here suffice to warn the young student against the ingenious dogmatism of Hermann and Ritter. Usage has settled this question, and from usage there can be no appeal.

the poetry of Solomon's Song, of the Book of Psalms, and of the few odes which we find in the prophetic and historic compositions of Scripture.

There is no feature of the inspired eloquence more clearly and prominently marked than that of deep-souled imagination. To do justice to this feature by quoting examples is out of the question. The student finds it every where in Scripture, and he must read and study all, if he would gain any tolerable ideas of its nature and its pervasiveness. He must give his days and his nights to an employment which, next to prayer and almsgiving, is of all others the most profitable to the soul; and when sleep surprises him he should, to adopt the beautiful image of St. Jerome, be found still holding fast the sacred volume, and its holy pages should receive his weary head.

Excitation in its relation to the imagination has been psychologically treated by Professor Spalding.[1] The process whose laws he lays down is the generation though language of such images as excite emotions tending towards desire or aversion. These laws are of three kinds: *First*, the Laws of Personal Relation or Adaptation. In the attempt to excite imagination and emotion the communicator and the recepient stand on different ground and in different positions. Accordingly the speaker must have not only imaginative and emotive susceptibility, but also power and skill of language enough for its due expression. To excite others to feeling we must not only form and represent images intellectually, but show that these images have excited in our own minds the emotions we desire to transfuse into the minds of others. *Secondly*, the formal doctrine of emotive imagery. Under this head he discusses the laws of direct and indirect representation. His speculations here as to tropes and figures are neither sound nor useful. *Thirdly*, Laws of matter or choice of circumstances tending to excite volition.

It may here be well to examine this question: What is the position of the imagination in its relations to the other intellectual powers on the one hand, and the passions and moral sentiments on the other? The answer is one of practical importance. Psychology teaches us that the imagination is intermediate between the other intellectual powers and all the emotional faculties, or, more strictly speaking, it forms that part of the intellect which, like a gallery of art, adjoins and opens into the entire department of the emotions from the lowest animal feeling up to conscience, reverence, and benevolence. This figure might be amplified. But let it suffice us here to remark that agreeably to this view the proper course for

[1] Encyclo. Britan., Art. *Rhetoric*, vol. xix, *8th ed.* with additions, 1859.

the orator to take is to excite the emotions of the hearers by means of images, and not to attempt to execute any images in the mind of the hearer by means of his emotions. For while some of the passions and sentiments appear to have the power to execute images in the mind independently of volition and the judgment, yet it should be considered that as the orator is necessitated to address the mind of the hearer in accordance with its common and normal operations, he cannot count upon this reflex art which the hearer may indeed practise upon his own imagination, but which the orator cannot reasonably expect to practise upon it except incidentally and casually, and therefore with no uniform results.

Here we may also bring forward for consideration the relations of the imagination and the elaborative faculty. It is obvious that they may and not unfrequently do act almost if not quite independently of each other, and that by turns each may be and often is absolute master of the other. Nor is it less evident that either of these mental states may be hurtful or beneficial according to the subject and aim of the orator, the character of his audience, the occasion, and other such circumstances.

The judgments of taste, or, as they are now generally called, æsthetical judgments, arise from the joint action of the imagination and the elaborative faculty. It has been always regarded a sound rhetorical maxim that while a discourse should not offend against the laws of æsthetics, it must nevertheless come short of its proper effect just in proportion as it is deservedly or undeservedly the subject on which the audience occupy themselves in pronouncing æsthetical judgments.

Nor will it here be amiss to add that modern speakers and hearers possess imaginations of a more contemplative kind than were known among the ancient Greeks and Romans. And this remark holds good not only as to oratory but as to poetry also; for, as some critic or other says, it is a marked "distinction between the very early poetry and that of modern days, that in the former the creative faculty appears generally pure and naked, and absolutely unconnected with the reflective. In all modern poets, and most, perhaps, in the greatest of all—Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton—thought seems to struggle with imagination for the mastery, and the one and the other produce their effects in such rapid succession and so interchangeably that nothing can be more difficult than to assign their respective provinces." The cause of this modern subordination of the imagination to reason may, we think, be traced to the influence of the imaginative parts of the sacred Scriptures, where, more than anywhere else, we behold this subordination in

its proper degree and its legitimate fruits. Examples of this are also found in some of the sermons of Jeremy Taylor and Thomas Chalmers. Here the imagination, like the carrier pigeon, only soars that she may catch a far-off glimpse of that truth which is the point of her destination.

The imagination has, however, not unfrequently been perverted even by the most intellectual preachers, and still oftener misinterpreted and disparaged by the most intelligent of their hearers. These things have served to create strong popular prejudices against what are termed "fanciful," or "imaginative," or "poetical" preachers—prejudices which are industriously fortified by the sneers of those preachers who are themselves both destitute of the faculty and blissfully ignorant of its nature and province. Let us then briefly review some of the real and more common abuses of this faculty:

The pursuit of the ideal for the pleasure it affords is one of the first errors into which the young preacher is liable to be allured. Hence the frequent quotation of such poetry as either has but a remote connection with the matter in hand, or is wanting in that clearness or energy or practical aim which is proper to Christian oratory.[1] Hence a tendency to describe heaven, hell, Christian experience, and sin poetically, *i. e.*, after the manner of the pastoral, epic, and dramatic poets. Not that the spirit and letter of these are always to be excluded from sermons; it is against the habit and not the single act that we are now levelling our censures. But lyric poetry, both inspired and uninspired, sacred and secular, may be safely and largely employed. This distinction is justified by the example of the prophetic orators and is one of the most important that they furnish us.

It may, by the way, deserve mention, that it is wrong to say that the end of poetry is to please. This is indeed the end of some kinds of ancient poetry. But the plurality of poets, ancient and modern, either professedly, or by implication, made this subordinate to higher and more important ends. The old epic, the dramatic, the amatory, and convivial kinds were for the most part content to be the ministrants and attendants of pleasure. But the ancient lyric, satire, pastoral, and elegy had more elevated purposes. And to the praise of Christianity be it said, that wherever it has had any influence, it has availed to make poets of every description more earnest and practical than were those of ethnic antiquity. We may

1 Aristotle (Rhet., L. iii., chap. iii.) forbids the orator to employ epithets poetically, as tending to frigidity and nonsense.

go further, and maintain with De Quincey,[1] that the term *power* rather than *pleasure* best designates the aim of the epic and tragic poets—a term which this writer thus explains: "Now, if it be asked what is meant by communicating power, I, in my turn, would ask, by what name man would designate the case in which I should be made to feel vividly, and with a vital consciousness, emotions which ordinary life rarely or never supplies occasions for exciting, and which had previously lain unawakened, and hardly within the dawn of consciousness (as myriads of modes of feeling are at this moment in every human mind for want of a poet to organize them)—I say when these inert and sleeping forms *are* organized, when these possibilities *are* actualised, is this conscious and living possession of mine *power*, or what is it?"

But to return to the consideration of the abuse of poetic pleasure, so-called; we should not hide from ourselves the fact that this is not merely a question of rhetoric or taste, but also one of vital consequence, even of salvation sometimes. For it is appalling to reflect how many hearers of highly imaginative sermons take the visions of the imagination for divine manifestations, and its higher transports for Christian affections. "There are such things in our Christian religion," says John Smith,[2] of Cambridge, "when a carnal and unhollowed mind takes the chair and gets the expounding of them, as may seem very delicious to the appetites of men; some doctrines and notions of free grace and justification, the magnificent titles of sons of God and heirs of heaven, ever-flowing streams of joy and pleasure that blessed souls shall swim in to all eternity, a glorious paradise in the world to come, always springing up with sweet-scented and fragrant beauties, a new Jerusalem paved with gold, and bespangled with stars, comprehending in its vast circuit such numberless varieties that a busy curiosity may spend itself about to all eternity. . . True religion is no boiling up of our imaginative powers, nor the glorious heats of passion." It was the opinion of Turretin[3] and Jonathan Edwards that it is only by the imagination that Satan has access to the soul. The latter accordingly remarks: "There is a great difference between these two things, viz., *lively imaginations arising from strong affections, and strong affections arising from lively imaginations.*"[4] This second phase of experience he suspects, *i. e.*, when the affection is *built* on the imagination *as its foundation*, instead of a spiritual illumination

1 Letters to a Young Man, Letter iii.

2 Select Discourses, pp. 370, 371.

3 Theolog. Elench. Loc. vii. 27.

4 On The Religious Affections, Pt. iii., sec. 4; also his Memoirs of Brainerd, chap. ix., sec. 4.

or discovery. Edwards's son-in-law, Brainerd, in his narrative of the work of grace among the Indians, says: "When this work became so universal and prevalent, and gained such general credit and esteem among the Indians, as Satan seemed to have little advantage of working against it in his own proper garb, he then transformed himself 'into an angel of light,' and made some vigorous attempts to introduce turbulent commotions of the passions in the room of genuine convictions of sin, imaginary and fanceful notions of Christ, as appearing to the mental eye in a human shape, and in some particular postures, etc., in the room of spiritual and supernatural discoveries of his divine glory and excellency. I have reason to think that if these things had met with countenance and encouragement, there would have been a very considerable harvest of this kind of converts here."

It may not be improper here to make a difference between these important cautions of Edwards and the doubtful theory of Turretin which is interwoven among them. A more Scriptural and more psychologial view of the matter would, we presume, be something like the following: Satan generally operates on the human mind, first, through the medium of the heart or active powers, and thereby obsesses and manages the ideal forms and combinations of the imagination. This distinction is the more important as there is an imagination of induction or of abstraction which is utterly devoid of passion and feeling, and as the Scriptures represent Satan as puting an evil purpose into the *heart*, and filling it with such purpose.[1]

Another abuse of the imagination in preaching is suggested by the last remark. It is the excessive employment of this faculty upon abstract subjects and subtle resemblances. The imagination as exercised by the schoolmen of the middle ages, by the mathematicians of atheistical France, and by not a few metaphysicians and naturalists of our day, is unfriendly and hostile to all feeling except animal feeling. The same must, we fear, be said of the habitual exercise of this faculty on the mere metaphysical parts of Christian theology, and on questions that naturally arise in the preparation of psychological, experimental, and ethical sermons. The propensity which some men still indulge of allegorising the historic and parabolic Scriptures, is likewise antagonistic to passion and emotion.

We must beware, again, of dwelling too long or too frequently on ideals of moral excellence apart from every-day life, and particularly the life of Immanuel. The consequence will be that we

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[1] John xiii. 2; Acts v. 3; Zech. viii. 17.

shall be in danger of acquiring a malevolent and misanthropic refinement, of all things the most discordant with the patience and composure proper to the preacher. One antidote to this is the exercise of the imagination on material and human rather than on mere abstract and romantic objects.

Nor should we allow ourselves to exercise the *fancy* to any considerable degree in our preaching. Hence wit and humour, which are often suggested by it, are very seldom admissible in sermons.

Do not dwell on gloomy images beyond what the sacred Scriptures warrant and require. Let it not be thought, however, that we may dwell on such images *less* than the Bible does. "The imagination stands most in need of restraint," says James Beattie,[1] "when it runs into one or the other of the opposite extremes of levity and melancholy."

Carefully discriminate between the true and the false grotesque; the true, as Ruskin says,[2] arises from the healthful play of the imagination in times of rest, and from the confusion of this faculty by the presence of truths which it cannot wholly grasp. The false arises from the irregular and accidental contemplation of terrible things, or evil in general.

But except where the true grotesque determines otherwise, our imagination should compose its ideals out of things as they appear to common observation, avoiding for the most part whatever is minute or novel, or is the result of profound scientific inquiry. Beattie makes an important difference between liveliness and correctness of imagination, and remarks that both are equally conspicuous in Homer, but that Spencer and Ariosto are not inferior in the first quality but extremely defective in the second.[3]

The author quoted last also warns us against the danger of an indistinct apprehension, observing that "sometimes, when one's imagination is lively, and regulated, too, by an acquaintance with nature, one may, notwithstanding, contract habits of indolence and irregularity in one's studies, which produce a superficial medley of knowledge."

But good sense will stand the young preacher instead of many cautions on this head. Only let him not too readily adopt this twofold error: that he will act according to it naturally without consulting it, and that it is not capable of growing in strength and activity by regular exercise.

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1 Dissertation on the Imagination, chap. v.

2 Modern Painters, vols. iii. and iv., chap. viii.; Stones of Venice, vol. iii., on the Grotesque Renaissance.

3 See also Ruskin's Mod. Painters, vol. iii., chap. vii., on the Naturalistic Ideal.

Richter, borrowing a metaphor from Plato, says of Herder's imagination, that its guiding or steering feathers were not of a power proportional to the mighty feathers of its pinions. It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the imaginations of the most of hearers are not powerful enough to sail far away or soar very sublimely for many minutes together. Let any one who is not naturally of an imaginative turn of mind read through without intermission some one of the most grand books of Homer or of Milton, and he will feel that the faculty has been overtaxed. Agreeably to this view, Ruskin[1] has said of the imagination that "it is eminently a *weariable* faculty, eminently delicate and incapable of bearing fatigue; so that if we give it too many objects at a time to employ itself upon, or very grand ones for a long time together, it fails under the effort, becomes jaded, exactly as the limbs do by bodily fatigue, and incapable of answering any farther appeal till it has had rest." It would therefore be advisable for some very imaginative preachers to invent all the matter of each sermon at one sitting, otherwise they will enshrine too many images within the space allotted to a single discourse. Those preachers, on the other hand, whose natural turn of mind is didactic or logical will have to guard against the delusion that they can operate on the imagination by concise propositions and general statements. Images are sometimes produced by circumstantiality which frequently demands a copious amplification. We may subjoin the observation that in general those sermons of the prophets are the shortest which are the most imaginative.

Of the abuses of the imagination in preaching we cannot here treat with any fulness. The good sense of the preacher, along with what we here throw out incidentally, will suffice. The history of the French Protestant pulpit affords one or two warnings for us. It was the practice of the earlier preachers to exercise their imaginations in delineating characters, in order to represent more vividly and profitably the vices of the world and the opposite evangelical virtues; but their successors, very unhappily, indulged in delineations for the purpose of displaying a sparkling and biting style. They sought applause for ingenious fancies, a delicate wit, and keen satire.[2] Something of this is visible in Taylor and Donne.

In exposition and discussion, again, we are liable to the danger of soaring too high, or at least of attempting loftier flights than the matter in hand will warrant. Beattie[3] has pointed out some facts

1 Modern Painters, Pt. iv., chap. x, vol. iii.

2 P. Roques, in his Pasteur Evangelique, pp. 355–479.

3 In a letter to Hon. Charles Boyd.

which go to show the incompatibility of the philosophical and poetical genius. He thinks, if we remember rightly, that even good Milton nods when he allows his characters to debate in blank verse. But still we should remember that herein the imagination which flies not *high* may nevertheless fly *far*, just as the empty down will soar much higher than that which is ballasted with a precious seed which it is commissioned to plant in a very distant field.

The uses of the imagination are, perhaps, not to be numbered; at least by any man of this generation. The future will undoubtedly reveal some functions of this faculty that are as yet hidden from metaphysicians, and many of the most excellent of its uses will, we presume, remain to be studied and admired through ages everlasting. We may nevertheless glance at a few of such as are obviously related to sacred oratory.

For one thing, it brings the distant near, and summons the realities of the past and of the future into the living and visible present. Apostrophe, vision, personification, and all the forms of hypotyphosis are deeply indebted for their efficiency to the imagination of speaker and hearer. Dugald Stuart has remarked that in dreaming and madness we ascribe to the objects of the imagination a real existence, and that we feel and act as if we believed that the objects of our attention were real. Almost as much may be alleged of the imagination when it is possessed with the images of true eloquence. The services of imagination, as an ally of reason in actualising the distant in time and space, have been justly and forcibly described by Lord Bacon:[1] "If the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true there would be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs. But in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections, reason would become captive and servile if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affection's part, and contract a confederacy between reason and the imagination against the affections. For the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth; the difference is that the affection beholdeth merely the present—reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present, filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that the force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth." Accordant with this view is his excellent definition of the office of rhetoric: "It is,"

[1] The Advancement of Learning.

he says, "to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will."

For another thing, the shapings of the imagination being always more complete and attractive than those of art and literature, it is by the assistance given them by the preacher that they are enabled to allure the hearer forward in the way to moral excellence and perfection. The imagination is ever beckoning on the heart from what is to what shall be, and ought to be, and what must be. It comprehends the absolute beauty and the universal good. It is, therefore, not only the beginner and the finisher of philosophy, but in some sense, also, of theology itself; for it is at once the guide of the discoverer and the perfecter of the thing discovered. And hence, as Aristotle[1] says, "Poetry is more philosophical and deserving of attention than history; for poetry speaks more of universals, but history of particulars." Of the same opinion was Sir Philip Sidney,[2] who declares that it is a commendation peculiar to poetry, and not to history, to exalt virtue and punish vice, to set the mind forward to that which deserves to be called good. . . "As if your journey should lie through a fair vineyard, at the very outset the poet doth give you a cluster of grapes, that, full of that taste, you may long to pass farther." Lord Bacon[3] gave to the world, ten years later, an amplification of Sidney's idea, in the words following: "There is agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical; because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence; because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations; so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind by submitting the shews of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind to the nature of things." The relation of these admirable words to oratory, and particularly to sacred oratory, is so direct that it does not need to be indicated.

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1 Poetic, chap. ix. 2 The Defence of Poesy.

3 The Advancement of Learning.

A further use of the imagination is in making comprehensible the mysterious spiritual and eternal things of divine revelation. The themes and thoughts with which the preacher has to deal often lie beyond the confines of the material and the temporal. They can only be conveyed from his imagination to that of the hearer in such words and figures as the imagination teaches. Here abstractions only make the darkness more visible, and at the same time are liable to inculcate much practical heresy. By depriving of its concrete life many a passage of holy Scripture, it renders them powerless, if not positively death-dealing. Creeds, or confessions of faith, are necessary for fortifying the truths of Scripture over against the assaults of their correlate errors, and catechisms are important aids in Christian instruction. Still we should in our preaching most vigilantly guard ourselves against the habit of reducing all the undisputed parts of holy Scripture to theological principles and the dry and compressed statements of abstract science—a habit we are almost certain to contract unless we keep the imagination not only in daily exercise but in continual sympathy with those of the inspired speakers and writers. A strain of preaching that is dryly didactic, like that of Paley and Whately, or coldly logical, like that of Isaac Barrow and Joseph Butler, may in some sense indeed convey religious knowledge and defend sound doctrines, but it ought to be seriously considered whether it does not imprint and engrave on the minds of common and habitual hearers the most erroneous and the most dangerous ideas and views of divine things. A purely imaginative strain of preaching, on the other hand, would undoubtedly do great injustice to the teachings of divine revelation, and mislead the hearers into harmful opinions. But the latter could not in any case be of so evil a tendency as the former. The comparatively bad influence of these two classes of preachers may be illustrated by that of the old pagan poets and philosophers: the poets inculcated a great deal of superstition, but, as Sir Philip Sidney maintains, "they did much better than the philosophers, who, shaking off superstition, brought in atheism."

For the rest, we may say that our enumeration of these advantages would be incomplete were we to omit to add that this faculty acts the principal part in rhetorical invention. The foregoing hints render this very evident. James Beattie, the poet and philosopher whom we have already quoted more than once, regarded this faculty as discharging an important office in arrangement. "By imagination," says he, "we *invent;* that is, produce arrangements of ideas and objects that were never so arranged before." He might have said, moreover, that imagination is a pathfinder and explorer.

It assists not only the poet but the rhetorical inventor, by suggesting hypotheses, by asking sagacious questions, by proposing different solutions of moral problems, and by piecing out and symmetrising the fragments of known ideas and principles. It may seem to us that now intuition and now deduction is foremost on the track of discovery; but if we look far ahead we espy imagination going forward a great distance in advance of all the rest. Sir David Brewster compared the offices of this power to light troops who are sent out to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy.

Why the imagination is not allowed the same liberty in the pulpit that it enjoys and exercises everywhere else, we need not go out of our way to answer. Deplorable it is to observe how such poets as Hildebert of Tours, Edward Young, Jr., Ralph Erskine, and John Keble have refused to permit their sermons to answer their genius. Of all flames, that of the imagination should be the last to be allowed to sink down and expire in treating and applying the beautiful, glorious, and infinite themes of the religion of Christ. Jeremy Taylor, John Bunyan, Samuel Rutherford, and Reginald Heber have demonstrated by their example that the plain homage of the shepherds of Bethlehem was not more sincere nor more acceptable than the gold, frankincense, and myrrh of the wise men whom a star had guided from the East. Nay, to those very shepherds also nothing is so captivating as the sight of the Magi following the new star and depositing their rich tribute at the feet of the infant King of the Jews. To suppose that the sermons of preachers truly imaginative cannot be acceptable to the common people is to ignore the whole history of homiletics and of poetry. "The creed of poetry," says Bishop Reginald Heber[1] "is the creed of the vulgar. The lofty strains of Pindar resounded through the streets of Elis and Corinth, and amid the promiscuous and crowded solemnities of republican festivals. Menander was the darling of the Athenian stage; and the hymn which placed Harmodius in the green and flowery island of the blessed was chaunted by the potter at the wheel and enlivened the labours of the Piræan mariner." By what orders of people are Christian hymns most frequently and most devoutly sung in their families and their places of daily occupation? Not certainly by those who are distinguished for their intellectual cultivation. These, like the Athenians of old, show a very decided preference for philosophical discussions. No; it is among people of middle and low degree, where the intellect has not yet reached its youthful prime, that we oftenest find the

1 Bampton Lectures, A. D. 1815, p. 410.

imagination in the strength and skill of maturity. True, in a few exceptional cases, intellectual discipline, perfected by means of text-books written in the style so necessary in handling scientific subjects (the dry style of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas) has, so far from using up the faculty, rather served to invigorate and every way improve it; but these cases are so scattered that no university preacher who sought "the greatest good of the greatest number" would venture to adapt his sermons to their taste and capacity. He would as soon undertake to peddle jewelry at the door of a Friends' meeting-house.

Subsection II.—Of the Feelings.

Under the term Feeling we comprehend all the active powers of the mind; both the *pathos* or passions, and the *ethos* or moral sentiments of the old classic rhetoricians and moralists; also in their best Scriptural sense and Christian exercise, wonder and reverence, love and hatred, esteem and contempt, hope and fear, joy and sorrow. We give this subject the second place because in the process of rhetorical excitation (not that of ministerial inspiration) we suppose that feeling commonly originates in, or else is intensified by, an intellectual image. The real finality of the matter appears to be that, according to the rhetorical method, no feeling reaches its highest degree until it comes in contact with the imagination, when it is changed by a natural process, not altogether unlike that by which vapour is converted into rain, as Dante describes it:

> "Well knowest thou how in the air is gathered
> That tumid vapor, which to water turns
> Soon as it rises where the cold doth grasp it."
>
> —*Longfellow.*

Whoever would excel in excitation should not despise the following precepts, many of which, though not original in substance, are of such high value that they deserve to be a hundred times repeated:

First acquire a knowledge of the human heart. Aristotle occupies about one-half of his treatise on rhetoric with an examination of the nature and uses of the passions: what he says on this subject may be read with the more advantage because it is rather practical than metaphysical. Not that we would have the young preacher undervalue a metaphysical knowledge of the passions; this is now almost indispensable. But it should by all means be coupled with much practical information of this kind, otherwise it may prove a

hindrance to rhetorical success. A thorough acquaintance with Biblical psychology will be of considerable service, while the study of holy Scripture as a history of the human passions will be still more valuable. We may also read with no small profit Dr. Watts's[1] treatise on the Passions, and his discourses on the Love of God and the Use and Abuse of the Passions in Religion. It is one of their excellences that they are pervaded with such Biblical views of the subject as are equally correct, clear, and profound. This Scripture knowledge of the human heart will be our most trustworthy guide through the labyrinths of our own hearts and those of our hearers.

We should also learn the language which the different passions use in different states and circumstances. For this purpose the Bible is more serviceable than all other known books collectively. The Spectator (No. 405) shows how much the English language is indebted to the Hebrew for its pathetic phrases.

We shall hence learn by what means the passions are awakened, and what various rhetorical purposes they subserve. "All passions," says Dr. Campbell,[2] "do not produce the same effect. Some are naturally inert and torpid; they deject the mind and indispose it for enterprise. Of this kind are sorrow, fear, shame, and humility. Others, on the contrary, elevate the soul and stimulate to action. Such are hope, patriotism, ambition, emulation, anger. These, with the greatest facility, are made to concur with arguments exciting to resolution and activity; and are, consequently, the fittest for producing what, for want of a better term, I shall henceforth denominate the *vehement*. There is, besides, an intermediate kind of passions, which do not congenially and directly restrain us from acting, or incite us to act; but by the art of the speaker can, in an oblique manner, be made conducive to either. Such are joy, love, esteem, compassion. Nevertheless, all these kinds may find a place in suasory discourses, or such as are intended to operate on the will. The first is properest for dissuading; the second, as hath been already hinted, for persuading; the third is equally accommodated to both." Others, as Ostervald, distinguish the *strong* emotions from the *mild;* the former being soon awakened and soon allayed, as pity: the latter being raised by slow degrees, and constant in their exercise, more lasting in their effect, as love and penitence. They also treat of what they denominate the *slow* passions, or such as are more con-

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[1] Works in 9 vols. (Leeds, 1812), vol. ii., pp. 443–614. Also Provost J. J. Spalding, of Berlin, on the Value of the Feelings in Religion.

[2] Rhet., B. i., chap. i.

cealed and silently influential, or such as dwell in the heart longer than others, as avarice and revenge. Theremin,[1] again, makes a distinction between passion and affection. Passion, according to this writer, is that passive and transient movement which is excited in the mind by an external object or the representation of it. This condition of soul supposes the inactivity of reason and the higher spiritual powers. Affection is that active and constant excitement of the mind which owes its origin to an idea—an idea which has become a living consciousness, has appropriated to itself all the powers of the soul, and set them in motion in one direction. It supposes the highest activity of reason, which is the parent of ideas. Affection does not, like passion, divide the mind into two contending parties, but unites all its powers in harmony with reason and the moral sentiments. The warmth of passion is obscure like a dimly burning fire; affection, on the contrary, is to be compared to the sun light which brings with it less warmth than clearness. Theremin, as he himself acknowledges, here uses the term affection (affekt) in a peculiar sense, and he might have added that he also employs the term passion in its lower and narrower import. It must nevertheless be conceded that this psychological distinction of his is very important. He sets rather too high an estimate, indeed, on Demosthenes as an example of affection, and yet to his praise be it said, he considers our Divine Master as without any fellow in this regard: "Every one who has ever come before the people filled with a great idea, has spoken with affection; but with the greatest affection, by far, He who gave utterance to the greatest ideas, namely, Christ. This Light of the World reveals eternal truth with an abiding inspiration, which is at one time mild and gentle, at another with thunder and crash; a great example for every sacred orator, and one that warrants him in dispensing with all so-called philosophical calmness, and lays him under obligation to speak with similar affection."

We must not here omit to mention what the French denominate *onction* (unction). The idea which this word expresses appears to have been originally derived from 1 John ii. 20. St. Bernard and other early French writers kept it mainly within Scripture limits. But the term which was at first employed in the sense of that illuminating grace which it is the honour and privilege of all true believers to receive, came at length to signify gravity and warmth of manner in the preacher, flowing from a heartfelt sense of the importance of his theme and an earnest desire that it may make a deep impression on the hearts of his hearers. Maury

[1] Eloquence a Virtue, Book ii., Dr. Shedd's trans.

calls it Christian pathos; but Vinet says that "it is from its opposite that we obtain a distinct notion of it. . . There are things incompatible with unction, such as wit, an analysis too strict, a tone too dictatorial, logic too formal, irony, the use of language too secular or too abstract, a form too literary; finally, a style too compact and too hard; for unction supposes abundance, overflow, fluidity, pliableness." It is remarkable that the Scriptural unction is of most service in exposition, and the French *onction* in excitation, exhortation, and consolation.

The removal of such emotions as are not conducive to the purpose of our discourse will often be necessary to the awakening of such as are favorable to that purpose. The methods of doing this, as stated by Spalding, are three: *First*, The allaying of the emotion may be attempted by the representation of the object in an aspect which does not tend to excite the unfavourable emotion, and the contemplation of which, therefore, is inconsistent with the continued intensity of the emotion. *Secondly*, The diversion of the emotion may be attempted by the representation of some other object, which tends to excite the unfavorable emotion, and on which, therefore, it may be expended harmlessly. *Thirdly*, By the extinguishing of the emotion. This may be attempted by the representation of the object in such an aspect as tends to excite some other emotion irreconcilable with the emotion which is to be removed.

"Consider carefully," says Dr. Blair, "whether the subject admit the pathetic and render it proper; for it is evident that there are subjects which admit not the pathetic at all."

The same author bids us "avoid interweaving anything of a foreign nature with the pathetic part of a discourse, and beware of all digressions which may interrupt or turn aside the natural course of the passion when once it begins to rise and swell."

Remember that deep feeling cannot pervade every part of a sermon, and that the attempt to express it throughout the discourse must, of necessity, be unnatural, affected, and insincere. He who would be always pathetic is never pathetic. "Young students in divinity," says Ostervald, "are apt to indulge this fault—the desire of always raising some great emotions."

It should also be remembered that the feelings are not under the direct control of volition, and therefore if we would move the hearers we must do something more than prove to them that it is right or reasonable to be moved. To every propensity, feeling, or sentiment the Creator has adapted a corresponding object, which it is the business of the speaker to represent to the mind as the subject or occasion requires.

Let it not be hence inferred, however, that we are never to *show* that it is *right, reasonable, proper,* or *good* to exercise and cherish particular feelings or sentiments. "If," says Dr. Blair, "we expect any emotion which we raise to have a lasting effect, we must be careful to bring over to our side, in the first place, the understanding and judgment. The hearers must be convinced that there are good and sufficient grounds for entering with warmth into the cause. They must be able to justify to themselves the passion which they feel, and remain satisfied that they are not carried away by a mere delusion." (See also Campbell's Rhet., B. i., chap. vii., sec. 4.)

This suggests and in part answers the question, To what part of a sermon does the pathetic properly belong? When the above-mentioned reasonings are introduced, very evidently after and not before them is the place for the pathetic. Beyond this no general rule can in all cases hold good.

For the timing and placing of the pathetic, and indeed of all kinds of affections, we know no better practice than that which Cotton Mather[1] recommended: "Do you lay one sentence and then another, and so a third of your Bible before you. . . Be not at rest until you find your heart-strings quaver at the touch upon the heart of the writer, as being brought into unison with it, and the two souls go up in a flame together."

A very moderate amount of good sense dictates that we should never give warning that we are about to be pathetic. But it has been universally overlooked that here we should make a distinction between what is meant as an exhortation to duty, or any other part of the application, and what is intended as a mere address or appeal to certain feelings. The latter should never be set apart as a formal head, nor announced as such. But the former may, and indeed often must be, announced. The very text frequently notifies the hearers of our purpose to preach a hortatory or practical discourse. In judicial and deliberative addresses the case is otherwise. Here deep feeling is generally deemed unfavourable to the impartial decision of the question at issue. But as to all matters of moral and spiritual concernment, the majority of hearers are ready to confess to their own consciences and to their friends, that their feelings come painfully short of the just demands of the subjects offered to their consideration. And it is notorious that almost all those hearers who are seeking repentance and Christian maturity resort to those sermons that consist in great part of applications and avowed appeals to the moral sentiments; and that

[1] Manuductio, Lect. xiv.

preachers who have even *studied* to be pathetic have, with few exceptions, been not merely the most popular, but, to the mass of the impenitent, the most useful also. But still we should remember that it is never advisable to say, "I am about to describe an affecting scene," or to herald the pathetic in the language of Shakespeare, "If ye have tears, prepare to shed them now." John Foster, in the partition of his 53d lecture, prudently omits every intimation of his purpose to appeal to the heart and conscience.

And yet the best orators are not without an unaffected tearfulness. Herein Demosthenes was feared by his adversaries: Dinarchus and Æschines warn the judges not to allow themselves to be unduly moved by his tears and wailings. In general tears are of two kinds; the first may be compared to the rain or the dew, which soon ceases to fall, and evaporates soon; the second to those fountain-waters which, though they may frequently abate, or for a season even disappear, are certain to return and flow as abundantly as before. But it is to be remarked that of these two sorts there are many varieties. Hence all general remarks concerning tears are apt to mislead us. Few sayings of the old rhetoricians have been so frequently quoted as that of Apollonius Molon of Alabanda: "Nothing dries quicker than a tear"—a saying that was twice borrowed by Cicero, and once with the additional phrase, "especially at the misfortunes of others," *præsertim in alienis malis*.[1] He is here writing about appeals to pity in courts of justice. This maxim, however, is not of universal application to judicial tribunals, much less to persons of deep religious sensibility, like David and Jeremiah, and, above all, the Man of Sorrows.

Yet not a few have been much mistaken as to the moral value of tears. Among the early Syrian monks laughter was the source and indication of all wickedness, sorrow of all virtue.[2] And the monks of the dark ages were very desirous to obtain of God in answer to the intercession of the saints, "the gift of tears" in the Church, so that they might weep at mass or certain solemn vigils.[3] Nor are all modern Protestants disabused of similar notions. One preacher, in a letter of advice to his own brother, holds the following language on this point: "If you cannot make them weep directly, make them laugh, and then make them cry. The distance between a laugh and a cry is very short, and the transition very easy. Smiles and tears go in company as harmoniously and legiti-

1 Cicero, De Partitione, c. xvii.; De Invent., L. i., c. lv.; Rhet. ad Herenn., L. ii, c. xxxi.; Quint., L. vi., c. i., sec. 27.

2 Milman's Hist. of Christianity from the Birth of Christ, etc., B. iii., c. ix.

3 Digby's Mores Catholici, vol. iii, p. 313.

mately as sunshine and showers in spring-time." To play thus with the superficial emotions of an audience, as nurses sometimes amuse themselves with the sensibilities of infants, is, to say the least, unfriendly to the making of any holy, deep, and abiding impression. The laugh that has pioneered for a tear is exceedingly apt to return and claim the path as its own rightful property, and make it toll-free only to the families of levity and frivolity. "There is a style of preaching," says an anonymous writer,[1] "which produces a great many tears but little repentance. 'I am tired,' said an adept in this style, 'I am tired of weeping. I want to see the deep turnings of heart and the substantial fruits of repentance.' Bunyan, in his Holy War, very properly represents Mr. Wet-eyes as an unsuccessful agent in the application to Prince Emanuel for pardon." The tears of godly sorrow and of a Christ-like compassion can only be made to flow by that preaching which is accompanied by the wonder-working grace of God. They are not to be elicited by any human art. Moses may, to be sure, smite the desert rock, but the Almighty alone can rend it and open the earth's central reservoirs and set their waters in motion. Augustine[2] was convinced of this when, after having melted the people of Cæsarea into penitence because of their bloody and unnatural Caterva fights, he thanked God for the grace that had made his sermon effectual; and eight years later the permanency of the reform gave him unmistakable proof that the Lord Jesus had indeed been propitious.

Next to divine grace in the hearers, nothing is so moving as that grace in the speaker. The rule that has been a thousand times repeated is: If you would affect others, be yourself affected. As Chrashaw says, "the wounding is the wounded heart." And yet it is not to be denied, as another poet says, that "false tears true pity move." Nevertheless, here, as in all true eloquence, more depends on the known or reputed character of the speaker. Isocrates[3] was the first of the ethnic rhetors who taught that real goodness was the source of true eloquence. He declared that a true, legitimate, and judicious speech is the image of a good and faithful mind. Aristotle, Quintilian, and others have inculcated a similar opinion. The former teaches that the orator should claim credit not only for integrity but also for good-will towards those whom he would persuade. If, therefore, the preacher has a character for benevolence and humanity, this will greatly assist him in all his ap-

1 Biblical Repository, vol. ii., p. 423 (second series).

2 De Doct. Christ., L. iv., c. xxiv. 3 Nicocles, sen Suasoria Oratia, in Opera.

peals to the feelings of his hearers. But the reputation for acts of charity is not sufficient; he must be really and deeply good: "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth good things." Nor is it enough for us to have a quick and tender sensibility, such as will weep with them that weep; we must have a genuine Christian love pervading our character and life. This last is of priceless value, and lends to sensibility all its persuasiveness. Augustine tells us in a letter to Alypius[1] that while yet a priest he was appointed by his aged bishop to preach against riotous feasting on solemn days. He earnestly besought his hearers by the ignominies and sorrows, by the blood and death of Christ, not to destroy themselves—to pity him who spoke to them with so much affection, and to show some regard for their venerable old bishop, who, out of tenderness to them, had commanded him to instruct them in the truth. "I did not," says he, "make them weep by first weeping over them; but while I preached, their tears anticipated mine. I own that then I could not restrain myself. After we had wept together I began to entertain great hopes of their amendment."

But in order to move the most powerfully, it is not enough to have and exhibit feeling; we must likewise know how to restrain it. Oftener quoted than understood are these words of Horace:

> Si vis me flere dolendum est
> Primum ipsi tibi.

It has been acutely remarked by Vinet,[2] that "Horace does not say *flendum*, but *dolendum est*—"Reserve has great force." In one of his essays he amplifies[3] this thought as follows: "This devout and holy sobriety of expression is not merely a discipline worthy of being reverenced for its motive; it is a wise and wholesome economy. Feeling is exhausted by the expression of feeling. Never without an evident and impracticable miracle can the words of the poet respecting a magic cup be spoken of the soul:

> 'And still the more the vase pour'd forth
> The more it seem'd to hold.'[4]

. . . Reserved men, when that reserve is not the mark of sterility, preserve the strength of their soul just as temperate men preserve their bodily vigour. Nay, their very reserve is usually a pledge and a foundation of mental strength. . . Nothing moves us so deeply as a single word from the heart of one whose words are, from a

[1] Epist. xxix., sec 7. [2] Homiletics, p. 219.

[3] Etudes sur Blaise Pascal, p. 349. [4] Ovid's Metamor., L. v., v. 681, 682.

sense of duty, few." With this agrees the remark of Pliny (we have not his letter at hand), that it is our duty to be affected by sorrow, and yet to oppose its excess.

This reserve is particularly demanded in reproof and commendation. In praising men we are apt to exaggerate what is true and good; in blaming them, to magnify what is false and evil. Now if we look through a microscope at a stain of oil on a piece of jewelry we may fail to discover any blemish; but if we hold it under the naked eye and in a proper light it is clearly seen. The province of rhetoric is not to magnify, but, as the schoolmen defined it, to color speech: "Rhetorica verba colorat."

Of this reserved force Luther was a distinguished example. Richter[1] attributes it to spiritual peace: "Luther, thou art like the Rhine falls! How mightily thou stormest and thunderest along! But as upon its foaming waters the rainbow hovers unmoved, so in thy breast reposes undisturbed the gracious bow of peace with God and man. Thou shakest vehemently the earth, but not the heaven within thee." This quality is valuable even in delivery; here the player may for once teach the preacher: "He uses all gently, for in the very torrent, tempest, and (as I may say) whirlwind of his passion, he must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness." But we must add Shakespeare's caution: "Be not too tame neither."

When we have roused such feelings or passions as naturally impel to practice, we should not rest content until we have secured prompt and efficient action. To be satisfied with anything short of this is to do our hearers a positive injury. As Butler[2] has proved, most of our active principles are strengthened by habitual exercise in real life, and weakened by every excitement that results in nothing beyond wishes and resolutions. This point, though very frequently alluded to and variously applied by subsequent writers, is of vast importance to the preacher. It has been observed of Southey's poetry, as may indeed be said of all good poetry, except lyrical, that it evinces *power* but not *force*. And such, alas! is the character of all pathetic sermons that are destitute of an effectual application in which we desire, expect, and obtain some good results. Now one of the natural enemies of such an application is a tendency to *anabasis*, or the modern *climax*, especially when it is continually mounting towards the sublime. And yet, if this gen-

1 Gesammelte, p. 172.

2 Analogy, Pt. i., c. v., and Stewart's Moral Philosophy. Smith, in his Sketches of Moral Philosophy (p. 401), shows that "some passions are increased by habit, others decreased, and others again increased to a certain point, then decreased."

erally is so, it need never be so; for when the holy prophets ascended in a sublime Anabasis, they were not ashamed immediately to descend in a practical Catabasis. Run with the prophet up to Ramah: "A voice is heard—in Ramah—lamentation and bitter weeping—Rachel weeping for her children—refuses to be comforted for her children—because they are not." Had an orator of the modern kind called your attention to that distant crying, then pointed to the city, and next hurried you away with him thither, and finally brought you into the presence of that wailing mother, bowed down beneath sackcloth, he would have said to you, "This acme of the sublime demands my instant silence." But hear rather, O son of the prophets, and imitate Ezekiel as he stoops to speak these words of balm: "Refrain thy voice from weeping, and thine eyes from tears; for thy work shall be rewarded, saith the Lord; and they shall come again from the land of the enemy. And there is hope in thine end, saith the Lord, that thy children shall come again to their own border."

Much more of the same kind might be adduced from holy Scripture; but the following example from one of Vieyra's sermons[1] will serve to show that the Catabasis of the sacred writers and speakers may be successfully imitated by post-apostolic preachers: "Let us remember that in this church are galleries loftier than those which we see; 'we are made a spectacle to God'—so St. Bernard would render the passage—'and to angels and to men.' Above the tribunes of kings and the tribunes of the angels is the tribune and tribunal of God himself, who hears us and who will judge us. What reckoning can a preacher give to God in the Day of Judgment? The hearer will say, They never told me; but thy preacher? *Væ mihi, quiâ tacui.* Let it be so no more, for the love of God and of ourselves. . . Let heaven see that even on earth it has those who stand on its side. Let hell know that even on earth there are those who make war against it with the Word of God. And let earth itself know that it is still capable of once more growing green and of bearing much fruit."

Thus should the preacher, in his most elevated moments, be like the cherubs of Ezekiel's vision, who, when they sailed above the world, still had eyes in their wings to look down on the wants of its inhabitants, and however high they soared, never left behind them those wheels on which they could timefully descend, and, as ministers of a kind providence, ride along the highways of needy and afflicted mortals. But still, as we said in the outset of this

1 Close of ser., The Seed by the Way-Side.

section, preaching has other important ends than that of persuading to action. It remains only, or rather we have space only to add, that the most active and enterprising Christians are the very ones, of all others, who suffer most from hunger of heart, and hence oftenest pray, with Augustine: "O love, who ever burnest and never consumest! O charity, my God! kindle me. Give me what thou enjoinest and enjoin what thou wilt. . . . O that thou wouldst enter into my heart and inebriate it, that I may forget my ills." Then again there is a class in almost every audience who have long been reforming their lives, but who need such appeals to their hearts as may, with the assistance of grace, lead to godly sorrow—such appeals as this of De Barzia: "Why!" says Jesus to thee, "who filled thee with such rage against me? *What iniquity have your fathers found in me?* (Jer. ii. 5). Of what sin canst thou charge me, that thou ragest so furiously against me? *Many good things have I showed you;* I have displayed abundant charity; I have poured forth many benefits; *for which of these works do ye stone me?* (John x. 32). Art thou enraged against me because I brought thee into existence out of nothing? Art thou vexed because I have watchfully preserved thee? because I have brought thee to a saving faith? Dost thou count it for an injury that I gave up life and honour, blood and all, upon the cross for thee? . . Come now, answer me wherefore art enraged against me? O Jesus, best beloved, cease to inquire. I own that there is no cause; I acknowledge my audacity, and I bewail it. Flow, my tears, flow, and streaming over my cheeks, testify to my sorrow. Break, heart, break, through excess of love. I acknowledge, I own, I see clearly my condition. What have I done! I have returned thee evil for good and hatred for thy good will. Which was it, love or enmity which crucified thee? O Lord, it was love and it was enmity. Thine the love, mine the enmity." But the young English preacher has to remember, while reading such bursts of passion in the sermons of De Barzia, as well as in those of Vieyra, that the former preached to the Spanish and the latter to the Portuguese. If, therefore, he already have a lively sensibility, he may find it prudent to keep at a distance from such hearts of fire. Why did Venerable Bede sometimes preach to rocks? Was it that he might prepare his feelings for the cool immobility of a British audience?

Section IV.—Use of Reproof or Correction.

This application aims, by producing conviction of sin or vice, to lead men to godly and holy living. It should almost always be

subjoined to or interposed between the didactic parts of the sermon; for unless the understanding is convinced the conscience will very seldom be addressed with success. The Scripture examples of this kind of use are very instructive.[1] The English preachers of the seventeenth century sometimes disarmed hostility and melted hard hearts by calling this a "use of lamentation." For giving reproof a pathetic form and spirit they were not without Scripture authority.[2]

Let us now turn in the mind several of those maxims which guide the young preacher in the discharge of a duty so important yet so difficult and dangerous. These conveniently fall into five groups:

I. *The Reprover.* A young man, as yet without a pastoral charge, while preaching for a pastor should abstain from specific and pointed reprehension. His youth will perhaps render his censure repulsive to the mature and aged; or he may reasonably be thought ignorant of the circumstances in which the shortcomings or misdoings he rebukes were committed; or else his procedure may cause the pastor to be suspected of advising another to do what he will not venture to do himself, or what may afterwards be disowned by his superior authority. Again, it may possibly happen that the pastor himself is temporarily aspersed or calumniated by some of his congregation. At such a time he will more wisely testify, instruct, and reason than reprehend. Jeremy Collier's position as a churchman qualified him successfully to rebuke the vices of the English stage. "Let the preacher," says Vinet, "before he censures, feel assured that he has the esteem, the affection, and the confidence of his parish." But still the preacher may be too nice as to such matters. The unmarried Paul taught husbands, wives, and children their respective duties; and Henry Smith, "the silver-tongued," though a young bachelor, yet reproved, and that very successfully, many ladies of rank for following the fashion of refusing to perform the duty of nursing their own children.

In some cases should the reprover be one who is morally distant from the person reproved; otherwise he may be crushed by the fall of the offender, much as Eleazar (1 Mac. vi. 46) was by the elephant which he crept under in order to stab him.

II. *The things to be reproved.* In general the preacher should expose and denounce such faults and vices or sins as his text or

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[1] Isa. iii. 9–26; chaps. v., viii., ix.; xxviii. 1–15; chap. lviii.; Jer., chaps. ii., iii., v.; Ezek. vjii. 15–18; chaps. xiii., xvi., xxii., xxiii.; Matt. xi. 20–24; xxiii. 13–39; Luke vi. 22–26; vii. 31–35; xi. 29–32; Acts iii. 13–17; vii. 52, 53; viii. 20–23; James, chaps. iii., iv.; v. 1–6.

[2] Isa. i. 21–23; Jer. iv. 19–31; viii. 18–22; chaps. ix., xix., xxvii., xxxii.

subject offers for consideration, whether he knows that members of the church or congregation are guilty of them or not, because general warning is often more salutary than particular reproof. And yet some very excellent preachers have continually to defend themselves against a tendency to censoriousness. Any indolent or malicious declaimer may easily win a certain popularity (in any large community where "birds of a feather flock together") by denouncing certain sins and vices, more particularly those to which most of his hearers are never tempted. "Here," as Ostervald advises, "the minister should in the first place ascertain the certainty of a fact. He should never censure upon mere rumor or vague reports. He should avoid being credulous and suspicious. Nothing does a minister more harm than taking fire unseasonably. But as all established facts are not deserving of censure, he ought, in the second place, to consider well the nature of the thing he is concerned with. 1. There are many things too inconsiderable and too trifling to be censured from the pulpit or to be made part of a sermon. 2. There are some private sins which very few persons are acquainted with. These ought to be censured in private; or, if you should do it in public, you should do it with such circumspection as not to let the people know what person you mean. 3. You should never bring into the pulpit things of a private and personal nature. This would be attended with very disagreeable consequences. I mean not, however, that this is totally unserviceable, but that it should not be done except in extraordinary cases; otherwise a minister would be justly accused of acting with passion or imprudence."

It is to be remembered that *heresy* is not only to be refuted but *reproved* (Titus i. 13).

Sometimes the preacher is tempted to neglect the denunciation of a sin from the fear that in so doing he will condemn himself. But let us repel such suggestions as the self-abasing Bunyan[1] did, so that we may adopt his testimony: "I have as Samson bowed myself with all my might to condemn sin wherever I found it. 'Let me die,' thought I, 'with the Philistines rather than deal corruptly with the blessed word of God.'"

III. *What persons are to be reproved?* Our superiors in the ministry we may entreat, but not rebuke (1 Tim. v. 1; Titus ii.; Acts xxiii. 5; Ezek. iii.). But kings and magistrates are not the superiors of the preacher while exercising his ministerial function. As a citizen he is of course their inferior, but we are not now defin-

[1] Grace Abounding, secs. 295, 296.

ing the duties of a citizen. The prophets, including John the Baptist and our Lord, reproved such men as Zedekiah, Herod, Simon the Pharisee, Peter, John, and others. Witness the courage of Ambrose in rebuking the emperor Theodorus,[1] and of Knox in reproving Queen Mary.[2] In this aspect the fifth chapter of Isaiah is very instructive, and so is Zephaniah, who calls the Hebrew judges of his day "evening wolves." In no measured terms does St. James rebuke the rich misers and oppressors of his time; and when, on the other hand, he denounces the men of the middle class who are obsequious to the rich in Christian assemblies, he employs terms scarcely more measured. But let us remember that *we* have not an inspired impulse to reprove, and cannot make a "Thus saith the Lord" our battle cry when we attack individuals. "You should never be too ready," is the wise language of Ostervald, "to censure magistrates and public persons, lest by exposing their faults and irregularities you should give the people occasion to show contempt and disobedience to their authority. . . You should first use private admonitions. If these prove ineffectual, and magistrates are guilty of any gross irregularities, you may then speak of them in public." In some such cases, we may be permitted to add, it is best to ignore the sin and seek only and ever the radical conversion of the sinner; otherwise we may have too frequent occasion, with Juvenal, to ask, "Quid te exempta juvat spinis e pluribus una?"[3]

We should therefore discriminate between different classes of transgressors. Are we not too liable to forget that some are more ignorant of Scripture than others, and that some will not be present to hear our reproofs? Jeremy Collier wisely preferred the press to the pulpit in censuring the vices of the stage poets of his time. There are also different degrees of moral debasement. The prophets deal more severely with their enlightened and privileged countrymen than they do with the ignorant and superstitious Gentiles. Paul accordingly rebukes the Galatians less mildly than he does the Corinthians. He does indeed advise Titus to reprove the Cretans *sharply* for their errors of faith, on account of the insensibility to which their tribal vices had reduced them.

When should we call transgressors and heretics by name? This is a question difficult to answer in few words. Isaiah is moved by the Spirit to prophecy against the unfaithful treasurer, Shebna, by name, and so is Ezekiel against the evil counsellors, Jaazaniah and Pelatiah (Isa. xxii., Ezek. xi. ch.). Paul, in writing to Timothy,

[1] Theodoret, Hist. Eccles., L. v., c. xviii. [2] Life, in "Scottish Worthies."

[3] What does it avail you if one thorn be removed, while the many still remain?

twice makes personal mention of Hymenæus and once of Alexander and Philetus (1 Epist. i. 20; 2 Epist. ii. 17), heretics, if not apostates and blasphemers, all. But it should be considered that these epistles, not having been addressed to a church, did not necessarily give publicity to the names and sins of these men. It was important that the young preacher should, by timely warning, be put on his guard against the eating canker of their errors.

Our Lord reproved some individuals, as Herod and others, personally and directly; and yet it should be remembered that in his public preaching he reproved the Scribes and Pharisees, and the rich *as classes*, and Chorazin, Bethsaida, Capernaum, and Jerusalem as *cities*.

We are to warn and reprove *some*, not with any reasonable hope of their repentance, but for the purpose of alarming others who have begun to walk in the same paths. It has often been thought to be of doubtful authority or expediency to reprove those whom we cannot expect to be the instruments of reforming. What are we to do with them? The incorrigible and the reprobate were denounced as hopeless by the prophets and apostles and by the Lord Jesus, their chief. But preachers fully inspired, be it ever remembered, could herein speak with an authority which was not weakened by the suspicion of personal hatred or prejudice. And yet Ludovicus Cocius[1] admits this use among others, terming it *genus Phobeticum*. As it is of the nature of a curse or commination levelled against the *abandoned*, or those who can be neither persuaded nor dissuaded, it can be employed by us only in very extraordinary cases—not oftener, perhaps, than once or twice in a lifetime. Hence the young preacher may safely excuse himself from the frequent utterance of those denunciations to which his warm blood is but too apt to incite him: *Ne puero gladium*.[2] But though he may very rarely speak *to*, yet he must often speak *of*, the class of those who are judicially blinded in mind and hardened in heart; this he is to do with a view to prevent others from becoming prisoners of despair.[3]

Whoever would learn to handle this use wisely and tenderly, let him read the sermons of Jeremiah and of the Son of God. The former so orders the successive types of the potter, the broken bottle, and the basket of figs as to pass step by step from the mildest to the severest prediction. In all his denunciations "the

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1 Quoted in the Methodologia Homiletica of Sebastianus Gœbelius, p. 72 (ed. Lipsiae, 1678).

2 Do not trust a boy with a sword. 3 Segneri, Quaresimale, Pred. xxix, §5.

weeping prophet" betrays the fact that he 'desires not the woeful day.' Then how often does the Prophet of prophets remind us of Jeremiah, or rather of a shower which, though it is often checked for a moment by flashes of lightning, still ceases not to descend until it has bestowed its entire self upon the thirsty earth.

In transitions to this and other painful subjects, it has a good effect sometimes to say, "I would gladly conclude here," or "would that I could pass over what I am now compelled to add," or other such words.

IV. *In what spirit and manner and by what means are we to reprove?* We cannot be too frequently told that our admonitions should be prompted by Christian affection (Prov. xxvii. 6; 2 Cor. ii. 4; xii. 14–21; 1 Thes. ii. 7–12; 1 Tim. v. 1; 2 Tim. ii. 24–26). The divine love will enable us at once to hate the *sinner* and to compassionate the *man* (Dan. iv. 19–22). "In all reprehensions," says Bishop Wilkins, "we must express rather our *love* than our *anger*, and strive rather to *convince* than to *exasperate;* though, if the matter do require any special indignation, it must be the zeal of a displeased friend rather than the bitterness of a provoked enemy." (See what we elsewhere say of the compassion of the Great Teacher and the other prophets[1] who sometimes quenched the fire caused by their lightning words with the showers of their tears. See how Segneri reproves the ingratitude of sinners (Quaresimale, Pred. xxviii., §11).

But still we should consider that Christian love is not, upon just occasion, without a holy indignation,[2] and that irony, though very seldom demanded, is not always out of place in a sermon, as the example of the holy prophets demonstrates. Nevertheless we should religiously avoid an habitual irony or sarcasm in reprehending all sorts of sins and faults; for, as says Bishop Wilkins, "'tis too much levity to check men in an ironical, jeering way." And yet Jeremy Collier[3] employed ridicule very seasonably and effectually in censuring the stage writers of the Restoration. In reproving great offences honest indignation is better than bantering, lest we should be suspected of regarding them as mere venial and trifling follies. This habit is akin to that unvarying fondness with which some pastors treat all persons and actions "Always to address one's disciples

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1 Read Abp. Newcome's Our Lord as a Divine Instructor, Pt. ii., c. i., secs. 2, 3, 6, 13, and Bp. Sumner's Ministerial Character of Christ, c. viii., ix., x., xiii.

2 Chrysostom, 17th Hom. on Acts.

3 Short View of the Stage; cf. Macaulay's Essay on the Comic Dramatists.

with mildness," says Chrysostom,[1] "even when they needed severity, would be to play the corrupter and enemy, not the teacher. Wherefore our Lord too, who generally spoke gently to his disciples, here and there uses sterner language, and at one time pronounces a blessing, and another a curse."

Preachers are often accused of *personality*, and from the nature of their labours these accusations must needs be as frequent as they are unjust and malicious. What pastor in his sober senses does not choose to preach a sermon to the profiting of hundreds alike rather than to the possible advantage of one. And if he wishes to amend the life of one does he not wisely prefer to do it in such wise as to warn all of the danger which has overtaken one individual, dwelling on such general truths concerning the sin in question as all may understand and apply for themselves, and not for their neighbours?[2] For, after all, it is the self-righteous hearer that is the largest dealer in personalities, and he can only be induced to suspend business during sermon-time by being compelled to hearken to a charitable but searching discussion of the general subject which is applicable to all the various sins, whether germinating or ripening, which belong to one ethical class. Thus shall we preach to the intellects of all, and to the consciences of some, perhaps, whose guilt we did not suspect. It is not every direct and specific sermon that is the most serviceable for convincing of sin. Our Divine Master was but speaking a parable when the chief priests and Pharisees perceived that he spake of them; and it was St. Paul's reasonings on the general subjects of righteousness, temperance, and the judgment to come, that made Felix tremble. And even in cases of private censure it were almost always better to begin with some general truth or illustration thereof, and especially with such passages of Scripture as are levelled against the sin to be reproved.

There are some authorities who forbid us to convey a reproof in the form of an oblique allusion, as being unmanly, timid, and disingenuous. But such a prohibition would, we fear, be too sweeping. To say nothing of our Divine Master and the old Hebrew prophets, we will only cite the example of Paul, who, as Chrysostom thinks,[3] showed his great wisdom in his indirect admonition re-

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[1] Enarr. on Gal. i. 1.

[2] Ideal examples pourtrayed in vague outline will be self-applied the most extensively; whereas cases depicted from real life are almost certain to be self-applied by no one.

[3] Hom. on 1 Thes. iv. 9, 10 (exordium of Hom. vi. on Thes.).

specting brotherly love: "Now, by saying there is no need, he has done a greater thing than if he had spoken expressly." The apostles Peter and Paul sometimes admonished *by way of remembrance.* Hence dehortation should sometimes be substituted for, and often follow reproof. The figure *communicatio* will assist us to reprove with considerate and insinuating kindness. "Let the minister," says Perkins, "include himself, if he may, in his reprehension, that it may be more mild and gentle" (Rom. vi. 1, 2; 1 Cor. 4, 6; Gal. ii. 15; *Segneri*—Quaresimale, Pred. xiv., §10—Quantunque che sto, etc. See a meek *expostulation* in Wesley's ser. lxxxi., Heb. ix. 1.)

We have already suggested that some persons and offences are best reproved in private. Nathan affords a safe example for all similar cases (2 Sam. xii.), and so do Isaiah (ch. xxxix.), Jeremiah (ch. xxxviii.), and the Lord Jesus (Mark viii. 32–34). On many occasions we may be assisted in preparing uses of reproof by imagining what we would be likely to say to the offenders in a confidential interview. We may in this way likewise test the quality of our zeal. "If," says Ostervald, "you wish not to deceive yourself on this point, examine whether you have the courage to say to sinners in private what you say to them in public." Bishop Sumner,[1] who is for the most part very correct and discriminating, fails to exhibit a full view of the case when he says that at the time our Lord reproved the Scribes and Pharisees for *hypocrisy*, he did it in private, while he corrected their *corrupt doctrines* before the multitude (Mark vii. 14). It should be remembered that their offence, which was the occasion of his rebuke, was a private one (they had found fault with his disciples for eating with unwashen hands), and that at other times he denounced their hypocrisy in the most public manner (Matt. xxiii. 1–39; Luke vi. 42; xiii. 15).

The old writers on sacred oratory mention commination, or threatening, as one part of this use. It consists in the exaggeration, upbraiding, and condemnation of sin. We exaggerate a sin when we show that it was premeditated, committed eagerly, habitually, with delight, or under the pretext of friendship, of law, of justice, or religion, etc. (Psa. xxviii. 3; xxxvi. 4; lii. 1; xciv. 20; Micah vii. 3; Matt. xv. 5). We upbraid or reproach sins when we dwell on the failure of former means of amendment, on circumstances of time and place, on blessings, privileges, and means of grace neglected and despised, on the long-suffering of God, etc. (Isa. i 5; v. 1–4; Jer. vii. 25–28; l. 7; Hos. xi. 1–4; Micah vii. 1–5; Rom. ii. 5; Matt. xi. 20–24). We speak in condemnation of

[1] Ministerial Character of Christ, ch. ix.

sins when we represent the evil of sin from its very nature, or from its violation of the law of God or conscience, or the sense of shame, etc.; and when we alarm the sinner by representing to him his danger, the wrath of a just God in this world and in the world to come. The common reservation here made is that we should not describe the sins we reprehend in too graphic and lively language, for fear we may either give lessons in vice or show that we are but too well acquainted with it. "Certain phrases and ideas," says Stier in his *Keryktik*, p. 243, "are not to be represented in all their profanity and nudity, lest we scandalise the innocent people who go to church to hear the Word of God, not to witness the sins of the world, because they see and hear enough of them during the week (Eph. v. 12–14). Therefore dip not too deep in the sand of sin in order to polish it, but rather present that with which every man may wash himself. Do not paint the devil on the church wall, nor mention his name too boldly. Beware of the æsthetical devil in your warrings against the Scripture Satan, and particularly of terrene and infernal descriptions of him." Yet we should not be afraid, as some appear to be, to call him by name and to speak the word *hell*.

It may not be amiss here to add what the same writer says concerning the use of too strong language and objurgations in preaching: "Some preachers scold in the pulpit. Those whom they would scold do not feel that they are intended, because they think that the language is altogether too strong to apply to them, and so they will be rather irritated than improved. If you think to justify such preaching by an appeal to the *woes* pronounced by the Messiah, forget not also that saying of Luther: 'First be like Samson and then you can act like Samson.' Be more polemical against the heart than against the words or the works of sinners. When you have engaged the heart you will soon convince the intellect and change the will." And yet it is a suggestive sign of these times that almost all preaching, however tender and compassionate, that aims at conviction of sin and self-examination is stigmatised as *scolding*. Many examples of warning and threatening are found in the prophetic sermons.

The ends of reproof may not seldom be attained without reproof. Erasmus, commenting on James i. 4, 5, says that we should set before a magistrate the image of a good ruler, so that, seeing himself in a glass, he may be led to imitate the same. Reproof may also be indirectly administered by proposing and resolving cases of conscience.

We may likewise mingle such encouragements with our rebukes

as we can with truth and safety, inspiring confidence in the assisting grace of God and an humble hope of his pardoning mercy. We may in some cases mitigate the severity of censure by deserved praise, as the apostle Paul does sometimes (1 Thes. iv. 9, 10; Phil. ii. 12–16). The Master himself commends some (Matt. viii. 10; ix. 22; xi. 11; xv. 28; xxvi. 10; Mark xii. 34, 43; John i. 47).

Nor should we neglect by directions to show what hinders and what helps repentance. "'Tis not enough for the physician," says Bishop Wilkins, "to inveigh against the malignity or danger of the disease, but his chief care must be to direct unto the remedy and cure of it." We should strike at the roots of evils. The doctrine of the atonement and the regenerating and sanctifying work of the Divine Spirit should be now clearly and forcibly exhibited.

We should seal all our reproofs with prayer for the offender, nor should we cease to follow him with our prayers until he give proof of genuine repentance (1 Thes. v. 23; 2 Thes. ii. 16, 17; iii. 16). We may sometimes even ask *him* to pray for *us* (1 Thes. v. 25).

Preachers who habitually speak loud should consider that if they reprove in a sharp and high tone, they must expect to be misjudged and misunderstood.

V. *When we are to reprove.* It is to be feared that all the foregoing hints will be useless to those who, after having learned in what manner they ought to discharge the duty, have also learned either to postpone the same indefinitely or to perform it prematurely.

In instances not a few it is best to prepare the way for admonistion by preaching one or more expository or doctrinal sermons such as will enlighten the understanding and improve the tone of the conscience and other moral sentiments. Indeed, a course of sermons aiming indirectly and remotely, but perseveringly, at a vice or sin, will in many cases supersede the necessity of direct reproof, just as in medicine a course of tonics or alteratives will sometimes prevent or cure sores which would otherwise demand the severe treatment of the surgeon's knife. A woe was pronounced against the unfaithful shepherds of Israel, for the reason that they did not *strengthen* the diseased (Ezek. xxxiv. 4). Or perhaps the people have a strong prejudice against reproof of any kind and however administered. They may have been led by the example of some respected or revered person to think that it is proper or manly, or even noble, to protest against all admonition, to resent it indignantly, and to persecute the reprover. Now, in such cases (and they are of very frequent occurrence), it may be advisable to pave the way for this duty by a sermon or two on meekness, or

candor, or nobility, or magnanimity in hearing, and illustrating the subject from the examples of ancient monarchs, nobles, and other honourable men who were meek and even grateful under ecclsiastical rebuke.

In rare cases of great criminality it may be necessary to allude to the crime, or derive lessons from it. For obvious reasons this will be most profitably done after the sentence has been pronounced or the penalty inflicted.

The young preacher, soon after his settlement, may deem it wisdom to preach many very plain truths on the supposition that it is better to do so then than at a later period, because no one can justly charge him with personalities, seeing he is as yet acquainted with none of his hearers. But he should consider that as his congregation are well acquainted with one another, they will hear these bold and severe sermons with all the mutual suspicion and uncharitableness of those who are persuaded that personalities are intended, while some will be apt to conclude that he has hearkened to and been deceived by informers and busybodies. All things considered, therefore, the counsel of Vinet is good: "Let the preacher before he reprehends be well acquainted with his parish, and let them also be well acquainted with him."

And yet delays here as elsewhere are not unfrequently dangerous, and we should without loss of time reprove vices that are coming to be both epidemic and chronic. "Were I able," says Chrysostom,[1] "by my silence concerning things done, to remove them, it would behoove me to be silent; but if the contrary comes to pass, and these things are not removed by our silence, but rather made worse, we are compelled to speak." We can easily invent plausible excuses for postponing a duty so painful and so hazardous; and when all other ones fail us, we may unhappily be able to say with unquestionable truth that the evil is past all remedies.

> Principiis obsta. Sero medicina paratur,
> Cum mala per longas invaluere moras.[2]

And accordingly we should beware of the habit of deferring all such matters until Lent, or the annual fast, just as too many preachers do the subject of gratitude until thanksgiving-day.

We may add that it were greatly to be wished that fewer farewell sermons were pervaded with a censorious spirit. The apostles

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1 Hom. on Phil. i. 30.

2 Resist beginnings. Medicine may be prepared too late when the disease has grown strong by long delay.

were, it must be confessed, to shake off the dust under their feet against all such as would not receive them (Mark vi. 11; Luke vii. 5), and there are, alas! occasions of a pastor's leaving his charge which may in justice and mercy demand a bold and detailed explanation; but the occasions are not so frequent as some preachers imagine which compel them to fill their farewell sermons with invective and denunciation. Such reproofs are sure to be received as personalities. The Parthian bowmen were neither the most brave nor the most victorious fighters. They bore little resemblance to that crowned archer of the Apocalypse who, facing the enemy, rode forth conquering and to conquer.

Times of national alarms and judgments give opportunities of reproof. Dr. Doddridge's sermon on the guilt and doom of Capernaum has a close yet considerate application to the Londoners. Observe how skilfully he makes a shield out of his own ignorance of the vices of the metropolis.

On the general subject of reproof there is one very important caution which young preachers are apt to disregard. While you are reprehending one vice or sin you are in danger of hardening the hearts of those who are addicted to the opposite vice or sin. This caution has been often repeated and as often illustrated. We cannot perhaps do better than to elucidate this in the words of Ostervald: "If you are declaiming against avarice the prodigal will join with you and outdo the utmost you can say upon this subject; but he will flatter himself that you have nothing to say to *his* disadvantage. If you are preaching against the profane and impious the hypocrites who have only the outside of piety will applaud themselves on this point; as, on the other hand, if you preach against hypocrites, the profane will embrace your sentiments. 'He is right,' they will say; 'these devourers of sermons and prayers are worse than we;' and thus they will establish themselves in their ungodliness. Just so when you are preaching from texts in the imprecatory Psalms, revengeful people will not fail to imagine that their behaviour has no evil in it. And thus you see how sinners will pervert almost everything." But how shall we prevent these abuses? Best, by praying and working for a revival, when both wheat and tares alike feel the edge of the sickle, and when they are most safely separated. Next best, by rambling in expositions or in textual discourses where we may not be tempted to omit contrasted views of a subject for the sake of preserving a topical unity—a unity which we must in such cases be willing to sacrifice in order to secure a higher excellence, that of perfect adaptation to the different spiritual maladies of the whole audience. At

any rate, these abuses must be prevented, or else our reproofs will be not merely unavailing yet simply innocuous—they will be positively and very injurious. Our sermons may indeed lose something not only of unity but also of impetuous fire or popular movement by these necessary antitheses and opposite aspects, but they will gain what is of incalculably greater worth, the sterling ring and stamp of candour, fairness, and broad good sense. In the midst of a strain of the most hopeful prediction Isaiah interjects a denunciation which has the startling effect of lightning out of a cloudless sky in spring-time (Isa. lx. 12).

Above all things, defend yourself against vindictiveness; for while this passion shadows your intellect you are almost certain to mistake and misjudge the faults you would remove. It was to his generous candor that Jeremy Collier owed much of his triumph in the controversy about the morality of the English stage. "He that saith he is in the light, and hateth his brother, is in darkness even until now." Thus benighted the admonisher remains ignorant of the real evil not only, but of the true remedy no less. Like the blind horseman of the fabalist Pilpay, while searching for his whip in the gray of the morning, he takes up a frozen serpent instead, and discovers not his blunder until his soft and nice whip warms into life and inflicts on his hand a mortal wound. Thus it often happens that on occasions when our hearers will not perceive the force of an argument or refuse to understand a mystery which we think we have illustrated very clearly, we are tempted to apply reproof; but let us remember the example of the archangel who, while contending, durst not bring a railing accusation even against Satan himself; and of the old philosopher who once said, "Were I not angry, I would reprove thee."

Section V.—Use of Exhortation.

By this kind of application we persuade the auditors to believe some truth or to practice some duty, or else dissuade them from the belief of some error or from the practice of some sin or vice. It embraces not only exhortation (which commonly includes dehortation), but also that part of instruction which consists in giving *directions* as to the *manner* in which we should exercise feelings or discharge duties, and concerning the *means* by which we accomplish the object which exhortation sets before us. The Scripture examples of exhortation are far superior to those of the best secu-

lar eloquence.[1] Use of invitation may also be comprehended under this term (Acts xiii. 26, 38). The use of reproof is generally followed by the use of dehortation or dissuasion, and sometimes it may be very properly succeeded by persuasives to such virtues and graces as will drive and keep out of the heart the faults reproved. Exhortation may sometimes properly come before instruction (1 Tim. iv. 13).

The instruments of persuasion are motives or the considerations which occasion or induce volition. To distinguish a *reason* from a *motive* is more easy in theory than in practice: thus much may be said in general, that the former serves chiefly to produce rational conviction, the latter to influence the will either persuasively or dissuasively, or even both at the same time.

Motives may be derived from ideas of excellence, right, honour, propriety, necessity, utility, happiness, etc.

Those considerations which are addressed to our *sense of moral excellence*, or, in other words, to our love of spiritual perfection, are the first in dignity, although not always the most generally powerful in the work of application, for the simple reason that comparatively few of the regenerate have reached that stage in sanctification where such considerations are more influential than any other. The divine beauty of the Lord Jesus Christ is the highest object of Christian affection and the highest motive to obedience.[2] The example of Christ furnishes many, and, to Christians, very powerful motives.

And hence, in addressing Christians we may appeal to their *gratitude towards the Lord Jesus Christ.* The apostles very often address our sense of obligation to our Redeemer. Segneri (Quaresimale, Pred. xxviii., §14) appeals to the gratitude of sinners.

The *Conscience* is addressed by motives of another class—those which appeal to *our sense of duty.* Considerations of this kind were employed under what was often termed "Use of Conviction." The moral sense is either directive or reflective; it takes cognizance of either what ought *to be* done or what ought *to have been* done. The wise preacher will chiefly endeavour after the cultivation of the directive or prospective function of this faculty; for, though its reflective or retrospective function is by no means to be neglected, it cannot be too deeply impressed on our minds that this is not the

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[1] Lev. xxvi.; Deut. iv., vi., viii., xi., xxxi.; Isa. i. 16–20; ii. 10–19; lv.; Matt. v 13–16; vii.; Heb. vi.; x. 7–34; xii.; xiii. 1–19; Jas. i, ii., v. 9–20.

[2] Edwards on the Religious Affections, Pt. iii., secs. 2 and 3; Whately's Essays on the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, essay iii.

guide to action, but the messenger of sorrow. Why is it that the consciences of most people arrive too late to be of much service in discharging their duty? Principally, we fear, because their consciences have formed a habit of retrospection and not at the same time a habit of prospection. While, therefore, we do well to heed the advice of the philosophers, both pagan and Christian, and *at night* cause all the actions of the day to pass in review before the conscience, we would obviously do better if we also formed the habit of considering every *morning* what we *ought to do* or *omit* during the day. On the same principle *young persons* should be particularly assisted in the formation of these two habits. In his six days' work the Great Creator not only reviewed what he had done, but also predetermined what he would do.

But while keeping our duties in view, we should frequently look at the privileges that lie beyond them. A rejoicing conscience is more persuasive than a trembling one. Remember the wise mother in the Greek epigram, who, when she sees her little boy creeping on the edge of a cliff, instead of raising the cry of alarm,

> "Far better taught, she lays her bosom bare,
> And the fond boy springs back to nestle there."
>
> —*Rogers.*

And so, in advocating the cause of a benevolent institution, we should not only appeal to conscience, but to Christ's love to us, his example, and such-like motives.

Shame was many times appealed to by the prophets. Segneri addresses it in the 5th and 12th sermons of his *Quaresimale;* so does Chrysostom in many of his applications.

Our *Christian love towards our fellow-men* should likewise be addressed. This affection has two kinds of exercise: the one is complacency towards the holy, and the other is compassion towards the unholy. This passion is persuaded, not by demonstrating that it *ought* to admire or pity, but by holding up before it the object of admiration or pity. To this head belong addresses to Christian benevolence and humanity. We are instructed by the example of Paul to encourage systematic giving, but not to favour *confining* beneficence to the limits of any system, however good; we are sometimes to defend even acts of Christian extravagance (Matt. xxvi. 6–13; 2 Cor. viii. 1–3).

Another motive is *interest or love of happiness.* Vinet teaches us that this motive may be presented for three reasons: 1. To some souls access is easy only on this side, and it is the side on which access to all is the easiest. 2. It is essential to human nature. 3.

It abounds in that revelation in behalf of which we speak (Deut. xxx. 19; Ezek. xxx. 19; Matt. v. 3). The same writer, together with Schott and others, lays down the following rules in appealing to self-interest

We should never excite the selfish feelings of an audience to such a degree or in such a manner as to disturb the fit proportions between the desires of a man for his own good and his interest in the welfare of others.

We should never inflame any selfish feeling of our audience so far or in such a manner as to repress the activity of the conscience.

We should not attempt to excite any merely animal feeling which we do not intend to make subsidiary to spiritual improvement. Emotions which are born blind and are not the legitimate offspring of truth and grace are ever prone to grope towards destruction, and either to lead or drive even intelligent emotions thither. True eloquence fills the whole soul with light, and not only reveals but promotes its order and concord.

We should give the first and largest place to motives derived from our spiritual and eternal interests.

When we urge motives drawn from our material and temporal interests we may sometimes wisely urge them indirectly and from an eternal point of view, as Bourdaloue does in his sermon on Impurity, where in the first part he considers impurity as a sign of reprobation, and in the second place as a principle of reprobation.

We ought to warn our audiences against the danger of allowing our lower temporal interests to make or determine our *beliefs*. "Parson Patten," the notorious curate of Whitstable, was so averse to the Athanasian creed that he never would read it. Archbishop Secker having been informed of his recusancy, sent the archdeacon to ask him his reason for the omission. "I do not believe it," said the curate. "But your metropolitan *does*," replied the archdeacon. "It may be so," rejoined Mr. Patten, "and he can well afford it. He believes at the rate of *seven thousand* a year, and I only at the rate of *fifty*."

Nor should we neglect to teach our audience to discriminate between their *real* and their *supposed* temporal interests—their temporal interests as regarded by the lover of gain, or of pleasure, or honour, or power, and as regarded by the lover of truth, or of holiness, or benevolence, or humanity, or justice, or Christian peace and joyfulness.

Neither ought we to endeavour to be more unselfish, more moral, and more noble than the Great Teacher was in rousing fear and terror. He warned men to fear Him who is able to destroy both

soul and *body* in hell (Matt. x. 29). It is not enough to dwell on the torments of conscience and the misery of an eternal separation from God; for as the majority of our unbelieving hearers contrive to live very comfortably with their consciences here, we shall find it difficult to convince them that it will be otherwise hereafter. And as to the idea of a separation from God, there is nothing that an impenitent sinner more desires and seeks after. These considerations have weight and power when addressed to real Christians, and yet even they *sometimes*, and the impenitent *always*, are more influenced by the fear of the sufferings which the risen bodies of the damned are to undergo through ages unnumbered. Some preachers may, if they please, stigmatise such sufferings as "vulgar;" but the Scriptures nowhere intimate that a just God regards any sin as refined and elegant in itself, nor that the hell of the vulgar is not the hell of all final impenitents, of all classes and conditions whatsoever. We shall best secure the rejoicings of our own consciences and best commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God by appealing to fear and terror just as often and just as vulgarly as holy Scripture appeals to them. Nevertheless, let the preacher remember that though he is an ambassador from God in Christ's stead, yet he is himself a man and a sinner. Let him therefore employ these motives as one not totally devoid of fear for his own eternal safety, and above all with the compassion which ever attends a godly sorrow for his own sins. "I never," says Payson, "seemed fit to say a word to a sinner except when I had a broken heart myself and subdued and melted into penitence, and felt as though I had just received a pardon to my own soul, and when my heart was full of tenderness and pity." A contrite heart such as this will not be liable to present untimely or exaggerated or disproportional views of the revealed doctrine of the future punishment of the wicked. Were any other thought or feeling necessary to prevent us from speaking on this subject in the tone of vehement invective, it might be that which is produced, as Dr. Dwight says, by the remembrance that we may at the very time be pronouncing the final doom of our own parents, or brothers, or sisters, or wives, or children.

We should also when necessary dwell on the *practicability* of the duty to which we exhort our hearers (Isa. xxx. 21; Ezek. xxxvi. 27; Matt. vii. 9–11; xix. 26; Mark ix. 23; John xv. 5, Heb. x. 4; xiii. 10, 11; James iii. 12; v. 17, 18; Demosthenes' first Philippic).

Furthermore, let the young preacher remember that the best of men almost always determine their choice and proceed to action

from *mixed* motives. By mixed we do not mean a blending of both good and bad (though immature Christians are sometimes actuated by such a mixture), but a blending of different kinds of good motives. The inspired orators furnish numerous examples of appeals to motives of this description, particularly in their perorations. In rousing fear or terror, therefore, we should take advantage of the liberty which both inspiration and the laws of the human mind proffer and secure. We should diversify this application with threatenings and promises, with considerations drawn from justice and mercy, from our exposure to eternal misery, and the offer of salvation through the blood of the Lamb, from our addition to our guilt and obduracy by each refusal of the Gospel offer, and from the certainty and necessity of damnation to all who reject the only Saviour.

Nor should he forget that, as the Divine Spirit is frequently in the hearts of the hearers assisting the speaker, he should follow his method rather than that of the secular rhetoricians who tell us that none but appeals to love, hope, joy, and other active passions are persuasive; whereas we know that the Divine Spirit usually begins the work of persuasion by inspiring sorrow, shame, fear, and hopelessness. Often, again, we have to address the irresolute and undecided, who say, "when I would do good evil is present with me."

Signs or Marks. These are Scripture tests by which we may prove the quality and state of gracious affections, and the acceptableness of duties and afflictions. These were chiefly employed by the old divines in uses of self-examination.

These signs ought to be applied with caution and judgment. The best authorities teach us that they should in all cases be *necessary*, *perspicuous*, *infallible*, and *few*.

"Cases of conscience" are also of this class of applications, although they are less frequently discussed and enforced in sermons than they ought to be.

It may not be here amiss to observe that signs or marks, though properly belonging to the department of παιδεία, yet, as is sometimes the case, they are employed less for persuasion than for information, or refutation, or reproof, or consolation. As to its classification, therefore, the use of examination is a *movable* use.

Nor must it be overlooked that signs and marks are serviceable not only in application to professed believers, but to worldlings as well. A man may, as George Herbert says, be both covetous and intemperate, and yet hear sermons against both the covetous and the intemperate, and condemn both in good earnest. The reason is this: he

may never have learned what is the nature of these vices, as it is ascertained by holy Scripture; or he may never have been taught where thrift and economy end, and avarice and parsimony begin, and so may have passed slowly and unawares from what is lawful and commendable, to what is unlawful and detestable.

Caution is likewise called for in teaching moralists and the self-righteous to discriminate between apparent and real virtues, as between conviction and confession and evangelical repentance; between wishing and choosing; between emotions and affections; between moral duties and those that are Christian and evangelical; between gospel charity and almsgiving, or a cheerful tolerance and indulgence of faults and errors, etc.

One of the most successful artifices of Satan is to induce us to fix a false standard of piety, and then through our repeated failures to live up to the same, to drive us back to a total neglect of the real and acceptable service of God. Thus deeply impressed by some distinguished example, perhaps we imagine that true religion consists in fluency, in unaccountable ecstacies, in large and public gifts of money, in a proselyting spirit, or the punctual observance of rites and self-denials which are of human invention, and all that. Coming short of the eminent and the splendid, we are tempted to despise the common and the obscure: like the goose in the old Sanscrit fable, that mistook for fish the reflection of the new moon in the water, and after vainly attempting to lay hold of it, at length abandoned all search for food, because whenever it saw a real fish, it fancied it was but the glitter of the moon which had so often disappointed it. The fruit of its experience was that it passed its time fasting and foodless

The manner and spirit in which duties are to be done. Under the head of use of exhortation some writers[1] place *Modi* or *Officia*, *i. e.*, directions concerning the *spirit*, *manner*, or *degrees* in which graces and virtues are to be exercised and duties are to be discharged; *e. g.*, if we are preaching from Isa. xlv. 19, after a *general* exhortation to seek God, we will naturally give some directions respecting the proper mode of seeking him; as, 1, seek him with the whole heart; 2, early and carefully; 3, before all other objects; 4, in season; 5, perseveringly, etc. Or, if preaching from the text Jer. xliv. 10, 11, the *officia* may be given thus: 1. We may show true contrition of heart (*a*) by grieving on account of our sins; (*b*) by despairing of help from ourselves; (*c*) by detesting our sins; (*d*) by forsaking them, etc. This kind of matter comes under what is

[1] D. Knibbe, Manuductio ad Oratoriam Sacram, p. 128–131.

sometimes termed the use of *Advice* or *Direction*. These *modi* or *officia* may not seldom be derived partly or wholly from the text itself.

But we are much mistaken if we think that to manage this use to advantage, we have only to learn to skeletonise. Valuable as this skill is, a thorough knowledge of Christian ethics is of more considerable service. We say *Christian* ethics as distinguished from philosophical ethics and from theological ethics, although this last is, it must be confessed, of no small utility in composing applications, especially the right understanding of the relations of the divine purposes and human ability and the relations of regeneration and our obligations. It is also important to make differences between the old ethnic system and the Christian; the former being taught by reason, the latter by revelation; the former regarding chiefly the outward life, the latter the feelings and thoughts. The former drew its motives from a terrene expediency, and found its best standard in moderation or "the golden mean," and was not animated by the exhibition of a perfect example and enforced by any adequate authority or sanction. The latter derives its principles of action from love to the Lord Jesus Christ and other similar considerations, proposes for an end the glory of God, promises us in the Divine Spirit the most effectual help to all obedience, sets before us the Lord Jesus as a perfect example of all virtues and duties, and enforces its precepts by the hopes and fears of the world to come. Nor should it ever escape us that the Christian ethics is superior to every other system by the simplicity and comprehensiveness of its principles, by the virtues on which it most emphatically dwells—love, humility, and holiness—and by its thorough and universal efficacy, transforming as it does the entire man, and equally potent to renew the philosopher and the savage, the gentle and the simple, in any and every part of the world. Our Saviour, it may here be subjoined, employed *modi* in Matt. vi. 3, 4, 6, 7, 17, 18; v. 22, 44; Luke xvii. 3–8.

Few duties are more commonly neglected than the careful study of the distinctive principles of Christian ethics as taught and applied in the New Testament. Works on moral science cannot be expected to give us much homiletical knowledge of the various branches of this subject.

The preacher in the handling of ethical subjects has to defend himself against temptations to scolding and fussiness. Some preachers appear to derive many of their themes from the provocations of the world and the devil. Every disturbance of public order, every breach of common justice, every college riot, every pub-

lic ball, they follow with denunciations which serve no other purpose than to add to the levity and frivolity of the young people of their congregations. Hereto applies the remark of Selden, who, if we remember rightly, says, in his Table Talk, that there is no medium in rhetoric: "if the preacher does not convince me, I laugh at him." When Paul made the confession, "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence," he had in mind, perhaps, some irritable Hebrew exhorter by whom he had, when young, been frequently berated in the synagogue at Tarsus. It is Bengel, we think, who somewhere observes that the pleasures of the world taste best when they are peppered by a little admonition.

Every kind of ethical application, therefore, should be founded on the vital doctrines of evangelical Christianity. Aristotle, in his ethical works, ever kept his eye on "the golden mean;" but no voyager has moral strength enough to steer safely between opposite temptations; and even the philosopher himself, while dying, is reported to have said: "I rejoice that I am going out of a world of contraries." But he who accepts the Lord Jesus as "the way, and the truth, and the life" has a shepherdly guide to the knowledge of every duty, an inward power to do it, and the most inciting motives to its observance.

To the *Modi* or *Officia* belong *experimental* uses. We cannot here specify the true nature and chief excellences of an experimental application. Nor is it necessary. What John Jennings has said on the general subject of experimental preaching, together with the devout examination and study of our own spiritual exercises, will give us some tolerable notion of "the life of God in the soul of man." The sermons of Dr. Watts are good specimens of this kind of application. His "Recollections," or uses of various sorts, in the style of soliloquy, are peculiar and well-deserving of imitation.

The popularity of experimental uses appears to have been pretty generally overlooked. It will be evident on consideration, that a preacher naturally calm and dispassionate in speech, who preaches experimentally, will move the people more powerfully than the most fervid and enthusiastic preacher, who neither derives any materials from, nor makes any appeals to, the workings of the human heart and spiritual consciousness. Herein consisted in great measure that "quiescence of turbulence" which Robert Hall attributed to John Wesley. "Nothing startles the mind and fixes the eye like having a voice given to the whisperings of our own hearts. In a time of revival, at a meeting crowded with awakened sinners, a preacher commenced his discourse with this abrupt inquiry: 'What

is this murmur I hear? 'I wish I had a new heart; they tell me to repent; I wish they would tell me to do something else.' These words, and the like that followed, were simple, yet they spread over that assembly the silence of the day of doom; and heaving breasts and falling heads testified that the thoughts of many hearts had been revealed. There was no lack of attention to the preacher, as he went on to show that repentance was the only direction which could be given to sinners. . . Here was one source of Christ's power as a preacher. He heard thoughts; the maledictions of the smooth-faced Pharisee, the cavillings of the Sadducean skeptics, the excuses of the indifferent—he heard them all, though no voice but his own broke the silence of the listening crowd. And it was because his discourses were such silent appeals to what was in man—their consciousness of sin and obligation—that the multitude, Scribes, Pharisees, and all, thronged to hear him. They would 'Come, see the man that told them all things that ever they did.' His words often filled them with rage, till they would take up stones to cast at him. And yet they must hear these words, they were so true, did so accurately discern the 'thoughts and intents of their hearts.'"[1]

Use of Counsel. Those who exhort us to duties without teaching us what means we are to employ in order to perform them, have been aptly compared to those who lighted ancient lamps, but at the same time neglected to replenish them with oil.[2]

Hence under the use of exhortation or dehortation should often be placed those directions or "uses of advice" or "direction" by which we may acquire and cultivate or forsake and guard against what the text or subject offers to our attention. *Positive* means are stated in exhortation; *negative* means in dehortation. They have likewise been distinguished as *general*, as prayer, fasting, self-examination, or the improvement which results from the *constant* exercise of the grace recommended, or the *habitual* performance of the duty, etc., and as *special* according to the nature of particular duties and temptations, or as the text itself may counsel or suggest. And it is equally agreeable and serviceable to observe how frequently either the text or context affords the best means for attaining the grace or doing the duty to which it persuades us, or the reverse.

But in giving directions on this subject we should vigilantly and continually guard against two opposite errors—that of underrating

[1] Mr. Edwin E. Bliss, Amer. Quart. Register, vol. xv., p. 317; Abp. Newcome, Our Lord as a Divine Instructor, Pt. i., c. ii., sec. 7.

[2] Plutarch, quoted by Luis de Granada in his Rhet. Eccles., L. iv., c. ii.

and that of overrating the means of grace. Whichcot, Tillotson, and Parker teach that meditation, prayer, the study of the Scriptures, etc., are *only* means in order to Christian practice, and that they are not to be compared with the *end*, which is holy living. This view was opposed by Dr. John Edwards[1] as an undue representation of the matter in two respects.

1. It implies that because they are means they are, in some sense, to be cheapened and disparaged; whereas, *first*, all the acts and parts of the Christian religion may be regarded as means and instruments, because they all have eternal happiness for their end. All exercises of holiness in this life have reference to a future life. *Secondly*, some of the acts of practical holiness are means that tend to promote other and similar acts. Thus humility, love, faith, and hope are helps and furtherances to other graces of a holy life. Though they are, in a certain sense, ends, yet they stand in the relation of means to other ends.

2. It is also a mistake to hold that acts of devotion are only means and nothing else. But they are likewise *parts* and *members* and *direct acts* of the religion of Christ. They have an immediate respect to the Divine Being, and are therefore of greater excellence than acts of charity which terminate on man only. Faith, meditation, prayer, the holy communion, and praise are more than *means* for attaining Christian piety. They are parts and branches of it, and in some of them there is a complication of virtues and graces. The latter view, though sound in the main, is yet liable to perversion, particularly by those who incline to Quietism, Aceticism, and Antinomianism. The former view is more friendly to Arminianism, Socinianism, Ritualism, and Rationalism.

The more to guard against misunderstanding and abuse, it will be prudent to omit this phrase in exhortations to the *impenitent;* for they are exceedingly apt to put their trust in the instruments and conveyances of grace to the total disregard of the obligation to immediate repentance. What concerns us just now is this, that "the means of grace," while they may indeed explain to us the nature and convince us of the necessity of repentance, were never intended to be a substitute either for our own natural efforts in forsaking sinful practices, or for the assistance of divine grace in continuing and crowning such efforts, much less for regeneration itself. As to method, *remedies* naturally go before *motives*.

Direct address is more effectual in exhortation than in reproof, although we may, when the reproof is *private*, commonly follow

[1] Preacher, 82–88.

the example of Nathan by saying, "*Thou* art the man." Peter and Paul sometimes used the words "every one." But those writers who teach that all exhortations should be direct addresses are less wise than those who advise either occasional changes from direct to indirect or the reverse, and in cases not a few a uniform strain of indirect. As a rule it is wiser to describe than to name the different classes of sinners. It is, however, necessary, by some means or other, to *individualise* the hearers.

Many persuasives come short of the effects intended because the minds of the auditors are not prepared for them by a thorough explication of the subject-matter from which the motives are deduced. "There is danger," observes Bishop Wilson, "of being persuaded before one understands." A striking example of this may be found in the unsuccessful attempts of Bourdaloue, Massillon, Bossuet, and other French preachers to overcome the advancing infidelity of the seventeenth century. Their reasonings perpetually ran forward to exhortation and reproof, whereas the English preachers of that period, whose arguments were ever going back and resting on solid instruction, were far more successful. Dry and unimpassioned as were their sermons, they nevertheless removed ignorance from the people as to what are the evidences of a divine revelation, and as to the rational foundations of the Gospel system. But still there is danger on the didactic side also. Rowland Hill said that the difference between the English and Scottish preachers of his day was, that the former preached *to* their audiences, and the latter *before* them. Dr. Ralph Wardlaw, as late as 1850, confessed that there was still a considerable amount of justice in the distinction.

The effect of innumerable exhortations is nugatory, for the reason that the preacher does not aim to bring the class of persons addressed to immediate decision and resolution. The ambassador for Christ should not be content to have merely proposed the terms of reconciliation; he should urge their acceptance and feel and show that his endeavours are almost in vain if his hearers continue to listen only to procrastinate, or to wish without ever choosing, or to seek yet never strive. Such preachers as Baxter and Alleine frequently in their conclusions express a deep concern as to the reception of their sermons, and great reluctance to leave the subject and their hearers without some assurance that their prayers and exhortations have availed to call forth a decided response then and there.

Bishop Meade[1] recommends the occasional use of the kind of ap-

[1] Lectures on the Pastoral Office, p. 155.

plication which Jeremy Taylor adopts in his Holy Living, viz., a set of resolutions drawn from the subject of the sermon. Better still would be the form employed by Vieyra and Segneri, who by Association make the resolutions as if for themselves.

Section VI.—Use of Consolation.

This is an application by which the mind is strengthened against material and spiritual evils, and cheered and encouraged by the opposite benefits. Consolation is, as Bishop Wilkins observes, "one main end of the Scriptures" (Isa. xi., xii., xxxii., xxxv., xl.–lxvi.; Jer. xxix., xxx., xxxi.; Ezek. xxxvi., xxxvii., xxxviii., xl., xlvii., xlviii.; Matt. v. 3–12; vi. 25–34; Luke xxi.; John xiv., xv., xvi.; Heb. xi., xii.).

The sufferings of men arise from inward and outward sources. Those which originate within are deserving of the preacher's first attention. The doubts and fears of the anxious inquirer, the distresses of such believers as have wounded consciences or are vexed with temptations, or are groaning under spiritual desertions, are to be carefully and perseveringly studied and treated. Those which come from without, or from loss of health, friends, property, employment, reputation, are, nevertheless, worthy of no small place in the preacher's sermons. Forasmuch as the God of all comfort has deigned to provide remedies for these latter diseases, he ought not to think himself superior to the humble task of ministering to minds that are troubled with external evils.

As to consolation, it cannot be too deeply impressed, nor too often recollected, that it is only in the school of sanctified adversity that we can be made rightly to understand and skilfully to apply the comforting parts of holy Scripture.

And yet the young preacher would be all the better prepared to profit by his lessons in this school if he could but bring himself to the study of the Bible with the steady determination to acquire a distinct and comprehensive knowledge of *Satanic accusations* and the *ways* in which it administers consolation. Some acquaintance with standard works on insanity is also desirable.

It is a noteworthy fact that industrious persons suffer less from bereavements and other outward adversities than the unemployed, as the most miserable are they that are idly opulent and who not unfrequently fall a prey to their own imaginations. Such persons should be taught to find remedies for these evils in daily and systematic works of self-denial and benevolence.

Beware of the methods adopted by ancient and modern philosophers in attempting to comfort the afflicted. And especially beware of your own favourite theory respecting consolation. The Scriptures exemplify a *vast variety* of ways in which consolatory applications may be made. But above all do not persuade yourself that consolation is never or very seldom necessary for *your* flock. Receive, therefore, not without some grains of allowance these words of the zealous and exemplary Payson: "In preaching to professing Christians I endeavour to rouse and humble rather than to comfort them; for, if they be kept humble, comfort will follow of course. Besides, I do not suppose that Christians need as much consolation now as they did in the primitive ages, when exposed to persecution."

The oracles of God do indeed set forth the *benefits* of affliction, but, unless we are much mistaken, they do it less frequently and less emphatically than most modern preachers. The character, attributes, and works of each person in the blessed Trinity afford innumerable and peerless themes for consolatory sermons. The way to handle these themes is best learned by the study of the last twenty-seven chapters of Isaiah.

The way to the cross is the way to consolation, and accordingly we must *begin* to comfort the impenitent by giving them a convicting view of Christ crucified, and worldly professors by exhibiting the cross in such a manner that they will glory in it as crucifying them to the world and the world to them. Holiness is the only source of evangelical consolation. Ostervald complains that Drelincourt, in his work against the fear of death, labours more to *comfort* than to *sanctify*.

The *use of Recollection* or *Reminiscence* is occasionally serviceable in the work of consolation (Psa. xlii. 6; lxxvii. 10, 11; Isa. xliv. 21–28; Micah vii. 14, 15; Malachi iii. 4).

Heavy calamities do not immediately allow the sufferer to hearken to advice or an argument: young preachers are apt to forget the observation of Seneca: "Levis est dolor qui capere consilium potest"—Light is that grief which is able to listen to counsel.

It was a saying of the Rabbins, that it is the greatest beneficence to prevent poverty: so he ministers to comfort the most effectually who prepares his flock for the inevitable sorrows of this life. And how can he do this so well by any other means as by solid Gospel instruction? It was by learning at the feet of Jesus that Mary was enabled to behave so nobly at the grave of her brother Lazarus. Christ must be our teacher if he is to be our comforter; God must be our dwelling place if we are also to find him a fortress.

Section VII.—Hints on Continual Application.

Isocrates interwove his persuasives, just as Isæus did his arguments, with the various parts of his discussion. Those uses which are intermixed with the body of the sermon are still better authorised by most of the inspired examples. Indeed, there is scarcely a sermon, either in the Old Testament or the New, whose applications are not continuous. The cases where the applications are left to the close may almost be said to be exceptional. In the historical discourses of Moses in Deuteronomy, and in the epistle to the Hebrews, *we* should have naturally expected that the speakers would not have applied each part as they proceeded, nor have paused or turned aside for uses by way of interruption or digression. But such we find to be the fact. The epistle to the Hebrews affords specimens of both continuous and final applications. The same may be said of the Sermon on the Mount. The sermons of the most of the prophets have perpetual or intermixed uses, and with the exception of some of Ezekiel's discourses, have no lengthened final applications. Those writers are wrong, therefore, who would have us chiefly confine current applications to hortatory and expository sermons. Our inspired masters employed them in sermons of every description. And so numerous and so obvious are the advantages of this mode of preaching, that the wonder is that so few writers of sermons should have employed it habitually or even occasionally. Claude, in his Essay, chap. vii., has given an excellent example of perpetual uses in a sermon on Phil. ii. 12. (See also Vitringa's sermon on 1 Chron. iv. 10, in his *Methodus Homiletica;* William Ames's, Rutherford's, and Leighton's sermons; Robert Hall on John v. 42; Simeon on Num. x. 29, in *Horæ Homiletica;* also his skeleton, Mark xvi. 15, 16, in appendix to his edition of Claude's Essay; Walker on 2 Cor. vi. 1; Doddridge's sermon on John vii. 37; Cooper's third sermon on Rom. vii. 21.) Bourdaloue and Massillon often attach a "use" to each part of the partition.

In cases not a few only one kind of application, *e. g.*, exhortation or consolation, can be profitably made. But this one form may require to be frequently repeated (always with new matter) in a single discourse.

In other discourses the time, the place, or other circumstances may demand the sacrifice of rhetorical unity to the paramount and supreme laws of Christian feeling; then the applications may appear inconsequential, or irrelevant, or superfluous. Never mind;

the Scripture uses are not seldom very remotely connected with the matter in hand, or rather they are always considered by the Divine Spirit as the matter which is of the greatest and the most immediate importance, and therefore always in order. The greatest things in sermons, and in all other sacred operations of Christ's kingdom, are often those which seem interstitial or interluded to *us*—to us who would ever have the vital and the useful grow out of the true and the beautiful, whereas the Creator Spirit would ever have the true and the beautiful grow out of the vital and the useful.

The chief excellences of many Puritan sermons are their continual applications. Those old preachers were not only careful to keep in mind all the various kinds of "uses," but also to consider well which and how many of them could be subjoined to each of the many propositions into which their sermons were often divided. Thus one of the sermons of William Ames (*Lat.* Amesius) on the text Matt. vi. 33 has five propositions, each followed either by reasons in confirmation of it or questions and answers; and each part concluded with one or more "uses:" the first with uses of information, admonition, and exhortation; the second with a use of refutation; the third with a use of exhortation; the fourth with a refutation; the last with two uses, one of consolation, another of direction. In his counsels to preachers, Ames did but repeat a current maxim of his age when he taught that in order to set forth to advantage the word of God, two things were essential: first, a declaration of what is contained in the text; secondly, an application of the same to the hearts and consciences of those present. How different is this from the practice of a majority of our living preachers, who bestow their thoughts principally upon comment, illustration, "views," and confirmation. But after all, whoever thinks of the proper ends of Christian preaching must concur with Ames[1] in the opinion that they who deduce no application from their text both forget themselves and impose upon their hearers.

Section VIII.—General Remarks on Uses.

§. Applications are to be chiefly deduced from the text or subject, either by *consequence*, by *comparison*, by *contrast*, or some other logical process; Schleiermacher's ser. on "Christ's Resurrection a Pattern," etc., has one use elicited even from a *distinction*.

§. They should not only be fairly derived from the text or sub-

[1] Medulla Theologica, L. i., chap. xxxv., secs. 17 and 18.

ject, but be wisely adapted to the congregation, the time, the place, and particularly to the age, condition, and circumstances, both of the preacher and the hearers.

§. When all the applications are left for the close of a sermon, it is of some importance that they be disposed in a proper method, so that the transition from one to another may be natural, and their connection with the subject and with each other may be obvious. They should generally be arranged according to the order in which they are here enumerated and discussed. It is very evident that in no ordinary case ought exhortation to come before information, consolation before reproof, or refutation after exhortation.

§. A prime quality in applications is seasonableness. For this our Divine Master was to be and was distinguished (Isa. l. 4; liii. 4, 5; Matt. xi. 28; Prov. xxv. 16).

§. Some texts or subjects do not admit of more than two or three kinds of applications, others of only one kind, and that often repeated perhaps. Of the prophetic Scriptures it has been justly said that they are marked both by simplicity of principle and variety of application.

§. After all, however, we should not suffer any maxims respecting rhetorical unity to keep us from making digressions when a timely and thorough application demands them. The pastor will desire sometimes in a single sermon, as Chrysostom has it, "to heal many and diverse wounds."

§. In addressing our hearers we should keep in mind not only physical but moral conditions, and rather describe than name various classes of sinners; but still it will occasionally be expedient to address the old and young, rich and poor, the converted and unconverted, etc. Doddridge's ser. on Luke x. 42, applies the subject first, to the unconcerned; secondly, to the concerned but procrastinating; thirdly, to those who have in good earnest found the one thing needful. The repetitions of the address may, in pathetic and earnest applications, go on increasing in expressions of affection, *e. g.*, (1) My hearers; (2) My dear hearers; (3) My well-beloved hearers.

§. The more profound a doctrine is the more deeply should we dig the channel for its various uses. It is only by thorough application that our Christian knowledge is saved from metaphysical and materialistic errors, just as the waters of rivers are purified by flowing.

§. In imitation of our Lord at the close of his sermon on the Mount, we may, in applying subjects similar to this, urge that obedience and well-doing are the only foundation that can uphold,

compact and defend our hearing, or worship, or belief, or experience, so as to save it from becoming our prison and our destruction.

Note.—The works which have been the most serviceable to us in treating the subject of application have been: *B. Keckerman*, Rhetorica Ecclesiastica, in Opera (Hanover, 1613), L. ii., chap. iii; *Sebastianus Gœbelius*, Methodologia Homiletica (Lepsiæ, 1678), chap. xiii., tit. v.; *D. Knibbe*, Manuductio ad Oratoriam Sacram (Ludg. Batav. 1679), pp. 86–148; *Solomon Van Till*, Methodus Concionandi (Frankford, 1716), Pt. i., chap. vii.; *Andrea Hyperius*, De Formandis Concionibus (Haļæ, 1789), pp. 250–410.

PART II.

THE FORMS OF SERMONS AS DETERMINED BY METHOD.

CHAPTER I.

THE MEMBERS OF SERMONS.

By member we here signify that part of a sermon which belongs to one place in it, serves peculiar purposes, and consequently attracts to itself all such matter as is subservient to those purposes. Sometimes, however, one member of a discourse may perform the function of another, as where the proposition discharges the duty of the exodium, or the recapitulation that of the partition. The essental parts of a sermon are the proposition, development, and conclusion; the subsidiary parts of it are the introduction, including the introitus, the nexus, and the transitus; the partition, the invocation, and the recapitulation. The latter are more or less useful, according to the nature of the discourse or the exigencies of its delivery; in some cases they are almost indispensable. In arranging matter we are to keep them all in mind, although in seeking it we ought chiefly to direct our attention to the teleology of the sermon, in other words, to the practical points which it is our intention to carry.

We cannot, in strictness, regard the text as *part* of the sermon; we may properly say that a text is a part of Scripture, or the subject or foundation of a sermon; but in thus refusing to make the divine a part of the human, we do not (of all things!) intend to disparage the divine, nor to deny it a place in our ministrations.

Section I.—Of the Introduction.

"God plays the skilful orator," as Arthur Lake[1] observes of his exordium to the Law. The inspired speakers, too, evince an admirable propriety in their introductions or exordia. How befitting

[1] Comment on Exod. xix.; he finds here Aristotle's three requisites of a good exordium.

it was that Moses should begin his discourses in Deuteronomy with a recapitulation of such striking events of the Exodus as served his purpose, and not with a journal of all that had transpired during forty years, nor with that compendious repetition of the Law to which he afterwards so naturally passes. And when we examine the beginnings of the several distinct sermons of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, we find them as varied, pertinent, and eloquent as are the other parts of those sermons. It is worthy of remark, however, that some of their discourses, as well as some of those of the minor prophets, have nothing that classical rhetoric denominates an exordium, while others, as Joel and Micah, commence with a brief *prosphonema* or allocution. The prophecy of Nahum opens with an introduction which may be readily separated from the rest of the discourse (i. 2–8). His grand description of the power and patience, the severity and goodness of Jehovah is a most becoming prelude to his succeeding utterances respecting the Hebrew emancipation and the fall of Nineveh. The earlier discourses of Isaiah begin with reproofs, the later with encouragements. Jeremiah sets out in one of his sermons (vii. 1) with a call to repentance with a conditional promise; another (xi. 1–17) begins by proclaiming the tenor of God's covenant and reproving the Jews for disobedience; and another (xxii. 1–10) exhorts to repentance, with promises and threatenings. Ezekiel (xiv. 1–11) denounces God's wrath against hypocrites; again (xx. 1–44) he recounts the many rebellions of the Jews, and announces God's purpose to gather them into the bond of the Gospel covenant. In xxiv. 18–27, the people having asked why the prophet does not mourn for his deceased wife, are told that he is a sign that they shall not mourn for the destruction of Jerusalem. The introduction of another sermon (xxxiii. 24—) rebukes the sophistry of the self-secure occupants of the Holy Land. Herein he resembles Haggai, who repeats and assails an opinion current among the returned captives (i. 2–11); Zechariah (i. 2–6) begins with an enthymeme that conveys a mild warning; Habakkuk with a prayer (i. 1–3); while Malachi in the very first verse gives the key-note of his entire dialogistic discourse. In general the very first words of the prophets were, "Thus saith the Lord."

Our Divine Master has left us a variety of exordia. On one occasion he begins with a declaration that a certain prophecy is fulfilled by himself; on another with a denunciation of the Pharisees (Luke xi. 29); on another with the parable of the Sower (Matt. xiii. 3; see also Luke xv. 3). Now he foretells his death (Matt. xvi. 21–28); now he gives his disciples the acted parable of setting

a child down before them (Matt. xvii. 2). Then again he announces in a metaphor a startling truth (John viii. 12); and again he utters a warning against the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt. xxiii. 1). Sometimes his sermons commence with answers to questions (Matt. xxiv. 3). But of all his exordia that of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 3–16) is the most remarkable. Spoken as it was to the uninstructed disciples, most of whom entertained Hebrew notions respecting the kingdom of God, nothing could have been so opportune as to give them at the outset correct ideas of the *character*, *condition*, *position*, and *influence* of those who possess this kingdom. Tholuck calls our attention to the fact that, as when He announced Himself at Nazareth he read Isa. lxi. 1, and declared that it was fulfilled in Him, so here ver. 3 relates to the first and ver. 4 to the second of the sixty-first chapter. The thoughts of this introduction are not only linked to each other, but also to the body of the sermon.[1] Here, likewise, he indirectly attacks Pharisaical piety by showing that in all actions God chiefly regards the dispositions of the heart.

We have said that the Sermon on the Mount was addressed exclusively to the disciples. It was possibly heard by some of the multitude (ch. vii. 28–29); but it was more propably after the subsequent repetition of much of this sermon that the people showed astonishment; for parts of the same sermon were, as we may infer from comparing this narrative of Matthew with Luke vi. 17, 49, repeated to the multitude while standing on the plain at the foot of the mountain. This accounts for the ellipses in some of the beatitudes, and the omission of others (it was to be presumed that the memory of the disciples would supply all that was verbally wanting); also for the addition of four woes which could have been intended only for "the audience of the people," and particularly for the rich, luxurious, and vain pleasure-seekers and visitors from Jerusalem, Tyre, and Sidon. Admirable as these two *exordia* are, the student should beware of considering them as standards by which to test the excellence of *all* others. They are perfect *in their kind*. Let him remember that each exordium is adapted to the hearers and the subject. It will be equally profitable for him to study the introduction of Peter's sermon (Acts ii. 15), of Stephen's apology (Acts vii. 2), of Paul's sermon at Antioch (xiii. 15–41), and at Athens (xvii. 22–31), of his defence at Jerusalem (ch. xxii.), and before Felix (ch. xxiv.), and before Agrippa (ch. xxvi.). Nor should

[1] Compare v. 3, vii. 3–5; v. 5, vi. 19, 34; v. 6, v. 20, vi. 1–13; v. 7, v. 38–49; v. 8, v. 27–32; v. 9, v. 21–26, etc.

he set a small value on the exordium of Hebrews (ch. i. 1–4), and that of James (i. 2–27).

In the time of Chrysostom it was the custom for the preacher to begin his sermons with a salutation after the manner of Paul in his epistles. This was afterwards abbreviated into the mere *Pax vobis*. But the Christian fathers seem not to have reflected that what had always been considered proper at the beginning of *letters* was not necessarily so proper in the introductions of *sermons*. Yet to the honor of their manly and Christian freedom be it added that they did not bind themselves to any formality in this matter. They sometimes prefaced their discourses with short prayers, sometimes with the apostolic benediction. Chrysostom's first homily after his return from banishment is introduced with these words: "What shall I say—Blessed be God! The word which I spoke on leaving you I now repeat at my return, or rather it has not been absent from my lips. You recollect, perhaps, that I said to you in the language of Job, 'the name of the Lord be praised forever.'[1] The circumstances are different, but the praise is the same. When driven away I praised Him, returning home I praise Him." This custom of the Greek fathers was afterwards cited in support of the *Introitus*, of which more will be said presently.

From these and other examples we may learn in the first place to study variety in our *exordia*. If antiquity has not misinformed us, both Demosthenes and Cicero were in the habit of preparing at their leisure different introductions to be prefixed to their extemporaneous orations. They thus secured variety but at the expense of pertinence. That kind of exordium which might be adapted to several causes was in Quintilian's[2] time regarded with little favor, and was called *vulgar* (vulgare), although he admits that it was not always avoided by the greatest orators. Some old rhetorician or other has compared such *exordia* to the sword used at the temple of Delphi which served the double purpose of immolating the sacred victims and executing malefactors.

In order to secure a variety, introductions may, as Claude has hinted, be taken from the same "topics" as those he has mentioned for suggesting fit propositions. Indeed, Mr. Sturtevant,[3] profiting by this hint of Claude, has furnished his readers with twenty-seven "topical exordiums," besides four or five "extra-topical," to say nothing of his narrative, expository, argumentative, observational, applicatory exordia, and his seven different methods of introducing

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1 Septuagint. 2 L. iv., c. 1, sec. 71.

3 Preachers' Manual (3d ed., London, 1838), pp. 573–641.

topical introductions. But let the student bear well in mind that the greatest possible diversity requires him occasionally to proceed at once to the matter in hand, as the inspired preachers frequently did, and as Cicero sometimes did (*e. g.*, *Pro Cluentio*), and Chrysostom and Gregory Nazianzen. And yet some brief premonition is almost always necessary lest the people imagine, as Claude says, that the preacher is aiming to do with them what the angel did with the prophet, when he took him by the hair of the head and carried him in an instant from Judea to Babylon (Bel and the Dragon, 36).

The next in importance is the rule: To adapt the exordium to the spirit, matter, and form of the sermon. The inspired examples of discourse at once suggest and illustrate this rule.

1. "If," says Claude, "the subject be sad and affecting, and your aim is to excite the compassion, grief and tears of your audience, you must commence accordingly. If you treat of a profound and difficult mystery, aim to diffuse elevation and wonder among your hearers. If some terrible example of God's justice be the subject, endeavour to stir up fear."

2. The same authority counsels us to take care to put nothing here that is foreign to our subject, and to connect the *whole* of the exordium with *all* the matter of the text. Claude lays down this rule on the supposition that every sermon is naturally to grow out of *all* the text. It cannot, of course, apply to the composition of all topical sermons. A more general rule is that of Cicero, that every exordium ought to convey an intimation of the whole matter in hand.

3. But do not here display a knowledge of rhetoric as Segneri does (Quaresimale, ser. iii.). Hence introductions should not anticipate matter that belongs to the other parts of sermons, but rather, by general and admitted statements, prepare the way for the proposition; *e. g.*, in a sermon on family prayer we may begin by saying that true piety honors God in everything.

4. The exordium should in length and style be proportioned to the length and style of the sermon. Cicero thinks it often advisable in small and unimportant causes to begin with the subject-matter itself without any preface. Dr. Blair has borrowed and elaborated this fruitful illustration of Pindar and the great Roman orator:[2] "Nothing can be more absurd than to erect a very great portico before a small building; and it is no less absurd to overcharge with superb ornaments the portico of a plain dwelling-house, or to make the entrance of a monument as gay as that of an arbour." But still Pindar is not to be disputed when he

2 De Oratore L. ii., c. lxxix.; compare Pindar's Olympiads, Ode vi.

says that a *stately mansion* should have a well-built portal supported by golden pillars.

Another rule, often repeated, is that the exordium should be accommodated to the mental state in which the audience are found to be at the beginning of the sermon. This rule is less important than the last; for the preacher is always expected to consult the demands of his subject before giving heed to any other consideration. As, however, he may on many occasions safely and advantageously adapt his exodium both to his subject and to the first thoughts and feelings of his hearers, he will find the following remarks not unworthy of his attention.

(1.) It may in general be presupposed that *the congregation* are at the beginning of sermon-time calm and dispassionate. We are accordingly told that here we should avoid apostrophies, exclamations, bold interrogations and surprising paradoxes. And yet the simile, the parable, and the supposition are here allowable. Nor should the student think that his introduction should be devoid of all feeling. So far from this, more feeling may often be expressed here than in the explication and confirmation of the subject. The exodium and the peroration are, according to Cicero,[1] the two parts which are to be devoted to excitation. But Quintilian[2] has made an important distinction as to the degrees of excitation which these two parts of a speech allows: "In the introduction the kind feelings of the judge should be touched but cautiously and modestly; while in the peroration we may give full scope to the pathetic." Hence Segneri is wrong when he begins one of his sermons (Quaresimale, ser. xiv.) with the words: "Either hell or penance."

There are many occasions, however, when Cicero's rule is to be received without Quintilian's distinction and the cautions of later writers. The *exordia* of some of the prophets and apostles are, to the full, as animated as any other parts of their speeches. See also Cicero's first and second orations against Catiline, that against Vatinius, against L. C. Piso, against T. A. Milo and the Eleventh Philippic. One of Chrysostom's sermons is reported[3] to have begun with these words: "Again Herodias raves; again she is troubled; she dances again; and again desires to receive John's head in a charger." This is said to have been spoken in allusion to the hostility of Eudoxia towards the bishop.[4] Fenelon preached a sermon

1 De Partitiones, secs. 1 and 8. 2 Inst. Ora., L. iv., c. i., sec. 28.

3 Socrates, Eccl. Hist., L. vi., c. xviii.

4 See also Chrysostom's Homily *Contra Circenses et Theatra*, beginning *Ταῦτα ἀνεκτά*, vol. vi., 314, Paris ed. See again the exhortations and objurgations in the exordia of his Homilies on Genesis.

for Epiphany on Isa lx. 1, "Rise shine," etc., in which he commences thus: "Blessed be God who has this day put his word into my mouth to praise the work which he accomplishes in this house. I have, I must confess, long desired to pour out my heart before these altars and to speak to the praise of divine grace, all that he wrought in the apostolic men who have enlightened the East. It is then in a transport of joy that I speak to-day of the call of the Gentiles in this house whence went forth the men by whom the rest of the Gentiles have been made to hear the glad tidings."

For funeral sermons pathetic *exordia* are natural. In these, as in the Lamentations of Jeremiah, the anti-climax is not only allowable but often unavoidable. After these abatements it may still be said, in general, that the milder feelings, Τὰ ἤθη, belong to the exordium, and the more vehement feelings, Τὰ πάθη, belong to the peroration. Even Chrysostom (*e. g.*, 6th Hom. on Philippians) raises expectations in the introduction which he afterwards disappoints.

(2.) The young preacher should consider that what seems a little abrupt to himself will appear still more abrupt to the congregation. "His own interest in the subject," says Schott, "was not sudden and instantaneous, but arose by degrees; therefore he should not expect that his hearers will enter into the subject with the same zeal which he has acquired by having passed through a prolonged study of it. They must observe the same law of gradation which he followed." The rule Charles Wolfe adopted for his own guidance was: "Begin naturally and easily, but so as to excite curiosity. Begin in an original and striking but sedate manner."

One principal object in an exordium is to gain and secure attention. Among the things that draw attention are reverence and modesty. Simeon advised his students to adopt such a tone of voice as they would naturally choose if they were speaking to persons older than themselves and to whom they owed reverence. Vinet would have the preacher even timid, but with this distinction of Marmontel, that he should be timid for himself, but bold for his cause. Another way to make people give ear is to set out with a popular saying, objection, difficulty, apparent contradiction, excuse, or question, which is to be afterwards disposed of. (See Chalmers's sermon on the Golden Rule, Matt. vii. 12.) A fact or short narrative is sometimes sufficient to seize and enchain the minds of an audience (Segneri, *Quaresimale*, Pred. 28); thus Wolfe preferred some incident or anecdote for an exordium. Padre Segneri and Dr. Ogden begin sermons with fables, and Adolphe

Monod one of his best (that on 1 John iv. 8) with a fact as the basis of a supposition. Segneri in one case (*Quaresimale*, Pred. 11) sets out with a dissimilitude. Some are in the habit of formally asking attention; for this they are supported by the authority of some inspired preachers.[1]

The transition from the exordium to the proposition should be short and easy. For the reason that the matter of their introduction is either irrelevant or badly arranged, some preachers appear to leap a very broad chasm when they pass from their exordium; and a written or printed discourse of theirs seems, when read, not unlike a temple from which the portico has been separated by an earthquake.

We will only add that the best authorities concur in the opinion that the exordium should not be chosen and planned until the principal matter of the sermon be *selected* and *arranged*. This is accordant with Cicero's[2] example and advice: "Quod primum est dicendum postremum soleo cogitare." Some forbid us to dream of the introduction until the rest of the discourse has been *written*. But Vinet thinks this mode of proceeding is not natural, as a good exordium prepares the orator to compose, as well as the congregation to hear. And yet he approves Cicero's method. If, however, we thus write our exordium, we are compelled to begin to arrange and to express those thoughts first which have occupied our minds the shortest time. Now, as a good exordium is confessedly very difficult to compose, and the success of the sermon so much depends upon its beginning, it is but fair to allow the preacher the longest possible time for pondering its materials, and for making such changes in them as the composition of the rest may happen to suggest. Few sketches are so complete as to admit no improvement from such after-thoughts as may make it very desirable either to modify the exordium we had premeditated, or to invent another which shall be essentially different from it. But if we make the explication of the text serve for an exordium (a custom of the English preachers, which Claude condemns, but which is sometimes very convenient), then we ought undoubtedly to write the exposition first, and that so carefully as not to demand any material alterations; for if we afterwards disturb this foundation we throw part of our building out of course, and run the hazard of bringing the whole superstructure down to the ground.

A synchronism (a figure which expresses the first things by

[1] Micah i. 2; Joel i. 2; Acts vii. 2.

[2] De Orat., L. ii., c. lxxvii., lxxviii. "The last thing one finds out is what to put first."—*Pascal.*

the first words, and the last things by the last words) makes a good introduction, *e. g.*, "We will begin where the Lord begins with us;" "The Scriptures first reveal the doctrine," etc.

No introductions are more effective than those which are suggested by time, or place, or circumstances. How opportune was that of St. Paul, at Athens, in which he makes an inscription he had just read on an altar the text of his address—an exordium which we will the more admire when we remember that the Athenians "heard with their eyes and saw with their ears." As such introductions have always been *ex tempore*, few of them have descended to us: Chrysostom, Vieyra, Walker, and Whitefield,[1] have left us some very happy *exordia* of this kind. The authenticity of the celebrated introduction which is ascribed to Brydayne has been called in question. John Munro, of Halkirk, Scotland, is reported to have begun a sermon on Psa. xlv. 2, with these words: "Coming here this afternoon, I was struck with the loveliness of creation. The green fields, the sparkling brooks, the blossoming hedges, were all smiling and rejoicing in the sunshine. Seeing the fairness of the creation, I thought of the Fair One who made and upholds all things, and who, while fair in his work of creation, is infinitely more so in his work of redemption. I remembered the fairness of his divinity, and the fairness of his humanity. Was he not fair in the manger, fair in the cradle, fair in his life, fair in his death? Yea, so fair is he that my whole soul was led captive by him, and began to preach him to the birds of the air, and now I will preach him to this congregation." Yet we must not think that such *exordia* are to be had by seeking; like the wings of the morning, they can easily dart down upon us, but we can never soar to meet them.

We will only add that in commemorative and other elaborate sermons for extraordinary occasions, we should bear in mind the old proverb, that "The vestibule is the ornament of a house."

Subsection I.—The Introitus.

In the later Latin church this term was applied to the psalm which was sung whilst the priest was entering within the rails of the altar; but in the Lutheran church it designated the salutation with which the preacher began his sermon, usually consisting of a Scripture benediction or doxology. Old writers[2] treat of it as the first part

1 Foster's Life, vol. ii., p. 315.

2 Carpzovius, in Hodegeticum, p. 24; Goebelius in Method., Hom. chap. xvi.; Titulus i.; Hülsemanns, in Orat. Eccles., chap. vi., p. 2, 3.

of the exordium, and designate two kinds: the one the common or fixed, because it was more usually employed; and the other the special, as varying in accommodation to particular themes. They give such texts from the Psalms or the Prophets as are commonly quoted by way of introitus, *e. g.*, Psa. xcv. 1, 2; xcvi. 8, 9; cv. 1–5; cviii. 8; Isa. i. 2; xlix. 13; lx. 1, 2; lxvi. 10—; Habak. iii. 20; Amos. iii. 8; Jer. vi. 8; ix. 12; Mich. vi. 9. A special introitus might be selected for any church festival; but it was considered essential to every one, whether fixed or special, that it should conclude with three things: a benediction or salutation, an indication of the theme, and an imploration of divine aid.

This formal prelude found its source in the apostolic epistles, in the homilies of Chrysostom, and the other Greek fathers; but as already shown, the example of these fathers, and of the apostles encourages a very large liberty as to this and other parts of the exordium.

Subsection II.—The Nexus.

The Nexus or connection is that part of a sermon which aims to elucidate the text by showing its relation to the context, near or remote. When the text is explained by a copious discussion of the scope and design of the sacred writer in the subject-matter connected with the text, the result often is not a nexus but an expository exodium; for the former should be very brief, and in the best sermons consists of a few remarks preceding the transitus. Many texts demand no such explanation; and those that do should, for the most part, be the made the subject of a regular explication, for, as Claude too truly remarks, the hearers almost always pass over the nexus and receive very little instruction from it. But still there are very many important texts which will not be understood by the mass of our hearers unless we trace their relation to some near or remote passage, *e. g.*, 2 Cor. xii. 9; 2 Pet. i. 4. Indeed, not a few sermons are so composed as to be little other than an amplified nexus, as almost all the subject-matter is suggested by the verses foregoing or following. Such is frequently the case when the text is a part of a parable or Scripture history. It is an excellent rule to *treat every text according to the sense it bears in its connection;* and hence when a text is to be treated in a secondary sense or application it is advisable, if possible, to quote it in that place where it is employed in such secondary import or use; so that if we wish to apply it to other analagous cases by way of accommodation, our justification for so doing will not be far to seek.

Subsection III.—The Transitus.

A Transitus is defined by Schott as "that part of the discourse which develops the connection between the theme and the text. . . . It is not the elucidation of the text as such, but is that part of the sermon which is neccessary for showing the pertinency of the proposition to the text, or the fact that the former is involved in the latter. If the proposition be derived directly and obviously from the text, it demands only such a brief transitus as shall unfold the intermediate idea uniting the two; but if it be derived indirectly and by inference, it requires a more extended illustration of the process by which it is deduced from, and of its precise relevancy to the text. The shorter the transitus so much the better, if it fully demonstrates the fitness of the theme to the words by which it was dictated or suggested. If the transitus be long it has, like the *nexus*, the appearance of a second exordium."

The transitus of English and French sermons usually forms a part of the exordium, particularly when the exordium follows the text and is expository. Then the transitus will naturally close the explication and, as Schott says,[1] "they may be considered as forming a single part of the discourse, in other words, as uniting in a compound exordium. If the reading of the text be deferred to the close of the exordium (as is customary in the German pulpit), then the development of the subject from the text constitutes a subordinate but distinct part of the sermon. When the two parts are thus separated by the intervening text, they may still have the same influence on the sermon, but they have each a distinct designation." But wherever the transitus is placed, it is frequently necessary, and the preliminary considerations it should contain prepare the hearers to understand the rest of the discourse. Nor is this all. Something like a transitus may sometimes be demanded at the beginning of one or more of the leading divisions of the sermon.

The divines of the seventeenth century,[2] strange as it may appear to us, were taught that the exordium might sometimes be properly placed before the *application;* but we should remember that then an entire sermon was often devoted to uses; occasionally, however, this precept might be observed in the more brief sermons of the modern fashion.

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[1] Dr. Park's condensed translation of his *Theorie der Beredsamkeit*, Bib. Sac., vol. v., pp. 735, 737.

[2] William Ames, Medulla Theologica, L. i., chap. xxxv., sec. 59.

Section II.—Of the Proposition.

The statement of the subject of a sermon, or of the doctrine of its text, is commonly termed the proposition. It is not a little remarkable that none of the inspired speakers formally announce their propositions, and that but two or three have embodied them in such forms of expression as may be examined apart from the body of the address. Various but unsatisfactory attempts have been made to specify the verse or verses in the Sermon on the Mount which express the fundamental theme. The same may be said of all endeavours to find out the propositions in the other sermons of our Lord, and in most of Paul's speeches. The proposition in Paul's speech before Felix is given in Acts xxiv. 25. Bengel, with doubtful propriety, puts forward Psa. viii. 5–9, as the proposition of the epistle to the Hebrews, but the same great scholar has with admirable success sought the theme of the epistle of James in chap. i. 19, "Let every man be swift to HEAR, slow to SPEAK, slow to WRATH." We are inclined to the opinion that Heb. vi. 1–3 was intended for a proposition embracing seven subjects (under that of perfection) which are treated in a free and somewhat disconnected way in this epistle, and in First and Second Corinthians successively. Without here attempting to show the grounds of our opinion, we may paraphrase the proposition thus: "Therefore leaving the doctrine of the origin of Christ, let us go on unto the doctrine of perfection, but in our way not throwing down (but rather building) the foundation of repentance from dead works, and of faith towards God; of baptisms, of teaching, and of laying on of hands (or conferring spiritual gifts), and of the resurrection of the dead, and of eternal judgment. And this will we do if God permit."

The proposition is, according to rhetoricians, the ultimate conclusion to be established. The premises or propositions of an enthymeme are by them called arguments. Of the real nature of propositions Mr. Mill has given us a philosophical account in his Logic. "In every proposition," says he, "is asserted or denied one or other of these five things: Existence, co-existence, sequence, causation, resemblance." Rhetorical propositions have received various names, two of which are of the most practical importance, viz., the *analytic* and the *synthetic*. The former are such as contain the proof within themselves, or the proof of which is derived from the very terms of the propositions; the latter are such as depend for proof on some fact or reason outside of themselves. By these

two terms we also designate two methods of argumentation. When we adopt the first we begin by laying down the main proposition, and then resolve it into its elements; in other words, we place foremost the conclusion and then go back to the premises whence it is derived. When we adopt the second we gradually establish premiss after premiss, and then finally create our conclusion out of them; in other words, we reach our proposition by inducing our hearers to make a series of concessions which necessarily conduct us to it by way of inference. Schott recommends this method when the proposition is unwelcome to the hearers, but thinks it is not appropriate for subjects which require much time for their full exhibition. Vinet, on the contrary, would scarcely permit the preacher to employ synthetic arguments. "When," says he, "we have only to reduce an adversary to silence, this method, to which Socrates has given his name, may certainly be employed with great propriety. We remark it in many of our Lord's discourses; but it is interesting to observe that he uses it rather to confound his unprincipled adversaries than to instruct well-disposed hearers." But Vinet here takes but a one-sided view of this method of reasoning. The fact is that our Lord employed it on various occasions, and not a few of his parables are in effect examples of synthetic reasoning.

But to return to our subject. There are three other classes of propositions which are worthy of mention, and either one of which may sometimes be employed by the preacher. One class of propositions consists of the mere names of the subjects of discourse. They do not differ from what is called the theme; as, "The Necessity of Regeneration." To another class belong those propositions which are expressed in a complete sentence. In this class are found two kinds: the categorical, wherein is an assertion which must be followed by proof, as, "Obedience without love is like a body without a soul;" the hypothetical, which asks a question or proposes a problem for the hearers to solve, as, "Is there at the present day a class of nominal Christians who in character and life resemble the Pharisees?" The third class consists of a union of the first two classes with an ellipsis, as, "The necessity of regeneration in order to the beatific vision of Christ." Reinhard, who was too ambitious to preach many sermons on one text, so as never to go beyond the lessons for the day, taught that the theme must be wholly contained in the text, but not be immediately upon the face of it, nor be a subtlety.

Some sermons admit of more than one proposition. Samuel Rutherford once preached before the House of Commons a very long and elaborate sermon from Dan. vi. 26, in which he takes up

in succession each clause of his text, and devotes to it a separate exposition, proposition, or "doctrine," confirmation, and series of uses. His method does not prevent him from being very eloquent in some of his applications. He seems to have borrowed his method in this discourse from Wm. Ames (Lat. Amesius), who employed it in all his sermons. Faulty as it is, it may be safely recommended to be adopted *for a season* to those preachers who have formed a habit of expounding vaguely and without end or aim.

We are advised by some ancient rhetoricians[1] occasionally to dispense with the statement of the proposition; but Aristotle says that the proposition and proof are the two parts which are absolutely necessary to every discourse. Demosthenes often omits it; and yet in his first Philippic and some other orations he states his theme immediately after his exordium. In some argumentative discourses the proposition may wisely be withheld until near the end of the sermon. Schott's counsel on this point is worth repeating: "In occasional sermons and in homilies the preacher may omit the regular proposition, and may indicate his main theme by his mode of transition to it. But in his ordinary discourses he should retain the formal proposition. The use of it gives definiteness and precision to the ideas of the audience; it excites their curiosity and stimulates their attention."

The question whether it should be laid down at the beginning or reserved till the end of the discourse, has been virtually answered in that part of the section which determines when the premises and when the conclusion should come first.

Section III.—Of the Partition.

According to Cicero[2] the partition is the explanation of the manner in which the speaker intends to handle a case, indicating, in one part of it, the points on which both parties are agreed, and in the other of those points on which they differ. He taught that a good partition rendered the whole oration clear and intelligible. In his oration for Roscius (§11), the partition is introduced by questions. Partition, as defined by Quintilian,[3] is the enumeration (*ordine collata*) in methodical succession of our own propositions or those of our adversary, or both.

Hitherto questions as to this part of the sermon have been decided by an appeal to classical precepts and examples. But we should consider that they are not ultimate authorities in homileti-

1 Quint., L. iv., c. iv., §2. 2 *De Inventione*, L. i., c. xxii. 3 L. iv., c. v.

cal matters. There are indeed some kinds of sermons which so nearly resemble the ethnic oration that the same rules on this point apply equally to both.

In none of the sacred speeches do we find any partition. Nor is the method indicated by any signs of division. The modern division of the Scriptures into chapters and verses does more to conceal than to reveal their method. Indeed this method is of such a nature as to derive little or no assistance from any marks that have as yet been invented.

It is well worth observing, however, that throughout the Scriptures partition has reference not to parts of texts or subjects or discourses, but to *thoughts*, and is somewhat of the nature of the rhetorical enumeration or recapitulation. (See Prov. vi. 16–19; xxx. 7, 15, 18, 21, 24, 29; Isa. xlvii. 9; li. 19; Jer. ii. 13; Ezek. xiv. 21; Amos i. 3, 6, 9, 11, 13; ii. 1, 4, 6; 1 Cor. xiii. 13; Gal. iv. 24; Heb. vi. 18.) Here from two to seven thoughts are enumerated with the utmost brevity, and with the evident intention thereby to impress them not only on the heart but the memory. And if there be any rule respecting division more valuable than all the rest, it is the one we here deduce. Brief partitions are useful in any part of a discourse where it is desirable to divide and arrange *thoughts* in order to render them more emphatic or to fix them in the memory. Thus might many religious truths be converted into proverbs which the people could not forget if they would. What but a partition has rendered immortal Luther's *three* things which make a good preacher, *oratio*, *meditatio*, *tentatio*. It is a noteworthy fact that preachers have sometimes chosen the passages above referred to as texts of sermons, and made these divisions of *thoughts* so many distinct parts of their discourses. Thus Edmondson has left us a sermon on Prov. vi. 16–19, which is separated into seven parts corresponding to the number and order of the seven thoughts which the text conveys. Had it been the purpose of those preachers to imitate the Scripture style (and we have no proof that it was) they could have effected it only by following the rule we have just stated.

These instances of partition may also teach us not to be too precise and formal in our divisions. It is remarkable that the last thought in most of these examples has the appearance of an *after-thought*. A somewhat different semblance of after-thought is seen in that passage of John (1 epistle ii. 12–17) where the apostle addresses three classes of believers. As if recollecting some things which he wished to add for the instruction of the "little children" and "young men," he returns to them, addressing them in the same order as before, and merely repeating what he has already

said to the "fathers." Then, as if bethinking himself again, he returns once more to the "little children," and bestows upon them fresh evidences of his pastoral solicitude. These things will at least justify the preacher for departing from the previously arranged number and order of his thoughts in all cases where the needs of his audience, or the demands of his theme as afterwards discovered, or the free action of his mind may require it. And yet this gives no countenance to that abuse of *correctio* which is committed by those preachers who frequently give to their audiences two or three more heads of discourse than they promised them in the partition.

The plans of the inspired discourses are almost always cryptic. How shall we account for this? It were a superficial view of the subject to say that it is owing to the structure and habits of the Oriental minds which the Divine Spirit condescended thus to move. For it yet remains to be proved that the minds of the Orient are by nature less fond of method than those of the Occident. Those great educators of Mediæval Europe, the Saracens, were excessively fond of method—a fondness which is not fully explained by the fact that they derived much of their science and culture from classic Greece. The truth of the matter appears to be this: All method as an object of separate consideration is the want which is created by some degree of mental discipline. It is principally felt in and created by didactics. Now the mass of mankind in all nations ever have been and probably ever must be destitute of this discipline. Nor can we suppose that it was intended that the contents of the Bible should produce their legitimate effects upon the the human family by being communicated to them didactically either as to matter or as to form. The sacred speakers and orators aimed principally to convict, move, and persuade. They instructed for one or more of these ends. The Holy Inspirer who was in them, knowing how useless and even dangerous is the mere study of facts, theories, and precepts, breathed the breath of life and the fire of activity into all their teachings. The Creative Spirit was less desirous of showing order in the instruments and modes than in the results of his operations—than in bringing moral order out of the chaos of the human creation.

Plans and divisions, therefore, belong principally to invention, which in the post-apostolic preacher partly makes up for plenary inspiration. And this part of invention is mainly useful to the preacher himself and particularly in the work of explication. For had it been directly useful to the hearers, all things considered, we may reasonably suppose that the sacred speakers would neither have

neglected nor concealed the practice of methodical arrangement. The precepts and examples of the best human authorities favor the announcement of divisions, and the mentioning of them from point to point as the sermon advances. When they are well chosen they do undoubtedly assist the perception and memory of the hearer. Reinhard tells us that there were citizens' wives among his academic hearers who could from Sabbath to Sabbath give a minute account of each discourse they heard, with all its divisions and subdivisions. Whether these wonderful feats of memory were coupled with proportional volitions of the heart and transformations of life, this great analytical preacher does not inform us. Reinhard vindicates his practice on the ground that to impart instruction is the principal object of preaching. Had he maintained that it was *one* of the objects of preaching, and that for didactic sermons order and arrangement are very useful, his reasoning would have been more sound and convincing. But let no one infer from what we have said that we regard it necessary to advise the student to shun altogether the example and precepts of the great German preacher; so far from this, his sermons and confessions should be read and even studied by all who would excel in the choice of themes and in rhetorical disposition. In the announcement of divisions favorite numbers and phrases should be avoided. Reinhard himself was too fond of the figures four and two, six and three, and even the free-souled Whitefield was in the habit of announcing his last head thus: "I shall conclude with an exhortation to all of you, high and low, rich and poor, one with another." A preacher of our time secures a variety and other advantages by occasionally reserving his partition for the end of the first division, as follows: "We have considered generally the resurrection of the dead. Our remaining divisions will be,

II. The sea giving up its dead.

III. The meeting of the dead so given up of the sea, with the dead of the land.

So John Foster in his lecture on "Access to God." Others sometimes give a long and complete partition of their subject, and then state that they intend to treat only two or three points, which they immediately repeat.

Cicero[1] did not, as some have asserted, totally condemn the practice of announcing the partition. He only condemned such long ones as burden the memory of the hearers, and being so confined to them as never to indulge in a digression. Quintilian[2] would have us always announce it.

[1] De Parti., c. viii.; De Orat., L. ii., c. xix. [2] Inst. Orat., L. iv., c., v. sec. 4.

Fenelon has frequently been cited as an opponent to partitions in general; whereas it is evident from a comparison of all that he says on the subject that he is only opposed to the antithetic and otherwise exceedingly artificial partitions which characterized the sermons of the most popular preachers of his time. He obviously has in mind this ingenious (*heureuse*) division which B. repeats near the beginning of the dialogue: "I. Though the dust be a sign of repentance, it is a principle of happiness. II. Though it seems to degrade us, it is really a source of honor. III. Though it represents death, it is a medicine which makes us immortal." Fenelon is condemning partitions of this kind—partitions such as La Bruyere[1] has quoted and ridiculed. It is unfair to quote a single passage[2] of this great writer, as Blair, Vinet, and others have done, regardless of what he says elsewhere in the same dialogue. He does certainly express himself too roundly when he says that Isocrates did not follow the rules of division; for we elsewhere show that he taught his disciples that division was the very first step in the process of invention, and that in his celebrated Panegyric he employs a partition. It might likewise be proved from Cicero and other ancient orators that divisions of all kinds are not "a modern invention, which we owe to the scholastic divines."[3]

It is nevertheless true that the extremely artificial partitions of the French preachers of the best class are not authorized by the example of any of the ancient orators. Indeed, he acknowledges that such is the dullness (*grossièreté*) of these last times that they do not perceive the order of a discourse, unless the speaker explain it in the introduction, and come to a stand-still at each successive point. But Fenelon's opinion concerning divisions is best expressed in his comment on the partition above quoted. "When," says he, "we choose to divide a subject we should do it plainly, and naturally. We should make such a division as is all contained in the subject itself—a division which elucidates and methodizes the matter, which may be easily remembered, and at the same time help to recall all the rest; in brief, a division which exhibits the extent of the subject and of its parts. Exactly the opposite is the course of this man here who endeavours to dazzle you at the

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[1] Caractérs, chap. xv.; De La Chaire.

[2] Dialogues sur L'Eloquence, second Dial., beginning "B. Vous nous avez dèja parlé."

[3] In Cicero's oration for Murena the partition is as follows: "The whole accusation, O Judges, as it appears to me, may be reduced to three heads: one consists in objections to his former life; another refers to his contest for the dignity of the consulship, the third to charges of bribery."

outset, to put you off with three epigrams or three enigmas, which he turns and turns again so dexterously that you fancy you are witnessing some tricks of legerdemain." Nor is this all: we have Fenelon's own example in favor of partitions. Each of his six published sermons has *two* points, and each of his "entretiens" *three* points, which he announces in the proper place, according to the custom of the French preachers of his day, but with less formality and fewer antitheses than Bourdaloue and Massillon are accustomed to do. We may add that the most eloquent of Italian preachers, Paul Segneri, was in the habit of omitting his partitions, and of only mentioning the successive points when he came to discuss them.

When a pastor succeeds to another who wore out the patience of some and deepened the spiritual sleep of others by too great uniformity in his partitions, it might not be imprudent to study some variety in them. This would certainly prove more useful to his flock than any attempt to dispense with them. Besides the expedient of apprising the hearers of the partition at the close of the first general division, there are two others which would answer a good purpose in certain kinds of discourses, particularly the controversial and hortatory, and such others as exhibit the subject by comparison, or supposition, or contrast. *First.* The partition may be formally made and announced, but not afterwards employed to mark the divisions of the discourse, but only borne in mind by speaker and hearer for the sake of the distinctions it contains; *e. g.*, a hortatory sermon on Matt. xi. 12 might sometimes begin with the partition that a city may be taken either by siege or by storm, and then proceed to contrast the two methods as illustrating two common ways of seeking a saving interest in Christ, and point each contrast with a "continuous application." *Secondly.* The partition may be deferred until the close of the sermon, and then given the form of a recapitulation. In cases where it is the principal thing to impress the parts of a subject on the memory of the hearer, and at the same time to avoid all checks upon an extemporaneous freedom of address, nothing can be more effectual than a partition thus placed.

Section IV.—Of the Invocation.

By invocation we here designate those short prayers for divine aid in preaching and hearing which are offered sometimes at the close of exordia, sometimes immediately after partitions. We find no examples in Scripture eloquence to justify making an invo-

cation in one part of a sermon in preference to another. The holy prophets break forth into prayers in a most informal manner in all parts of their discourses. Jeremiah often betrays his devotional feelings by passing from animated assertions to petition and praise (ii. 13; vi. 14; viii. 11, 22; xvii. 13). The Greek and Latin fathers are as free and irregular in their invocations as in the general arrangement of their homilies and sermons. Augustine sometimes begins his exordia with short prayers for ability to expound the Scriptures, and occasionally coupled with a request to the people to assist him with their prayers for the same object. Origen makes short prayers not only in the beginning of his homilies, but sometimes also when in the course of his interpretations he meets with an obscure passage of Scripture.

The custom of the French preachers is to offer an invocation immediately after the partition. The nature of their invocations is too well known to need exemplification. The German preachers, who often deliver their exordia before they take their texts, not unfrequently offer their invocations either at the close of their exordia, or immediately after taking their texts. Sometimes the invocation is silent. Reinhard, at the end of the exordium of his sermon on the Unity of the Lutheran Church, has the following invocation: "May the Spirit of God be with us, and cause us with glad amazement to contemplate his holy work in our Church with his blessed, ever-during rule in it! Let us in silent devotion implore his grace." He then announces his text—Eph. iv. 3. Van Der Palm[1] always takes his text first, and then delivers his exordium, while his invocation (which is commonly rather long) is sometimes placed before and sometimes after his partition. For the composition of this part of a sermon two short rules will suffice. 1. Let it flow sincerely and freely from the heart. 2. Let it be suited to the subject of discourse. Romaine has left us many examples of skilful *transition* from the invocation to the partition. He always places the former before the latter.

We cannot approve the course of those who always omit the invocation, nor of those who never in any part of their discourses make ejaculations. How are such preachers shamed by the example of Demosthenes, through all of whose orations, and particularly through his greatest, the oration on the Crown, there breathes a spirit of deep reverence towards the gods of his people. Of Pericles, who always spoke with equal thought and feeling, and who was called the Olympian, because his eloquence was like thunder

[1] Life and Sermons, translated by the Rev. J. P. Westervelt, and published by Messrs. Hurd & Houghton, New York.

and lightning, Plutarch[1] says that the secret of his superiority to others was that "he was very careful what and how he was to speak, insomuch that whenever he went up to the platform he prayed the gods that no one word might unawares slip from him unsuitable to the matter and the occasion." And the younger Pliny introduces his Panegyric of Trajan with these very remarkable words: "Conscript fathers: Well and wisely was it ordained by our ancestors that, as in our actions, so in our speeches we should begin with prayer; since mortals cannot undertake anything rightly and prudently without the power, the counsel, and the approbation of the immortal gods." Cicero,[2] in his oration for Cornelius, makes an invocation, and in his oration for Roscius (§11) the invocation is in the form of an interrogation.

The Scripture speeches are distinguishable from all others, whether religious or secular, by this among other things, that they contain no prayers *for inspiration*. The reason for this will be very evident to any one who considers that all these communications from God must *begin* with inspired words. And hence the sacred speakers never express any sense of the worth of a divine *afflatus* while they are preaching. On one occasion[3] we find the primitive Church praying for Peter and John that they may speak the word with all boldness—a prayer which is immediately answered; but this was something very different from the post-apostolic invocation which naturally and reasonably came into the sermon as soon as plenary inspiration had passed out of it, and was itself an acknowledgment that the latter was no longer needed or expected.

A free and unpremeditated invocation often obtains of the Father of Lights grace that would have been denied to one that was formal and premeditated; but when we do premeditate an invocation we should avoid raising too high an expectation as to *us*. Thus Segneri (Quaresimale, ser. xiv.) prays the great God to lend him the keys of hell, so that he may show to his audience the prison of the damned.

Section V.—Of the Development.

In general this term denotes the rhetorical amplification of every part of a skeleton, but here it signifies that part of the sermon which is commonly devoted to explication and conviction. It is

1 Lives, vol. i. 2 See chap. vii., Pt. i. of Prayer as a Means of Inspiration.
3 Acts iv. 29-31.

also not unfrequently termed "The Discussion" or "the Body of the Discourse." The discussion naturally follows the invocation, and may in general be said to occupy in sermons that place which in judicial orations and argumentative compositions is given to narration and proof.

This part commonly occupies too much space in modern sermons. The discourses of the best of the ancient preachers were pretty equally divided between exposition and application. Three very distinguished and successful preachers, Francis V. Reinhard and Jonathan Edwards and Andrew Fuller, first explain, secondly prove, thirdly apply. This is not, however, their uniform practice. Thus much may be said in general, that doctrinal and controversial sermons will admit of discussions the most extended, and commendatory and hortatory sermons the least extended.

But whether the discussion be long or short, let it by all means be Biblical. Many a preacher falls into the habit of devoting this part of his sermon to a free and full expression of his own peculiar views of his subject, including its relations to his favourite system of theology, his darling theory of psychology, or his approved code of Christian ethics. Or if he would be very popular, he now entertains his large congregation with echoes of their one-sided sentiments concerning the social, commercial, or political questions of the day. In either case the divine authority is apt to be crowded out of the minds of the audience to make room for the more welcome authority of man. "The prophets of the Old Testament," says the Rev. John Davison,[1] "lay the practice of religion and virtue where the teachers of the New Testament have laid it—upon faith in the revelation of the Divine Will. . . An operose deduction may convince the understanding without disposing to practice; nay, it often happens that the greater is the success of the intellect in eliciting a principle or rule of duty, the less is its impression on the springs of conduct; the reason of which may be, that the mind is wearied before it is satisfied, and the spirit of action is gone before the theory is settled. Let the same truth be dictated by the word of God, it puts on a new meaning; and if the maxim be true that 'all knowledge is power,' the knowledge which is to give the impulse to duty takes its greatest sway and momentum as derived immediately from His paramount wisdom and will." On the contrary, we may add, philosophical preaching affords matter for doubt and contradiction, which multitudes prefer to faith and obedience.

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[1] Warburton Lectures on Prophecy, p. 66.

Section VI.—Of the Conclusion.

The term Conclusion, as applied to a sermon, designates the last part of it, without defining the extent of that part. Among the modern Italian preachers the last *half* of the discourse is called the peroration or conclusion, because it is chiefly occupied with applications. The usage of English writers authorises us to employ the term either in the comprehensive sense of the "improvement," or in the restricted sense of the last paragraph or sentence. As that part of our discourses to which the application is assigned is exceedingly varied as to length (too frequently little short of nothing), the word has received a corresponding elasticity of import.

The conclusions of the Scripture preachers, like their introductions, are marked by an admirable variety and fitness. As an appropriate conclusion grows out of the body of the discourse, its excellences cannot be duly estimated without a study of all that goes before. And hence a full and sufficient discussion of the inspired perorations would involve a rhetorical examination of the entire sermons to which they belong. Our limits deny us so pleasant and instructive a task; but the student should make such an examination for himself if he would acquire the highest ideas of their indescribable pertinence, gracefulness, and force.

As these conclusions have not, in a single instance, any announced beginnings, we cannot quote them without exposing ourselves to the charge of misjudgment from some and of dogmatism from others. We may, then, be permitted to say beforehand, and once for all, that we do not here presume to mark in every case the transition from the body of the discourse to the peroration. Nor is it a work of less difficulty to classify under a few heads so great a diversity of conclusions; and yet it seems desirable and profitable to give some general views of the different kinds, although it were a labour of months to regard them in all their rhetorical aspects.

The preacher who would be led and taught by the Spirit rather than by the ethnic rhetoricians, will be glad to study the Scripture perorations. Though the limits of these inspired sermons must in some cases be conjectural, yet the following classification of conclusions, however imperfect, will, we trust, be thought instructive. Among these we find those which are either composed of or contain promises: Lev. xxvi. 40–45; Deut. iv. 29–40; Isa. lx.; Jer. xxxi. 31–40; Ezek. xxviii. 24, 26; xxix. 13–16; Obadiah 17–21; Warnings, Deut. viii. 7–20; Blessings and Cursing, Deut. xxviii. 1–68; xxx. 15–20; Denunciation, followed by Supplication, Jer. x.

17, 18; 19–25; Songs of Praise foretold, Isa. xii. xxvi. 1–19; the Prosperity of Christ's Kingdom foretold, Isa. xxxv., lx; Prayer, Isa. lxiv.; John xvii.; Acts xxvi. 29; Heb. xiii. 20–21; Expressions of Regret, Isa. xlviii. 18; Lamentations, Ezek. xix.; Matt. xxiii. 37; Contrasts, Deut. xxviii. 1–68; xxx. 15–20; Isa. xviii. 18–22; li. 17; xlii. 1, 13; lvii. 19–21; lxvi. 23, 24; Jer. xvii. 25–27; Joel iii. 9–21; Nahum iii. 17–19; Habak ii. 19, 20; Malachi iv.; Matt. vii. 24–27; xxv. 31–46; Luke xvi. 19–31; Objections answered and Explanations made, Jer. xiii 22 27; John vi. 61–65; Reproofs, Ezek. xiii.; Exhortations to Repentance, followed by Promises, Amos ix. 11–15; Acts iii. 19–26; An exulting appeal to the gracious character of Jehovah, and an assurance of his faithfulness, Micah vii. 18–20; A call to Israel to exult in their deliverance from captivity, and in the gracious presence of Jehovah their King, Zeph. iii. 14–20; Brief and weighty sentences, Lev. xxvi., 45 Isa. xlviii. 22; lvii. 21; lx. 22; Jer. vi. 30; li. 58; Ezek. vii. 27; xiii. 23; xix. 14; xxiii. 49; xxviii. 26; Figures, Anthropopathcia, Isa. v. 26; Oath, Isa. xiv. 24; Metaphor, Jer. vi. 27–30; Interrogation, Isa. lxiv. 12; Jer. xiii. 27; Parable, Jer. xxiii.; Matt. vii. 24–27; Luke xi. 24–26; xvi. 19–31; Apodioxis, James v. 19, 20; Synchronism, or expressing the first or the last things by the first or last words, Isa. lxvi. 24; Jer. li. 58; Ezek. vii. 2–27; Matt. vii. 27; xvi. 28; Luke xii. 58–59; Matt. xxv. 46. "Thus life is spent in framing apologies, in making and breaking resolutions, and deferring amendment, till death places his cold hand on the mouth open to make its last excuse, and one more is added to the crowded congregation of the dead."—*Alison.* Doxology, Heb. xiii. 21. See Dr. Bethune's peroration ending, "Then burst from countless armies of souls, floods of praise loud as many waters; 'Thanks! thanks! thanks! thanks be to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.'"

The violence of persecution has deprived us of some of the perorations of the sacred speakers. Much as we may regret their loss, we ought to consider that it is compensated by the illustrations of inspired force and boldness which are thereby furnished us. Our Divine Instructor's synagogue discourse at Nazareth was thus interrupted: He was, perhaps, preaching topically on the words, "He hath sent me," etc. (Luke iv. 18; compare verse 26, "But unto none of them was Elias *sent*," etc.), when he was silenced by the outburst of the wrath of the whole synagogue. Stephen and Paul were thus interrupted (Acts vii. 54–58; xvii. 31–33; xxii. 21, 22; xxvi. 28–30).

The Conclusion, Peroration, or Epilogue is treated of by the

classic rhetoricians chiefly in its relation to the judicial oration. Aristotle[1] says that the peroration has four objects: first, to make the hearer favourable to the speaker and ill-disposed towards his adversary; secondly, to amplify and extenuate; thirdly, to place the hearer under the influence of the passions; fourthly, to awaken his recollection. Cicero, in his earliest work, *De Inventione Rhetorica* (L. i. c. lii.–lv.), has reduced these objects to three: the *enumeratio*, or a summary of the subject-matter for the sake of recollection; the *indignatio*, which seeks to excite hatred against a man or dislike of some proceeding; the *conquestio*, or an appeal to the pity of the hearers. In a later work (*De Partitione*, c. xv.), he divides it into two parts—amplification and enumeration. Quintilian,[2] again, says that there are two kinds of perorations—the one, recapitulation, and the other whatever is adapted to excite the feelings. His notion respecting it is substantially that at which Cicero finally arrived. The Christian sermon is of so many kinds, and has such a variety of applications, that the precepts of the classical rhetoricians as to the conclusion are not sufficiently comprehensive and specific. It is chiefly to argumentative and pathetic sermons that they have reference.

The recapitulation (Gr. *anacephalæosis*), or the summing up of heads, or *enumeratio*, as the Latin rhetoricians term it, is the most appropriate and useful in argumentative discourses. Of this we have to say something under the head of Arrangement of Arguments. It is a weighty remark of Cicero[3] that "it will be necessary to avoid letting it have the air of a childish display of memory; and he will best keep clear of that fault who does not recapitulate every trifle, but touches on each particular briefly and dwells on the more weighty and important points." (See this orator's condensed and emphatic recapitulations in his speeches for Archias, C. Balbus, and A. Caecinias.) Quintilian advises us to vary and enliven our enumerations with different figures, and cites as an excellent example Cicero's oration against Verres: "If your father himself were your judge what would he say when these things are proved against you?" and then adds the recapitulation. Maury[4] is unsparing in his censure of enumerations such as were made in his day. He quotes in his favour the language of Cicero, who compares the orator that dryly and formally recapitulates to a serpent crawling round in a circle and biting his own tail. But it is obvious that what Cicero and this French writer condemn is not so

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[1] Rhet., L. iii., c. xix. and c. xiii. [2] L. vi., c. i.

[3] De Partitione, xvii. [4] Essai sur L'Eloquence, tome ii., p. 250.

much the enumeration as the abuse of it. The ancients employed it much more frequently than the moderns. Cicero thought that it was sometimes necessary even to the panegyrist. But they often omitted it. (See Demosthenes against Midias, and Cicero for Ligarius and for the Manilian Law.)

We must guard against confounding the enumeration with what the French term the *résumé*, which aims to reduce the leading ideas of a discourse to their essential principles, or to condense them into a sentiment or terse observation.[1] The Greek term *anacephalæosis* is sometimes employed in this sense. The *résumé* need not always be deferred until the close of the sermon. Some of the sacred examples of this kind of rhetorical focus are the following: Deut. xi. 26, 27; Eccles. xii. 13, 14; Matt. xxii. 40; John xvi. 28; Heb. viii. 1, 2.

Sometimes, as we have already remarked, the recapitulation may be in substance a partition. The "silver-tongued" Henry Smith, *at the end* of a sermon on the Lord's Supper, from the text 1 Cor. xi. 23, 24, gives this partition, which is worthy of being imitated, especially in expository sermons: "Thus ye have heard the Author of this sacrament, *the Lord Jesus;* the time when it was instituted, *the night that he was betrayed;* how it was instituted, *after thanksgiving;* why it was instituted, *for a remembrance of his death;* and the discovery of transubstantiation, one of the last heresies which Babylon hatched."

§. The student is apt to be misled by striking remarks on this as on all other rhetorical subjects. He should remember that general advice is not always comprehensive advice; *e. g.*, Bishop Burnet's oft-quoted observation[2] is: "The sermon that makes every one go away silent and grave and hastening to be alone to meditate and pray the matter over in secret, has had a true effect." Now this is excellent as opposed to sermons that awake applause, self-complacency, and talkativeness, and as descriptive of the proper effects of many kinds of sermons. But this test ought not to be applied to sermons whose object is to move the people to holy praise, thanksgiving, and joy, nor to those which are intended to secure immediate contributions for the relief of the suffering.

§. Matters for reproof, or alarm, or horror should not in general be assigned to the concluding sentence or words of a sermon. Let them come, when come they must, before the conclusion and in the

[1] Vinet's Homiletics, Pt. ii., c. v.

[2] This may have been suggested by Jerome's advice to Nepotian: "When you teach in the church, do not draw plaudits but sighs from the people. Let their tears praise you" (Epist. 52, sec. 8).

first part of the application. "But did not our Lord and some of the other sacred speakers sometimes utter bold and inflammatory things in their perorations?" Very seldom. In most cases their sermons end mildly and hopefully (Hosea ii. 14–23; v. 15; vi. 1–3; xiv. 2–9). The inspired speeches which excited indignation and violence were, as we before said, *interrupted;* so that it were just to consider these conclusions as made not by the holy prophets, but by human madness and folly. What they would have gone on to communicate had they been heard with respectful attention we may fairly infer from the conclusions they made on other occasions when they were not interrupted. See our Great Teacher's lamentation at the close of his heavy denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.); also his tender invitation to all such as feel the burden of their sins, after having denounced woes against Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum (Matt. xi.). Observe, also, how mildly Baxter concludes his sermon on the Judgment, Edwards his sermon on the Eternity of Hell Torments, and that of Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,[1] and James Hervey his third sermon on the National Fast.

§. "Very properly," says Vinet, "the peroration will often be in a less elevated and less vehement tone than the preceding parts. Here again the rhetoric of the ancients cannot be taken absolutely as our guide and model. . . The perorations of the great masters of the pulpit are generally moderate and gentle. We may compare them to a river the waves of which, very near and perfectly sure to reach the sea, slacken their pace as they approach the mouth, and present to the eye only a sheet of water, the motion of which is almost invisible." He cites as examples the funeral orations of Bossuet and Flechier, and the Abbe Poulle's sermon *Sur l'Aumône.* But in these and similar sermons it is natural that we should begin with agitated feelings and close with something like composure. Vinet's rule, therefore, is not universal, but particularly applicable to most kinds of funeral, consolatory, ethical, and didactic discourses. We have already referred to the fact that some of the inspired conclusions end with brief and weighty sentences. And it is well worthy of note that the last words of not a few of the inspired conclusions already quoted are unimpassioned as compared with those that go before. These perorations, each regarded in its entirety, suggest the idea of the whole course of the eagle, not only in ascending and descending but also in the very act of perching himself on the battlement of a mountian tower.

1 See Dwight's ed. Some of the other editions of his works lack parts of the peroration.

The concluding sentences of Demonthenes' orations are, as Lord Brougham has observed, more calm and tame than the penultimate portions. He adds, however, that to this rule there are some remarkable exceptions; as the oration on the Crown, whose closing period is a highly wrought invocation, and the oration on the Embassy, and that on the liberty of the Rhodians, the perorations of which continue impassioned to the very last words.

§. The above remarks prepare us to answer the question whether the last division or sub-division of a sermon may ever constitute the epilogue. Reinhard has been censured for too frequently winding up with the last head of the body of the discourse, without any regular peroration. The moderate and gentle feelings with which the second half of some sermons should be pervaded, ought, in most cases, to inspire the very last sentence. And in some other discourses, where a high pitch of animation has been reached at an early stage, it will be most natural and effectual to maintain it even to the end. Several of the sacred discourses thus conclude.

§. The various figures whose essential principle is repetition, and the Assyndeton are proper and natural for many kinds of perorations. As to the last-mentioned figure Aristotle[1] says: "For the close, the style without connectives (ἡ ἀσύνδετος) is becoming, in order that it may be a peroration (ἐπίλογος) and not an oration (λόγος) as, 'I have spoken—you have heard—the case is in your hands—pronounce your decision.'" (See example from the sermons of Antonio Vieyra, appended to this chapter.)

§. The extemporaneous speaker ought to give good heed to Whately's warning as to "more last words." "Let the speaker decide beforehand what shall be his *concluding* topic; and let him resolve . . . that whenever he shall see fit to arrive at *that*, nothing shall tempt him either to expand it beyond what he had determined on, or to add anything else beyond it." Nor should he forget this maxim of Bengel:[2] "A preacher who can come to a close when and how he pleases is able to preach the whole sermon with greater ease and freedom." Then he has likewise to consider the weakness or infirmity of many a hearer. When the Greeks set up statues of Nemesis holding a measuring-rod in one hand and a bridle in the other, it was to forewarn us, as Parmenion in his epigram sings, to do nothing beyond our limits, nor speak with unbridled tongue. If the old classic orator needed thus to be admonished, how much more does the Christian speaker who can but seldom have audiences as attentive as theirs so frequently were.

1 Rhet, at the end. 2 Life by Burk, p. 78.

As to the closing words of perorations, fitness and variety should decide our choice of them. Among the Scripture forms are proverbs, promises, prayers, and doxologies. The Roman and French Catholics sometimes conclude with the paraphrase of some psalm. (See Bourdaloue on Riches, Massillon on the Resurrection of Lazarus, and Abbe Poulle on Heaven.) Or else they sometimes paraphrase parts of hymns; *e. g.*, see at the end of Massillon's sermon on the small number of the Elect, a paraphrase of *Te oportet adorari;* and the peroration of Torielli's sermon on the General Judgment for a paraphrase of the *Dies Iræ.* Schott recommends one or more stanzas of a hymn, but gives the preference to a passage of holy Scripture. Many append to their sermons a written or extemporaneous prayer. This is frequently a part of the conclusion of French and German sermons. "Reinhard," says Schott,[1] "sometimes inserts in his exordium a prayer which contains the division of his discourse, and sometimes the prayer in his epilogue is a virtual recapitulation of the leading views which he has advanced. The same may be said of other eminent preachers, and it cannot be indiscriminately condemned." Nevertheless, the *habit* of preaching in prayer is, in our judgment, every way pernicious. A direct and formal prayer (the same may be said of a benediction), made out of its customary time or place, is apt to throw some hearers into a doubt as to whether they ought to assume the posture of prayer or not. We may, as Mr. Gresley[2] suggests, avoid this inconvenience by continuing to address the people in the form of benediction. "May God grant us," etc., instead of "Grant us, O God," etc. If, however, both the congregation and the preacher are strongly moved, then a direct address to God is impressive and affecting; and in order to remedy the inconvenience before adverted to, you may commence your prayer with the words, "Let us pray."

EXAMPLE BEFORE REFERRED TO.

Antonio Vieyra's *peroration on the emancipation of the enslaved Indians at Maranham, Brazil, in the year* 1653: . . . "Let the world know that there is still truth, that there is still the fear of God, that there is still a soul, that there is still a conscience, and that self-interest is not the absolute and universal lord of all. Let the world know that there are those who, for the love of God and of their own salvation, still trample self-interest under foot. Lord

1 Prof. Park's condensed translation in Bib. Sac., vol. v., p. 750.

2 Treatise on Preaching, Letter xxix.

Jesus, this is the mind, and this is the resolution of these thy faithful Catholics from this day forth. There is no one here who has any other interest but that of serving thee; there is no one here who desires any other advantage but that of loving thee; there is no one here who has any other ambition but that of being eternally obedient to thee and prostrate at thy feet. Their property is at thy feet, their interest is at thy feet, their slaves are at thy feet, their children are at thy feet, their blood is at thy feet, their life is at thy feet, that thou mayest do with it, and with all, whatever is most conformable to thy holy law. Is it not thus, Christians? It is thus; I say thus and promise thus to God in the name of all. Victory then on the part of Christ; victory, victory, over the strongest temptations of the devil. Woe be to Satan, woe to his temptations, woe be to sin, woe be to hell, woe to ambition, woe to self-interest. But blessed be the service of God; blessed be faith, blessed be Christianity, blessed be the soul, blessed be conscience, blessed be the law of God, and whatever it shall command; blessed be God, blessed and only blessed be us all. In this world may a rich abundance of good things be ours, but chiefly those of grace; and in the other world, glory everlasting."

Paolo Segneri closes his Lenten sermon (*Perdono agli inimici Quaresimale*, Predica iii.) with a similar promise on behalf of the people. It is, perhaps, the most grand and pathetic passage in his sermons. The first part of the same sermon (§8) contains a long apostrophe or lamentation before the Author of his text.

CHAPTER II.

OF DISPOSITION.

We have here presumed to make Disposition a part of Invention; first, because the proper exercise of invention either proceeds from or results in thinking according to some *method*, good or bad; secondly, because in searching for the best method the most pertinent and useful thoughts are not unfrequently suggested to us. "The penmen of Holy Writ," says Diodati, "often designedly follow the method of prudence, whereby they apply themselves to the present subject, time, place, or persons." Isocrates, the disciple of Socrates and the master of some of the greatest of the Greek orators, appears to have assigned disposition the very first place in invention; for in one of his letters[1] he says: "I have been accustomed to tell my hearers that they ought first to consider how the subject and each part of it is to be treated, and when that has been duly weighed and examined, then to think of arguments and a proper style to support and recommend it, that it may answer the end we propose." And this great rhetorician evidently practised the lessons he gave. His Panegyric has a free yet admirable order. His partition is as follows: "For my part there are two reasons which engage me to undertake this task; the first and principal, that you may be thoroughly reconciled to one another, and persuaded to turn all your resentment against the barbarians; the second, that, if unsuccessful in this principal design, I may at least have an opportunity of pointing out the obstacles to your happiness, and of proving in the presence of this assembly the ancient superiority of Athens on the sea, and its present title to assert the first rank among the Greeks." It is worthy of observation that Isocrates takes up the second proposition in his partition first, and pursuing this reverse order, makes the several clauses of the two

[1] Epist. vi., ad Jasonis Libros.

propositions so many concealed subdivisions of his oration.[1] The younger Pliny,[2] a disciple of Quintilian, considered a methodical arrangement and propriety in the use of figures as distinguishing the educated from the uneducated orator.

Cicero is never hampered by excess of method, and yet several of his orations are obviously composed according to a previous analysis and arrangement of the matter. His oration against Publius Quintius has three divisions, that against Quintius Cæcilius two, and that for the Manilian law three; while his oration for Murena, and his seventh Philippic, have each three divisions, of which the hearers are apprised in brief partitions.

Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Augustine, preaching, for the most part, expository sermons, neglected divisions; and even their topical discourses are often very far from methodical. In the sermons of Isidore and other preachers in the seventh and eighth centuries, we sometimes find the heads and partitions carefully set forth. Antony of Padua, a very popular preacher in his time, frequently divides his subject in an orderly manner. Herein he is followed by Albertus Magnus and his pupil, Thomas Aquinas, recommended by Borromeo, and freely imitated by the princes of the French pulpit.

Of Method several writers have treated. Descartes[3] has discussed the subject of philosophical method, which he defines a proceeding according to certain rules with a view to realize a certain end. Keckerman,[4] Watts,[5] Coleridge,[6] and Beck,[7] have left us dissertations on method, while Mr. F. E. Ziegler[8] has elaborately applied the principles of methodical division to homiletics.

Logical method is, according to Dr. Beck, a union of cognitions, determined by the *internal* relations of things; in other words, by the necessary interdependence of being or substance, and attribute and accident, of cause and operation or effect, of condition and conditional, of end and means. This is distinguished by him from the geographical and chronological method, which is based on *external* relations of objects in space and time. Definition, in pure

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1 Reinhard also sometimes compresses his subdivisions into a single sentence, and afterwards recurs to the successive clauses which form them. (See Dr. Park's two excellent articles on his sermons, Bib. Sac., vol. vi.)

2 Epist. xiii., L. iii. 3 Discourse on Method.

4 Systema Logicæ à Minus, pp. 576–595. 5 Logic, Pt iv., chaps. i. and ii.

6 Gen. Intro. to Encyclop Metropol.

7 An Outline Treatise on Logic, trans. from the German by Dr. E. V. Gerhart, p. 308–339. 8 Fundamentum Dividendi, pp. 500, 8vo (Dresden, 1851).

logic, relates to the contents of a conception; division to its extent. To divide logically is to represent the objects which a conception comprehends, both in their relation to each other and in their relation to the conception itself. The office of logical division is to regard a conception as a *genus*, and to resolve it into its several *species*, or to subordinate the particular to the general, a case to its rule, and an inference to a universal proposition; consequently this kind of division involves the following elements: (1) *A given conception*, or the *divisible whole;* (2) *a principle* of division (fundamentum divisionis); that is, some general attribute of the divisible whole, which determines the character of the division. As we reflect upon a given conception from various points of view, we discover in it different principles of division. Thus we get collateral divisions. *Man*, for example, may be variously divided. We may take as the principle of division either his nationality or religion, or morality or mental qualities, or occupations. In each division the given conception, *Man*, is the same, but for every new principle we adopt we get a different set of *members of division*, or specific differences, or various particulars. Each member of a division may itself be regarded as a divisible whole from which a subordinate division may be derived. Thus we get subdivisions which may be subjected to the same dividing process to almost any extent. That division to which a subdivision is immediately subordinate is called a *superior* division. The division which comprehends all the different series of subdivisions is called the *fundamental* or *primary* division (divisio fundamentalis, or primaria).

As to the order of division, Dr. Beck's precept is: In the first place elucidate the given conception by a complete definition; secondly, settle the principle of division, which must be an essential attribute of the given conception; next determine by this principle the several species of the divisible whole; then take each species in turn as a divisible whole; again settle a principle of division, and determine its several subordinate species; and thus advance till the process is complete. Hence, as Ziegler teaches, it is an offence against logical method when a preacher, *e. g.*, upon the proposition, "Why is it necessary to bridle the tongue?" builds this as a subdivision "What is it to bridle the tongue?"

These laws of logical method are worth remembering, as they constitute the groundworks of rhetorical method. "It is the fundamental tendency of the mind," as Dr. Beck observes, "to refer its manifold conceptions or cognitions each to its own category, and thus reduce them to unity in order to comprehend them. Hence

it is the logical method only which can satisfy the deepest wants of the human understanding." The preacher finds it a constant help in invention, although in composition an occasional hindrance to a free and popular diction.

Section I.—The Principles of Rhetorical Method.

Rhetorical method may, in general, be defined such a disposition of the subject-matter of a popular discourse as best serves to explain, establish, and apply it. It may be divided into two kinds, natural, and arbitrary or heroic. The natural is that which is founded on the laws of the creation, as the method of genesis, or the order in which beings come to exist, the modes of existence, the parts, properties, kinds, relations, sequence, and ends of things. The method of deduction is the natural one, and every valid process of induction is, in reality, a species of deductive reasoning. The arbitrary or heroic disregards deduction, whether absolute or subordinate, the external or internal relation of things, and logical unity. It follows or forsakes any arrangement according to the purpose of the speaker, and the variable circumstances and necessities of his hearers; *e. g.*, when a panegyric neglects the order of time in delineating the deeds of its hero, and speaks first of his private and Christian life, secondly of his public and political life. The arbitrary may be divided into the mixed or eccentric, and cryptical. The former may either employ in turn several methods, or occasionally forsaking one or more, may abound in regressions, digressions, and rhaposdies. The cryptic has, in some cases, perhaps, only the *appearance* of arbitrariness; for its method, though concealed, may really be natural. There are some ancient rules still observed in the process of division and arrangement; the most important of which are the following:

Let your method, for one thing, be founded on a distinct conception of the nature and verge of your subject, so that you can separate that which belongs to it from all that is foreign thereto. Never preach a topical sermon without first reducing to writing and fixing in your memory, if not always announcing its subject, or, what is still better, its proposition. Now we should remember that argumentative propositions are of two kinds, analytic and synthetic; in the former are expressed or implied all the positions which are to be established by proof; so that an analysis of the terms of the proposition suggests the arguments by which it is supported; *e. g.*, Dean Young shows that judgment is for the Lord by first analysing the term "judgment" into the conceptions of power, matter, issue

and form, and then analysing the phrase "for the Lord" into the ideas of God's right, God's cause, God's end, and God's sentence. These ideas are coupled in four subordinate propositions. (See plans and divisions.) Such a method is recommended by Quintilian[1] when the separate arguments are powerful. *In such cases only* should we observe the rule that the partition should exclude all matter not embraced in the chief proposition. Synthetic propositions are such as are established by arguments that are not suggested by an analysis of their terms, but founded on matter outside of themselves. Of this kind are many deductive arguments, and all propositions established by historic proofs.

And let your method be founded on a proposition that is not only distinct but true. This hint, though second in order, is first in importance; hence, the necessity for employing only such propositions, terms, definitions, descriptions, consequences, and inferences as you can defend if attacked. Express, therefore, and arrange so cautiously your proposition, partition, subdivisions, and matter generally, as to preclude or anticipate common objections. Next in order after the question, What is my subject? is the question, Is it founded in truth or based on the text?

Let your method, for another thing, be as plain and simple as the subject will admit of, beginning with what is well known and advancing to that which is less known, and thence to the obscure and profound. Do not attempt to gorge one long sentence with a great number of ideas, nor, like Hooker, 'drive before you a multitude of clauses like a flock of sheep, and so become perplexed and tedious.' And accordingly you have to avoid too long a partition, and too many subdivisions; otherwise not a few of your hearers will be in danger of confounding generals with particulars, and things foregoing with things following, or the reverse. This excess of method has the practical effect of confusion. The observance of logical sequence in the arrangement and connection of sentences often has the effect of method without exhibiting it. Robert Hall and Sydney Smith seldom connect their thoughts; hence their sentences move not forward in single file but irregularly along parallel lines.

Again, let not the various parts of the sermon interfere with one another, as the partition with the proposition, or the division with the subdivisions. Do not regard as co-ordinate that which is subordinate, nor the reverse. Thus, of the two ideas of *charity* and *indulgence* the second is subordinate to the first; but the two

[1] Inst. Rhet., L. v., c. xii.

ideas of *kindness* and *indulgence* are co-ordinate. Do not therefore distribute into two distinct heads two aspects of the same idea or thought, or two ideas which from their relation to each other are liable to be confounded; *e. g.*, do not attempt to prove that a vice is contrary, first, to good sense, secondly, to our interest; nor to treat under two heads the scripture phrase, "gentle, easy to be entreated." Herein we shall be greatly assisted by the habit of conceiving and distinguishing things according to their natures, parts, properties, kinds, relations, and ends. Besides, we shall thus avoid a *leap* (Saltus in dividendo) as when a preacher divides the divine nature into the attributes, immutability, spirituality, justice, love, etc., instead of first dividing them into absolute and relative.

And let your transitions and connections be made with a reference not only to an orderly disposition of all the parts, but also to a methodical tendency of all the parts to attain a particular end. A discourse may be so arranged that each part may prepare the way for what follows, and at the same time preserve the force of what went before, but it may still fail to keep in view the main object, or make it evident that all the parts thus connected lean and move towards it. Hence the necessity of observing the difference between a side-path and an obscure and, it may be, devious path.

Let your method moreover be without deficiency, and yet without superfluity. "There is," as Dr. Watts says, "a happy medium to be observed in our method, so that brevity may not render the sense obscure, nor the argument feeble, nor our knowledge merely superficial; and, on the other hand, that the fulness and copiousness of our method may not waste the time, tire the learner, nor fill the mind with trifles and impertinences." The proposition should be as brief as possible, and should contain few or no terms that call for explanation; and accordingly all definitions, where necessary, should go before the proposition. The *divisions*, as stated in the partition, should be as concise and elliptical as clearness will admit; but the *subdivisions* must in general be so fully expressed that no words are wanting either to convey the sense or to make all transitions. Uniform and artificial partitions, like every other kind of sameness, are tedious. Bishop Burnet almost always has but one division, and Christmas Evans and F. W. Robertson usually two. Never dwell at great length on introductory, transitional occasional, and incidental matter, nor make a subdivision merely for the sake of obtaining a symmetrical and complete skeleton. Make your plan bend, and, if necessary, give way to the most important and useful matter and its amplifications. In the distribution of matter two errors are often committed: digressions and parenthe-

ses, filled with unimportant and irrelevant thoughts, are allowed to occupy space which is needed for thoughts that contribute to the principal design; and again, such a prolixity is indulged in the exordium and body of the discourse that little or no space is left for a full application. So inveterate is this habit in some that it is advisable for them, after meditating deeply on all parts of their plan, to compose their application first. Be it observed, however, that we suggest this only as a *remedy*.

For the rest, conform the method to the laws of rhetorical adaptation; in other words, let it be suitable for the speaker, for his matter, for his purpose, and for his audience. Thereby you will cultivate that "method of prudence," which characterises the inspired writers and preachers. "Discretion of speech," says Bacon, "is more than eloquence." The sermons of the prophets deserve the most careful study in this respect. The example of the apostle Paul in his epistles to the Corinthians is also worthy of imitation, although none but an apostle could safely announce the purpose of addressing a church as a congregation of spiritual children.[1] A good rhetorical method, being much influenced by adaptation, admits of great liberty and variety, as will be seen from a study of our examples of plans and divisions. Exposition, conviction, and application demand their own respective and peculiar arrangements; and these again may be advantageously modified by the exigencies of time, place, and audience. The most argumentative sermons cannot afford to lose sight of a practical scope and design. The sermons of Bourdaloue and Massillon are noted for their formal and elaborate partitions, and yet their partitions very seldom fail to trace the connection between the discussions and their various and consequent uses. These preachers were anxious even to excess, lest their hearers should not from the outset keep in full view the practical end for which each division was introduced and discussed. So prone are many modern preachers to throw their uses into the background, if not quite out of sight, that they might, for a time at least, find it judicious as a means of self-reform to base the parts of their partitions, if not their propositions, upon the preconceived and previously adjusted matter of their applications. To know how to analyse our hearers is more important than to know how to analyse our propositions.

Adaptation does not demand that in the process of invention we

[1] Heb. v. 12–14; 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2; cf. sect. on Partitions. Bengel has remarked that the inspired teachers in the N. T. always set what is good in the foreground; first touching on betterments, and then adducing what they had to blame. (Life by Burk, p. 79.)

should neglect exactitude and fulness of method. It is only in the act of composition, and occasionally in the course of delivery that an arbitrary, mixed, or cryptic arrangement will often be wisely adopted.[1] In few things is the novice more readily detected than in his rigid adherence to a scientific method. Of one of the Czars of Russia, Dr. Watts writes, that when he first learned the art of war he practised all the rules of circumvallation and contravallation at the siege of a certain city in Lavonia; and he passed so much of his time in his mathematical approaches that he wasted the season for taking the town.

Some never acquire a free method, because in their minds the subject is bound up with rigid notions of rhetorical unity. Thinking thus, they adjust almost all the parts of their sermons in such an order that the principal subject or proposition shall be continually kept before the hearer. Their plans are apt to resemble the pine or fir, the main body of which grows up straight to the very top of the tree, while branches shoot out on its sides at regular intervals; and there are, it must be allowed, certain subjects, *e. g.*, those of the argumentative and demonstrative kind, which sometimes derive considerable energy and gracefulness from the constant visibilty of the stem proposition. But still it is to be remembered that there is also a unity of amplification and of various applications. Almost all fruit trees divide the trunk among the first branches, and sacrifice height and symmetry of stem, limb, and twig to that rotundity which exposes the greatest amount of fruit to the ripening weather and the admiring eye. It is therefore by keeping the utility of our sermon ever before us that we acquire the truest unity and, at the same time, that *Ars ut artem falleret*, that art of deceiving art, of which Venantius Fortunatus writes.

Let no preacher esteem skill in practical method a cheap, superficial, and enfeebling accomplishment. No man can methodise thoroughly well whose mind has not been disciplined to habits of sound thinking; for "method," as Coleridge[2] observes, "is a power or spirit of the intellect pervading all that it does, rather than its tangible product." Nor is he likely to reduce any subject to a just method who has not a distinct, particular, and comprehensive knowledge thereof. But to learn to arrange a subject practically and popularly, we should add to all this much intercourse with men[3] and considerable experience in public speaking. That mas-

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[1] See the sections on Digressions and Regressions.

[2] Friend, vol. iii.

[3] The following partition by Krummacher on 2 Cor. xiii. 5 must have been derived from a knowledge of common doubts and delusions. I. The characteristic

ter analyst, Charles Simeon, told Bishop Wilson that he had recomposed the plan of one of his discourses nearly thirty times.

But is not an analytic mind necessarily wanting in force? Believe it not. The tendency of method is exactly the opposite: by contributing to perspicuity and by reducing the whole subject to one view, it stimulates energy, sometimes to an extravagant degree. Massillon and Baxter were both analytic thinkers, and yet both wrote and spoke with a force that is Demosthenian. The latter[1] studied the schoolmen, chiefly, it would seem, because of their acuteness and skill in methodology. "And though," says he, "I know no man whose genius more abhorreth confusion instead of necessary distinction and method, yet I loathe impertinent, useless art and pretended precepts, and distinctions which have no foundation in the matter." He somewhere says he never thought he understood anything until he could anatomise it. Method therefore, as it belongs in germ and potentiality to the mind itself, so it is the most perfectly evolved by the most capacious and cultivated minds. When nourished by great vital forces the osseous frame of the sermon will be sound, well-proportioned, and capable of supporting the strength and gracefulness of the entire composition. Method will, moreover, serve so fully to possess the mind with the beautiful symmetry of a subject as to compel utterance. It was this, perhaps, that gave to the hearers of Massillon the impression when he began to speak, that he could not help setting his pent thoughts at liberty. The relations of method and eloquence may be rendered more clear and vivid by the speculations of the schoolmen as to the name Cherubim. It signifies, as they said, fulness of knowledge, which consists, first, in a perfect *vision* of God; secondly, full *reception* of divine light; thirdly, the contemplation in God himself of the *beauty of the order* of things emanting from him; finally, that *fulness* of this knowledge which enables them to pour it out upon others copiously.

Of the assistance method affords to the memory of the speaker and hearer many rhetors have said many excellent things.

Section II.—Of Digressions.

The Digression (*digressio*, *egressio*, *parecbasis*) abounds in the

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graces that are not necessary. II. Those marks of a state of grace which are insufficient. III. Those which are satisfactory, and at the same time indispensable.

[1] Knowledge and Love Compared, Pt. i., c. i.; Whole Works, vol. xv. p. 15. Baxter wrote a very elaborate work in Latin entitled *Methodus Theologiæ* (Lond., 1681). It is a rich contribution to methodology.

inspired eloquence to an extent unequalled by any speeches that are merely human. The instances of this are multitudinous and evident to all. But we must possess a considerable knowledge of classical digressions before we are prepared to appreciate the natural and noble spontaneousness and negligence which characterise those of the holy prophets. Though their thoughts are never poured forth in a tumultuary and precipitate manner, yet they are never, on the other hand, uttered under the restraints to which the laws of logical unity would subject them. The speaker at the end of a digression never says, "But I have been travelling a little out of my proper path."

The digressions of the greatest of the Greek orators were free and artless, being such as properly belonged to their "impulsive style," or that which at all hazards follows the flow of the thought. Cicero approved digressions, even such as were premeditated.[1] According to his great work (De Oratore, L. xi, c. xix.) the chief digression customarily came before the conclusion. Those of the later rhetors and declaimers[2] were often carefully premeditated and set in a particular place, namely, between the narrative and the proof. Quintilian thinks the digression should not be uniformly assigned to this part of the oration, although he admits that it is often useful as a kind of second exordium to prepare the judge for the examination of the evidence. The same writer makes the important remark that expressions of indignation, pity, detestation, reproach, or conciliation, apologies, replies to invective, all exaggeration, extenuation, and appeals to the passions are of the nature of the digression. It is manifest, therefore, that disorderly wandering is true method in almost every kind of vehement, pathetic, or hortatory speech. Excitation, if it is to be prolonged, demands an irregular and unrestrained flow of ideas, the liberty to pass obliquely from one digression to another, and the privilege of sinking down to rest and expiring in an anti-climax.

This principle serves to account for much of that abruptness in the ancient classics which critics have so often complained of. In cases not a few it will be found that the abruptness is occasioned not by a *transition* from one branch of the same subject to another, but by a *digression* from one subject to another. The impassioned speaker almost always awakens the feelings of his hearers by surprise, or before they are aware. Dr. Johnson is wrong, therefore, when he conjectures that these transitions, as he terms them, were usually performed by indirect allusion; and the

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[1] De Orat., L. ii., c xix. and lxxviii. [2] Quint., L. iv., c. iii.

reason why they appear to us so disjointed, is only because we have lost the intermediate idea, which, by being understood without being expressed, served thus to connect the adjoining parts of the composition. But he should have remembered that the modulation of the voice in singing or reading them supplied this want. Nor did it occur to Johnson that many of these passages owe their power to their total lack of transitions of every kind, to their being, in fact, of the nature of digressions. It requires a lively imagination, as Beattie[1] has truly remarked, to understand and appreciate the incoherent language of enthusiasm. "Hence," says he, "in the odes of Pindar, and in some of the odes of Gray, which imitate the language of enthusiasm, many readers complain that they are often at a loss to discover connection between contiguous sentiments; while others not more learned, perhaps, find no difficulty in conceiving the progress of ideas that lead these authors from one thought or image to another. The latter surely are the only persons qualified to judge of those odes; and this qualification they seem to derive from their superior liveliness of fancy." The emotional kind of imagination (to which should be joined a deep religious experience) is nowhere in greater request than in the study of the digressions of the prophetic eloquence. It has not escaped the notice of Calvin[2] that Isaiah, in the second part of the book, after having begun to encourage the hope of pardon, appears frequently to digress to another subject, and to wander through prolix circumlocutions, celebrating the wonders of the divine government in the mechanism of heaven and earth, and the whole order of nature; yet there is nothing said but what is applicable to the subject; for, unless the omnipotence of God be presented to our eyes, our ears will not attend to his word, nor esteem it according to its worth. This is the reason, as this great interpreter and theologian thinks, why the prophet, when he would impress the hearts of the doubting and fearing people of God with an assurance of salvation, discourses in so magnificent a manner concerning the infinite power of God. These prophetic roamings are indeed justified alike by Hebrew history, and the exigencies of all believers in their temptations and other experiences. Paul in his defence before Agrippa (Acts xxvi.) suddenly drops his subject at verse 8, and exclaims: "Why should it be thought a thing incredible," etc. He then returns to his defence, but he again digresses to the subject of the resurrection, verse 23, when he is interrupted by Festus with the

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[1] *Dissertations*, Moral and Critical; *Of Imagination*, c. iv.

[2] Institutes, B. ii. c iii., §31.

charge, "Paul, much learning hath made thee mad." The *obiter dicta* of Scripture are very instructive.

Nor are wanderings forbidden in those parts of sermons which are argumentative. When well chosen and brief they afford to the reasoning powers a little recreation, from which they may return to their task with undivided attention, or else give an opportunity for handling such matters as serve to elucidate the whole field of discussion; whereof the effect is much like that of climbing to the top of a mountain during a campaign, and there surveying the territory in dispute. Mr. Taylor,[1] the famous street preacher of San Francisco, makes very effective use of what he terms "surprise power;" and Cecil speaks of "darting upon you with an unexpected stroke." The Roman orator, Lentulus,[2] owed much of his success to his sallies and surprises; and the oath of Demosthenes, the most eloquent of all his utterances, must be numbered among digressions.

And of didactic subjects it may likewise be said, that ramblings often give us new and more extensive views. It has been justly observed that "a man does not know England" (nor, we may add, "Pilgrim's Progress") "until he has broken loose from railways, from cities, from towns, and clambered over stiles and lost himself in the fields." He who knows not how to wander, knows not how to explore; and circumnavigators have changed the map of the world and greatly enlarged the domain of civilized nations, because furious gales swept them out of their course, drove them up and down, and finally wrecked them among the rocks of the unknown coast.

But some disciple of the old classic rhetors will say: "This writer has dared to set at naught all that the highest authorities teach us concerning homiletical unity. Were they, after all, mistaken in demanding that a sermon be one in subject, one in design, one in the adjustment of its parts to the principal end and to each other, one in the general design and effect of its figures?' No, we reply, they were not mistaken, if they intended that their precepts should apply only to the most of the sermons written by students as exercises in homileties, and to discourses that are to be printed for general circulation; in brief, to all discourses, disquisitions, and essays that are composed without regard to an application to a particular audience. But mistaken they certainly were, if they meant to exact such unity from the homilies and sermons of the pastor who aims to make full and specific and timely applications of all

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1 Model Preacher. 2 Cicero's Brutus, chap. lxvi.

texts and themes to the many different and ever-changing moral states and circumstances of his flock. And it just now occurs to us that we stand not alone in this view of homiletical unity. "In the applications you make," says Ostervald, "do not tie yourselves down in such wise as to feel under a necessity of saying nothing that does not exactly arise from the subject. You should always preserve a reasonable liberty, especially when you are preaching in your own church. But I would not recommend this to young students of divinity, or to ministers that preach in a strange church. We have in favor of this course the example of St. Chrysostom, who in his applications runs out into several subjects to which his text does not lead him. You should always have more regard to edification than to anything else; what is good and necessary is always seasonable; and even those uses that do not appear to flow naturally from the text may show the hearers the necessity of the exhortations you address to them." But our opinion respecting this matter is supported by the supreme authority of inspired examples—examples too familiar and too abundant to quote.

And if we examine closely those predictive, historic, and hortatory Scriptures which mention the Lord Jesus, we shall find that not a few of them are digressions. Mark how abruptly Isaiah sometimes introduces his visions of the Messiah. Mark with what bold and unexpected turns John the Baptist, and Stephen, Paul, Peter, John, and the other holy prophets make aberrations in their orbits in order to lead us betimes nearer Jesus, the radiant centre of all Scripture light, and the efficient source of all Christian obedience.[1] And, blessed be his name, if we keep within the bounds of divine revelation, we need never turn aside very far from our path to find ourselves in the footsteps of the Lamb of God.

The love of divine knowledge and of a miserable humanity will, when necessary, make short work of our ideas of symmetrical images, classic sentences, and rhetorical unities. Only see how St. Paul, evidently made flexible by his compassion for his countrymen, or his ignorant and erring converts, chooses rather to mar his metaphors than to break the head of a fellow-disciple, and to build his periods out of course lest they appear to shock needlessly the prejudices of some Hebrew or heathen. Then consider that a wholesome variety in our ministrations cannot always be secured without imitating Chrysostom,[2] who thought it needful to set a variety of

[1] Isa. vii. 14; ix. 1; lii. 2; John i. 29; Acts ii. 22; vii. 53; i. Cor. v. 7; Eph. v. 2–5; Titus iii. 2–6; 1 Pet. ii. 18–25; Jas. ii. 1; v. 7.

[2] Homily i., Pt. i.; De Prophete Obscuritat. Chrysostom and Greg. Nazianzen abound in digressions.

spiritual food before an audience of sick and convalescent souls. It was a kind of digression when Moses turned aside from his flock to learn why the burning bush was not consumed; it was much like a digression when the good Samaritan left the high road to save the life of his waylaid fellow-traveller. Zoroaster, in one of his fables, describes a wretch who was so far immersed in a fiery lake that only one of his heels was allowed to be lifted above the surface as a reward for having once turned upon it to relieve a lamb entangled in a thicket. And of how many a sermon does the aged preacher commit to the flames, all except a small digression still treasured in the memory, which served to lead back some wandering sheep to the holy fold and the Chief Shepherd. Augustine[1] one day made a long digression against the Manichees. On returning home he mentioned that he had wandered from his subject much against his will and purpose, and asked Possidonius and other friends: "Did you not observe it?" "We did, and wondered," was the reply. Upon this he said: "I believe that it was the good pleasure of the Lord through my forgetfulness to look after some straying one." Two days after this one Firmus, a merchant, called on him, and falling down at his feet confessed with tears that he had for many years entertained the Manichean heresy, but was by that sermon rightly instructed and soundly converted to the orthodox faith. When Augnstine and his friends heard this, they wondered at and admired the deep purpose of God, and glorified his power to convert souls when he will, whence he will, and in what manner he will, whether the preachers know it or know it not. Luther was no stranger to these side-gusts of the Spirit and their blessed results; hence his sermons, as one words it, have often the irregularity of an ode. "I have observed," says John Bunyan,[2] "that a word cast in by the bye hath done more execution in a sermon than all that was spoken besides." "He wanders from his subject," complained some critic of the late English preacher, John Gualter. "Yes," was the reply, "he wanders from his subject to the heart." A late dissenting minister in England had obtained no small reputation among his brethren for his eloquence generally, and, more particularly, for the logical sequence, and, most of all, for the impressive conclusions of his sermons. On some great occasion he was appointed to preach in the open air, and he had held the attention of his auditors through a long discourse. Just before the conclusion he was observed to hesitate—and then in a rambling manner he recapitulated part of what he had already said, until he

1 Possidonius, Vita Augustini. 2 Grace Abounding, etc., §287.

reached a very lame and impotent close. At the subsequent dinner, when the preacher's health was proposed, "Brother ———," said one of the ministers present, "we must all, I am sure, have been charmed by your discourse; but if I may hazard the observation, I thought that at the conclusion you lost the thread of your argument, and hardly equalled your ordinary excellence." "I must tell you the reason," was the reply; "thus it was. Just as I was about to conclude I saw a poor man running to the place, hot and dusty and eager to hear. 'Speak a word to him,' said conscience. 'You will spoil your sermon if you do,' said pride. And I *did* spoil it, I know; but still I may have done him good."[1] Such an application is often less a digression than, to borrow a happy phrase from Eustathius, "a profitable side-path" running towards the same point as the highway.

It is to the excursions of the eloquence of the Scriptures that we are indebted for one of its most excellent adaptions to the undisciplined minds of the common people, and of the young of every condition. Though the interdependence of its parts is greater in some books than most superficial readers think, yet it is less than most critics imagine. Some sentences and paragraphs are linked, or else are merely hooked together by verbal connections, but the plurality are attached to one another by the magnetism of an inward unity so deeply hidden that it can only be explored by the future progress of Scripture knowledge. And yet for all this they are perfectly suited to inattentive and vagrant minds which, being unable either to embrace in one view the whole extent of a speech, or to trace the connection of all its parts, can comprehend and feel the import of each short phrase and sentence; whereby as by so many drops irrigated, they will be gently and gradually evolved in spiritual beauty and fruitfulness. Descriptive of this peculiarity of the prophetic style are, we think, these lines in the song of Moses: "My doctrine shall drop as the rain, my speech shall distil as the dew, as the small rain upon the tender herb, and as the showers upon the grass."

But from the above, or from anything we have elsewhere advanced, let no one infer that we approve the practice of those who select for subjects large portions of sacred history, or general views of cardinal doctrines, or of virtues, and then expatiate upon them in every direction; extravagating by turns, north, east, south, and west; or else wandering, totally regardless of any point of the compass, and of the outermost fences of the theme, be it ever so

[1] Rev. J. M. Neale's Mediæval Preachers and Preaching, p. 17.

widely extended. The canonical books afford no example of such incessant and purposeless roaming. Digressions are only allowable and commendable in cases where the *subject* and the *aim* of the preacher are characterised by the strictest unity. These remarks do not, of course, narrowly apply to some sermons which conclude series—sermons whose object is to recapitulate the matter of the series,—and certain kinds of historical and statistical discourses. Yet, let it be remembered, that any sermon on "the generality of things in general" is soporific for the many, while it aggravates the painful insomnolence of the few.

As a general thing digressions ought to be short, otherwise they may cause the minds of the hearers to forget and abandon the matter in hand. It will conciliate our more intelligent and methodical auditors if we ask of them the liberty of digressing when we are about to do so, and to notify them when we begin to return to the main current of our thoughts. In oratory, however, we should not be too ceremonious in our transitions to and from digressions.

Some invent best when they invent immethodically. Their best thoughts on a subject come to them disconnectedly. Such preachers would find it advantageous to themselves and their hearers, were they to number their suggestions in the order they jotted them down, and then, after finding that they could range almost all of them under two or three heads, proceed to do so with the following result: Text John iii., 16: "God so loved." I. Mode, 4, 7. II. Degree, 3, 6, 9. III. Intention, 1, 2, 8.

We do well to avoid such a habit, either of thinking or composing, as leads to a confusion and contradiction of thoughts and feelings. "If," says Vieyra,[1] "the labourer were first to sow wheat, and over that rye, and over that millet, and over that barley, what would spring up? A tangled forest, a green confusion." It is well, however, that such preachers are apt to sow scatteringly; and let us hope that they, at least, pre-occupy the minds of their hearers against the weeds and thorns of error.

Section III.—Of Regressions.

No writer appears to have directed out attention to that quality of the inspired oratory which we may venture to term *variation* or *enhancement by regression*. An example of this is furnished by these familiar but inexhaustible words of our Divine Instructor: "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and *I will*

[1] Sermon on the Seed by the Wayside.

give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart: and *ye shall find rest unto your souls.* For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light" (Matt. xi., 28–30). The members of the sentence we have italicised both promise rest, and, therefore, according to modern notions of unity, should not have been separated. A similar regression is observable in the closing words where he returns to the idea of His yoke, and amplifies it with the idea that the yoke is easy. Yet another retrogression is found in the clause, "my burden is light," which very evidently goes back to the words, "ye that . . . are heavy laden." The inspired sermons teem with such regressions; few of which, however, are as short or as regular as these. The text is, indeed, an example of the Hebrew parallelism; and being such, it would serve to confirm the opinion that the parallelism is the germ of the regression as well as the refrain. The recurrence is not always to the same word, phrase, or thought; nor is it always a return to the first expression of an idea, or first statement of a subject. The progress of such ideas in prophetic speeches may be illustrated by the way in which the downy seeds of certain plants are disseminated by the winds of autumn. Could we trace back to their mother-country all the plats of wild flowers which we count in a single field, we should find that one was colonised by a seed wafted to it on a light wind from an adjacent field; another owed its foundation to some more daring adventurer, driven by a storm-gale from the utmost corner of the valley; another, again, was indebted for its first settlement to a packet of hope, sailing before a fresh breeze from a region not quite so remote. Would you have the illustration less imperfect? Suppose these winds to blow only from one point, and years crowded into the space of half an hour.[1]

This reproductive variety which thus enlivens and adorns the sacred addresses is well adapted to the mental habits of the mass of almost every congregation. The reason is not far to seek. They are unused to close attention and consecutive thinking; we have but to listen to their common talk to detect many a *gratis dictum.* Their ideas follow one another in a fortuitous, disorderly train. In

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[1] By comparing the speeches of Christ with those of Hebrew prophets, the reader will have striking and full evidence that his regressions are essentially like theirs, *e. g.*, Lev. xxvi. 8, 17, 36, 37, 26, 29, 34, 43; Deut. iv. 7, 3, 32–38; 11–12, 24, 36; v. 22–26; Isa. xlviii. 20; xlix: 9–12, 24, 25; lii. 2–12; lv. 12, 13; lvi. 4–6; lviii. 13, 14; Jer. ii. 2, 3, 20, 24, 33, 34; iii. 1, 2, 14, 20; v. 4, 5, 21; viii. 7, 9, etc.; Matt. v. 5, 38–48; vi. 12–15; v. 8, 27–32; vi. 5–15; vii. 7–12; vi. 22, 23; vii. 3–5; x. 34–40; xxiii. 14, 23; John x. 2, 11, 19; xiv. 16–18, 26; xv. 1–5: 26; xvi. 7—11, 13, 14, 33; xvii. 4, 5, 22, 11, 22–23, etc.

Plato's Theætetus, we hear Socrates comparing the mind to an aviary, and the cogitations to various kinds of birds, gregarious and other, which fly about within. Their owner may be said to *possess*, but not to *have* them; and when he puts in his hand to catch a dove, the chances are that he will grasp a wood-pigeon instead. And this holds good of the most intellectual hearers when Sunday finds them, as it commonly does, disinclined to further mental toil. Rare as black swans are the minds whose thoughts are always available.

The undisciplined many are often compelled to return again and again to search after that which they know. Not dissimilar is the process by which they are instructed by an explication, convinced by an argument, or are moved by a persuasive. And hence Agustine[1] advises the expositor to observe the ways by which an assembly signifies that they either do or do not understand what he says, and so long as there are indications that an idea is not comprehended, to give it another turn or set it in a variety of new lights. In this manner did the prophets almost always teach and move the people. They seldom returned to the treasury of the mind to bring out something new without bringing out, at the same time, something old. Uncultivated minds compensate for the want of a steady attention by frequent returns to the subjects they love. Rowland Hill was fully aware of this, and used, in his homely way, to compare his preaching to milking an excellent cow: "I first pull at sanctification, then at adoption, and afterwards at sanctification; and so on, till I have filled my pail with gospel milk." The minds of all except a few are excursive. Each of the many avocations of life draws a transient attention, while some of them are, perhaps, often revisited by it, and yet it is continually finding its way back to one endeared and paramount subject, which is apt to grow the more precious the oftener it is thus revisited. Now, unless we are much mistaken, the Divine Spirit has deigned to adapt the sacred eloquence to this habit or law of the common mind, and instead of aiming directly to discipline it to continuous thinking, he has in preference sought to save it by yielding a complete subserviency to its untutored modes of operation. And it will generally be found that when any one speaks extemporaneously on a subject which had often, but only a little while at once, engaged his attention, his speech will be of this regressive description. Even Isocrates in his elaborate Panegyric has not lost sight of this quality. He frequently returns to these two ideas, the unfriendly

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1 De Doct. Christ., L. iv., c. x.

relations of Athens and Sparta, and the feasibility of conquering the Persians by restoring the union of the Greek states. Never was there a better illustration of the adage, *caput artis est celare artem.*

The regressions of Demosthenes are more frequent and more natural. Lord Brougham, commenting upon a passage of his oration on the Crown, thus draws attention to them, and, at the same time, contrasts them with those of Fox. "Here is the same leading topic once more introduced; but introduced after new topics and fresh illustrations. The repetitions, the enforcement again and again of the same points, are a distinguishing feature of Demosthenes, and formed also one of the characteristics of Mr. Fox's great eloquence. The ancient, however, was incomparably more felicitous in this than the modern; for in the latter it often arose from carelessness, from ill-arranged discourse, from want of giving due attention, and from having once or twice attempted the topic and forgotten it, or perhaps from having failed to produce the desired effect. Now in Demosthenes this is never the case; the early allusions to the subject of the repetition are always perfect in themselves, and would sufficiently have enforced the topic had they stood alone. But new matter afterwards handled gave the topic new force and fresh illustration by presenting the point in a new light."

But to return to the inspired regressions. They not only deepen the impression of divine ideas and present them in new lights, but they also compel us to receive the more unwelcome parts of revealed instruction. We have elsewhere shown that such admixture makes exposition for purposes of correction superior to other kinds of warning and reproof.

Another advantage of this recurrence is that it perpetually reminds us of the interconnection, interdependence, and harmony of all the Scripture verities; but this theme is too copious and too important to be discussed within out restricted limits.

Object not that as regressions involve repetitions we should defend ourselves against the habit of making them, lest we at length become addicted to preaching in circles. Suppose we do, this will never injure or afflict our hearers, provided only we rise in feeling with each new gyration. We may then, as old Thomas Fuller somewhere suggests, justify ourselves by the example of Paul, who said: "Of whom I have told you often, and now tell you even weeping."

Section IV.—Disposition in Expository Discourses.

When the subject for exposition is composed of different parts, it is necessary that these parts should be arranged with a careful

regard to method. In simple exposition of Scripture, the textual order is wisely followed, provided an analysis of the passage is given either in the introduction or the conclusion of the sermon, in order that the hearers may not in their attention to details lose sight of the subject in its entirety, and the relations of the several parts. But when a subject is complex, or such as embraces the different parts of a doctrine or a duty, a distinct and perspicuous arrangement is more difficult. From the study of our examples of plans and divisions more may be learned than from any thing else except actual practice. But we must here repeat two plain but often disregarded cautions. One is, that in methodising our plans, the simplest and the fundamental divisions should be placed before others. Thus, in explaining the love of God in the most extensive sense, we may reflect on what passes in our minds towards a person whom we esteem and love. To such a one we will feel, 1. High esteem for his talents and virtue; 2. An inclination to think often, and to speak honorably of him; 3. Desire for his happiness, and rejoicing in it; 4. Desire for his approbation, and pleasure in receiving it; 5. Gratitude for his favors; 6. Confidence in him. These tests may, by way of resemblance, be applied to the gracious affection of love to God. "If," says Dr. Gerard, "the first of these were placed anywhere else, the division would be confused; for esteem is the foundation all the rest."

The other caution is, Avoid unnecessary divisions and subdivisions. The young preacher may imagine that *he* is in no danger of making such a mistake, but let him be warned by the errors of celebrated masters of sacred rhetoric. For example, Claude, in illustrating the commonplace, "Descend from Genus to Species," brings forward one of his sermons, in the first part of which he shows that true love to God has *thirteen* characteristics. Simeon, one of his editors, reduces them to *three*, which substantially embrace them all. Take another instance: Dr. Ammon illustrates one of his principles of disposition by the following division, which has been approved by Vinet and others: "I. What is ambition? II. Its unhappy influence on temporal good; (1) It makes us habitually discontented with ourselves; (2) It excites others to resist us; (3) It does not secure us the esteem of other men; (4) Still less their love. III. Its unhappy influence on spiritual good. (1) It hinders self-knowledge; (2) It prevents us from being just to others; (3) It prevents us from loving others." The last three subdivisions under the second head should have been embraced in one. The same may be said of the last two subdivisions under the third head.

In giving evening lectures of this kind, particularly to a sleepy

and inattentive audience, it may be well, occasionally, to write a number of questions on the obscure points of the text, and put them into the hands of some intelligent hearer to read aloud, in order to be separately answerd by the lecturer. Macarius says that in ancient times auditors were permitted to question the preacher.

The Pastor will not seldom reverse the logical method; in other words, he will make his application the basis of his explication.[1] Thus he finds it necessary to dissuade his congregation from seeking justification by the works of the law, and to persuade them to seek it only by faith in Jesus Christ. As the subject first occurs to him in this practical shape, he is led to inquire, "How may I do this effectually?" Choosing, perhaps, Rom. iii. 20 as his text, he will endeavor to make each head of explication pave the way to his application. And accordingly he will first explain the word justification; secondly, show that good works cannot be the meritorious cause of our justification; thirdly, that the righteousness of Christ is that cause; fourthly, explain the nature of that faith which is the instrumental cause of our justification. Now the work of dehortation and exhortation will be comparatively easy, for it will proceed intelligibly, and with that force which motives ever carry to minds which are already taught the import, and convinced of the reasonableness of our position. Generally, indeed, the adoption of this retrospective method will enable the preacher to omit all those parts of his sermon that are not in some way ancillary to his practical inferences, and their immediate or ultimate results.

In methodizing a didactic discourse we should so arrange the several parts that their connection may, as far as possible, suggest itself, so that long transitions may be superceded. But when from the complexity or obscurity of the subject this cannot be done, some transition will be necessary; and even arguments may sometimes answer this purpose; for, as every important particular in a doctrine, experience, or duty must be explained, so it must be shown that every particular introduced is really included in that doctrine or duty; and that it arises from the preceding and is subservient to the succeeding parts of it; and thus, says Dr. Gerard, *reasoning* is introduced on these several particulars even in an explicatory discourse, *though not in* support of the *truth of the general doctrine or obligation of the whole duty.*

Good examples of method in expository sermons may be found in the sermons and commentaries of Thos. Adams, Caryl, Greenhill, Manton, Burkitt, Henry, and Bradley.

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[1] Principal Blackwell's Methodus Evanglica, chap. iii.

Section V.—Method in Historical Sermons.

The orderly disposition of a subject taken from Scripture history or biography is comparatively easy, except in cases wherein, as in a series of sermons, a variety is very desirable.

In biographical discourses we attempt to exhibit and apply a single act or event in a good or bad man's life, or a particular virtue or vice as it appeared in one action or trial, or else in all the principal events of a life. It is only in a series of discourses that preachers endeavour to display all the virtues or vices which are recorded of a person, either in one period of his life or in all the successive periods, and in all the emergencies and circumstances of life.

When a character, as that of Balaam, for example, is to be delineated and applied, the second part is usually devoted to an examination of the principle or motive or temper which prompted the actions before described, and the third part is occupied with the application. In other cases the second part is assigned to "observations" which, by the way, Claude considers necessary in discussing such historical subjects as need no explication. Dr. Thos. Guthrie, in his sermon, the Apostate Demas, considers, in the second place, the *cause* of Demas' fall. In many historical sermons the application may be continuous. Robinson's "Scripture Characters" is a work well deserving attention as affording good example of this form of application. Reinhard[1] excelled in handling historical and biographical subjects. His method usually was, first to draw from a Scripture fact a principle or doctrine; then illustrate it incidentally by the text and by modern ways of thinking and acting; finally, to make applications. He thus secures the unity of a logical arrangement, which is so difficult that Dr. Porter[2] accounts it one of the inconveniencies of the choice of an historical subject; and it is not a little remarkable that so severe an exactor of rhetorical unity should here concede that the sacrifice of unity is fully justified on proper occasions by the advantages with which it is attended. Our method, however, should not be determined by the matter of the text or context. We should especially keep in view some definite, practical object, and adjust our plan thereto. See how admirably Massillon bends his method to his knowledge of human nature, and Krummacher develops his from the treasures of his Christian experience.

In sermons of this kind the plan should always be simple, and may often be mixed and cryptic. An animated style should mark

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[1] Read Dr. Park's two able and instructive articles on his sermons in Bib. Sac., vol. vi. [2] Lectures on Homiletics, Lect. v.

historic sermons. Even the much-abused Bishop Butler warms with the subject of Balaam, exclaiming: "Good God, what inconsistency, what perplexity is here!" Butler's sermon, and nearly all other able ones, conceal the sketch, which in such compositions should never be very prominent. One dead body is known to have been quickend by the touch of another; but who ever read of a dead body being raised to life by the touch of a skeleton? Another excellent example of a cryptic plan is furnished by Dr. Enoch Pond's sermon, "Darius and Daniel; or, the Necessity of an Atonement," in the National Preacher, vol. xxxviii.

For a series of historical sermons there are no better models than the discourses of the late F. W. Krummacher, composing his two books, the one entitled "Elijah the Tishbite," and the other "The Early Days of Elisha." Their structure is solid and inartificial; the heads of each are only two or three, and these are always suggestive and compact. Those who would know how much valuable instruction may be conveyed by the mere order of a series of sermons must study the arrangement of the prophetic addresses. Thus Ezekiel places his threatenings against foreign nations between predictions of the fall of Jerusalem and predictions of the return and salvation of the Jews. This order taught the covenant people, as Keil and others have observed, that though they were for a time to be in subjection to heathen powers, yet those wicked powers must themselves ultimately fall, and the chosen nation rise again out of their ruins to new and higher prosperity.

Section VI.—Disposition in Funeral and other Demonstrative Discourses.

Panegyrical addresses are seldom delivered by Protestant preachers, except in praise of some post-Biblical person, generally of some one not long deceased. But we know no good reason why they should not occasionally preach on the perfections of our Saviour and the moral excellences of the apostles, prophets, and patriarchs. We say occasionally; for were they frequently to paint Scripture personages to the life, and to recommend their godly example, they would be in danger of slighting the doctrines and precepts and promises of Holy Writ. Recent facts demonstrate that this danger is by no means imaginary; for are not some now preaching demonstrative sermons on the subject of our Saviour, in which they would paint the whole man and represent him before us speaking and acting at the very time that they either ignore or deny the truth and authority of his teachings?

But to return: in funeral sermons, delivered while the memory of the departed is fresh, a studied method will naturally be avoided; and the common and the individual loss and sorrow will demand the foremost place. How Isaiah wanders up and down weeping in the fifty-third chapter of his prophecy; and how bewildered with his sorrow does Jeremiah sometimes appear!

There are five methods in demonstrative sermons: First, the *historical*, in which the order of time is followed. If we have much material, and time permits, we may divide the career of the person we eulogise into distinct periods, and consider each in its order; if our materials are few or comprised within a short period, we should not divide the discourse into separate parts. The historical method demands not a narration of the minor incidents of a life, but of its principal events. The discourse may either embody continuous applications or conclude with practical deductions. Fenelon, Maury, and Theremin give their preference to panegyrics of this kind.

Secondly, the *logical* method, according to which the most eminent virtues of a character are separately illustrated by the great events of his life. This was the arrangement adopted by Bossuet, Bourdaloue and Flechier: Thus Bossuet[1] in his oration over the Prince of Condé, by recounting the leading achievements of his hero, shows, first, the admirable virtues of his heart; secondly, the excellent powers of his intellect. Flechier[2] in his funeral oration for Turenne shows, first, how he triumphed over the enemies of the state by his bravery; secondly, over the passions of his soul by his virtue; thirdly, over the errors and vanity of the world by his piety.

Thirdly, the *apologetic*, in which is commemorated a famous man, against whose memory much has been said or written. In such cases, it is best to speak, *first*, in answer to the attacks that have been made; *secondly*, in praise of those deeds for which the personage is deserving of our gratitude.

Fourthly, the *dramatical*, in which two or three memorable events are employed by the encomiast to illustrate the virtues which the hero displayed in his conduct on these several occasions. This method is the reverse of the logical, or, rather, this process is inductive, the former deductive. Here events are foremost in the partition, there virtues. The historical and biographical discourses of Krummacher afford numerous examples of the dramatical method.

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[1] Dr. Fish's Masterpieces of Pulpit Eloquence, vol. ii., p. 24–25. [2] Id. 72.

Fifthly, the *descriptive*, in which the person is sketched characteristically from the life. Theremin holds that the law of constant progress, which true eloquence obeys, excludes the logical and dramatical (both sometimes are united under the term moral); but while it condemns description it approves narration. "The orator," says he, "should never in his narration exhibit, side by side, the different qualities of a person, or the different characteristics of things; but he should find an historical thread, by means of which his representation may run off like a gradually developing history. . . Unless this be done, the orator falls away from the rhetorical into the poetical representation, and allows himself and his hearers a rest that is destructive of all affection." But though sketches of character are less oratorical, yet they are better than those eulogies that make their subjects patterns of every virtue, like that of Nazianzen on Athanasius.[1]

As to the manner of concluding such discourses, either any one or all of the three following may be adopted:

1. We may make out of the life we have been narrating a distinct character of the person. This is difficult. We should, in such an attempt, avoid artificial and elaborate antitheses. Gregory Nazianzen[2] concludes his oration over Basil with a description of a crowd, each praising Basil from his own point of view.

2. We may introduce a resemblance or contrast between the conduct of the person commended in some memorable instances, and that which is commonly followed by most persons in like circumstances. But it is not necessary that these contrasts be confined to the conclusion. Aristotle[3] recommends the demonstrative comparsions of Isocrates.

3. Or we may conclude with a more direct application to the passions of the hearers in order to excite in them a generous ardor to be themselves what they so much admire in the life of the departed. This is the most common method of concluding, and may be either general, as relating to the whole subject or assembly; or special, as relating to some of the actions or virtues narrated, or to particular persons or classes in the assembly.

Section VII.—The Arrangement of Arguments.

The order in which arguments should be employed will depend on one or more of a great variety of considerations.

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[1] Oration xxi., §§1–4.

[2] Dr. Fish's Masterpieces of Pulpit Eloquence, vol. i., pp. 71, 72.

[3] Rhet., L. i., chap. ix.

The order may be determined by our direct purpose whether it be one of preparation or demonstration or corroboration, or include all these special ends. Matters of opinion, matters of individual facts that are past, and matters of individual facts that are future, each require different kinds of arguments. "Matters of opinion," says Whately, "are established chiefly by the argument from antecedent probability, though the testimony of wise men is also admissible; past facts, chiefly by signs of various kinds (including testimony); and of future events by antecedent probabilities and examples." Now the arrangement will depend sometimes on the question whether or not we have to establish both a fact and an opinion, or whether we have only to create an antecedent likelihood in favor of a conclusion, or remove lingering doubts. We have already in effect answered these and similar questions.

The order may be fixed according to the kind of the arguments employed. Arguments of the same kind ought, if possible, to be grouped together, *e. g.*, all the *a priori* arguments in one place, and all the *a posteriori* arguments in another, etc.

The arrangement will often be determined by the dependence of the arguments on one another. "This principle," says Prof. H. N. Day, "requires in the first place that the analytic proofs precede all others, *i. e.*, proofs which are given in the very terms of the proposition to be proved. As in exhibiting a proof of this class, the proposition itself must necessarily be explained, the relevance and force of every other proof will be more clearly seen after such an explanation. . . . This principle requires, in the second place, that arguments from antecedent probability precede examples and signs. . . In Dr. Barrow's discourse on the Divine Impartiality the *a priori* arguments are, with obvious propriety, presented first; and then the *a posteriori* arguments. If the order had been reversed the force of the reasoning would have been greatly weakened." The argument from antecedent probability comes first, that from signs or symptoms second, and that from examples last of all. "After the other proofs have been adduced," says Aristotle, "one example comes in with as much force as the testimony of a single honest witness."

In some cases, however, wherein the subject of discourse is obscure or profound, and the *a posteriori* arguments serve likewise to *illustrate* it, the latter should be brought forward first; *e. g.*, we may first prove *a posteriori*, that our Maker does give songs in the night; *secondly*, show *a priori*, that our Maker can give us such songs.

Arguments ought in general to be placed in such an order as to

show our respect for the oracles of God. "Our strongest proof," says Dr. Porter, "is taken from the Bible; but when this is mingled with a series of other proofs, there is a valid objection to placing it first. I know it is common in preaching, to prove a point from the word of God, and then add arguments from experience or consciousness, or other sources; but to my mind there is at least an apparent disrespect to the declarations of God, when we adduce these as proof of a point, and then proceed by arguments of a different kind to corroborate that proof, as though it were not of itself decisive. In general when such arguments are independent of Scripture authority, they should be arranged, not after, but before it." He makes two exceptions to this rule. 1st. When arguments are adduced to *answer objections* aginst the Scripture proof. 2d. When, as is often the case, prejudice and waywardness give only a reserved, doubting assent to proof from the Bible. Bellefroid concurs with Porter in advising that proofs from reason should be offered first, because they are adapted to the capacity of every one, and prepare the way for the sacred Scriptures.

The order will sometimes be wisely derived from a consideration of the state of the minds addressed. "If," says Prof. Day, "there be already a state of belief, and the object of the discourse is to confirm and strengthen it, then the weaker arguments will generally need to be placed first, and the stronger ones last. . . If there be an opposing belief to be set aside, it will be better to advance the stronger first, in order to overthrow opposition at once. The weaker may follow, which will serve to confirm, though they would be of no avail in the first assault. In order, however, to leave a deep impression, some of the stronger should be reserved to the close; or, what is equivalent, the arguments may be recapitulated in the reverse order."

A question often discussed by rhetoricians is, When should the premises and when should the conclusion come first? A proposition that is *well known* (whether easy to be established or not), and which contains nothing peculiarly offensive, should, according to Whately, in general be stated at once, and the proof subjoined; but if it be not familiar to the hearers, and especially if it be likely to be unacceptable, it is usually better to state the arguments first, or at least some of them, and then introduce the conclusion. Schott,[1] an earlier authority, is of a similar opinion. He prefers the progressive or synthetic arrangement, so making the discussion more popular and interesting, for it often begins with individual and con-

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. iii., p. 488.

crete statements, and advances gradually to the more general and abstract propositions. He adds, however, that it is an arrangement which demands much time for its full exhibition, and therefore is not appropriate for some subjects, and for some discourses. The same writer prefers the regressive or analytic arrangement (which reverses the order just named) where the theme is very extensive, or where the discourse must be very brief. But he concludes that the "use of the first or the second of these methods depends not merely upon the nature of the theme, and of the occasion on which it is discussed, but also upon the character and habits of the preacher; upon the specific design which he has in view; upon his text which may or may not require a formal proposition and distinct divisions; or upon the facility with which his audience can or will follow a train of consecutive argument, from premises which are unobjectionable to an obnoxious inference."

In historical and biographical sermons the arguments may often be placed here and there like continual applications. (See where Dr. James Hamilton, in his eighth lecture on Moses, fixes the argument from Congruity.)

It has been overlooked by rhetoricians, that the arrangement of arguments will, in some cases, be determined by the reasoner's relation to presumption and the burden of proof, or *onus probandi*. By the way, the preacher who makes much ado in order to shirk the burden of proof, is liable either to be suspected of being a weak reasoner, or else of attempting to maintain groundless opinions.

In the ordering of arguments *ad doctrinam* (*e. g.*, such as are addressed to the learned) we are to employ a cryptic method, and avoid, to the utmost of our power, long transitions. In other cases, ignorance or prejudice may demand the utmost lucidity in methodising our arguments. Through ignorance the argument from antecedent probability may not be well understood when placed foremost. In such cases the argument from example should come before it. As to prejudice, the whole subject should be studied by all who would learn how to convince. (Read Port Royal Logic, Pt. iii., chap. xx., Of the Sophisms of Self-Love, of Interest, and of Passion; also Dr. Watts' Logic, Pt. ii., chap. iii., "Of the Springs of False Judgment, or the Doctrine of Prejudices.") It is an acute observation of Spalding, that "adverse prepossession is always to be supposed possible where the writer or speaker has not the first word."

The effect of disorder in reasoning is sometimes grand and overwhelming, like that of an army scaling the walls of a city. Robert Hall's manner is an example of this. Foster compares his independent propositions to a number of separate and undisciplined savages.

Where should the refutation of objections be placed? We answer, When the counter-opinions are deeply rooted it is advisable to begin with refutation; but, as in some cases it is difficult to refute objections before we have finished our arguments, it is best to mention those objections at the beginning with the promise of afterwards refuting them; for, if we do not so much as mention them at first, or in the midst of our sermon, our arguments will be received with little favour by those who know and remember that there are strong objections on the other side.

But if the objections to be refuted are indirectly opposed by our main arguments, they should be fully considered in the midst of each argument or at its close. Generally, indeed, refutation, like application, is most effective when *continuous*, *i. e.*, distributed here and there. When, again, we have to refute *anticipated* objections, we should defer them till the last; for then our refutation will be fresh in the memory of our adversary and of the audience.

When the argumentator has to make refutation his principal task, he may, as the French preachers have often done, divide an objection into two or three parts, and dispose of each one in succession.

Entire sermons may thus be profitably devoted to the refutation of weighty objections. Bourdaloue, Massillon, and Saurin furnish examples of such discourses. (See also Richard Watson's ser., "God with us," Acts xvii. 28; Vinet's ser., "The Mysteries of Christianity," 1 Cor. ii. 9., and Chalmers on the Golden Rule, Matt. vii. 12.)

Follow not the example of those Jesuits and other reasoners who very seldom or never take any notice of objections. Even Jonathan Edwards, we are sorry to say, was not always careful enough to pause at real obstacles that might be thrown in his way. "His preaching," said Charles Simeon, "reminds me of a man holding another's nose to to the grindstone, and turning with all his might in spite of all objections and expostulations." Thomas Watson, of Walbrook, on the contrary, is so attentive to the doubts and difficulties of his hearers, that some of his sermons read like dialogues.

Section VIII.—The Manifold Framework of Sermons.

Our present aim is to exhibit a *variety* of plans and divisions, without attempting, however, to give examples of every possible or every allowable kind. Among those preachers who neither underrate nor overrate the importance of analysis and method, there are not a few who employ certain favourite and stereotyped forms

of division and arrangement. It is very true, as Reinhard[1] observes, that "a large proportion of subjects must be divided alike, if treated in the most natural manner; and a man will fall into artificialness, or fail to do them justice, if he divides them in any other way." And yet he confesses that far too much uniformity of method was one of the faults of his own earlier sermons. Method, however, of some kind, we must employ, or else we must renounce all hopes of becoming Christian teachers and reasoners. Exhortation is, in general, most effectual when the method is concealed. On the whole, we should here remember and observe the sterling precept, "Amplify rather than multiply."

The divisions of sermons, in so far as they relate to texts, are of two kinds—the Textual and the Topical. In the textual division, the words or clauses of the text either form or suggest the heads of the sermon. In topical division, the subject or proposition which is usually derived from some text is made the groundwork of the principal parts of the discourse.

Subsection I.—Textual Divisions.

These are of three kinds—the Natural, the Selective, and the Supplementive.

§ I. The Natural Division resolves into parts the ideas expressed in the text by following the order of its words or clauses, or else by reversing that order, as in the following examples:

Exodus i. 6.—I. And Joseph died; II. And all his brethren; III. And all that generation.—*Dr. Candlish.*

1 Tim. i. 5.—I. Charity out of a pure heart; II. And of a good conscience; III. And of faith unfeigned.

1 John iii. 2.—I. For we shall see him as he is; II. But we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him; III. And it doth not yet appear what we shall be. IV. Beloved, now are we the sons of God.

Gal. iii. 28.—I. In Christ Jesus; II. All one; III. Ye are.

§ II. The Selective Division picks out the principal ideas conveyed by the text, and arranges them either in a logical or a rhetorical order. This kind of division has two forms, the interrogative and the indicative.

1. The interrogative division introduces the leading parts of the text, with the words, who? what? where? why? etc., as in the following example:

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[1] Geständnisse.

1 Cor. xvi. 2.—I. Who should give? "Let every one of you," etc. II. When? "Upon the first day of the week." III. How much? "As God hath prospered him." IV. Why? "That there be no gatherings when I come."

This kind of division is abused when it is applied to texts which do not properly admit of it, and when the interrogative heads are too numerous for one text or one sermon. Cf. Division by Inquiry.

2. The indicative division suggests elliptically the matter of the chief members of the text by means of the *implied* questions or answers by which they are introduced. This division is either regular or irregular; regular when in representing actions or events the natural order is followed, *e. g.:*

Phil. ii. 13.—I. Cause: "God." II. Operation: "Worketh in you to will and to do." III. Result: "His good pleasure."

This division is irregular when the order of sequence cannot be observed, *e. g.:*

Heb. xii. 3.—I. The trial spoken of: "Contradiction of sinners." II. The danger to be feared: "Lest ye be wearied and faint," etc. III. The example and protection offered: "Consider him that endured," etc.

Psa. cxix. 62.—I. The puspose: "I will rise to give thanks unto thee." II. The motive: "Because of thy righteous judgments." III. The time: "At midnight."

§ III.—Analysis by Moveable Emphasis.

1 Chron. xxviii. 9.—I. *If.* The prize is obtainable on a condition. II. If *thou* seek Him. The words stop with thee; do not glance by thee. III. If thou *seek* Him, not inquire, not read, not hear, not desire. IV. If thou seek *Him.* The chiefest, whom angels adore, Immanuel. V. *He* will be found of thee, not his angel, not a merely human mediator. VI. He *will be found* of thee. He is willing to be found—certainly will be found. VII. Of *thee.* Yes, even of thee. Though mean in origin, poor in resources, obnoxious to wrath, unbelieving, plagued with an evil heart.—*The Rev. George Bowen, of Bombay.*

§ IV.—Supplementive Division adds one or more such heads to the strictly texual division as are implied by the text or context, or are expressed in the context, or expressed or implied in some other part of Scripture.

Text, Ezek. xxxvi. 31.—I. "Then shall ye remember," etc. II. "And shall loathe yourselves," etc. III. Such repentance is a sign of returning prosperity.

Text, Matt. vii, 17.—I. Trees that bring forth good fruit. II. Trees that bring forth evil fruit. III. Trees that bring forth no fruit.—*Thomas Aquinas.*

Subsection II.—Topical Divisions.

Divisions of this class are too multiform to admit of being here fully enumerated and exemplified. In these the topic or general

proposition is the basis of division, *fundamentum dividendi.* The mode of division in a given case must depend more or less on the immediate object of the sermon, which should be either explanation, conviction, excitation, or other application. And hence the object of the sermon should determine the form of its main proposition. Nor can the proper divisions and subdivisions be made before this proposition has been carefully limited and qualified.

In giving the following examples, our object is not to present skeletons and sketches that are full and symmetrical, but to exemplify the principal and various forms in which divisions may be made in the material parts of a sermon. Very seldom have we occasion to preach a sermon that contains all these parts or divisions and subdivisions of them. Some discourses admit either no explication, or no confirmation, or no application, although the last should very rarely be excluded.

§ I.—Examples of Topical Expository Plans.

The Time-Server.—Eccles. vii. 16, 17.

I. Show what these words cannot import; II. Show the true signification of the passage; III. Answer some objections to these views of the text.

The State of the Blessed Dead.—Phil. i. 23.

Regard this revelation negatively and positively: I. As to what it disproves; II. As to what it implies.—*Dean H. Alford.*

Christ Knocking at the Door.—Rev. iii. 20.

I. What the text expresses; II. What the text implies. 1. It implies that those who are addressed are not forsaken by the Saviour; 2. That a person may delay opening the door until Jesus has not only knocked but spoken; 3. Until he has offered not only to become his guest but his host also; 4. That we are in some sense able to admit Christ.

The Duty of Resignation.—Matt. xxvi. 39.

I. Consider what is *consistent with* resignation.
  1. An earnest deprecation of an impending judgment;
    (1.) Because afflictions are evils which the will naturally declines, and are not desirable things in themselves.
    (2.) There are temptations that attend afflictions;
  2. A mournful sense of afflictions sent from God;
    (1.) A pensive feeling of them is suitable to the law of our creation;
    (2.) If we do not feel the stroke, how shall we regard the hand that smites us?

II. What is *implied* in resignation, etc.—*Dr. W. Bates.*

§ II.—Divisions according to Depth of Meaning.

The Prophecy of Caiphas.—John xi. 47–53.

Let us consider the words in their twofold meaning: I. As intended by the High Priest; II. As expounded by the Evangelist.—*D. G. Uhlhorn*, of Göttingen.

The Fulness of Christ.—Col. i. 19.

I. What ideas these words *shut out.*

II. What ideas they *shut in:* (1) By expression; (2) By implication.

III. What ideas they *draw after* them: (1) By logical inference; (2) By practical inference.

The Traitor.—John xiii. 18.

I. The text *historically* considered (Psa. xli. 9); II. *Prophetically;* III. *Application.*

The Duties of Marriage.—John ii. 1.

Four kinds of marriage are spoken of in Scripture. First, historical, Esth. ii. 18; Second, allegorical, Matt. xxii. 2; Third, tropological, Hosea ii. 19; Fourth, anagogical, Matt. xxv. 10. 1. The literal marriage is the union between the man and the woman; 2. The allegorical is between Christ and his Church; 3. The tropological between God and the soul; 4. The anagogical between God and the Church triumphant. We now treat of the literal marriage, which, I. God sanctioned in four ways. II. In marriage there should be present three good qualities.—*Thomas Aquinas.*

§ III.—The Scholastic Division consists in distributing the proposition or text treated as a proposition into three parts, namely, the subject, the predicate, and the copula. This division is principally useful for the *exposition* of short but weighty texts.

Subject: Salvation by Hope.—Rom. viii. 24.

I. What is it to be saved? II. What is hope? III. The certainty that all that have a good hope shall be saved.

Subject: Living by Faith.—Heb. x. 38.

I. What is the meaning of the term "just," as used in the text? II. Explain the nature of "faith." III. In what sense may it be said that the just live by faith?

Subject: Salvation Gratuitous.—Eph. ii. 8.

I. What is salvation? II. What is grace? III. Prove that it is by grace alone that we are saved.

§ IV.—Examples of Narrative and Descriptive Plans.

The Great Assize.—Rom. xiv. 10.

Consider, I. The chief circumstances which will precede our standing before the judgment-seat of Christ; II. The judgment-seat itself; III. A few of the circumstances which will follow it.—*John Wesley.*

The Great Sin of Rejecting Christ.—John xv. 22.

I. How greatly aggravated the sin of the Jews was in rejecting Christ; II. How much more inexcusable we are if we reject Christ. Address, 1. Those who make excuses for their neglect of Christ; 2. Those who desire to attain the saving knowledge of him.—*Charles Simeon.*

The Interview at Jacob's Well.—John iv. 4–29.

I. The Preparation, ver. 4–15; II. The Crisis, ver. 16–27; III. The Decision, ver. 23, 29.—*F. W. Krummacher.*

The Dying Malefactor.—Luke xxiii. 39–43.

I. The state of the man's mind before the time of his conviction;

II. The circumstances and means of his conversion;

III. The nature and results of the change show that the turning-point of his conversion was the belief that Jesus is the Christ.

IV. Lessons.—*James Buchanan.*

The Raising of the Young Man at Nain.—Luke vii. 11–16.

I. An account of the occurrence. II. This miracle proves, 1. The matchless philanthropy of Jesus; 2. That he is invested with unlimited power; 3. That he is the resurrection and the life; 4. That he is the Redeemer of mankind. (Brief application).—*Van Der Palm.*

§ V.—Division by Association.

And there were set there six water-pots of stone.—John ii. 6.

There were six water-pots, from which wine was poured out; and there are as many persons or groups of persons from whom we may take pattern. I. Christ; II. Mary; III. The Disciples; IV. Bride and Bridegroom; V. The Ruler of the Feast; VI. The Servants.—*S. Baring-Gould.*

The Three Refuges of the Soul.

Our Lord found refuge, I. In a ship; II. In a mountain; III. In a desert.—*Matthew Faber.*

§ VI.—Division by Synthesis.

The Interposition of the Saviour Vindicated.—Isa. lix. 1.

A. The notion of intervention in other matters is familiar to us all, and reasonable.

α. Peoples have often by revolutions interfered with the successions of royal families, with ancient constitutions and laws, for the purpose of redressing wrongs and securing privileges.

β. Civil justice does not ignore mercy; the regular administration of laws is often set aside by the pardoning power.

γ. The transgressors of "the laws of nature" are saved from suffering full penalties by physicians and other humane persons. Sailors are saved from drowning without lengthening the ship's voyage. Children found asleep on railways are saved from instant death without causing any detention to the approaching trains.

B. If man can thus, in spite of our theories concerning "the laws of nature" and "second causes," interfere to save the body, how much more can God do it to save the soul.

α. If the creature, how much more the Creator; if the feeble, how much more the Almighty; if the ignorant and unwise, how much more the All-Knowing and the All-Wise, etc.

β. If man may interpose to save the body from death, how much more God to save the soul from perdition, etc.

The Lord Jesus the Desire of all Nations.—John i. 29.

א. Christ was typified by the lamb of the Passover, and of the regular morning and evening sacrifice.

ב. The vicarious offerings of the Patriarchs.

ג. The antediluvian notions of sacrifice; their mysterious origin.

ד. The sacrificial rites of ancient pagan nations.

ה. The immolations of modern heathens.

ו. All men of all ages and nations are, by nature and practice, sinners, and therefore feel more or less the need of some atonement, etc.

ז. Hence the Lord Jesus is the one great want of all men.

ח. Hence the Gospel should be preached to all nations.

§ VII.—Examples of Division by Analysis.

The Disbelief of a Future State of Retribution.—Luke xvi. 19–31.

A. The true nature of this disbelief. B. Its sources. C. Its influence on the heart and life. D. Preventives and Remedies.—*J. H. B. Dräseke.*

What is Justifying Faith?—Rom. iii. 25.

I. What this faith is not.

1. It is not a mere belief that Christ is come, or that the New Testament is inspired, etc. 2. It is not a belief in the truth of all the principal doctrines of the Gospel. 3. It is not to believe in our own safety through Christ.

II. But justifying faith is the trust which a sinner feels in Christ to save him from hell, as a divine Saviour, in the method he has revealed by his atoning sacrifice and by his sanctifying Spirit.

1. It must be a trust in Christ to save *us*. 2. A trust in him to save us *from hell*. 3. *As a divine Saviour*. 4. In the method he has revealed by *his sacrifice*. 5. *By the power of his sanctifying Spirit*.

III. *To what extent* does this faith justify?

IV. *The manner* in which this faith justifies. *Application.*—*B. W. Noel.*

§ VIII.—Examples of Distinguishing Outlines.

The Fear of Death.—Heb. ii. 14, 15.

1. Some fear death from a pure instinct of nature; 2. Others from a principle of their religion, having a suspicion of their state; 3. Some from a spirit of infidelity, or a mere want of faith; 4. Others from an attachment to this world; 5. Others, again, from a mere weakness of the imagination.—*Bertheau.*

The Difference Between the Joy of the World and the Joy of Christians.—John xvi. 20.

A. They differ in their *sources.*

a. The former proceeds from the indulgence of uncontrolled desires; *b.* The latter from a pure and devout mind.

B. They differ in their *objects.*

a. The former depends on the objects of sense; *b.* The latter on spiritual benefits.

C. They differ in their *modes of expression.*

a. The former is disorderly and violent; *b.* The latter deliberate and regular.

D. In their *consequences.*

a. The former is converted into sorrow; *b.* The latter is followed by still more exalted happiness.—*Reinhard.*

The Meaning of Suffering.—John ix. 1–3.

I. How Christ *conceals* the *cause* of it. II. How he *reveals* the *design* of it.—*Dr. Steinmeyer.*

§ IX.—A Partition formed on a Division of Time.

Christ's Love for the Church in its Threefold Manifestations. Eph. v. 25–27.

I. In past time: gave himself for the Church.

II. In the present: that he might wash and sanctify it.

III. In the future: that he might present it to himself spotless.—*Rev. Dr. H. G. Weston.*

§ X.—Sketches Determined by Relations.

Sorrowing Souls and Starry Systems.—Psa. cxlvii. 3, 4.

I. God's relation to sorrowing souls;

II. His relation to starry systems;

III. The relation of three classes of men to this subject.

1. Those who deny God's active relation to both souls and stars;

2. Those who admit his active relation to stars, but deny it to souls;

3. Those who profess faith in his active relation to both, but are destitute of the spiritual feelings which are suitable to faith.—*William Rees.*

The Shame of the Gospel of Christ is its Glory.—Rom. i. 16.

We are not ashamed of the Gospel,

I. In its relation to the human intellect—its mysterious character;

II. In its relation to man's moral nature and powers—its humiliating character;

III. In its relation to other kinds of religion—its exclusive character;

IV. In its relation to this life—its unworldly character.—*Rev. Dr. H. G. Weston.*

§ XI.—Partitions by Correlation.

The Church and the World.—Acts viii. 14–25.

I. The Church in the world. 1. The extension of the Church in the world; 2. The unity of the Church in the world; 3. The testimony of the Church in the world.

II. The world in the Church. 1. The gathering of the world into the Church; 2. The spirit of the world in the Church; 3. The Church's judgment of that spirit.—*Dr. Ch. E. Luthardt.*

The Correlation of Seeking and Finding.—Matt. vii. 7.

I. There is no finding without seeking; II. There is no seeking without finding.—*Rev. H. D. Ganse.*

§ XII.—Syllogistic Division.

The Duty of Growing in Holiness.—Lev. xix. 2.

I. The moral character of man ought to resemble the moral character of God; II. God is holy; III. Therefore man ought to be holy.—*Anon.*

§ XIII.—Figurative Partition.

The Raising of the Widow's Son.—1 Kings xvii. 24.

I. The pruning of a branch that bore fruit; II. Its bearing more fruit; III. The satisfaction and joy that ensued.—*F. W. Krummacher.*

Acts i. 1–14.—Practical deductions:

I. The place of his *partings*, the place of his *sufferings;* II. Veiled is his *ingress* veiled is his *egress;* III. When we are brought to *a stand*, it is by a benedictive *hand;* IV. He is separated *from us*, and yet he continues *with us;* V. From his own he will remain *concealed* until he can be clearly *revealed.*—*Dr. Tholuck.*

For another instance see Latimer's sermon for all saints on the Beatitudes, where the partition is made under the figure of a pilgrimage of eight miles (Works, vol. i., p. 476).

§ XIV.—An Example of a Sketch by Alternation or Disjunction.

The Importance of a Sinner's Repentance.—Luke xv. 1–10.

Proposition: The conversion of a sinner is an event which gives joy in heaven.

I. The meaning of this proposition.

It admits of a double meaning, and is to be understood either as an emphatic description of the great importance of the sinner's moral improvement, or as an express announcement that this event does rejoice the hearts of beings in heaven. In other words, it is either a figurative and rhetorical sentence, or a literal and historical one.

A. It may be an emphatic but figurative description of the great importance of the sinner's conversion. Such phrases are used in this rhetorical manner:

a. Reason proves, and, *b.* the Bible teaches that the reformation of a man is thus inconceivably momentous.

B. The proposition may be a literal and historical announcement that a sinner's conversion pleases the inhabitants of heaven. They actually feel this interest in his spiritual condition.

a. Reason makes this statement probable, and *b.* the Scriptures favour it.

II. In the application of this proposition, I remark:

A. It teaches that human nature, even in its degraded estate, merits our high regard.

B. It is fitted to touch the hearts of the impenitent especially, and make them zealous for their own moral transformation.

C. It should encourage the regenerate to perseverance and progress.

D. It should stimulate all who can contribute to the moral improvement of their brethren, to do so with an unwearying zeal.—*Translated by Dr. Park from F. V. Reinhard's Predigten*, 1804, *Band* 1, *ss.* 373–390.

§ XV.—Examples of Distributive Partitions, or According to Different Aspects.

This kind of division may be distinguished from the kind last illustrated, by the fact that it is not founded on two or more allowable *interpretations of a text*, but on *various views or uses of a topic or proposition*, as presented by discussion or application. Besides, it is conjunctive, or, in other words, the *and* is here naturally employed in preference to the *or*.

The Passion of Christ.—John i. 29.

Exhibit it from three different points of view: I. As a melancholy scene of human passions and vices; II. As a sublime spectacle of human greatness; III. As the cause of all human happiness.—*Van Der Palm.*

The Deprecation of Evil in the Lord's Prayer.—Matt. vi. 13.

Consider, I. The cry of the text *stammered*, as by the unregenerate and heathen world it universally is; II. That cry *articulated*, as by the penitent and Christian, now taught the plague of his own heart, it is; III. That cry *answered*, as it is by God, come down to our deliverance.—*W. R. Williams.*

The various Ways in which Men may deny that they are Sinners. 1 John i. 8.

I. By denying the essential distinction between right and wrong; II. By calling good evil and evil good; III. By admitting the reality of sin, but denying its consequences; IV. By owning it in general, but denying it in particular; V. By confessing it in particular, but at the same time attempting to make their goodness outweigh it.—*E. De Pressensé.*

§ XVI.—Examples of Division by Degrees.

The Gift of God.—John iv. 10.

I. God's greatest gift—The gift of Christ. II. Christ's best promise—"Living water." III. The world's worst error—"Not knowing the gift of God." IV. The sinner's strongest encouragement—"He would have given."—*Richard Cecil.*

The Preciousness of Christ.—1 Pet. ii. 7.

I. Show that Christ is precious to believers, (1) Positively, (2) Comparatively, (3) Superlatively. II. Why faith regards Christ as thus precious. III. Application.

Grounds of Thanksgiving.—Rom. i. 8.

I. We give thanks for those among you who have begun to manifest a concern for your souls.

II. But with greater delight will we return thanks for those who have made some progress in the divine life.

III. Most of all must we bless God for those among you who are walking worthy of their high calling.—*Charles Simeon.*

The End of the Christian Strife is Better than the Beginning. 2 Tim. iv. 7, 8.

I. The beginning is good; II. The continuance is better; III. Perseverance to the last is best of all.—*Rieger.*

§ XVII.—Division by Analogy.

Christ greater than Solomon in those Respects in which Solomon was greater than other Monarchs.—Matt. xii. 42.

I. Wisdom; II. Inherited wealth; III. In temple building; IV. Homage of other monarchs; V. Extent of dominions; VI. Happiness of his subjects; VII. The duration of his reign.—*Rev. George Brooks.*

§ XVIII.—Partition by Negation.

Christianity Inviolable.—Gal. i. 8.

I. The import of the Gospel cannot be vague; II. Its divine origin cannot be controverted; III. Its efficacy cannot be denied; IV. Its authority cannot be superseded; V. Its existence cannot be endangered.—*Rev. Dr. R. Winter Hamilton.*

§ XIX.—Examples of Illustratory Sketches.

Of Divine Grace.—John iv.

The sweetness and power of grace exemplified in the conversion of the Samaritan woman:

A. See how the grace of Christ uses all the attraction of its *sweetness* in order to convert the woman of Samaria.

a. The grace of Jesus waits for sinners, "wearied with his journey," etc.

b. The Saviour takes a favourable opportunity of conferring with her.

c. The converting grace of Jesus anticipates the efforts of sinners.

d. In what manner does grace prevent or anticipate?

e. Grace in order to act with more sweetness adapts itself to our weaknesses and imperfections.

f. He leads us to renounce the world by convincing us that it cannot make us happy.

B. See how the grace of Christ Jesus, by its *force* and *efficacy*, converts the Samaritan woman.

a. Consider the miraculous power of grace in the victory it gains over the *intellect* of this woman.

b. The miracle of grace in changing her *heart.*—*Bourdaloue.*

Keeping the Heart.—Prov. iv. 23.

I. The heart is to be kept, 1. As thou wouldst keep a temple; 2. As a treasure; 3. As a garden; 4. As a garrison; 5. As a prisoner; 6. As a watch.

II. The frame and posture in which it should be kept: 1. Awake; 2. Jealous; 3. Serious; 4. Humble; 5. Sublime.

III. Keep the passages, forts, and outworks of the heart: 1. The senses; 2. The thoughts and impulses.

Conclusion: If we do not keep our hearts, the devil will.—*Thomas Watson.*

The Sinner's Choice.—John xviii. 40.

. . . I did not select these words to speak particularly of the Jews. They are to be viewed as the expression of the choice of a carnal mind. In pursuing this subject I remark:

I. The great and peculiar sin of man, under the Christian dispensation, is the rejection of the authority and offices of the Saviour for the sake of some opposing interest or proposition. . . . He prefers Barabbas to Christ.

II. I would illustrate this choice in some instances which display it.

1. I see the young man following the pleasures of sense, and for these despising and driving from him the claims of piety. . . What is the expression of every act of his life but the vehemently declared choice? "Not this man, but Barabbas."

2. I see the giddy daughter of vanity and fashion studious of a vain exhibition of herself; her whole thoughts are occupied with the changing scenes of this world. . . She is daily shouting in her insensate giddiness: "Not this man, but Barabbas."

3. I see the man of business in his neglect of godliness, devoting all the energies of his mind to the amassing of wealth. . . The whole language of his life, and, if you press upon him the obligations of piety, the language of his lips is: "Not this man, but Barabbas."

4. I see the toiling aspirant for human honor climbing the slippery steeps, the summit of which so few have gained. Reputation is the all with him. For this he studies, plans, and labors. He will not seek his life from Christ. The language of his unchanging course as it speaks in every act and in every determination of life is: "*Not* this man, but Barabbas."

5. I see the self-righteous man in the false estimate of his own character. . . The choice which his whole heart makes is, "Not this man, but Barabbas."

6. I see the healthful, the prosperous, and the young. . . And as I see these things I cannot but mourn that even God's blessings to man, health and prosperity and youth, should be converted into a Barabbas of opposition to him.

III. Consider how fearful is the guilt, how alarming is the danger of this choice. Barabbas was a *robber*, and is not Barabbas a robber still?

1. You are robbed of the favour of God forever;

2. You are robbed of the compassionate intercession of a Saviour;

3. You are robbed of the welfare of your immortal soul.—*Dr. S. H. Tyng.*

§ XX.—Examples of Sketches by Comparison or by Contrast.

The Brazen Serpent an Emblem of our Saviour.—John iii. 14.

I. Compare the physical condition of the bitten Israelites with the moral condition of all mankind.

II. For both dangerous conditions some remedy was indispensable.

III. Neither of the remedies provided was or could have been the invention of human reason.

IV. As no other remedy was found for Israel, so no other Saviour can avail for us.

V. Both then and now the Remedy must be received by faith, and by faith alone.

Life to be Chosen Rather than Death.—Deut. xxx. 19.

I. Guilt and depravity, on the one hand; on the other, pardon and renewal.

II. Death by the first Adam; resurrection by the second.

III. By the law condemned; by the Lord Jesus justified.

IV. Left to ourselves, we walk towards hell; redeemed by the blood of Christ, we are admitted into heaven.

Application: 1. Refutation and instruction; 2. Exhortation and advice; 3. Reproof and encouragement; 4. Lamentation and rejoicing.

In a sermon on John xvi., Joseph De Barzia sets the sorrow of the first disciples because of their Lord's departure over against the indifference of modern professors to the danger of being forsaken by the Spirit.

The Broad and the Narrow Way.—Matt. vii. 13, 14.

I. If you incline to the former of these ways, it has many things, it must be owned, to recommend it, particularly:

1. You have *no difficulty* in entering upon it. 2. You have also *full scope for your inclinations* in your progress. 3. Moreover, you will be in *no want of company.*

II. If, on the other hand, you incline to the latter of these ways:

1. There may be *great difficulties* at the entrance. 2. There may be *hard struggles* attending your progress. 3. You may have *but little company.*—*Andrew Fuller.*

§ XXI.—Example of Partition in Inductive or Analytic Reasoning.

The Origin and Right of Human Judicature.—2 Chron. xix. 6.

Proposition: The administration of justice is for the Lord.

I. The *power* of judgment is God's *right.* II. The *matter* of judgment is God's *cause.* III. The *issue* of judgment is God's *end.* IV. The *formal* judgment or sentence is God's *sentence.*—*Edward Young*, Dean of Sarum.

§ XXII.—An Example of an Outline by Dilemmas.

The Lamb that was Slain.—Mark xiv. 65.

I. Either the person mentioned in the narrative bore the guilt of our sins, or what we have been taught of a Divine Providence is a delusion.

II. Either this person suffered what our sins deserved, or the whole transaction is an inexplicable enigma.

III. Either the sufferer in this scene made satisfaction to the divine justice on our account, or we are irremediably lost.

IV. Either we are at variance with sin and hate it, or we do not love the Lord Jesus.

V. Either no regenerate person will be saved, or the condemning power has been taken from the blasphemous thoughts of believers.

VI. Either the scene which has this day been presented to you has moved your hearts to say with the apostle, "Let us go forth to him without the camp, bearing his reproach," or you are not the friends of Jesus.—*F. W. Krummacher.*

§ XXIII.—Oratorical Plans.

Here the plan is formed according to the laws of rhetorical progress and the method which is most conducive to persuasion. Gregory Nazianzen, Vieyra, Segneri, Hall, Irving, and John Harris excelled in composing "propositional" sermons. In the first example the rhetorical objects of the sermon (viz., explanation, conviction, and excitation) are cryptically bound up with the partition.

On the Resurrection.—1 Cor. xv. 42.

I. Its essential character. II. The certainty of it. III. Its glory.—*Dr. J. J. Van Oosterzee.*

The Spirituality of the Divine Nature.—Isa. xxxi. 3.

It is my design to suggest to you some of those views of the character of the Supreme Being, inseparably connected with the spirituality of his nature, in which he stands contrasted with all other beings whatsoever:

α. The spirituality of the Deity is intimately connected with the possession of that infinite power which renders him the proper object of entire confidence.

β. The spirituality of God stands in close and intimate connection with his invisibility.

γ. That God is a spirit and not flesh is inseparably connected with his immensity and omnipresence.

δ. Because God is a spirit, and not flesh, he is possessed of infinite wisdom and intelligence.

ε. The doctrine of the spirituality of the divine nature establishes a most intimate relation and bond of union between him and all the intellectual part of the creation.

ζ. The spirituality of the divine nature renders him capable of the exalted prerogative of being the satisfying portion, the supreme good, of all intelligent beings.

(A brief improvement concludes the sermon.)—*Robert Hall.*

§ XXIV.—Outlines Suggested by Emotions.

The Conversion of the Eunuch.—Acts viii. 26–39.

I find in this narrative four subjects of astonishment, which go on heightening, one upon the other:

I. A courtier who reads holy Scripture—a thing which is already surprising.

II. A courtier who confesses his ignorance—a fact which is more surprising still.

III. A courtier who asks instruction from his inferior—this ought to redouble our surprise.

IV. Finally, in order to crown this surprise, a courtier who is converted.—*Pastor P. J. Courtonne.*

A View of the Tomb of Jesus.—Matt. xxviii. 6.

As we enter, I. Our first emotion is wonder; II. Gratitude; III. Admiration; IV. A feeling of tranquillity.—*Anon.*

The Five Wonders.—Rev. iii. 20 (A Sermon to Children).

The first wonder is found in the person mentioned in that little word "I."

The second wonder is—His object in knocking there.

The third wonder is—that Jesus is permitted to stand there without being admitted.

The fourth wonder is—the patience of Jesus in standing so long at the sinner's heart.

The fifth and last of these wonders is—Christ supping with the sinner.—*Dr. W. P. Breed.*

§ XXV.—An Example of a Skeleton by Observations.

The Church the Lord's Vineyard.—Heb. vi. 7.

A. Observations:

a. God in his word exhibits his Church under the image of a vineyard or piece of ground which he cultivates.

b. As the cultivator, so God uses means adapted in the order of nature to make this ground productive.

c. He asks for corresponding fruits.

d. He blesses those who bring forth fruits meet for him by whom it is dressed.

B. Improvement:

a. Show the richness of the dispensation of grace which sinners now enjoy. God is working through his Word and Spirit in cultivating the ground.

b. Warn sinners that they are now under trial, etc.

c. Exhort them to bring forth fruit meet, etc.

d. Encourage the pious to bring forth more fruit, inasmuch as more blessing is promised, etc.—*Dr. J. S. Cannon.*

§ XXVI.—A Partition by Analysis of the Proposition.

A Prayer for a Revival of the Lord's Work.—Hab. iii. 2.

I. The Lord's work; II. A revival of it; III. A prayer for, etc.

§ XXVII.—Plans by Questions Expressed or Implied.

Christ is Waiting.—Rev. iii. 20.

I. Who knocks without? II. What is his errand? III. Why is not the door opened?—*Anon.*

Was it not Seemly?—Luke xxiv. 26.

I. Yea, Lord, thine attributes teach us the propriety of thy sufferings. II. Yea, Lord, thy achievements teach us the propriety of thy sufferings.—*Anon.*

Partial Knowledge.—1 Cor. xiii. 9.

A. Partial knowledge is a calamity when, a. traceable to early prejudice; *b.* traceable to false teaching, *c.* to inability to learn. *B. Partial knowledge is a crime when, a.* owing to prayerlessness, *b.* to wilfulness, *c.* lethargy, *d.* inattention. *C. Partial knowledge is a blessing when, a.* it exercises faith, *b.* evokes inquiry, *c.* displays filial fear. *D. Partial knowledge is an argument for, a.* humility, *b.* alarm, *c.* hope, *d.* praise.—*Anon.*

§ XXVIII.—Division by Cumulative Arguments.

The Day of Judgment Appointed.—Acts xvii. 31.

Such a day is, I. Possible; II. Probable; III. Certain.

§ XXIX.—An Example of Sketches by Climax or Gradation.

The Hidden Manna.—Rev. ii. 7.

I. No man knoweth the new name, save he that receiveth it;
II. No man receiveth it, but he that hath the white stone;
III. No man hath the white stone, but he that eateth the hidden manna;
IV. No man eateth the hidden manna but he to whom it is given;
V. It is given to none to eat thereof but to him that overcometh.—*Anon.*

The Nature of Christian Love.—Matt. v. 20.

I. Love for the commandments, yet not separated from love to God;
II. Love to God, yet not separated from love to man;
III. Love to man, yet not separated from love to our neighbour.—*Marheineke.*

Paul at Ephesus.—Acts xix. 19.

I. Notice what produced this excitement. II. Notice what this excitement produced.—*Anon.*

§ XXX.—Examples of Skeletons by Suppositions.

Prayer Considered as a Privilege.—Dan. vi. 7.

I. Suppose that it were now possible to make a law which should forbid your praying to God for thirty days, as Daniel was forbidden, would you not then be able to form some estimate of prayer as a privilege?

1. Were such a law passed, now what would various classes of men be likely *to say* and *do* about it?

2. What would probably be *the course* Christians and professors would adopt?

3. Who would then regard it a *cross* or *duty?*

II. Suppose that in such case there were *only one place* where it were lawful to pray.

III. That in that place *only one person* could lawfully pray either for himself or others.

IV. Suppose *a large sum of money* were exacted to procure the intercessions of that privileged person, etc.

Christ at the Feast.—John xi. 56.

I. He may be at this annual festival. There is nothing in such a feast inconsistent with Christ's presence.

II. Suppose he should be here, how different from all former feasts would this feast be.

III. Suppose Jesus Christ should not come to the feast; then it will not be worth coming to.

IV. He will be here.—*Thos. Toller, of Kettering.*

§ XXXI.—Division by Assumptions.

The Christian waiting until the Lord shall be revealed.—Acts i.

Like the disciples who abode at Jerusalem, I. He obeys, for he is full of faith. II. He dwells with others in unity, for he is full of love. III. He prays, for he is full of hope.—*F. G. Lisco.*

The Lord the Keeper of the Saint.—Psa. cxxi. 5.

I. Thou art willing to be kept of him; II. Thou knowest the voice of thy keeper, not that of strangers.—*Rev. George Bowen, of Bombay.*

§ XXXII.—Application by Concomitants and Adjuncts.

Christian Knowledge.—2 Tim. iii. 7.

I. Its excellence. II. Its necessity.

III. Its attendants are: 1. Wisdom. 2. Benevolence. 3. Humility. 4. Faith. 5. Self-denial.

Death of Christ.—1 Cor. xv. 3.

I. Its nature.

II. Some of the adjuncts which commend it to our regard:

a. The result of God's eternal decree. *b.* A matter of compact between the Father and the Son. *c.* Anciently prefigured and predicted. *d.* Executed by God, man concurring. *e.* The excellence of the person who died for us, etc.—*Isaac Barrow.*

§ XXXIII.—Application by Mixed Partition.

On the Birth of Christ.—Luke ii. 10, 11.

I. Are you one of those who, seduced by false maxims, quit the way of salvation for the way of the world? Be afraid, because this mystery will lay open to you afflicting truths.

II. Are you, or would you be, one of those who seek Almighty God in spirit and in truth? Be glad, because this mystery will discover to you infinite treasures of grace and mercy.—*Bourdaloue.*

Christ our Wisdom.—1 Cor. i. 30.

I. He is the righteousness in which it is our wisdom to believe.
II. He is the sanctification for which it is our wisdom to strive and suffer.
III. He is the redemption in which it is our wisdom to hope and rejoice.

The Prodigal Son.—Luke xv. 11–32.

I. The history of us all. II. A warning for us all. III. An encouragement for us all.—*Kern.*

§ XXXIV.—Application by Negation.

The Rich Fool.—Luke xii. 16–21.

I. What was his true character as described? etc. II. What were not his faults and vices?

I. What was his true character? *Explication.*

1. He heaped up riches from selfish motives; 2. He was a man of pleasure; 3. He imagined that his wealth would make him happy; 4. He cherished the delusive hope of a long life; 5. He was not rich towards God; 6. He was consequently a fool.

II. What were *not* his faults and vices? *Application.*

1. He did not accumulate a fortune by dishonesty; 2. He does not appear to have been in great haste to be rich; 3. Did not aim to gratify pride and vanity; 4. He was no unsociable and ungenerous miser; 5. He seems not to have desired riches in order that he might by bribery procure office or distinction; 6. We are not told that he either contradicted or derided God's revelation of his folly and danger.

§ XXXV.—Hortative Division.

The Terms of Reconciliation.—2 Cor. v. 20.

I. The nature of the controversy existing between God and man.
II. The terms on which it may be settled.
III. Urge on the unreconciled the immediate acceptance of these terms.—*Albert Barnes.*

§ XXXVI.—Distinguishing Kinds of Uses.

Use of Exhortation: Consider the difference between, (*a*) A finite and an infinite; (*b*) A seeming and a real good, etc.—*Bp. Beveridge*, in his Thesaurus, text Jer. ii. 13.

Use of caution: (*a*) Be *wisely* righteous; (*b*) Be *truly* righteous; (*c*) Be righteous *enough.*—*Chas. Simeon*, text Eccles. vii. 16, 17.

(*a*) The Gospel may be heard with pleasure but without profit: (*b*) It may be heard with profit but without pleasure; (*c*) It is desirable that it should be heard both with pleasure and profit.—*Anon.*

§ XXXVII.—Applications by a Repetition of the Text.

Great Sinners Encouraged to Return to God.

"But if from thence thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou shall find him, if thou seek him with all thy heart and with all thy soul."—Deut. iv. 29.

. . . Notice a few cases to which this language applies:

1. One would say: I have gone great lengths in sin. I was a drunkard and a blasphemer. God has now brought me into trouble—I cannot live long, and yet I fear to die. *But if from thence thou shalt seek the Lord*, etc.

2. Another says: I was born of religious parents. I was long weary of religion, and wished to be free. At length my father died, and I gave myself up to evil, and now no one respects me and no one cares for my soul. *But if from thence*, etc.

3. Another may say: My conduct has been correct and orderly, but I have valued myself upon it. I have lived a Pharisee. Now I feel the need of something with which to appear before God. Well, *if from thence thou shalt seek*, etc.

4. Another: I have made a profession of religion, and thought well of my state, but indulged secret sins, and afterwards outward transgressions; and now I am an outcast. Every one shuns me. *But if from thence*, etc.

5. Yet another: Though I have not lost my character, yet I have lost my peace of mind. I am a backslider. *But if from thence*, etc.

II. The grounds on which this encouragement rests.—*Andrew Fuller.*

Lot's Wife.—Luke xvii. 32.

A. Remember, she was warned; *B.* Remember, she left Sodom; *C.* Remember, she loitered; *D.* Remember, she looked back; *E.* Remember, she became a monument of divine wrath.—*Anon.*

John Foster, in his 9th lecture, applies by repeating the text at the *beginning* of each division. Melvill furnishes some happy examples of such repetitions of the text. Cf. Dr. Tyng's ser. under Division by *Illustration.*

§ XXXVIII.—Division by Moods and Tenses.

Our Change.—Job xiv. 14.

I. It *may be* a sudden change; II. It *will be* a great change; III. It *should be* a joyful change.—*Anon.*

§ XXXIX.—Practical Inferences by Interrogation either Expressed or Implied.

The Treason of Judas.—Matt. xxvi. 47–49.

. . Did Judas sell Christ for money? What a potent conqueror is the love of this world. . . Did Judas, one of the twelve, do this? Learn hence that a drop of grace is better than a sea of gifts, etc.—*John Flavel.*

Tribulation.—John xvi. 33.

I. In the world we must have tribulation, but we must not court it. II. In the world, etc., but we must not avoid it. III. In the world, etc., and we may make much out of it. IV. In the world, etc., but we shall be delivered from it.—*Anon.*

§ XL.—Uses by Confession.

The Servant's Story.—Psa. cxix. 65.

I. Though he knew my faults, he engaged me.

II. Though I am far beneath him, yet he familiarly teaches me.

III. Though one of his meanest servants, he feasts me at his own table.

IV. While my master is all this to me, I murmur if he cross me in anything. —*Anon.*

§ XLI.—Examples of Continual Application.

Marks of Love to God.—John v. 42.

I. I suggest a variety of marks which indicate love to God:

1. What is the bent of your thoughts when disengaged from any particular occurrence? These show the general temper and disposition.

2. Consider seriously how you stand disposed to the exercises of religion.

3. How do you stand affected towards the word of God?

4. Reflect with what sentiments you regard the people of God.

5. Consider the disposition you entertain towards the person and office of the Son of God.

6. Examine how you are affected by his benefits.

7. In what manner are you impressed with the sense of your sins?

8. Finally, how are you affected to the present world?

II. Supposing that any of you have now reached the conviction that you have not the love of God in you, permit me to point out the proper improvement of such a conviction:

1. It should be accompanied with deep humiliation;

2. And let your humiliation be accompanied with concern and alarm.

3. This is an awful state; but, blessed be God, it is not a hopeless situation.—*Robert Hall.*

The Gospel Message.—Mark xvi. 15, 16.

I. What knowledge have we of the Gospel?

II. What effect have its sanctions produced upon us?

III. What evidence have we that our faith is saving?

Application: 1. To the unbelieving; 2. To those who are weak in faith; 3. To those who are strong in faith.—*Charles Simeon.*

The Actions and Feelings of those who would be Saved.—Phil. ii. 12.

I. Some considerations on *our salvation.*

II. The acts by which we *work it out.*

III. The *fear and trembling* by which these acts are accompanied.—*John Claude.*

Examples of perpetual application in sermons on biographical and historical subjects may be found everywhere in Robinson's "Scripture Characters," and see particularly Dr. Schaff's sermon on Gen. xxxii. 24-31, in Dr. Fish's "Masterpieces of Pulpit Eloquence in the Nineteenth Century."

BOOK III.

STYLE.

MANY and stout are the prejudices which hinder the cultivation of Style, especially the style proper for the pulpit. This is partly the result of that ignorance which refuses instruction, and partly of those misapprehensions which have been occasioned by immethodical and superficial teaching. To place style before invention is to put the soul in subjection to the senses; and to talk of words as "the dress" of ideas, and figures as "the ornaments" of style, is virtually to calumniate rhetoric and to enfeeble and corrupt the minds of proficients. The apostle Paul's disavowal of the use of the false rhetoric of the sophists of his day has been interpreted to the disparagement of true eloquence; so that if such interpretation is to be accepted, it was not a curse but a blessing when Jehovah took away from Judah "the eloquent orator," and the eloquence of Apollos deserved no mention among the things that made him very serviceable to believers and mighty in convincing the Jews that Jesus was Christ. Nay, if this is so, then the apostle himself sinned against his own declared duty when he tempted the Lystrians to propose to sacrifice to him as the god of eloquence.

We begin with the study of Figures, which are in some sense the alphabet of style. The contempt in which this study was once held by pedagogues, essayists, and reviewers, like the serpent's tail, was not expected to die until the sun of rhetoric went down. But another morning is dawning, and therefore it cannot now be said of figures that "they may be so observed, in an hour or two, as to acquire a knowledge of them sufficient for a lifetime."

CHAPTER I.

OF FIGURES IN GENERAL.

THE term Figure, called by the Greeks *schema*, and the Romans *figura*, is thought by some to have been borrowed from the stage. The word *schema* and its derivatives were employed by Greek writers to designate the gestures and attitudes of the actors and the characters assumed by them.[1] It is not uncommon in our own language to say of a person's dress or actions, "He makes an awkward figure;" "he makes a handsome figure;" "his conduct is out of character."[2] It was therefore natural and suggestive to call any striking form of speech or turn of thought a figure. Now this idea may assist us in making such a definition of the term figure as will include the notion which the Greeks and Romans expressed by the term. In spite of their own definitions, their practice shows that they understood by it any noticeable form or turn of language without regard to the question whether the word or words were changed *from* their proper, natural, or principal sense. They regarded the striking peculiarities of diction as characters *into* which words of whatever signification had been transformed. Wherefore they are termed by Cicero[3] "attitudes of style."

The Greek and Roman rhetors made a distinction between the trope and the figure. Modern writers on the subject have respected this distinction, and yet have often employed the latter term in so wide a sense as to embrace the idea of trope. A trope is, according to Quintilian,[4] the change of a word or phrase from its proper, natural, or principal meaning into another, in order to increase its force or to adorn style. This definition is faulty in several particulars. It ignores the fact that the most natural significa-

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1 Aristoph. Vesp., 1525; Pac., 324, 325; Plato, Protag., p. 342; Eustath. Com. ad Hom. Il., B. ii., p. 185; Demetrius, de Eloc., p. 293.

2 Dr. John Ward's System of Rhetoric, vol. ii., p. 33. Lond., 1759.

3 Orator, c. xxv.

4 Inst., Orat., L. viii., c. vi., sec. 1, and Lib. ix., c. i., sec. 4.

tion of a word or phrase may be tropical, and the word that is supposed to be turned from its primitive sense is perhaps in reality turned from a derivative one. The literal or original import of a word is not always its proper and principal import. Nor is it philosophical to say that one word can be changed from its own signification to that of another; for many words have several well known senses. A word may indeed take the place of another, but it stands there for itself and in one of its own significations. The moderns confine tropes to single words, while they consider figures as belonging either to words or phrases or sentences. We agree with those who take exception to the correctness and utility of the distinction between the trope and the figure.

The most philosophical and serviceable classification of figures is that which is made by Dr. Alexander Carson:

a. Figures founded on resemblance, as metaphor, comparison, and allegory.

b. Figures founded on relation, as metonomy, metalepsis, synecdoche, antonomasia, onomatopæia, periphrasis, emphasis, or insinuation, equivocation.

c. Figures in which there is an apparent inconsistency between their literal and their figurative meaning. To this class belong irony, sarcasm, epitrope, oxymoron, "Hibernicon, or the Irish trope," apophasis, syncœceiosis, allusion, paradox, litotes, "callida junctura," hyperbole, interrogation, "designation by opposite extremes."

d. The elliptical figures. To this class belong ellipsis, aposiopesis, interruption, asyndeton.

e. The pleonastic figures. To this belong pleonasm, polysyndeton, repetition, parenthesis, epanorthon.

f. Figures of arrangement, as hyperbaton, antithesis, and climax.

g. Personification, apostrophe, exclamation, interjection.

h. Grammatical figures. Change of cases, of tenses, of persons, of names, of numbers.

i. Figures of a complex nature, as catachresis, euphemism, vision.

Some have classified the figures according to the various excellences of style which they serve to produce. Part of the following classification is borrowed from Segneri:

1. *Grandeur* of style is expressed by periphrasis, circumlocutio, epiphonema, emphasis, and gnome.

2. *Vehemence* demands interrogation, dubitatio, admiratio, exclamatio, apostrophe, synonymia, ætiologia, enumeratio, pleonasm, and hyperbole.

3. *Beauty and grace* require descriptio, gradatio, simile, antitheses, synœceiosis, divisio, distributio, and suspensio.

4. *The middle or familiar style* employs extenuatio, definitio, dialogismus, epexegesis, gnome, parable, permissio, confession, obtestatio, communicatio, concessio.

5. *Severity* demands irony, reticence, præteritio, rejectio, licentia, preoccupatio, prosopopœia, dialogismus, correctio, climax, paradox, and imprecatio.

6. *Force or energy* calls for similes, metaphors, parables, the dialogism, asterismus, personification, apostrophe, metonymy, hypotyposis, hyperbole, interrogation, repetition, climax, asyndeton, polysyndeton, and synechdoche. It sometimes increases energy to employ pronouns in the first and second persons, to change the future tense into the present, and to adopt the Hebrew form of epithet, as "trees of God," "hearts of stone."

Section I.—Of the Importance and Necessity of Using Figures.

Of late years it has come to be no uncommon thing for teachers of rhetoric either to condemn or to ignore the use of figurative language. The most distinguished writers on this science devote but little space to the discussion of figures, define only a few of them, and, what is more censurable, do not so much as intimate that there are any more tropes and figures than they have defined and illustrated. But the disparagement of figurative language is a fault not peculiar to our times. Plutarch says that the most of those who are delighted with figures are the childish and the sensual. Such early writers as Aristotle[1] have favoured the neglect of figures by confining their chief attention to the simile and the metaphor, while such later rhetoricians as Hermogenes have confused and wearied their pupils with over-nice distinctions. Many authors have made the whole subject still more distasteful by uniformly quoting their examples of figures from the poets, thus conveying the impression that these forms of style are only suitable to poets. We need not wonder, therefore, that able writers on rhetoric still quote with admiration the epigram Ansonius wrote under the portrait of the rhetorician, Rufus:

"Ipse rhetor, est imago imaginis."

No wonder that modern grammarians still love to quote Butler's doggerels:

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[1] See not only his Rhetoric, but his "Topics" also.

"For all a rhetorician's rules
Teach nothing but to name his tools."

But a rhetorician's rules teach a man also *what to do with his materials* and *how to use his tools*. Then, just as if it were of no use for a mechanic to have a name for his tools, and so keep them in their place and be able to call for them when wanted. But mere grammarians ever did Quixotically assail the language of imagination and passion. If it would but submit to rules and suffer itself to be parsed, it might be allowed to ride prosperously past them, and even to live in good estate under the protection of their chivalry.

Archbishop Whately and his disciples have, both by precept and example, opened the mine of figures only to close it and conceal it forever after. Mr. Henry Rogers, their reviewer, says truly of their style, that "of all its characteristics the most striking and the most general is the moderate use of the imagination." He might have added that they were compelled to use in moderation a faculty which in the most of them appears to have been feeble. We must of course except here such men as Dr. Pusey, Henry Melvill, and others equally worthy of mention. The brothers Hare are also exceptions to this remark; and when Augustus William composed his "Sermons to a Country Congregation," he studiously employed figures. Having resolved so to express himself that all should understand him, he used many familiar similes, and no doubt considered that he who does not abundantly use figurative language in preaching to plain country people runs the hazard of not only not being understood, but not even heard by them with attention and patience.

Learned men not a few have been taught that figures are not the natural, clear, and ordinary utterances of the human mind. But a little observation and reflection would have disabused them. "Nothing," says M. De Bretville,[1] "is so easy and so natural as a figure. It has often given me pleasure to listen to peasants using in their talk figures so varied, so animated, and so free from vulgarity that our artificial rhetoricians were quite outdone; and when I have heard this rhetoric of Nature, I have been ashamed of myself for having made eloquence a study so long and to so little purpose." To which Du Marsais[2] adds: "I am convinced that more figures are made in a single day at the market than in many days' sessions of the Academy." The language of barbarous na-

[1] Eloq. de la Chaire et du Barreau, L. iii., c. i.

[2] Œuvres, tome iii., p. 16, Paris, 1797; An. V.

tions abounds in figures. Thus, as Mr. Henry Rogers and others have observed, the old Scandinavian laws forbid trespass on the unfenced field, "inasmuch as it hath heaven for its roof," and is "under God's lock." Sir Philip Sidney found 'the whisperings and disputations of the common people of his day to taste of a poetic vein.'

The utility of figures has been often and clearly set forth, but no writer has done justice to the subject, for the reason that none has taken views of it that are sufficiently broad. As figurative language is in some sense language itself, figures being its chief distinguishing features, and openly or secretly pervading almost all words and phrases, he who would enumerate the various uses and benefits of figures ought first to consider whether he can adequately show the many purposes, necessities, advantages, blessings, and excellences of that human speech which hides so many sunken argosies; for concrete words are continually descending into abstractions. The metaphor by passing into common speech degenerates into a literal term; and the symbolic phrase comes at length to be debased into a trite and unimaginative idiom. The silver coin, by daily circulation and occasional clippings, loses at last the image and superscription of Cæsar. The angular fragment which some mad storm-wave smites out of the ocean wall rolls down among the shingle, and there, in all weathers, runs regularly up and down the beach, along with its more polished acquaintance, until it becomes as round and smooth as they. To the common observer its parentage is now a mystery; but the curious summer stroller finds in its complexion and veins the unmistakable evidences of its origin.

Some have contracted a prejudice against figures by confounding them with "flowers" and "ornaments" of speech,[1] which have no proper place in real eloquence and none in any true rhetoric except that part of it devoted to their reprobation. There is no necessary connection between a figurative style and one that is florid or meretriciously ornate. Others again shun figures from a just abhorrence of the mock sublime. Longinus[2] makes a difference between *hypsela*, words truly sublime, and *meteora*, or words which have only the empty appearance of elevation. Once these terms were synonymous; but the sophists and other declaimers, having become addicted to making allusions to the clouds and stars, were reproached with the name of *meteorologoi*, which, as Hesychius says,

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1 Quintilian has used the same deprecatory terms, and so have Keckerman and Whately. 2 De Sublim., sec. iii., §2.

denotes those who are always talking about the meteors of the sky. And accordingly, from a too frequent allusion to Phœbus, a man who makes extravagant flights in declamation is said in French, "parler Phœbus."[1] This prejudice may be traced to imperfect notions of figurative diction; for it would not be difficult to prove that they who, from poverty of passion or imagination are least capable of producing figures, are most liable to be puffed up with mock sublimity, grandiloquence, and bombast.

To avoid this false sublime, writers and speakers of taste, as Dugald Stewart has well remarked, find it in most cases expedient, when they wish to produce the emotion of sublimity, to touch on some of its less familiar adjuncts, or some of the associated ideas which follow in their train, rather than to dwell on the idea of literal sublimity or any of its worn-out and traditional imagery. Another way to shun the appearance of the false sublime is to express the lofty idea or emotion with dignified yet guarded and reserved language. Robert Hall[2] abounded in this excellence of style. One other method is to write and speak on such subjects with that simplicity and familiarity of diction which is seemingly employed because the author is ignorant of the up-in-the-air style. It is a mistake to think that sublime ideas cannot be expressed in common and matter-of-fact language. Thus by way of illustration read the following extract from the poet Gray's journal: "On the cliffs above hung a few goats; one of them danced and scratched an ear with its hind foot, in a place where I would not have stood stock still for all beneath the moon."

But we were considering objections against figurative language. The most plausible of those that have ever been levelled against the legitimate use of figures are best refuted by an appeal to the style of holy Scripture. To object to the employment of figures in speaking and writing, particularly on religious subjects, is to censure the very oracles of God and to criticise the communications of the Holy Ghost, which contain tropes and figures far more numerous and various than are to be found in any other production of equal size. And we boldly add that by defining and illustrating the tropes and figures which are employed in the oratorical parts of holy Scripture, and by showing that the most useful preachers have either wittingly or unwittingly imitated them, we hope that we have done something to restore figurative language to its proper

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1 Samuel Werenfelsius, Disserta. de Meteoris Orationis, §1; Segneri, Arte di Parlar, Trat. iv., cap. xi., in Opere, vol. iv., p. 1018.

2 Philosophical Essays, Pt. ii., Essay ii., chap. v.

dignity, and to settle, among preachers at least, the question of the duty and importance of intelligently and deliberately using it.

We have said among preachers at least: for how well soever an abstract and unimaginative style may become the lawyer, the judge, the statesman, or the man of science, let it ever be remembered and deeply considered that the preacher has to deal with matters of divine revelation, and, consequently, with themes that, from the intense secularity and atheism of the diction of the cultivated and refined, cannot be touched, much less handled, without the assistance of figures. Not more essential is the atmosphere as a medium of solar light than figurative diction as a medium of divine communications. God's unfathomable thoughts and feelings towards us can by no other language be conveyed; and even this, when employed by its best masters, strives in vain to embrace and carry their golden gleanings. Revealed religion is fraught with subjects too vast for any human vehicles however seemingly extravagant. The broadest hyperbole refuses to encompass their immensity, and the highest climax does not begin to scale their secret summits.

There is, however, one kind of sermons in which figures should be employed but seldom, and then very guardedly; that is, in argumentative and controversial sermons; for few tough debaters understand their use and feel their force. If your adversary be malicious he will find it no difficult thing to make them appear farfetched or irrelevant or in bad taste, and so raise a horse-laugh at your expense. If, therefore, you are tempted in such addresses to employ any figure, state plainly what you do *not* mean by it, and for what purpose you do *not* employ it. A sophist hates such a limitation, very much as Satan is said to hate ink, because it reveals his devices.

The above caution is founded on the deplorable fact that very many intelligent minds have somehow learned to associate figures with the ideas of exaggeration and sophistry, or else an unscrupolous disregard of plain and exact truth. But the history of heresies proves that our greatest danger is in the attempt to translate figures into the language of metaphysics. Poets, on the other hand, who abound in figures, have been found nearer the truth of religion and even of philosophy than contemporary men of science, who trusted in their technical terms and cold abstractions. For figures are not the utterances of blind impulse; they are rather, in many cases, the result of the mind's endeavours to illustrate the truth, and to prove from an appeal to the visible world that its existence is both possible and probable. 'Every metaphor,' according to Cicero,[1]

[1] De Oratore, L. iii.

'expresses the things spoken of to the senses, especially to the eyes;' and Seneca[1] says that 'by reason of human infirmity the teacher may by the help of figures bring into the very presence of his hearers those ideas which they could not otherwise understand.' Herewith accords Horace's celebrated couplet, ending, *Quæ sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus.* Yes, those who honestly speak out their images of the true and the good will, excepting some dissenting voices, call forth a general responsive amen from earth and time, man and life; while those who condemn figures and practically reason on the supposition that there can be nothing in heaven and earth but what is dreamt of in their philosophy, will ultimately be found to have opposed not only the facts of the material world, but also the archetypes of those facts as they existed in the divine mind from all eternity.

Generally, those who oftenest employ figures think they will best conceal their art by calling them "tricks of rhetoric," as if all rhetoric were false; whereas, there is more popular rhetoric in the Bible than in all the existing speeches of all the classic orators.

Section II.—Of the Simile.

This is a figure by which two things are brought together in thought, and sometimes in fact also, while one or more of the attributes of each is formally likened or contrasted. Aristotle repeatedly teaches that the simile is a metaphor, with the mere difference of the addition of a particle denoting similitude.[2] Whately, who everywhere acknowledges Aristotle as his favourite master, defines and distinguishes the two figures as follows: "The metaphor is a word substituted for another on account of the resemblance or analogy between their significations. The simile or comparison may be considered as differing in form only from metaphor, the resemblance being in that case *stated*, which in the metaphor is implied." But neither master nor disciple, in their directions as to the use of these figures, makes the difference to consist *in form only;* for the former says that the simile may be used in prose, though but seldom, for it is poetical (*poetikon*). Aristotle does not here mean that the simile is *merely* poetical, but he evidently intends that it is associated with poetry more than with prose. The similes of Homer were in this philosopher's day uppermost in the minds of all; indeed, he has himself just before quoted one from this poet.

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[1] Epist. lix. [2] Rhet., B. iii., chaps. iv., x. and xi.

Among the Orientals this figure occurs more frequently in lyrics than in other kinds of composition. It is often found in the Psalms, but is by no means absent from the sermons of the prophets and of our Lord.

But Whately is wrong when he says that Aristotle teaches that "the metaphor is the only ornament of language in which the orator may freely indulge." As several writers on rhetoric have unhappily copied this mistake of Whately, it is deserving of further notice in this place. Not to mention that Aristotle very seldom speaks of a figure as "an ornament of language," it should be observed, in the first place, that he is so far from inculcating the notion that the orator may freely indulge in the metaphor alone, that in the preceding chapter on Frigidity of Style he says that this bad quality may be produced by such metaphors as the comic and tragic poets employ. Mark, secondly, that Aristotle is probably aiming to warn the young orator against the imitation of Homer's similes, for he tells him that they are to be introduced in the same manner as metaphors, *i. e.*, as we understand him, the subject, or *antapodosis*, or *redditio contraria*, is to precede the similitude, or *protasis; e. g.*, *The army like a swarm of bees*, instead of, *As a swarm of bees so the army*, etc. This accounts for his remark that the simile is less pleasing in oratory because it is longer than the metaphor.[1] And yet Cicero[2] dared to oratorise similes in this poetic way. Thirdly, Aristotle himself gives us approved examples of the simile from the *prose* of Androtion, Theodamas, Plato, Pericles, Demosthenes, Democrates, and Antisthenes—examples, as he goes on to say, which the orator may employ at his option either in the form of metaphors or of similes. Elsewhere he recommends the orator to diversify the matter of demonstrative speeches by comparing the character eulogised with some other in high estimation.

Nor can it be denied that this figure occurs oftenest in those kinds of poetry which most nearly resemble oratory—namely, the passionate. The Psalms were for the most part written by the Hebrew prophets, and some of them were originally the beginnings or endings of their sermons. And accordingly Mr. Gladstone has well observed that in frequency, length, and picturesqueness of similes, the peaceful Odyssey is far behind the stormy Iliad. Instead of one hundred and ninety-four it has only forty-one, and these, with few exceptions, are, as Mr. Coleridge thinks, imitated from the earlier poem. Cicero[3] compares the use of figures to the exercises of the Palæstra. . . As those who study fencing and polite exer-

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1 Rhet., L. iii., c. x. 2 Pro. Muræ, c. xiii. and xvii. 3 De Orat., L. iii., c. lii.

cises not only think it necessary to acquire skill in parrying and striking, but also grace and elegance of motion, so the orator must use such words as not only contribute to elegance, but also to impressiveness. To the same purpose Quintilian[1] says: "Figures penetrate imperceptibly into the mind of the judge. Indeed, as in a passage of arms, it is easy to see, parry, and ward off direct and undisguised strokes, while side-blows and feints are less observable; and as it is a proof of art to aim at one part when you intend to hit another, so that kind of oratory which is free from artifice can fight only with its own mere weight and force; but that kind which disguises and varies its attacks can assail the flank or rear of an enemy, can turn aside his weapons and deceive him, as it were, with a nod." These words of Quintilian's should be received with due allowance for the common ethnic notions of honesty and fairness. Father Lamy,[2] the best of all the French writers on rhetoric, has in a more Christian tone compared the orator to a soldier, and the figures of the former to the weapons of the latter.

This digression shows that the secular orator ought not be denied the simile. But the preacher, who is at once peaceable and peace-making, will not hence infer that he may not use figurative language in general, and the simile in particular. There are other passions than those which animated the breasts of Homer's martial heroes. Besides, the examples of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, James, and, above all, the Great Teacher himself, are a sufficient warrant for the frequent employment of the simile. The parable itself is an extended and modified simile.

This figure is often employed with happy effect by Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, and Augustine. But of all ancient and modern preachers, Jeremiah Seed has, perhaps, managed it with the most admirable skill. Twenty similes of his might be quoted to show that it is not the inspired speakers alone that have becomingly employed this figure.

As to the number of similes that may be permitted in one sermon, there is no better general rule than that which the Scottish worthy, John Livingstone, laid down for his own guidance: "Neither too many similitudes nor none at all." And yet the study of inspired examples of the simile is of more value than many rhetorical rules, *e. g.*, Isa. xi. 19; xxxi. 4, 5; xxxviii. 12–14; lix. 7–11; lxiv. 6; Hos. v. 10–14: xiii. 3, 7, 8; xiv. 58. What Ewald[3] says of Isaiah is hardly

[1] Inst. Orat., L. ix., c. i., s. 20; cf. L. i., c. ix.

[2] La Rhetorique, ou L'Art de Parler, Paris, 1757, pp. 141, 171–174.

[3] Propheten Alt. Bund., vol. i., p. 167.

less applicable to the minor prophets: "It is seldom that the simile appears apart and complete in itself; generally it crowds into the delineation of the subject it is meant to illustrate, and is swallowed up in it—yes, and frequently simile after simile; and yet the many threads of the discourse which for a moment appeared ravelled together soon disentangle themselves into perfect clearness."

We will only observe that when this figure is derived from holy Scripture it is often stigmatised as either quaint or irreverent, but it is not necessary that it should be either the one or the other. When it thus originates, other considerations being equal, it has to the taste of all who are familiar with the oracles of God, a peculiar sweetness. Read for example those of Thomas Watson. In one place he compares the believer clad in the robe of Christ's righteousness to Joseph after his prison garments were taken off and he was arrayed in fine linen. Wm. Archer Butler, if we recollect rightly, compares the Dissenters to the "other little ships" that sailed on the lake of Galilee along with that in which Jesus was. This was indeed highly favoured; but when the great tempest arose they also shared the benefit of that miraculous power which rebuked the wind and the sea.

Section III.—Of the Parable.

Anaximenes, in his Rhetoric,[1] gives a definition of the "probable" which is, we think, both more profound and more available than that of Aristotle, his contemporary: "That is probable which when mentioned immediately suggests similar or analagous cases to the minds of the hearers." And Professor Mansel[2] and Dr. Buchanan[3] have lately shown that some process of comparison is the mainspring of almost every kind of reasoning. The progress of scientific inquiry is thus affording fresh justifications of the wisdom of the Great Teacher in adopting a parabolic kind of discourse.

We are about to examine the laws in obedience to which the parables of our Lord were spoken. By studying these utterances rhetorically, we discover certain principles that enable us to compose useful parables for ourselves, and to judge intelligently and fairly of the utility of other men's comparisons. In doing this we ought not to content ourselves with singling out two or three of the longer and more popular parables, and, having subjected these to a critical analysis, to be satisfied with a few general deductions

[1] Rhet. ad Alex., c vii. [2] Metaphysics, p. 229. [3] Analogy, pp. 154–206.

therefrom. It should be our endeavour to survey rhetorically all the parables, and to lay open to our view all those laws which lie beneath their surface, and which help us to compose similes, suppositions, and even parables of kindred form and object. But why not employ the facts of history and biography instead? We do not forbid this common practice. Only we should remember that while we pursue this course the people often suspect that we either coin some of our stories or embellish them for our service; whereas, if we avowedly make parables, we preclude this suspicion; we likewise save ourselves the trouble of tracing anecdotes to their sources, relieve the memory of much verbiage, and, what is often of no small advantage, we frame alike for our subject and for our audience apologues which are more suitable than anecdotes.

The parables reported in the first three Gospels we have at the end of this work[1] sufficiently defined.

The parable has, from the earliest ages, been a favourite medium of instruction among the Orientals. It is found in the discourses of several of the Hebrew prophets, and in the writings of the Rabbins who lived previous to the birth of the Messiah. The simile, which the parable is essentially, abounds in all but the first of the books of Homer. This greatest of the ethnic poets lived in Asia Minor, which bordered on the Syrian, Chaldaic, and Persian provinces. This accounts for the Eastern thoughts and style which prevail in his compositions more generally than in those of any other of the Greek poets. The lips of Socrates, the greatest of the Greek philosophers, flowed with parables of another form. But, as we shall presently demonstrate, it was reserved for our Divine Master to bring this figure to perfection, by handling it in the most admirable ways and with deep feeling—yes, with very deep feeling; and herein our Lord's parables are infinitely superior to those of the philosophers and sophists of Greece. The latter are always striving to reason themselves up into cold abstractions; so that when they press a simile into their service, it is immediately chilled by the frigid generalities which surround it. The Great Teacher, on the contrary, aims to conduct his hearers to logical conclusions by reasoning less than by instructing. With him the apologue is more than evidence; for while it demolishes the idols which are enshrined in reason, it also peoples the imagination and the heart with living and attractive creatures, both angelic and human.

It has not escaped the reader's attention that the Great Teacher

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[1] See Alphabetical List of Figures.

on more than one occasion delivered a *series* of parables. In doing this he seems to have had several objects in view.

In some cases these series were so arranged as to contribute to the progress of thought and the increase of the hearer's interest. The six parables that are recorded in the 15th and 16th chapters of Luke, and which were obviously delivered on the same occasion, ought to be studied in their connection and mutual relations by all who would learn to speak with a clearness and a force that go on increasing to the very last.

He sometimes made use of a variety of parables drawn from a number of very different objects, in order that each of them might illustrate a different aspect of the same subject. Thus the eight parables recorded in the 13th chapter of Matthew were spoken on the same occasion, and were intended to throw light on the inward and outward nature of the kingdom of heaven. Some of the advantages of such a use of several illustrations, quite unlike one another, are the following:

They give us, for one thing, a comprehensive knowledge of the subject. They serve a purpose similar to that of the sun, which, during the day, shines on the different sides, wings, and towers of a palace, and so enables us to take a number of photographs of all its principal features. And they are often so many varied confirmations of the truth to be established. In the 15th chapter of Luke a shepherd, a housewife, and a father are shown to be actuated by the same general principle which prompted the rejoicings of angels over the repentance of one sinner, namely, the disposition to take more pleasure in the recovery of that which was lost than in the possession of that which is secure. Or, again, these three parables represent the work of the Son, of the Spirit, and of the Father in redemption.[1] For the rest, they keep us from committing the mistake of confounding analogy with direct resemblance, a mistake to which we are quite as liable as we are to that of taking *metaphorical* expressions in a literal sense. Analogy, as Whately has defined it, is a likeness between things, not in themselves as in direct resemblance, but in their *relation* to certain other things; either in their position, or in their use, or any other circumstances. By employing a variety of parables to illustrate each a single point of a subject, our Divine Master has taught us to understand that the different objects are analagous to, but do not resemble in themselves, those different points. In this way the parables explain and correct one another.

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[1] This view is set forth in a volume of three discourses by Rev. Dr. W. R. Williams, entitled God's Rescues. (Randolph, N. Y., 1871.)

The Great Teacher has selected for his parables objects differing much from the things represented by them in most points, except the one on which the comparison is founded. The parables of the dishonest steward, the unjust judge, and the unkind neighbour are instances of the choice of objects very remote, except on one or two points, from the things to be illustrated. This is partly to guard us against the mistake mentioned under the preceding observation. It also serves to keep us from the mistake of tracing and applying analogy more exactly and completely than was intended and authorised. And illustrations drawn from things very dissimilar to what is to be illustrated will sometimes, as Storr and Whately remark, have the effect of an *a fortiori* argument; as where Jesus says: "If ye then being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more," etc.; as also in Paul's illustration drawn from the Isthmian games: "Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible."

Some of our Lord's parables are of the nature of invented examples, or cases supposed for the sake of illustration, as Mark iv. 13, Luke xi. 5–9, 11–13. The word parable was employed in this sense by Aristotle,[1] who says that it "is Socratic, as if some one should say, It is not proper that magistrates should be chosen by lot, for this is just the same as if some one were to choose wrestlers by lot, not selecting such as were able to contend, but those on whom the lot fell; or as if a crew were to draw lots for the sailor who was to take the helm, as if it became the person on whom the lot fell, and not him who understood the art." Yet it is worthy of note that though some of the parables of the Great Teacher are essentially cases supposed, they are never formally introduced as such. (For good examples of cases supposed, see Segneri, Quaresimale, ser. iii., §4; ser. xiii., §7; ser. xxii., §9.)

These examples are sometimes accumulated to an amount that a mere classical taste would not approve, but that due excitation and persuasion demand. The prophets, as we have shown, in treating of the simile, poured forth a swelling fulness of this figure, which is the archetype of the parable; and the Great Teacher, as we have before seen, added parable to parable with the evident aim not only to convince the reason, but to refurnish the imagination with pictures that would satisfy, move, and strengthen gracious affections. And Cicero, as the fruit of his Rhodian training, and Burke, as the result of his early-formed habit of reading the Bible, did, so far as judicial and deliberative oratory admitted, use examples in

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1 Rhet., B. ii., c. xx.

abundance. It has been truly and strikingly said of Burke that "his favourite argument is the example, instances real and fictitious being crowded upon each other, as if the speaker were resolutely determined to appropriate one to every individual who listened to him." Tholuck also, whose taste and cast of mind are Oriental, very frequently rises above the severe simplicity of the Attic models. Take the following passage in one of his sermons: "'It is too late!' Oh! word of terror, which has often fallen like the thunder of God upon many a heart of man. See that father, as he hastens from the burning house and thinks that he has taken all the children with him. He counts—one dear head is missing; he hastens back—'It is too late!' is the hollow sound that strikes his ear. The stone wall tumbles under the roaring torrent of flame. He swoons and sinks to the ground. Who is that hastening through the darkness of the night on the winged courser? It is the son who has been wandering in the ways of sin, and now at last longs to hear from the lips of his dying father the words, 'I have forgiven you.' Soon he is at his journey's end; in the twinkling of an eye he is at the door—'It is too late!' shriek's forth the mother's voice; 'that mouth is closed forever!' and he sinks fainting into her arms. See that victim for the scaffold, and the executioner whetting the steel of death. The multitude stand shivering and dumb. Who is just heaving in sight on yonder distant hill, beckoning with signs of joy? It is the king's express; he brings a pardon! Nearer and nearer comes the step. Pardon! resounds through the crowd—softly at first and then louder and yet louder. 'It is too late!' The guilty head has fallen! Yea, since the world began the heart of many a man has been fearfully pierced through with the cutting words, 'It is too late!' But oh! who will describe to me the lamentation that will arise when at the boundary line which parts time from eternity the voice of the righteous Judge will say, 'It is too late!' Long have the wide gates of heaven and its messengers cried at one time and another, 'To-day if ye will hear his voice!' Man, man, how then will it be with you when once those gates, with appalling sound, shall be shut for eternity!"

Where short examples are thus accumulated, the resemblance or the analogy should not in each case be carried beyond a single point. But when we make a parable in imitation of some of the *longer* ones of our Great Teacher, we may, as he did, indicate two or more points of comparison. It is a sound principle laid down by Tholuck, and reaffirmed by Olshausen and others, that we ought to seek some meaning in all incidents except such as are evidently added for the sake of imparting reality and life to the narrative.

The Germans err, however, in applying this principle to the *short* as well as the *long* parables. In several of the former our Divine Master himself has pointed out only one point of comparison in each, as in Matt. xiii. 44–52. In the latter, as in the parables of the Sower and of the Tares (Matt. xiii. 3–43), there is a fulness of import which causes them to resemble allegories in the modern sense of the term.

These more elaborate and suggestive parables of our Divine Master cannot easily be imitated by the modern preacher except in the more didactic kind of discourses, or in those parts of such other kinds as are occupied with exposition or illustration. When a long parable is so constructed as to have a directly experimental and practical tendency, and to carry several obvious meanings and applications along with it in its course, it may be safely introduced in the more animated parts, and sometimes even in the conclusion of a sermon.

There is, however, be it remembered, in the longest of the Great Teacher's parables no such verbosity and mere word-painting as are betrayed by some modern imitations, or rather caricatures of them. In this respect, as in others, they are incomparably better than those of the Rabbins Hillel, Schammi and Meir, and those of the Christian preachers, Ephræm Syrus, Anselm, and Damascenus. The Greeks and Romans were given to "much speaking," not only in their prayers but in almost all their communications except their fables and proverbs, in which they studied the utmost brevity. But herein they are surpassed by our Divine Master, who, while he ever keeps within the bounds of probability, says nothing for the mere purpose of attracting attention to the parable itself rather than the subject it illustrates, confirms, and enforces.

Hence the parable may be easily contracted into a proverb, and the proverb may often be expanded into a parable. Wherefore one of the significations of parable is proverb, as in Luke iv. 23: "Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, Physician, heal thyself." "It is plain," says Cardinal Wiseman, "that this expression corresponds exactly to what we should call a proverb; yet who does not see in it at once a full parable which scarcely requires development? A physician loudly proclaims his skill in curing every or some particular complaint; a patient sends for him, and sees at once that he is as sick as himself, and that his boasted method of cure has not answered in his own case. He very naturally rejects him as an empiric, and bids him first cure himself with his nostrums before he tries them on others. 'Physician,' he exclaims, 'heal thyself.'" Next to the making of parables in actual preaching it would be useful for

the young student to grow parables out of the many seeds or fruits of parables which he finds in the Book of Proverbs and other parts of Scripture; for though proverbs are more portable they are less digestible than parables.

Some of these are, rhetorically speaking, allusions as to their form; as, "Enter in at the strait gate," etc., Matt. vii. 13, 14; "Can the blind lead the blind?" etc., Luke vi. 39; xiv. 28, 31, 32; 1 Cor. ix. 24–27. In such instances there is merely a reference to some well known or supposable case. To put a parable in this form is best in the more animated parts of discourse, where a formal narration might dampen ardor or wear the appearance of repeating what is already well known.

Some of the parables are introduced by the figure *Aporia*, *Diaporesis*, or *Doubt;* as, Mark iv. 30; Luke vii. 31; xiii. 20. By this form of speech our Lord excited curiosity, sustained attention, and kept awake the spirit of inquiry. There is also an air of honesty and humility in thus revealing the deliberations of his own mind, and in showing that he was not ashamed to hesitate in order to fix upon the best among several parables that occurred to him. This may in part account for the exceeding variety of the objects from which he drew his parables. Herein they are far superior to the illustrations of Socrates, which were almost always founded on the analogy of each one's duty to some special vocation. So often did he repeat this kind of comparison that men reproached him with wearing it threadbare. They complained of his ever talking of "carpenters, and smiths, and fullers, and cooks;" and all preachers are liable to fall into this error unless, like the Divine Master, they *seek out* illustrations from many different objects. Some stigmatise as "far-fetched" all figures that are not trite. The true orator will sometimes, for the sake of variety, bring figures from afar.

We do well, moreover, to bear in mind that the Great Teacher avoids all formality in bringing forward his parables and in explaining and applying them. It may be laid down as a rule that the explanation of a parable is made at its conclusion. The Hebrew prophets almost always gave the explanation of their parables in the epilogue; as, Isa. v. 1–7. Our Lord did not in general depart from the common rule (Matt. xxii. 1–14). And the inspired writers have not unfrequently given us the occasion, scope, and design of the parables in the words that go before them; as, Luke xviii. 2, 9, xix. 11. But we are not hence to infer that in these and some other instances the Great Teacher himself gave any intimation of his purpose. In some cases, however, he notified his hearers of the general subject of the parables he was about to utter.

One parable would sometimes suggest the subject and scope of others which followed it. Yet in several cases our Divine Master both began and ended his parables with declarations which served to explain them; as, Matt. xviii. 21, 22, 35; xix. 30; xx. 1–16; Luke xii. 15, 21. Again, he sometimes begins and ends his parables with the same words, or the same with some variations or additions (Luke xiii. 3, 5; xiv. 7, 10). Occasionally we meet with emphatic repetitions in a parable; as, Matt. xxv. 21. It is also to be remarked that our Lord, on more than one occasion, breaks the formal unity of his discourse, either for the sake of putting forth some great principle or for deferring till the very last a severe sentence or some denunciation that might otherwise appear an outburst of unbridled anger. In Matt. xxv. 28–30 the sentence against the unprofitable servant is delayed until the very last moment. So in Luke xix. 12, 14, 27, the citizens who sent a messenger after the nobleman, saying, We will not have this man to reign over us, are represented as receiving their sentence after the reckoning with the servants (15–26). The modern rhetorician would be likely to slay the rebellious citizens first, and then proceed to reckon with the servants. But how does this delay of the heaviest demand illustrate the forbearance of the Great Teacher, and the long-suffering of the Supreme Judge? In both of these examples the great principles on which eternal justice proceeds are inculcated before the words of doom are pronounced. What pauses and digressions these! Another purpose was equally well served. The people were deceiving themselves with the expectation that the kingdom of God would appear immediately. The parable teaches us that the Lord must ascend to heaven, while his people remain here in a trial state, and that upon his return he will call them to an account, and punish his secret and avowed enemies. Here is a climax at the expense of a superficial rhetorical unity, and yet what other method could so vividly represent God's long delay in punishing the finally impenitent?

Various as the parables of our Lord are, a few of them were, we judge (some of them in form and others in substance), repeated on different occasions with the same or different applications. The parable of the Pounds (Luke xix. 11–), which is within another parable, is in many points similar to that of the Talents (Matt. xxv. 14–). But the former was spoken in the house of Zaccheus; the latter is a part of that last prophetic discourse which he spoke some days later while he was sitting on the side of the Mount of Olives. The parable of the Friend at Midnight (Luke xi. 5), and that of the Unjust Judge were related on different occasions, but for the same

purpose; and the fundamental idea is identical in both. (See the parable of the Lost Sheep, Matt. xviii. 12–14; Luke xv. 3–7.) "Judging *à priori*," says Dean Alford (rather too roundly, as we think), "the probability is that he repeated most of his important sayings many times over, with more or less variations, to different audiences, but in the hearing of the same apostolic witnesses." That he repeated them "many times" is hardly probable; it is not incredible, however (and this admission is all that is demanded to reconcile the different reports of his addresses), that he repeated some of them once or twice.

Any how, these repetitions disprove the fashionable opinion that our Lord set great store by originality and novelty. Of the texts that are quoted in support of this opinion none is more powerful than Matt. xiii. 52; and yet in this passage the words "scribe" and "old" are conservatively coupled with the words "kingdom of heaven" and "new." Some are apt to apologise for parables and illustrations as if they were necessary to save the Gospel from the reproach of triteness and worn-out familiarity. They do indeed bedew the dryness of sermons; but still we have to consider it well that there are many other ways of imparting to sermons a perennial newness. Every fresh theme; every higher degree of feeling; every improved explanation of an obscure text; a narration or description of unusual fidelity to fact and probability; an original argument or refutation in answer to the latest phase of old error, or else the most telling reproof of some stylish form of ancient sin; any new and needful application of some plain old text (to say nothing of the endless variety of method, style, and delivery, which a living and manly preacher will command)—these things make it pretty manifest that the preacher is not reduced to the invention of illustrations or any such thing in order to gratify a healthy appetite for a moderate variety, and even to go far to satisfy a morbid desire for novelty.

Many of the Scripture parables are of the[1] nature of *argumentum ad hominem*, or else *e concessis*. They apply the admitted principles and practices of the persons addressed, and press them with consequences drawn from their own concessions. Almost all the parables recorded in the Old Testament are of this nature; that of Nathan is an admirable and familiar example of this description. Such also was Socrates' method of reasoning. In pursuing an argument he proceeded from admitted principles, and he was wont to say that Homer had ascribed to Ulysses the merit

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1 See chap. on Conviction.

of being a true orator on account of his ability to conduct a discussion by reasoning from such principles as men acknowledged.

Some have gone farther than this, and found, as they think, in the parables of our Divine Master positive accommodations to popular errors. Where the Master speaks of the unclean spirit going out of a man and walking through dry places, seeking rest and finding none,[1] it is pretty evident that he alludes to a popular belief respecting dæmons. But we should show how far that belief was erroneous before we accuse the Holy One of encouraging superstition. If this could be proved to be a popular delusion it would only follow that our Lord used such delusion to illustrate the tendencies and effects of the fancied perfection of those who entertained that delusion. And it is observable that the Great Teacher never employed any thing that bears the faintest resemblance to Hebrew superstition in those parables which illustrate any of the leading principles and duties of the new dispensation. The modern Germans make a distinction between a positive or material and a negative or formal accommodation. According to their teachings our Lord and his apostles did, for pedagogic or didactic reasons,[2] adopt expressions and representations as they existed in common life without stopping to investigate the erroneous ideas which were associated with them; but in doing this they did not *own and establish*, but only for the time being *tolerated* error.[3] But these distinctions are founded on the hypothesis, which cannot be established, that the popular ideas were erroneous to which Jesus and his apostles adapted their language. It is certain that some errors and sins were tolerated without being approved by our Lord and his apostles. But while they may have been wisely silent as to some errors and sins, they were so because they were too busy in striking at the roots of flourishing heresies and thriving vices to occupy themselves any long time in cutting away limbs or plucking off fruit. We may unhappily show the most bitter intolerance of effects while we allow the largest liberty to causes. The maxim illustrated by primitive preaching, as it should be by ours, is, *Principiis obsta.*

The perspicuity of our Lord's parables is another of their obvious qualities; so obvious that it seems almost needless to do more than remind the reader of what he must often have noticed. We do not indeed deny that this clearness was relative to those whom he intended especially to address, nor that he sometimes em-

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[1] Matt. xii. 44, 45. [2] John xvi. 12.

[3] Acts xvi 1–3; xxi. 17–26; 1 Cor. iii. 1; ix. 20; Gal. iii. 15; Heb. v. 11–14

ployed the *argumentum ad doctrinam*, or reasoning adapted to the capacity of his advanced disciples.

But we must here dispose of an objection which, if it be unanswerable, wrests from these parables the claim of clearness. It is said: "Did not our Lord at a certain stage of his ministry begin to practice reserve and reticence towards some of his hearers by casting the parable as a veil over the knowledge of the truth? On one occasion[1] when some asked our Lord why he spoke to the people in parables, he answered: 'In them is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah, which saith, By hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see and not perceive; for this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have thy closed, lest at any time thy should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them.' Were not these parables evidently spoken to the multitude that they might *not* understand, and for the purpose of sealing the eyes of their mind in penal blindness?"

Let the Scriptures themselves answer this objection, and may the Divine Spirit enable us to hear and keep their answer in an honest and good heart.

1. What is the import and aim of the text which our Lord here quotes from the 6th chapter of Isaiah? The vision which the prophet saw represented Jehovah as judge, sitting on a high throne, and withdrawing his visible and gracious presence from the temple, and filling the place which the glorious Shekinah had deserted, with smoke. The chosen people, for the sins which are rebuked in the preceding chapters, have forfeited the farther abiding of the Shekinah in the temple, and therefore the Seraphim exclaim: "The whole earth full of his glory!" They declare prophetically that the thrice holy Lord of hosts will forsake the polluted sanctuary and fill all Gentile nations with the presence of the Divine Spirit; thus fulfilling the oath of the great Eternal addressed to the murmurers at Kadish, and the last prayer of David, and the prophecy of Habakkuk.[2] The prophet finds himself and the chosen people "of polluted lips" like the heathens, and enveloped in smoke instead of a heavenly radiance; a smoke that was the fit emblem of the judicial blindness which their natural depravity had induced. The Jews were, accordingly, in consequence of their sins, deprived

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[1] Matt. xiii.

[2] Num. xiv. 21; Psa. lxxii. 19; Hab. ii. 14. The Hebrew words in these passages are radically the same as those in Isa. vi. 3.

of the illuminating grace of the Holy Ghost.[1] Now be it observed that in the various accounts of this retributive blindness of mind and hardness of heart, nothing is said from which we can infer that there was any thing either in the matter or style of Isaiah's preaching that was divinely intended or naturally calculated to bring about this moral insensibility. We find, on the contrary, that of all the prophets the utterances of Isaiah are, as to matter, the most plain, and, as to style, the most perspicuous.

2. What meaning does our Lord give to this text as quoted in reply to those who asked him why he spoke to the people in parables? The very same, we answer, that it conveyed to Isaiah and to his contemporaries. In neither case is there intended any allusion to the matter and manner of discourse; in both cases there is a declaration of God's agency and a description of this self-invited and penal insensibility of the people.

Our Divine Master (mark it well) did not regard this obduracy as limited to the hearing of the people; it was equally visible in their seeing. On the same day that the parables in question were spoken, the Scribes and Pharisees had ascribed his miracles to Beelzebub.[2] And John[3] quotes this text from Isaiah as fulfilled by the fact that though Jesus had done so many miracles before the Jews, yet, with some exceptions, they believed not on him. And this is in harmony with his declaration on the present occasion, "Unto them that are without, *all things* are done in parables." His miracles no less than his parables were incomprehensible and incredible.

But the more full interpretation which our Lord himself gave to his disciples of these words of Isaiah has been very generally overlooked by learned expositors. In explaining to them the parable of the sower, he revealed to them and to us the nature and effects of this insensibility and obduracy in their relation to parabolic preaching. Here are represented three classes of unprofitable hearers, and three causes of their unprofitableness. So far from teaching that Jesus hardened hearers through the instrumentality of parables, these explanations inform us that Satan is the author of this obduracy and spiritual unproductiveness of men. "Then cometh the devil and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be saved."[4] In two other classes, Satan

[1] John xii. 37–41; Acts xxviii. 22; Rom. xi. 8.

[2] Matt. xii. 22–32; xiii. 1; John xii. 37–42. [3] Mark iv. 11.

[4] Luke viii. 12. The last clause of this sentence should be compared with like words in Matt. xiii. 15, "Lest at any time," etc. Cf. also the repeated word, "understand," Matt. xiii. 13–16, 19, 23.

operates through persecutors and terrene tempters. In the following parable of the tares, the agency of the devil in hindering the work of the Gospel is yet more clearly illustrated. It is the same sower and the same seed that, though coming impartially to each kind of ground, are rewarded with such diverse results. The Great Teacher had spoken many parables before, as he did many after, the day in question. His preaching was parabolic whenever he spoke to the people in general. It was only in the more private circle of his disciples that he was wont to speak in abstract and unfigurative language. The seed was of the best description. The parable, in all its forms, has ever been considered the most fitting and effectual means of instruction for the mass of mankind.[1] The seed was good, and all the fault lay in the soil, and especially in the adversary who went before and came after the benevolent sower.

Nor should it be overlooked that the apostle Paul[2] was compelled by the Spirit of God to quote this same passage from Isaiah as a testimony against the Jews of Rome, where he spoke to them in his lodgings *no parables whatever*, but "*expounded* and *testified* the kingdom of God, *persuading* them concerning Jesus, both out of the law of Moses and out of the prophets, from morning till evening."

As many of our Lord's parables are of the nature of illustrations, it would be casting a great slur upon his manner of teaching to maintain that any of his illustrations served but to obscure a subject. No, no; it would be difficult to find any illustration merely human which is as perspicuous as the most abstruse of these parables of the Great Teacher. "The parable," according to the forcible words of Fred. Arndt, "is nature's own language in the human heart. Hence its universal intelligibility, its permanent sweet scent, so to speak, its healing balsam, its mighty power to attract one again and again to hear. In short, the parable is the voice of the people and hence the voice of God."

To treat adequately the excellence of the parable and its various and peculiar uses would demand a large volume. Much has already been said on these themes by able and celebrated writers; but much more will need to be said before the riches of these themes will have been exhausted. A few words on the utility of this figure, when employed in intelligent imitation of the Great Teacher's example, seem to require our attention before dismissing this subject:

The Scripture parables are to such an extent drawn from na-

[1] John iii. 12. [2] Acts xxviii. 23–28.

ture, human, brute, and inanimate, that the employment of parables composed, in this respect, according to the divine rules which the Holy Spirit evidently observed when he spoke in Jesus and the other prophets, will preserve the preacher from those theoretical and practical errors which result from separating the natural and the spiritual, and keeping them ever and in all things at war with each other. Luther, in his sermon on the Descent into Hell, says that one of the uses of images and comparisons is that "they serve to keep off from us the devil with his fiery darts, who seeks to seduce us from the word with high and subtle thoughts, while these clear and simple images, which every man, even the most ignorant, can well conceive, keep us in the right understanding of the word." It has likewise been remarked by Whately that the extreme *commonness* of the images introduced in our Lord's parables guards men against the mistake they are so prone to, of laying aside their common sense altogether in judging of any matter connected with religion; as if the rules of reasoning which they employ in temporal matters were quite unfit to be applied in spiritual. Some of the most deadly heresies of the Gnostics, Manichæans, Mystics, and Schoolmen appear to have sprang out of a neglect of our Divine Master's example in this particular. Hence we need not wonder that the preacher who is invisible all the week should be incomprehensible on Sundays—two wonderful attributes which one of the old Huguenot ministers was perhaps slanderously reported to possess.

Those who in Christian times have attempted to make parables, have too often been the copyists rather than the imitators of their Divine Master. They have copied not only the thoughts but even the language of the originals. The modern practice of making similitudes by weaving together passages of the common English version is most reprehensible. We make a right rhetorical use of Scripture parables only when we compose parables of our own in the light of the principles on which the sacred parables were constructed.

The most of modern parabolists are also wanting in a lively sympathy with common life and the daily duties of the Christian. They address the intellect rather than the feelings, and they intend not so much to instruct and move as to entertain and enchant. They are content to make out of generalities and abstractions such individuals as the cultivated few will recognise, not such as are known and familiar to the mass of the people all the world over. The difference between them and those of the Master is somewhat similar to the difference between the allegories of Bun-

yan and those of Spencer, Addison, and Johnson. The latter, as Macaulay has observed, only amuse the fancy; but the former have this peculiarity, that they "possess a strong human interest." Herein the parables of Socrates, although sometimes needlessly coarse and vulgar, are deserving of study. Hence, also, their infixedness. Alcibiades, in Plato, says that men, after hearing Pericles, went away filled with admiration of his speech, but soon ceased to think about it; whereas the the talks of Socrates left stings in the minds of his hearers which could in no wise be extracted. But, alas! the great philosopher was ignorant of that ruby balm, the blood of Jesus, which can remedy the smart of the sting of truth, and even of death itself.

It may be observed of all true parables, that they are especially helpful in the indirect yet effectual application of unpopular and unwelcome truths. Of all parables, those of our Divine Master are the most varied, close, and beneficent in their application. Nor was there in general such mystery wrapped around these parables that their application was blunted. When the chief priests and Pharisees heard the parables of the Two Sons and the Husbandmen, "they perceived that he spake of them."[1] The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus was intended as a warning to the covetous Pharisees who derided our Lord.[2] Again, the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican was spoken in reproof of "certain which trusted in themselves that they were righteous, and despised others."[3] The same remark holds good of most of the other parables and fables. Those which are found in the Old Testament, as that of the trees which choose a king (Judges ix. 8–15), that of Nathan (2 Sam. xii. 1–14), that of the prisoner (1 Kings xx. 35–43), that of the thistle and cedar (2 Kings xiv. 9), are indeed very ingenious and close in their application, but it is observable of them that they were employed rather for censure than for encouragement; and were intended more to reclaim individual sinners than to bring whole classes of men to repentance, or to illustrate and enforce great and positive virtues and duties. So most of the parables of Socrates were levelled against men's dogmatism and conceit of knowledge. If we study the parables of his which Plato and Xenophon have reported, this is the conclusion to which we must come. They were not in general followed by precepts and exhortations that were designed to establish men in new truths, and to move them to the practice of moral and religious duties.

It is well worthy of note that in some applications, and particu-

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[1] Matt. xxi. 45; Luke xx. 19. [2] Luke xvi. 13–31. [3] Luke xviii. 9–14.

larly such as are hortatory, the parable, in the Socratic form as exhibited by Aristotle, may be preferable to the parable in the Hebrew and Hellenistic form, that is, as a case supposed, assumed as possible or probable, provided only that probability be very evident *at the points of resemblance.* In Socrates's supposed case of mariners choosing their steersman by lot, though we have no reason to suppose such a case ever occurred, we see so plainly the probability that if it did occur the lot might fall on an unskilful person, that the argument, as Whately observes, has considerable weight against the practice, and he adds[1] that "it often answers very well to introduce an instance not only *fictitious*, but even manifestly *impossible*, provided it be but *conceivable.* A case may thus be exhibited more striking and apposite than any real or possible one that could be found." But in arguments or addresses to the intellect, with a view to produce conviction, we will ever find it wise to employ such parables as have the quality of verisimilitude and possibility; for, unhappily, many persons are either so ignorant or so obstinate that in discussions they treat your supposed cases as if they were facts asserted, and your parables as if they were intended to be historic narratives. This mistake or fault has, it seems, been committed in all ages. Plato introduced into his dialogues, as a case supposed, the celebrated Gyges, who, as the fable is, whenever he turned the stone of his gold ring to the palm of his hand, was visible to no person, while he himself saw everything, and whenever he turned the ring into its proper place he again became visible. "And here," says Cicero,[2] "some philosophers, and they indeed by no means unworthy men, but not very acute, say that the story told by Plato is false and fabulous, just as if he indeed maintained either that it happened or could have happened. The import of this ring and of this example is this: *If nobody were to know, nobody even to suspect that you were doing anything for the sake of riches, power, dominion, lust; if it would be forever unknown to gods and men, would you do it?* They deny that the case is possible. But though indeed it be possible, I only inquire what they would do if that were possible which they deny to be so? They argue very stupidly, for they simply deny that it is possible, and they persist in that answer. They do not perceive what is the force of that expression, 'If it were possible.'" It is

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[1] Rhetoric, Pt. i., chap. ii., §8; Pt. ii., chap. ii., §4. See also his admirable examples from Wolfe's Sermons; Appendix K, Id. See also other examples at the end of this section.

[2] De Officiis, Lib. iii., c. ix.

the more important to heed this caution, as the logical but unimaginative, the very class of persons to whose capacities parables would be the most useful, are more liable than any other to commit this fault or make this mistake. For the sake of such our cases supposed should be at least *conceivable*. And herein we are supported by the example of the Great Teacher, whose parables are remarkable for their verisimilitude. They have such an air of truth, and there is such keeping in all the characters and circumstances, that learned men have, to say the least, wasted their time in endeavouring to show that some of them are authentic narratives and others of them contain historic incidents; whereas, rhetorically considered, it is of no consequence whether they allude to historical circumstances or not.

In further answer to the question, When or where is it proper to use parables? we may add that they are in general perhaps less suited to the purpose of exposition and illustration than of application. We have the example of our Divine Master for the use of this figure in applications, as at the end of the Sermon on the Mount, and at different points in his other discourses. Nor can anything exceed the propriety and discrimination which the Great Teacher exhibits in the use of the parable. In St. John's Gospel, which chiefly records what Jesus said more confidentially and affectionally in private, and, particularly in the circle of his disciples, not long before his crucifixion, he speaks in what is essentially metaphor rather than in what is essentially simile. It is remarkable, therefore, but not at all strange, that John has transmitted to us so few parables, strictly so termed. We have one in chapter iii. 8: "The wind bloweth where it listeth," etc. "St. John," as has been remarked, "while he avoids the exact type of the parable, has preserved the relation of addresses and acts which are only parables transformed;"[1] transformed, we may add, to express the deep feeling with which he now spoke. The more didactic *like* is melted and moulded into the fervent *is*. That metaphor is the language of feeling may be shown from Paul's epistles, where in one case he transforms a well-known fable into a metaphor,[2] or what in modern terminology would be called allegory. And, accordingly, in many kinds of persuasive sermons, and in pathetic and animated perorations it is sometimes advisable to give our parables the form of metaphors. Herein the safest rhetor is the heart.

The reader who wishes to learn how to employ parables by con-

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1 John iii. 29; x. 1–13; xii. 24; xiii. 4–12; xv. 1–6; xvi. 21.

2 1 Cor. xii. 14–30.

sidering some of the uninspired examples of success and failure in the use of this figure will consult with advantage the following works:

RABBINICAL PARABLES.

The Gemara and Midrash; Cocceius' Excerpta Gem.; Meuschen's N. T. ex. Talmud., illust.; Wetstein's Nov. Test.; Jost's Judenthum; Herder's Hebrew Poetry; Coleridge's Works; John Damascenus' Barlaam, and Josaphat, in Opera Om., and in De Voragine's Legende Dorée; Trench's Parables, Introduc., chap. iv., in notes near the end; Hyman Hurwitz's Hebrew Tales.

CHRISTIAN PARABLES.

Ephræm Syrus' Opera, Paræneses, 21, 28, 37; In Illud, Attende Tibi Ipsi, cap. ii.; Works of Chrysostom and Augustine; Works of Anselm, Benedict ed.; De Similitudi.; Works of Bernard of Clairv. (Benedict ed.), vol. i., p. 1251; Works of Hugo of St. Victor; De Sacrament.; Vincent Ferrer (ser. on St. John xx. 19); Sermons of Latimer; Sermons of Wickliffe; Jeremy Taylor's "Liberty of Prophesying" (at the end), borrowed from the Bostan of the Persian Poet Saadi; Joseph Hall's sermon on Noah's Dove; Philip Skelton's sermon on the Cunning Man; John Livingstone, in Select Biographies, Wodrow Soc., vol. i., pp. 202–212; Alphonse Salmeron's sermons on the Parables, p. 300; Peter Poiret's De Œconomia Divina (in 7 vols., 8vo, 1687), vol. ii., p. 554; Brydayne, quoted by Maury, Eloquence de la Chaire, chap. xx.; Christmas Evans' Sermons; German sermons of Tzschirner and of Stiller; F. A. Krummacher's Parables; P. B. Girandeau's Parables; Dr. Payson's Memoirs, chap. xiv.; Dr. James Hamilton's Sermons; Spurgeon's Sermons.

We here subjoin two examples of cases supposed. The first is carried so far as to have the effect of vision:

"I fancy in some sad abode of this city, some unvisited pallet of straw, a man, a Christian man, pining, perishing without an attendant, looking his last upon nakedness and misery, feeling his last in the pangs of hunger and thirst. The righteous spirit of the man being disembodied, I fancy it to myself, rising to heaven encircled by an attendance of celestial spirits, daughters of mercy, who waited upon his soul when mankind deserted his body. This attended spirit I fancy rising to the habitation of God, and reporting in the righteous ear of the Governor of the earth how it fared with him amid all the extravagance and outlay of this city. And saith the indignant Governor of men, 'They had not a morsel of bread nor a drop of water to bestow upon my saint. Who of my angels will go for me where I shall send? Go, thou angel of famine; break the growing ear with thy wing, and let mildew feed upon their meal. Go, thou an-

gel of plague, and shake thy wings once more over the devoted city. Go, thou angel of fire, and consume all the neighbourhood where my saint suffered unheeded and unpitied. Burn it, and let its flame not quench till their pavilions are a heap of smouldering ashes."—*Edward Irving.*

"I may be addressing one against whom the decree is even now gone forth, and in whose veins the disease that shall accomplish it is gathering and growing while I speak—one whose preparation for an eternal state of being must be crowded and condensed into a few months, or weeks, or days—one who is meditating what he shall never realise, and reckoning on that to which he shall never attain; who contemplates the taking heed to others, and yet is in danger of being swept into eternity before he has begun to take heed to himself.[1] One who is laden with a prospective responsibility, which aggravates beyond all conception the pressure of present guilt, in that he is neglecting or betraying, by anticipation, the flock that he shall never feed. Could I point out that individual; could I designate and describe him to the perception of this assembly; still more, could I raise the curtain of the invisible world, and reveal to you his perilous position on the very verge of the abyss, the arm of death outstretched above and the grave expanding below, oh, how every eye would fix upon him, and every heart would bleed for him, and every voice would pray for him, and one cry of earnest entreaty would go up from all this congregation, 'Sinner, have mercy upon thine own soul! O God, grant unto him repentance ere it is too late!' Brethren, there *may* be one such among us at this moment. I cannot tell who it is; but let *that* man only set light by the things that have been spoken; let *him* only turn a deaf ear, and object a dead heart to the words of truth and soberness; let *him* only defer the preparation and despise the warning and disregard the prayer—that can tell me who it is not; that can affirm, 'It is not I?'"—*R. W. Dale.*

Section IV.—Of the Fable.

The fable was regarded by Aristotle as quite different from the parable. He taught that there are two kinds of examples, the parable and the *Logos.* The latter is the fable: "like those of Æsop, and the African stories." But this difference is owing to his having considered the parable as a case supposed, and not, as we do, a fictitious narrative. It is important to keep in view this change in the meaning of the word parable; for the oriental Trench, by disregarding it, has declared logomachy against the classic Lessing and Storr, who define the parable according to the distinction of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

To-day the distinction between the parable and the fable is apparently very broad, because these words are no sooner mentioned than we recall the parables of our Lord and the fables of Æsop. But when we examine more closely and consider more deeply the distinguishing features of each, we find that they bear a nearer resem-

[1] The preacher is admonishing lax and unwatchful pastors.

blance than we at first supposed, especially if we base our definition of the parable on some of the longer ones of our Lord—parables which differ from the simile or comparison and the case supposed in having the form of a fictitious narrative. We do not, however, think that it is necessary thus to limit the term parable as employed in the New Testament, where it seems to comprehend all that Aristotle meant by it, along with the Rabbinic notion of its import. The chief distinctive features of the fable are as follows:

1. In the fable the qualities and actions of men may often be attributed to brutes. We say *often* may be so attributed; for in many of the best pagan fables the principal characters are men and women who are represented as thinking, acting, and talking as is natural and habitual to men and women; and in fables where brutes are introduced, they are not seldom represented as acting according to their nature and habits. The above feature, however, serves clearly to distinguish the fable from the parables of our Lord.

The way some have endeavoured to account for this will not bear a close examination. Archbishop Trench reasons very plausibly thus: "In his mind the creation of God, as it came from the Creator's hands, is too perfect, and has too much of reverence owing to it, to be represented otherwise than as it really is. The Great Teacher, by parables, therefore, allowed himself in no transgression of the established laws of nature—in nothing marvellous or anomalous. He represents to us no speaking trees nor reasoning beasts, and we should be at once conscious of an unfitness in his so doing. Mr. Trench does not often take such narrow views of a subject. He forgets that since the Fall nothing exists as it came from the Creator's hands, and that in Paradise itself one reptile at least was caused by a Satanic miracle to speak fabulously in transgression of the laws of its Creator. He forgets that the inspired apostle saw the whole creation groaning and travailing in pain together, and hopefully foresaw the happy day when that creation should be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Does not Jehovah pronounce a curse upon the serpent, as if he could understand, be humiliated, and obey, like a human being? Does not the Divine Spirit, speaking out of the whirlwind to Job, say that Leviathan laugheth at the shaking of a spear? Is not the spider represented as taking hold with her hands? In the original Hebrew is not a hand ascribed to the dog, the lion, and the bear? Does not the Divine Spirit, in Joel, describe locusts as an invading army?

Though our Divine Master spoke no fables in the ethnic sense

of the term, yet he and John the Baptist personified the stones of the street and of the desert (Luke xix. 40; Matt. iii. 9). Our Lord calls Herod "that fox." He also said: "Beware of false prophets which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are raving wolves." These and other metaphors are condensed fables. Indeed, the example last quoted may have been an allusion to Æsop's fable of the wolf in sheep's clothing, which must have been well known at that time.

2. The fable is further distinguished from the Christian parable by occasionally indulging itself in raillery and revenge. In one old Greek fable[1] a vine says to a he-goat, "Though you eat me down to the root yet will I yield wine enough to pour upon your head when you are sacrificed."

3. The fable is more commonly than the parable devoted to the inculcation of ethical precepts and prudential maxims. We are by no means to overlook the fact that some of the pagan fables were vehicles of as high truths as natural religion could impart. Herder, in his Scattered Leaves (*Zerstreüten Blättern*, vol. iii.) divides fables into three kinds.

a. Theoretic, or such as are intended to form the understanding; *e. g.*, the fable of the dog snapping at his shadow in the water, the lamb reasoning with the wolf, or that of the hare hunting with the lion. Fables like these are designed to inculcate the maxims of secular wisdom.

b. Moral, or those which contain rules for the regulation of the conscience and will; as, "Go to the ant, thou sluggard, consider her ways and be wise," etc. Here we learn that the happiness of all living creatures is connected with well-directed activity.

c. Fables of *destiny*. As we do not always see the connection of cause and effect, we often call that the effect of fate or chance which befalls according to the secret purpose of God; *e. g.*, the eagle carries with her plunder a coal from the altar which sets fire to her nest, and so her unfledged brood becomes the prey of animals which she has already robbed of their young. To these classes Herder might have added another.

d. For some of the ethnic fables inculcate *religious duties; e. g.*, in the fable which represents the wagoner praying to Jupiter to lift his wagon out of the mire.

Two out of four of these classes illustrate and enforce the profoundest truths of religion; so that we are to receive with some reservations the declaration that the fable has no higher aim than

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[1] Evenus, in the Greek Anthologies.

to teach the maxims of a worldly and atheistical morality. Abp. Trench, in attempting to exalt our Lord's parables in this regard, unduly disparges all fables; yes, even those that are found in the Old Testament. Jotham, by his fable (Judges ix. 8–15), it appears to him, seeks only to teach the men of Shechem their folly, not their sin, in making Abimelech king over them. And Jehoash (2 Kings xiv. 9), in the same way would make Amaziah see his presumption and pride in challenging him to the conflict, not thereby teaching him any moral lesson, but only giving evidence in the fable which he uttered that his own pride was offended by the challenge of the Jewish king. In neither case is it God that is speaking, nor yet messengers of his delivering his counsel; but men, and, from an earthly standing point, not a divine. But is this a fair account of these men and their respective fables? Jotham, the youngest and only surviving son of the believing Gideon, uttered a true prophetic warning, as the event proved. He stood there on Mount Gerizim to speak with divine authority; for he said to the people at the beginning of his fable of the bramble: "Hearken unto me, ye men of Shechem, that God may hearken unto you." This sounds like a voice from heaven, and it is echoed by Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel.[1] His fable betrays none of the ambition of the mere demagogue. It might be regarded in some of its aspects as a funeral sermon for his slain brothers, whom he compares to the vine, the fig-tree, and the olive. But it concludes with a terrible malediction from God, which thunders over Mount Gerizim during the life of Abimelech, and then falls upon him and on his idolatrous subjects: "And all the evil of the men of Shechem did God render upon their heads; and upon them came the curse of Jotham, the son of Jerubbaal." As to the fable of the thistle and cedar, which was sent by Joash to Amaziah, it was probably the inspired composition of some prophet at the court of the king of Israel. Hezekiah addressed to Sennacherib a divine communication which Isaiah had received, rebuking the pride and predicting the destruction of the king of Assyria. This is rendered the more probable from the fact that Joash had been the friend of the true prophets. He visited Elisha in his last sickness, wept over his face, and addressed him as "the chariot of Israel and the horsemen thereof." The dying prophet promised him three victories over Benhadad, king of Syria. Besides, Amaziah declared war against Joash without provocation, and contrary to the repeated warnings of a man of God.[2] Here also the event sets its seal that the prophecy is true. Nor is

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[1] Isa. lxv. 12; lxvi. 4; Jer. vii. 13; Ezek. viii. 18. [2] 2 Chron. xxv.

this view without confirmation from the words of the inspired chronicler which close the fable: "But Amaziah would not hear; for it came of God that he might deliver them into the hand of their enemies, because they sought after the gods of Edom." We have dwelt the longer on this well-meant attempt to disparage the Scripture fables, because it is a highly important question, rhetorically considered, whether these fables are given by inspiration of God, and are, consequently, to be commended to the intelligent imitation of the young preacher.

So far from the fable having no place in Scripture, it does in substance, if not in form, occupy a large and honourable space therein. Even the transgression or temporary suspension of the laws of nature, though in itself considered, it is a good reason why the Great Teacher did not represent speaking trees and reasoning beasts, yet when we remember that all men, from the earliest times, have believed in a miraculous power, why may it not be a sufficient offset to the above hypothesis to say that the fabulous element in the Scriptures was intended to satisfy the cravings and to nourish the growth of this faith in the wonders of the Almighty? Does not the fable stand before the young as a perpetual witness of the existence and the anomalies of the supernatural? And does not the biblical fable rebuke the ravings of our inspired Rationalists just as the ass once rebuked the anger of a prophet, who was not more blind to the presence of a sworded angel than the most covetous and the most worldly-wise of them all. Many of the proverbs of Solomon are distilled fables (*e. g.*, Prov. xxvi. 11, xxx. 15, 25–28), while animals are prophetic symbols of monarchies (Ezek. xvii. 1–10; Dan. vii. 3-8). And some of the allegories bring forward beasts as the emblems of political power (Psa. lxxx. 8–16). In the parable of Nathan the lamb represents the wife of the slain Uriah. The two inspired and prophetic dreams of Joseph were constructed fable-wise, in marvellous disregard of an all-pervading material law.

Even the classic fable has an honourable descent. Hesiod,[1] the first of the Greeks who made this figure, was of Asiatic ancestry, and was the most religious of the ethnic poets. It has been inferred from Pausanius and others that he was a priest of the temple of the Muses on Mount Helicon. There exists, as critics observe, a strong resemblance between the hexameter oracles of Pythia and the verses of Hesiod. There is a verse in his "Works and Days" which is also mentioned by Herodotus as a Pythian oracle, and the poet himself is said to have possessed the gift of prophecy, and to

[1] Fable of the Hawk and Nightingale, Op. et Di., 200.

have acquired it in Acarnania. As to Æsop, he also appears to have been of Asiatic origin. He is said to have visited Persia and Egypt, and it is not impossible that he was the same fabulist who is in the East called Lokman, whom Oriental tradition represents as an ugly black slave. At any rate, Æsop was of a serious and religious turn of mind, and his fables were related not for the amusement of princes, but were some of them parts of actual speeches delivered in behalf of piety, justice, and mercy. His fable of the fox, the horse-leeches, and the hedgehog was made while pleading at Samos in behalf of a demagogue who was tried for his life.[1] He lost his life while on a pious pilgrimage to Delphi, whither he was sent by Crœsus with a large sum of money in order to offer a magnificent sacrifice to Apollo, and also to present a gift to each inhabitant of the sacred city. It is doubtful whether Æsop ever *wrote* his fables, but they were circulated orally throughout Greece, and some of them occupied the attention of Socrates in his last days. Diogenes Laertius[2] has handed down to us the beginning of one of the fables which Socrates put into verse:

> "Æsop one day did this sage counsel give
> To the Corinthian magistrates: Not to trust
> The cause of virtue to the people's judgment."

The rest is wanting, but the fable Socrates thus rendered into verse from recollection was, we conjecture, that of the frogs praying for a king. This is the only genuine fable of his which is susceptible of such an application. We are told that they desired a king in order that by his authority he might check their dissolute morals. The log and the water-snake correspond to the annual magistrate, and the despot Clypselus, who having made himself a great favourite with the people, overthrew and expelled the magistrates or Bacchiadæ. The only objection to this hypothesis is the authority of Phædrus,[3] who makes the water-snake answer to Pisistratus, the Tyrant of Athens, and the log to Solon the Archon. But it is safer to trust Socrates.[4] Any how, this passage from Plato and this fragment from Laertius serve to show how the great fabulist was then regarded at Athens, and in what estimation he was held by the great philosopher himself at a time when he was anxious to discharge his conscience and so prepare himself for death. Demosthenes is said to have related Æsop's fable of the sheep and the wolves when dissuading the Athenians from surrendering the orators to Alexander.

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1 Arist., Rhet., L. ii., c. xx. 2 De Vitis, L. ii., sec. 42. 3 Fab., L. i., Fab. ii.
4 Plato, Phædo §12.

The fables of Æsop, with their natural accretions, have been admired and quoted by many learned and eloquent preachers. The first of the principal editions of this fabulist was collected by Planudes, a Greek monk of the 14th century. And Luther, in the castle of Coburg, while daily employed in translating the sacred Scriptures, occupied his moments of recreation in preparing a popular edition of Æsop. "I am," he writes, "making a Zion out of this Sinai, and build here three tabernacles: one for the Psalmist, one for the Prophets, and one for Æsop." The great Reformer also occasionally used fables in his sermons and homilies. "There is no cause," says Storr, "to consider the very ancient and, as Luther has well observed, highly excellent method of teaching by fables, as trifling or unworthy of Christ,[1] nor are we immediately to conclude from there being no mention of the apologue or completely moral fable spoken by our Lord, that he never spoke anything of the kind."

Nor has the Divine Spirit disdained to make an allusion to one of the most celebrated of the ethnic fables. In 1 Cor. xii. 12–27, Paul employs metaphorically a fable which Livy puts into the mouth of Menenius Agrippa,[2] who is said to have reconciled the people to the senators by that well-known fable about the members of the human body revolting against the belly. The apostle here uses the fable most skilfully and agreeably to the counsel of Aristotle[3] (if the writer of an epistle which is to be read to the Church may in this case take the advice that properly belongs to the orator). "For an orator," says he, "ought to construct fables

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1 May there not be an allusion to a fable in these words of our Divine Master? "It is like unto children sitting in the market and calling unto their fellows, and saying, We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced," etc. (Matt. xi. 16–19). Wolfius (in Curæ Phil.) quotes a similar proverbial saying from Æsop. We conjecture that this was part of a song of the fish boys in the Oriental markets, founded on the well-known fable made by Cyrus at Sardis (Heroditus, L. i., c. cxli.), in reply to the Ionian and Æolian Greeks: "There was a certain piper, who was walking one day by the sea-side, when he espied some fish; so he began to pipe to them, imagining they would come out to him upon the land. But as he found at last that his hope was vain, he took a net, and, enclosing a great draught of fishes, drew them ashore. The fish then began to leap and dance; but the piper said, Cease your dancing now, as you did not choose to come and dance when I piped to you." Since writing the above, we find a similar opinion in "Bowyer's Conjectures" on Luke vii. 32.

2 Hist., L. ii., c. xxxii.; Lokman, Fab. xxxii.; Æsop, Denis of Halicarnassus and Florus. There are also allusions to this fable in Seneca, De Ira, L. ii., and in Marc. Antoni., Med., L. ii., §1.; Quint., Inst. Orat., Lib. v., c. xi., §20.

3 Rhet., L. ii., c. xx.

just as he does his parables" (illustrations, or cases supposed), "if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical turn of mind." As the Gospel is to be preached to all men, fables are not out of place either in the sermon or the ecclesiastical letter; for, as Quintilian has observed, they are adapted especially to attract the minds of rustic and illiterate people, who listen less suspiciously than others to fictions, and, charmed by the pleasure they find in them, put faith in that which delights them. But it is well, in the more animated parts of discourse, and particularly in addressing the learned, and worldlings, and carping critics, to follow the example of the inspired Paul, and relate fables *hypothetically*. We have here his authority for also employing fables for a different and higher object than the one the original fabulist had in view. We are at liberty to use fables in a variety of other ways: by mere brief allusion to a well-known one, by repeating only such a part as suits our purpose, or by relating the whole of one very little known or of one of our own invention, either with the original or with a new application. In short, the rules we have elsewhere laid down for the use of the parable are in general applicable to the treatment of the fable also.

But the skilful employment of fables is best learned from the example of Paul and other preachers. Not only Luther, but Wickliffe also, used fables. In one of his homilies the latter discourses thus: "Christian men might well say, as the poet in his fable represents the frogs as saying to the harrow, 'Cursed be so many masters.' For in this day Christian men are oppressed now with popes, and now with bishops, now with cardinals under popes, and now with prelates under bishops." Thomas Adams compares any sin which promises to remove trouble to the axe which begged a helve of the confederate trees, under pretence of ridding them of sapping and shading undergrowths. And Whitefield, as I recollect, somewhere compares the lot of the rich and the poor, when overtaken by a common calamity, by a beautiful allusion to the fable of the Oak and the Reed, the former torn up by the roots, the latter bowing down for a little while beneath the storm, and then joyfully lifting up its head. Jeremiah Seed pointedly closes a paragraph by quoting that part of Horace's allusion to Æsop's fable of the Fox and the Sick Lion which has passed into a proverb: "This is the case of your deliberate, determined, presumptuous sinners—men who wilfully step aside out of the path of innocence and virtue, upon a presumption of being able to return into it again, after they have compassed such a situation in life. But alas! *Ves-*

tigia pauca retrorsum." Julius Charles Hare has imitated the apostle Paul's allusion to a fable: "At present that which ought to be Christ's body, the body corporate of mankind, is wholly out of joint, and stricken with an almost universal palsy. The members, for the most part, instead of helping, war against each other. Each strives to live and to act solely for its own sake. The eye will not minister to the ear, nor the ear to the eye. The hands rob each other. The heart is loth to pour forth its blood. Every limb is impeding the circulation, that it may keep all it can to itself; although, by a righteous judgment, it is itself the greatest sufferer thereby; for pain loves to prey on the full rather than on the empty."

But here we must subjoin one cautionary hint. The fable suffers more than any other figure from an incongruity. Thus Mr. Hare's fable is marred with the impropriety of first representing the body as wholly out of joint and stricken with an almost universal palsy. So, too, Mr. Matthew Arnold, in discussing the question whether the Church of England ought to be disestablished, says that the cry of the Nonconformists "is a little like that proposal of the fox who had lost his own tail to put all the other foxes in the same boat by a general cutting off of tails." The figurative phrase, "in the same boat" introduces an image remote from the fable, and ridiculous in itself. The effect of such incongruities on the mind is not unlike the impression made on the eye and the fancy by putting into a magic-lantern two pictures at a time, and side by side.

Section V.—Of the Metaphor.

Metaphor is affirmed by some to consist in things, by others to consist in words. It has, therefore, been variously defined as one thing put for another which it resembles, or as one word substituted for another on account of the resemblance or analogy between their significations. But if a word expresses an idea, then both are put for others which they resemble. In the metaphor the sense of the word is not changed. It is only employed in a new connection and with a new application. Aristotle[1] comprehends synechdoche under the term metaphor. "A metaphor," says he, "is a transposition of a noun from its proper signification, either from the genus to the species or from the species to the genus, or from spe-

[1] De Poetic., c. xxi.

cies to species, or according to analogy." Since the days of Cicero[1] only the third and fourth kinds of tropes have been regarded as metaphors. These are illustrated by Aristotle thus: "A transposition from species to species is such as

'The brazen falchion drew away his life;'

And

'Cut by the ruthless sword.'

For here, in the first case, *to draw away* is used instead of *to cut;* and in the second, *to cut* is used instead of *to draw away;* since both imply king something away. But I call it analogous when the relation of the second term to the first is similar to that of the fourth to the third; for then the fourth is used instead of the second, or the second instead of the fourth. . . I say, for instance, a cup has a similar relation to Bacchus that a shield has to Mars. Hence a shield may be called the cup of Mars, and a cup the shield of Bacchus. One may therefore say that evening is the old age of day, and that old age is the evening of life."

Classic writers applied the term with less discrimination than the moderns do. They often employed it as not only synonymous with synecdoche, but also with anthropopathy. Essentially considered, it may indeed be detected in many a figure that very properly passes under another name. Personification and other figures which attribute life and action to things inanimate were formerly thought to be metaphorical in their nature. Thus Cicero, speaking of Claudius (Pro Milon., c. xxxi.), says: "In truth, the holy places themselves which beheld that monster fall, seemed to move themselves and to assert their rights against him." Here the holy places appear to imitate the priests. An example from Gregory Nazianzen is yet more bold: "Ye orators speak now. I, this tomb, keep closed in silence the lips of the great Amphilochus." In this case the tomb plays the orator.

The figure termed vision is very frequently of the nature of metaphor. Thus the prophet Theoclymenus[2] beholds *night* as a similitude of death, wrapping itself around the faces, bodies, and limbs of the suitors who riot in the halls of Ulysses. It is likewise noticeable that Homer has here illustrated the aptitude of all abject and reprobate men to construe figurative language literally:

"He said, they hearing laughed; and thus the son
Of Polybus, Eurymachus replied,

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1 De Orat., Lib. iii., c. xxxix.; Quint., Lib. viii., c. vi.; Campbell, Philso. Rhet.

2 Odyssey, xx., 351–352, 360–363.

This wanderer from a distant shore hath left
His wits behind. Hoa there! conduct him thence
Into the forum; *since he dreams it night*
Already, teach him there that it is day."

But more on this subject two or three pages hence.

The metaphor and the simile often assist each other. The simile may first point out the resemblance, and then as the discourse quickens its pace the words denoting comparison are thrown aside as a cloak of cumbersome weight; or, on the contrary, the too swift discourse may slacken its pace in order to state the similitude which was before only implied, as if to gather the floating cloak more closely about the person, in order that the runner may be more easily recognised. Examples of the former kind are found (Matt. vii. 20; Luke xi. 35). Take also the following instance from one of the sermons of Jeremiah Seed: "A man that is divided between piety and sin is like one that lives on the confines of two mighty contending states; his heart is a constant seat of war; and he is sometimes under the dominion of virtue, and sometimes under the tyranny of vice." It is, however, remarkable that very few Scripture similes are transformed into metaphors. They are more commonly followed by words of literal explanation (Jer. xi. 19; xvii. 6–8; Ezek. xxxiii. 32; Heb. xiii. 15). Not only similes but metaphors also are followed by a literal interpretation (Isa. i. 22–23; xi. 6–9; Amos iii. 8).

Examples of Scripture metaphors explained by similes are not uncommon (Isa. lix. 9, 10; Jer. xliii. 12; Ezek. xxxiv. 11–13; Matt. xxiii. 37; James i. 6; iii. 2, 3). As the Divine Spirit has always, when necessary, sacrificed strength and gracefulness to clearness of style, we cannot be at a loss for the reason why he appends to a metaphor a literal statement or else a simile, which is the most perspicuous of all figures. As an uninspired instance under this head, take the following from one of Augustine's homilies: "There is, as it were, the army of an emperor seated within my mind. For as an emperor by his army does what he will, so the Lord Jesus Christ, once beginning to dwell in our inner man, uses these virtues as his ministers."

The parenthesis, *as it were*, employed in the last example and by the most eloquent preachers, is not approved by Dr. Blair and some other writers on rhetoric. They think that the metaphor which needs this extenuation or apology may safely be omitted. The phrase may indeed be too frequently repeated; but its occasional use is authorised by inspired examples (Isa v. 18; xxvi. 20; liii. 3).

It will sometimes serve to prevent a metaphor from being understood literally.

As a general rule, on the contrary, when we are addressing true believers who read their Bibles daily, and whose thoughts and style are in consequence imbued with Scripture conceptions and expressions, we seldom have any just occasion to intimate to them that we are speaking metaphorically. For universally the same grace that makes them lovers of Scripture makes them also ready and accurate interpreters of all metaphors that have been made on sound principles. But all unbelievers and all mere formal professors, who neither love nor read the Scriptures, are provokingly and portentously liable to take figures literally. Thus when Jeremiah[1] spoke figuratively of bottles filled with wine, his idolatrous hearers said, "Do we not certainly know that every bottle shall be filled with wine?" Thus Nicodemus asked, "How can a man be born when he is old?" and the woman of Samaria said, "Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep. From whence, then, hast thou that living water?" The Jews, on another occasion, strove among themselves, saying, "How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" The false and disagreeing witnesses said, "We have heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will build another made without hands." And it is not unworthy of note that on one occasion, when the disciples supposed their Divine Master was speaking of literal instead of metaphorical leaven, they were reproved by him with uncommon sharpness: "O ye of little faith. . . Do ye not yet understand, neither remember? . . How is it that ye do not understand?" (Matt. xvi. 6–12). It was their unbelief that made them so slow to understand.

When, therefore, the preacher is addressing dull formalists and unbelievers, however well educated and intelligent in other respects, he will find frequent occasion to say, "as it were," "in some sense," "figuratively speaking," "or to speak without a figure," "or in plain terms," etc. Luther was well aware of the propensity of some hearers to take figures literally. In a sermon on Christ's Descent into Hell, speaking according to the representations of the old monkish pictures, he said that Jesus beat in the gates of hell with his victorious banner. "If," he adds, "the matter were who should be the cunningest, I could be as cunning as those who mock us and scornfully ask, 'How then was it? Was the banner made of paper or of cloth? How came it to pass that it was not burned in

[1] Jer. xiii. 12.

hell? What kind of gates, doors, and bars were there in hell? Were they of iron or wood?' Now, were I to endeavour to fathom, to represent and to heighten these promises without images, and as they are in themselves, I could not express, nor couldst thou understand them. On this account the outward tokens, images, and comparisons are good and useful to paint the thing so that thou mayest comprehend and retain it." Every preacher can sympathise with the feelings here expressed by the great Reformer.

And the history of false doctrines abundantly proves that men are more prone to misinterpret metaphors than they are similes or parables. This conclusion would favor the notion that it is not the parable, but, if any figure, the metaphor that was intended as a veil to intercept the light to those who love darkness, as a means of withholding from the reprobate the knowledge of the truth, or as an instrument of smiting them with penal blindness. We are of the number of those who deny that the Father of Lights has invested any figure with a judicial character. Certain it is, however, that the most deadly and wide-spread heresies have sprung from a guilty inability to discover the difference between certain metaphorical and literal expressions. Great numbers throughout nominal Christendom are fatally deceiving themselves as to the meaning of such a Scripture metaphorical metonymy[1] as this: "This is my body." . . "This is my blood." From this one mistake has arisen the doctrine of transubstantiation, or the transmutation of the sacramental bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, and the doctrine of consubstantiation, or the incorporation or introduction of Christ's body and blood into the consecrated elements; both asserting the substantial or corporeal presence of Jesus in the Eucharist!

Lord Kames has said that in expressing any severe passion that wholly occupies the mind, metaphor is improper. He seems to have overlooked the fact that metaphor is the natural and spontaneous language of the all-absorbing passions. His lordship would have been nearer right if he had applied this rule to the proper use of allegories, or other long trains of implied resemblances. Dr. Carson is hardly less in the wrong when he affirms that, with few exceptions, grief, despair, or any of the dispiriting passions is seldom found to employ this figure. The Book and Lamentations of Jeremiah make short work with this theory.

Some rhetoricians advise us never to make use of the same word

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[1] *I. e.*, the thing signified being put for the sign, and yet the idea of resemblance is not wanting.

to express metaphorically opposite ideas. Others, discussing the subject philosophically, claim to have discovered that all mankind make metaphors according to certain universal laws. Thus Richter has observed that no nation calls error light, and truth darkness. But it should be remembered that, as Glassius[1] has indicated, the many different qualities and attributes of the same object may be made to convey metaphorically many diverse ideas. Christ is called a lion, and so is Satan. Leaven is employed in a good sense as well as a bad. Sleep expresses at once the hopeful repose of the blessed dead and the false security of sinners. The sun denotes happiness and unhappiness.[2] A shadow signifies protection; also great perils and adversities. A river denotes plenty of blessings; it likewise expresses terrors and overwhelming evils. The harvest is used in both a good and a bad sense. And so are the words treasure and treasurer. So we may warrantably say, "floods of fire," and "ghosts of stars." The most trustworthy canon, and founded on divine usage, is this, that the same metaphorical word ought not to be employed on the same occasion or connection to express different or opposite ideas.

A succession of distinct metaphors, like that of similes and parables, is sometimes not only allowable, but very serviceable. Lord Kames and Dr. Blair would dissuade the young orator from this. The former forbids the joining together of two metaphors in the same period; the latter condemns Horace for crowding together three metaphors in describing the difficulty of Pollio's writing a history of the civil wars. But the Divine Spirit, speaking by the mouth of Jeremiah, is better authority than they. In the first sixteen verses of the 3d chapter of Lamentations we find more metaphors than verses employed to describe the variety and severity of the weeping prophet's miseries. James likewise accumulates metaphors to describe the evils of an ungoverned tongue. This member is a boaster, a fire in a forest, a world of iniquity, an untamable beast. The mouth is a fountain sending forth at the same opening sweet water and bitter, salt and fresh. It is a fig-tree bearing olives; a vine bearing figs. The curse of the Father of all on the covetous rich and their ill-gotten gains is a moth in their best garments, a rust among their treasured gold and silver—a rust which is at once a witness against them before God, and a fire eating their own flesh. The hire of the labourers fraudulently kept back cries out and enters into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.

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[1] Philologia Sacra., Lib. v., tract i., cap. v.

[2] Judges v. 31; Psa. cxxi. 6; Matt. xiii. 6, 21.

All the principal rhetoricians condemn the use of mixed metaphors, or a grotesque, monstrous, or impossible combination of images. Some quote against this practice Horace's lines in his letter *ad Pisones*, which compare the unskilful poet to the painter who represents a monster whose members are taken from various kinds of animals, having the head of a man, the neck of a horse, etc. Others quote Quintilian's censure of those who begin a metaphor with a tempest, and conclude it with a conflagration. Shakespeare, who was often guilty of this fault, they single out for exemplary punishment; particularly these words:

"Or take arms against a sea of troubles."

How absurd, say they, to think of drawing one's sword upon a rising tide. Addison, who, alas! is in the same condemnation, advises us to try to form a picture of our ideas, and by considering how the parts would agree when delineated, find out whether or not they be of the mixed or simple sort. Evidently Dr. Tholuck did not think of this while he said, "When the tongue goes upon stilts, reason spreads but half her sails." Now, as to Shakespeare's notorious metaphor, it needs no words to prove that we can picture the scene both in imagination and on canvas. Nor is it hard to believe that Shakespeare had in mind when he wrote, as doubtless many thousands of Englishmen have had in mind when they heard these words, King Canute reproving his flatterers by vainly commanding the sea-tide to obey him. At any rate, the classical student will recall the like offence of Æschylus[1] against metaphorical propriety when he puts into the mouth of Io, the daughter of Inachus, this despairing plaint: "But my troubled words dash idly against the surges of loathsome calamity." But, still more unhappily for the rhetoricians, by attacking all such figures they are opposing with military weapons a sea of Scripture metaphors. What do they propose to do with the four-faced creatures seen in the vision of Ezekiel? What with Daniel's vision of a great ram behaving like an emperor, and of a he-goat that touched not the ground, and had a horn between his eyes? What with the holy John's vision of the ram with seven heads and ten horns, and sea of glass mingled with fire? What with this most beautiful and consolatory assurance: "Light is sown for the righteous?" (Psa. xcvii. 11). While for beginners this rhetorical caution may, when properly qualified, be of considerable service, it has frequently to be disregarded by the experienced preacher. And why? For the following very good rea-

[1] Prometheus Chained, lines 910, 911.

sons: The apparent contradictions of Scripture, the seeming monstrosities among the issues of the providence of God, the crepuscular mysteries and semblances of incongruity in the union of the human and divine natures in Immanuel, the paradoxes and inconsistencies which, exhibited by the experiences of the immature Christian in the struggle between the new and the old life, not unfittingly symbolised by a serpent slowly transforming into a dove, the partial blindness of the most enlightened disciples of Jesus still too often seeing "men as trees walking"—these and very many other sacred metamorphoses which are necessitated by human views and applications of revealed truth and grace, demand the service of mixed metaphors in order not only to illustrate and impress, but likewise to guard and defend.

Some preachers, like Chrysostom and Lactantius, naturally reason in metaphors. Thus does Lactantius (De Ira Dei, cap. xxiii.) argue *à fortiori:* "Let us purify that temple which is defiled, not by smoke or by dust, but by evil thoughts; that temple which is illuminated, not by burning candles, but by the light and brightness of wisdom." Those who think in metaphors will avoid ridicule if they can get the better of this habit when they are compelled to answer rude and unimaginative disputers; but when they are addressing their friends they may safely use metaphorical arguments and even figurative digressions whenever they spontaneously offer themselves, in which case their effect is similar to that of the stars as mirrored from the bright uplifted sword of old King Gorm.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE HIGH, THE LOW, AND THE MIDDLE STYLES OF CLASSIC ORATORY.

THE classic rhetoricians describe three kinds or "characters" of styles, which derived their names from the subjects for which they were thought to be respectively suitable. They were denominated the "low," or "plain" style; the "middle," or "temperate;" the "grand," or "sublime." Some ancient writers thought they found these three styles in Homer. They assigned the "grand" or "sublime" to Ulysses, whom the poet describes as an orator so copious and magnificent that his words came from his lips like a winter snow (Il., B. iii., l. 222). The "plain" style they attributed to Menelaus, because his speeches are acute and concise (Il., B. iii., l. 213), while they placed the eloquence of Nestor between the two, because it is neither plain nor sublime, but smooth and pleasant, or, as Homer describes it, "more sweet than honey" (Il., B. i., l. 249). They also discovered these three styles in the three philosophers whom the Athenians sent on an embassy to the Roman Senate to solicit the remittance of the fine imposed on account of the plundering of Oropus. The diction of Carneades was rapid and vehement, that of Critolaus neat and polished, that of Diogenes modest and sober. Those who desire further to acquaint themselves with what the classic rhetoricians have said on this subject will of course consult their works.[1] We have revived these distinctions here because they had an important effect on preaching from the time of Augustine until the Reformation.

In the fourth book of his treatise, *De Doctrina Christiana*, Augustine employs these classic distinctions in defining and illustrating his ideas respecting the styles proper for the preacher. What-

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[1] Aul. Gell. Noct. Att., B. vii., c. xiv.; Dion., Halicarnas. De Comp. Verb., caps. xxi.–xxv.; Cic., De Orat., L. iii., c. lii.; Orator (ad Heren.), L. xxiii.–xxix.; Quint., Inst. Orat., L. ii., c. xvii., sec. 8; L. xii., c. x., sec. 63, 64; Keckerman's Eccles. Rhet., Lib. iii., chap. xxvii.; Dr. John Ward's Lectures on Oratory.

ever this father says on such subjects has a special value; for he was before his conversion a teacher of rhetoric, and became afterwards the most popular and useful preacher of his age. Nor is it a small commendation of this treatise of his, that it formed the basis of Luther's knowledge of homiletics.

Augustine holds with Cicero[1] that the orator should so speak as to teach, to delight, and to persuade; that necessity requires him to teach, suavity to delight, and victory to persuade. "With these three things," says this Christian father, "the author of Roman eloquence seems, in his own mind, to have connected those other three which he goes on to name: 'He, therefore, will be eloquent who can discourse of humble matters in a plain style; of matters of a middling kind in an intermediate style; and of great subjects in a grand style.'[2] It is as if he had added these three things in order to bring out more fully the sentiment he had previously expressed. It is as if he had come substantially to this conclusion: 'He, therefore, will be eloquent who, in teaching, can discourse of humble matters in a plain style; in giving delight, of middling matters in an intermediate style; and, in persuasion, of great affairs in a lofty style.'"

I. As to the first kind of style, or that which is proper for teaching, Augustine thinks everything depends on the subject-matter of instruction. By teaching he means not merely the imparting of knowledge, but also the resolving of doubts, the confuting of errors, and the answering of objections. It is not necessary that the teacher should aim to give delight by his manner of conveying instruction, since in making the truth plain he gives delight to those who discover the truth. He deprecates, however, the idea that the subjects of Christian instruction are, in the pagan sense, "humble matters." Augustine finds examples of the plain style in Gal. iii. 15–18; iv. 21–26. It did not occur to this father that in taking his instances from the epistles, he at once left the field of strict oratory. We may, therefore, be permitted to add some examples from such parts of holy Scripture as were at first orally communicated: Ezek. xviii. 1–30; Matt. v. 21–48; xiii. 3–52; Heb. vii., viii.; Jas. ii. 14–26. Of this style Origen[3] says, that it is of the most general service, and suitable for all sorts of hearers. Arnobius,[4] a rhetor

[1] Orator ad M. Brutum, c. xxi.

[2] Id., c. xxix. The Greeks designated these three kinds of styles by the terms ἁδρος, ἰσχνος, μέσος; the Latins by the words *grande, graviter; submissum, subtiliter; temperatum, temperate.* Cf. Keckerman's Rhet. Eccles., L. iii., c. xxvii.

[3] Contra Celsum, B. vi. [4] Adversus Gentes, L. i., c. lix.

of Sicca, in Africa, and a convert to Christianity in the fourth century, seems to have thought this style better adapted for the pulpit than the high style. "Let pomposity of style," says he, in writing against the Gentiles, "and strictly regulated diction, be reserved for the forum and courts of justice." This writer, however, like his disciple Lactantius, had no adequate conception of the allowable variety and range of pulpit eloquence.

One characteristic of this style is graphicality, especially when it is employed by those preachers who are masters of it, and who are, at the same time, studious observers of familiar things. Aristotle[1] has remarked 'that uneducated men have more power of persuasion among the ignorant than the educated have, because the latter are apt to speak of matters of common knowledge and of a general character, while the *former speak from their own knowledge, and say the things that are close to their hearers.*' But the example of such men as Luther and Latimer shows that the learned can acquire the power of speaking of familiar things in the plain style.

II. The intermediate style was used by the ancients for delectation; not indeed for its own sake, but to the end that the hearers, by being pleased, might more readily assent to, or more firmly retain what they already know. He considers the proper matter of this style to be either blame or praise; but condemns those who glory in their tongue, and pride themselves in panegyrics, and those kinds of discourse by which the hearer is neither to be instructed nor persuaded, but only to be delighted. In whatever the preacher praises or blames; in desiring and firmly retaining some things, and in shunning and utterly rejecting others—in all this it is his aim to be heard with obedience, and to induce his hearers so to live as to avoid censure and deserve praise.

His examples of the intermediate style are taken from hortatory portions of the epistles (1 Tim. v. 1; Rom. xii. 1, 6–16; xiii. 6–8, 12–14). Better instances for the young preacher may be found in Lev. xxvi. 3–45; Deut. i. 6—iii. 1–29; Isa. lviii.; Amos, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi; Heb. xii. 3–29; xiii. 1–21; Jas. v.

The intermediate style seems to be proper for demonstrative discourses, and such others as have for their object mere excitation.

III. The grand or lofty, according to Augustine, differs chiefly from the intermediate in that it is not distinguished so much by the beauty of ornament as by the vehement emotions of the soul, to which it gives natural utterance, and which, consequently form its character. Ornament indeed, of almost every kind, it takes, but it

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[1] Rhet., L. ii., c. xxii. §3.

does not demand them. Its end is persuasion. His examples are Rom. viii. 28–39; 2 Cor. vi. 2–11; Gal. iv. 10–20. To these passages many others might have been added. (See Deut. xxviii.; Isa. xl.–lxvi.; Joel, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Matt. xxiv., xxv.; Heb. x. 35–39; xi.; xii. 1, 2 inclusive.) For this style some have an inborn aptitude: William Ames[1] candidly taught that the efficacy of the Sprit is more clearly manifested in simplicity of speech than in elegance of style (2 Cor. xi. 6); but should a man have a natural talent for the latter, let him take care to use it with genuine sincerity.

Augustine treats the sublime much more practically than Longinus does, who, by failing to connect precepts of practical art with his theories, and so conveying the impression that the exclusive end of the sublime is to call forth wonder and admiration, has contributed much to the exclusion of this quality from the acknowledged sphere of modern oratory.

This Christian father does not omit to add that sometimes the very same great subject must be handled in all three of these styles; in the plain style for instruction; in the intermediate for commendation; and in the grand for the purpose of obtaining the assent of the unwilling mind. The plain style will be endured for a greater length of time than the grand; for the greater the feeling excited in the mind of the auditor to bring him to act, the less the interval during which it can be maintained beyond the moment when it is excited to a sufficient height. Caution must be exercised, therefore, lest we diminish the effects which have already been produced. But, having introduced the plain style for a time, it is well to return to the grand, that the current of the discourse may alternate like the waves of the sea. In the grand style it is almost always proper to begin with the intermediate. The orator can also employ the plain style sometimes for expressing those things which might have been expressed in the grand, and thus render what he utters in the grand still more lofty by comparison, more luminous by the shading with which it is contrasted. These last precepts of Augustine find their best and most numerous exemplifications in the Scripture oratory. They may not be duly appreciated by the student who has been taught to admire dictional uniformity and smoothness, but they are justified by the long and successful ministry of Augustine, and must be very frequently brought to mind by all who are called to preach to the common people.[2]

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[1] Medulla Theologica, L. i., chap. xxxv., sec. 65.

[2] Aristotle's Rhet., L. iii., c. vii.

IV. We give the last place to that characteristic of holy Scriptures which Augustine puts in the first place, and discusses at great length, namely, the *wisdom* which is every where associated with the inspired eloquence. Cicero[1] had said that wisdom without eloquence profited states very little; but that eloquence without wisdom profited them not at all, and generally proved highly injurious. "If," says Augustine, "those who taught the precepts of eloquence, even though ignorant of the true wisdom 'which cometh down from the Father of Lights,' were compelled to make such a confession, are not we under far higher obligations to acknowledge the same thing, who are the sons and daughters of this heavenly wisdom?" What attracted Augustine most and filled him with astonishment, was the fact that the sacred orators have so used the classic eloquence in connection with another kind of their own, that it is neither wanting in their productions, nor yet rendered prominent. The words by which their ideas are expressed seem not to be employed by the speaker, but, as it were, spontaneously furnished by the ideas themselves; as if you perceived wisdom coming forth from her habitation in the breast of the wise man, and eloquence, like an inseparable handmaid, following unsolicited in her train. Augustine finds examples of this eloquent wisdom in Amos vi. 1–6; Rom. v. 3–5; 2 Cor. xi. 16–30. Augustine regarded this wisdom as inseparable from just reasoning.

The words of inspired preachers, the precepts of Augustine, and universal experience, all make good the forecited observation of Lord Bacon, that "Discretion of speech is more than eloquence."

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[1] De Inventione, L. i., cap. i.

CHAPTER III.

THE THREE REQUISITES OF THE ORATORICAL STYLE.

Section I.—Of Clearness.

The properties necessary to a good oratorical style are three: perspicuity, force, and gracefulness. The requisite first mentioned, being strictly fundamental, is entitled to our earliest consideration.

This quality of style (termed by the Greeks *Enargeia*, by the Latins *Perspicuitas*) is thought by some to be enjoined in Hab. ii. 2: "Write the vision, and make it plain upon tables, that he may run that readeth it." The vision was to be couched in plain terms and be legibly written on tablets, in order that every passer might read and understand it, and run and publish it to all. A parallel passage is found in Dan. xii. 4, where Daniel is commanded to shut up and seal the prophetic roll until the time appointed for breaking the seal, when "many shall run to and fro" with the message it contains, "and knowledge shall increase." The lucidity of the Scripture style has by some been understood to be asserted in the words of Moses: "For this commandment . . . is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off," etc. (Deut. xxx. 11–14). But this passage, in so far as it does not refer to the righteousness of Jesus (Rom. x. 6), can only be employed to prove the perspicuity of the revelations made by Moses—revelations more plain and distinct than any other to be found in the sacred Scriptures. And for very good reasons. Moses was a law-receiver and law-giver, the planter of the Hebrew commonwealth, and the inspired teacher of the elementary lessons of the true religion. We need not wonder, therefore, that in perspicuity he even surpasses, if possible, the Great Teacher himself.

Others, again, have recommended plainness in preaching, by adducing the example of Paul, who declared that he used "great plainness of speech" (2 Cor. iii. 12). But the word *Parrhesia* here signifies, not *perspicuity*, but *frankness*, as opposed to all concealment or intended obscurity of speech, such as was used by the Jewish teachers of the apostle's time, whom, in reading and ex-

pounding the Scriptures, Paul allegorically represents by Moses wearing a veil. That the apostle did not always employ great clearness of speech is manifest from the declaration of Peter (2 Epistle iii. 16), that there are in his letters "some things hard to be understood." "Some things," observe, not many, and "hard," not impossible, to be understood; for everything, or nearly everything obscure in the epistles of Paul may be explained by comparing them with other passages which are hard to be misunderstood.

Another text has been quoted in favour of clearness—namely, 1 Cor. xiv. 9–19. But this passage was levelled against the practice of addressing congregations in an unknown tongue, and might have been appropriately used in dissuading the Anglican divines of the seventeenth century from the custom of quoting Latin, Greek, and Hebrew in the pulpit.

The duty, therefore, of compelling all our hearers to understand immediately all that we say in the pulpit is nowhere enjoined in the Scriptures. Indeed, our Divine Master uttered some things in public that were not comprehended by his most intelligent disciples until they were explained to them in private, and other things that they did not understand until after his crucifixion. Richard Baxter, no mean example for religious teachers and catechisers, purposely threw out some things in his sermons that were beyond the comprehension of his hearers, in order that they might learn to be dissatisfied with their existing stock of Christian knowledge. How often does the teacher give out terms to be defined or explained by his pupils at the next recitation? "Wherefore," says Chrysostom, in one of his homilies, "have I presented this difficulty and not appended its solution?" He replies that herein he proceeds like doves, which, as long as their young remain in the nest, feed them from their own bills; but as soon as they are fledged and leave the nest, the mother lets food fall upon the earth, and the little ones pick it up. The late Dean Alford[1] joined his voice to the popular cry for simplicity and plainness. "If," says he, "any rhetoric wants teaching those who are to lead others, it is the rhetoric of simplicity—the art of expressing earnest thoughts in plain words." It is just such bright but hemispherical truths as this, abounding as they do in modern disquisitions and treatises on preaching, that cast on the student's path a delusive light which is much more to be feared than total darkness.

One characteristic of Scripture ideas is their union of clearness and depth—a union which must distinguish all preaching that is

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1 Henry Alford's Essays and Addresses, p. 153.

truly Scriptural. "The style of a sermon," according to Antonio Vieyra,[1] "may, like the stars, be at once very clear and very lofty: while the peasant derives from the stars rules for farming and the mariner for sailing, the mathematician equally draws thence the principles that guide him in his astronomical calculations. The former, unable, it may be, either to read or write, can nevertheless apprehend the stars as far as is necessary for him; the latter, in spite of all his scientific knowledge, is very far from comprehending all the stellar universe. Thus of many Scripture ideas may we truly say that all men may apprehend, but few or none can comprehend them." But even then, be it observed, our apprehensions are more practical than precise, for Scripture definitions and illustrations are more striking and moving than they are scientifically accurate. What if you employ words and phrases with philosophical and theological exactness? If the people have never learned their meaning you are to them but a babbler.

Keeping these things before us, we shall easily find a passage leading out into a justifiable clearness. Were we fully inspired, and speaking directly from and for God as his messengers to men, the eternal and divine sides of the ideas communicated by us would necessarily be more or less obscure, and mortals could not complain if they were not able to understand those mysterious sides; but as we do in fact profess to be popular teachers of revealed religion, lucidity rather than depth may properly characterise our thoughts and our style. The ancient and better notion of the rhetorician was that of one who talked *ad populum*;[2] and this is the true notion of all except occasional and academical preachers. To say of a pastor's usual sermons to his own flock that they are profound is very great dispraise. Thus considered, many of the sermons of Thomas Chalmers, Vinet, William Archer Butler, and Horace Bushnell are anything but models. Deep originality of thought and philosophical insight are, when pervasive, very detrimental to sermons professedly intended for the common people. It is far otherwise with acuteness, reasoning, originality in respect of practical views, familiar doctrines newly illustrated and freshly put, the giving of a sharper point to some blunted arrow and a keener edge to some rusty old sword. These things matter much, for they contribute not a little to the right understanding of a subject.

And yet, keeping all this in view, we may with profit occasionally and collaterally touch upon the deep things of Biblical theology. "There are, indeed," says Arrowsmith, "some obscure pas-

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[1] Sermon on the Parable of the Sower. [2] Isocrates, Orat. Nicocles., iii.

sages in Scripture to exercise our understandings and prevent our loathing of over-much plainness and simplicity."[1] The preacher who walks with sandaled feet through all the mysteries of Scripture, neither exalts Christ nor humbles the sinner.

Perspicuity, therefore, is a relative quality. It depends not only on the conceptions of the preacher and his style, but also on the subject-matter of the sermon and the intelligence of the congregation to which it is addressed. What is adequately clear to a mature Christian may be somewhat obscure to a young convert, almost unintelligible to an anxious inquirer, and totally incomprehensible to a worldling. Nor should a sermon be called perspicuous or the reverse without first considering whether it was adapted to the average knowledge of the audience. Athanasius, discoursing before a council on the doctrine of the Trinity, could be as lucid relatively as Augustine preaching repentance to his congregation of tradesmen, labourers, and women in the little town of Hippo.[2] Luther, whose strength lay (to use his own phrase) "rather in the rhetorical way," and his skill in addressing plain, unlearned people, was too impatient of those who occasionally preached sermons to the clergy. He once reproved Bucer for floating in the air and making his sermon too high and learned. But to whom had Bucer been preaching? To an assembly of theologians from Suabia and Strasburg to consult with Luther on the article of Consubstantiation. And the sermon he preached was at the request of several of these learned ministers. Was not this a time proper for a *concio ad clerum?* It was very well for him to say to Bucer across the supper-table, "I do as a faithful mother does who gives to her crying baby her breast, and gives it milk to drink, by which it is better nourished than by giving it sugar and delicious cordials from an apothecary shop." Well and good, O Martin Luther, when you are preaching sermons *ad populum.* But do you not forget that this is the time, if there ever was one, when men of full age are hungry for and much need the strong meat which Bucer is able to carve for them? The question is not whether babes shall have milk or sugar, but whether parents shall not sometimes be fed with food convenient for them.

It ought also to be considered that what is very perplexing, if

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[1] Armilla Catechetica, p. 71. A. quotes in the same place these words of Augustine: "Pascimur apertis, exercemur obscuris, illic fames pellitur, hic fastidium."

[2] And yet it is generally true that the people do not prefer to hear from the pulpit *much* of that familiar language and style which they use in the field, the market, and the forecastle.

not quite unintelligible to the same congregation at one time, may afterwards be made distinct and luminous. The gradual revelations made by God the Father in the old economy, and by the Lord Jesus and the Divine Spirit in the new, are fraught with instruction. Erskine, in his Armata, observes that when the truth breaks in too suddenly on those who are unprepared to receive it, it confounds the understanding, just as the vision is overpowered by a sudden burst of light. "You see," says Gregory Nazianzen,[1] "that the morning light shines upon us by slow degrees, and you observe, what is better, that the method of theology is neither to bring the whole truth to light at once, nor to conceal it to the end. The former course betrays a want of skill, the latter is impious; the one may injure those who are strangers to the doctrine, the other may estrange those who favour it."

This Christian father more than intimates that the doctrine of a progressive revelation of divine truth, and of the gradual teaching of Jesus, is liable to perversion. It has, indeed, been too frequently used in support and defence of the dangerous theory of "Reserve," or "Economy." Against such tendencies nothing but thorough sincerity on the part of the preacher can be a safeguard. An unaffected desire to teach all the principles of revealed religion, and to advance people in Christian knowledge as rapidly as possible, will prevent the preacher from keeping back from the people any part of his knowledge and belief that can be profitably communicated to them.[2] And this sincerity will guard him not only against "double doctrine" and sophistry,[3] but that species of affectation in style from which obscurities may and often do arise.

But a preacher may be obscure not only from lack of sincerity, but from sheer ignorance of popular modes of expression. When a man of learning would assure himself that he has a clear and distinct comprehension of an idea that is conveyed in figurative language, he expresses it in plain or abstract terms. Hence, he too hastily concludes that in explaining Scripture figures to an unreading audience he must adopt the same method, whereas he should rather endeavour to explain one figure by another of the same kind

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[1] Oration xxxvii., De Spirit. Sanct.; Bp. C. R. Sumner's Ministerial Character of Christ, c. v.; Abp. Trench's Hulsean Lectures for 1845, Lects. iii. and v.; Intro. of this work on the alleged obscurities of prophetic eloquence.

[2] Acts v. 20; xx. 20, 27; Rom. xv. 19; 2 Cor. ii. 17; iv. 2; 1 Thes. ii. 3, 5.

[3] Every Greek student will concur with Schott, that Æschines was less honestly and heartily engaged than Demosthenes in the case of Ctesiphon, and that consequently the reasoning of the former is far less natural, direct, and cogent than the reasoning of the latter.

with which they are already familiar. It is safe to assert that there is no figure used in the inspired volume that cannot find its own species in the practical rhetoric of the people who think and talk not in abstractions, but in similes, metaphors, and all other figures. It is only by a familiar intercourse with the people while they are engaged in their daily vocations that the preacher can treasure up, and learn to circulate, these current forms of their language.[1] The educated preacher, long accustomed to think and speak in technical and abstract forms of diction, is in consequence more liable to misunderstand the figures of Scripture than people of plain, unlettered sense, and he is continually in danger of supposing obscurities and contradictions in places where the people find none. For this reason *expositions* of those Gospel parables which chiefly demand modern *applications* are much less instructive to common, practical minds than many learned preachers seem to imagine. Let the preacher, then, endeavour to make parables of his own, for the purpose of making intelligible those theological and philosophical terms and dogmas which, when they come to be clearly understood by the people, will serve as so many breastworks behind which they may defend the truth against the assaults of error. And to this end let him form a taste that is not merely correct and refined, but popular and humane. Let him read not only the classic orators, but all those productions that inform him of the language of primitive and common life, particularly the Bible and Homer. From the study of these he will at least become familiar with figurative representations and learn to enter into their spirit. Briefly, he will be convinced that figures contribute to clearness of style, and that, so far from obscuring, they illustrate our ideas.

But in thus condescending to use popular forms of language, care is to be taken that we adopt the present, and not the ancient dialect of the common people. We are often admonished to use, as far as possible, words of Saxon origin. But we need a caution here; for by employing those Saxon words and phrases which are most intelligible to the humblest class, we run the hazard of not being understood by another class, who, from the fear their mothers felt of being thought vulgar, were never taught by them to speak plain English. Most congregations are better acquainted with Norman-English than with Saxon-English. Nor will the Christian teacher

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1 Did the Almighty confound the tongues at the tower of Babel by separating those who wrought at the summit from those who wrought on the earth, so that in no long time those above came to speak an abstract, and those below a concrete dialect? Let that rationalist Max Müller solve this problem.

murmur at this when he remembers how difficult a task he found it to explain the articles of his faith in Saxon-English.

Terms of Greek or Latin or French derivation often, particularly in explanatory parts of a discourse, secure clearness by means of precision. Some words of this description present each a different aspect of the same general idea, and while often employed as synonymous, they convey specific shades of meaning which good writers and speakers will always perceive, even when they do not preserve. The assertions: "It will not fail to produce most beneficial effects;" "It cannot but yield a very good harvest," may be made by two different preachers with the intention of expressing the same idea, and yet the former is the more precise and unequivocal. Perspicuity may often demand the sacrifice of elegance; but it should, on the other hand, be remembered that not unfrequently the Norman-English is more perspicuous than the Saxon-English. Opinions the reverse of this are generally advanced, but this remains true nevertheless.

Some, on the other hand, appear to think that if they employ the Saxon-English (which, in the received version outweighs the Norman-English) they will secure lucidity at the expense of dignity. This is a very natural mistake, since all our juvenile and familiar talk is in this part of our language. But it is noticeable that when we are preaching Biblically with the utmost perspicuity, our thoughts naturally demand now and then those technical terms, which being derived, as most of them are, from the Greek, Latin, and Norman, are often, though not always, essential to a dignified style. We may say of the style of the Bible what Mr. Matthew Arnold says of that of Homer, that it is marked not only by plainness and directness, but by nobleness; and the same critic justly remarks that our English version is the grand mine of diction for the translator of Homer, and that it may afford him also invaluable lessons of style.

In adapting the style to the comprehension of all, we likewise do well to remember the advice of the rhetoricians, viz., to repeat the same ideas and thoughts in other words, phrases, and sentences; on the one hand, to expand plain terms into figures, to describe what cannot be clearly defined, and to amplify what is too concise; on the other, to compress a sentiment or argument which has already been expanded into a concluding maxim or figure or brief summary. The holy prophets furnish many excellent examples of iteration, reiteration, and regression; examples which are beyond the reach of rhetorical art, and which only find their solution in the principles of psychology. Chalmers and Melvill may be advan-

tageously read by those who naturally incline too much towards the dry and concise. When the former was once asked what was the secret of his rhetorical success, he replied: "Repetition, repetition, repetition." He was too diffuse, however, and not seldom deserved this criticism of Robert Hall: "All very excellent, but why not go on, sir, why not go on? It's all round the apple, all round the apple."

A few practical distinctions flow from the views here taken:

1. Though we have no direct Scripture injunction always exacting perspicuity of *matter*, yet the examples of the prophets of the Old Testament and the New, of Augustine[1] and his greatest disciple, Luther, not to mention the names of other popular preachers, commend all possible perspicuity of *style* in addressing the common people.

2. In the didactic or pedagogical parts of a sermon, perspicuity should, as far as possible, characterise the method and style; and that not only in the exposition of the text and the explication of the theme, but also in the "Use of Information," and in that part of the "Use of Exhortation" (called *modi* or *officicia*), which shows *how* a duty is to be done or the virtue exercised. But in practical didactics, what is perspicuous to one class of hearers is necessarily obscure to a class less advanced; and what is obscure or incomprehensible to one class at one time may be made plain by subsequent study and instruction. The repeated experiences of Paul warn us not to expect that young converts will rapidly grow beyond the stature and the necessities of spiritual childhood. Milk, and not strong meat, must furnish the chief nutriment of the young and the old, besides not a few in middle life (1 Cor. iii. 1, 2; Heb. v. 12–14). But in no case is it lawful to adulterate the milk. "The milk of the Word" must ever be "sincere" (1 Pet. ii. 2).

Here the preacher should beware of aiming to be eloquent, but should rather heed the important distinction Horace makes (Ad Pisones, l. 143):

> "Non fumum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem
> Cogitat."[2]

3. The subject-matter of many a timely and valuable sermon must be mysterious, and ought, therefore, to be commended more to our unquestioning faith than to our mere intellects. To be per-

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[1] De Doct. Christ., L. iv., c. x.

[2] Trans.: "He meditates not to bring smoke out of lightning, but daylight out of smoke."

fectly clear on some Gospel themes is to be perfectly superficial. "On the top of a hill," says Vinet, "the horizon appears distinct to to us, because it is narrow and not far off; on the top of a mountain we take in a horizon whose limits may be obscure, but then the region we survey is immense." Great clearness is often very unfriendly to the sublime and to terror.

4. In the hortative portions of a sermon, plainness as to matter, method, and style is not always indispensable. Here reasons and motives must very often be drawn from subjects the most mysterious—subjects not only perceived but felt to be true, and yet in their very nature incomprehensible to mortals. Here, then, heat must accompany the light. The sermons of Paley and Whately are models of lucidness, but they are almost destitute of warmth. "Our language," says Quintilian,[1] "ought to convey our meaning so clearly that the meaning shall fall on the hearers' minds as the sunlight falls on our eyes." But the sunshine of winter is cold and barren, although its radiance is brightened by the transparency of the air and the reflections of the ice and snow. The summer's sun has less brilliance indeed, but far more heat—a heat that causes blue vapours to veil the distant hills and silver mists to wreath the green mountain's brow, that gathers storm-clouds which darken the earth and sky and discharge such volleys of lightning as render that darkness all the more visible and appalling.

Section II.—Of Force.

The second requisite of a good oratorical style is Force. This quality has also been variously termed energy, vivacity, and strength. We here use the word in a sense that comprehends the Greek terms *energeia*, *deinotes*, *hypotyposis*, and the Latin terms *evidentia* and *vis*.

The inspired preachers afford us many and various examples of this property of style. Their figures contribute much to this quality in them. We say much, not wholly, as some rhetoricians appear to think, who treat of figures under this head exclusively. The truth is, figures promote not only energy but also perspicuity and gracefulness; for, as Augustine[2] says, "the figurative expres-

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1 Inst. Orat., Lib. vii., c. ii. Good examples of a warm clearness are the sermons of Luther, of Latimer, of Bunyan, of Henry Smith, "the silver-tongued preacher," and of Spurgeon.

2 De Doct. Christ., L. ii., c. vi.

sions of Scripture affect us more *sweetly* and *agreeably* than if the same sentiments were uttered in plain terms."

Among the figures of Scripture which must be characterised as energetic, is *evidentia* or *hypotyposis*, particularly as it is employed by the Hebrew prophets. Indeed, the genius of the Hebrew language is very favourable to *evidentia*. "The Hebrews," as Herder[1] says, "like children, aim to say everything at once, and to express by a single sound the person, number, tense, action, and still more. How vastly must this contribute to the sudden and simultaneous exhibition of an entire picture!" This language proves that copiousness of vocabulary is not necessary to force. "Even the poverty of the language of the Hebrews contributes to the energy of their thoughts, as the mountain torrent, far from being impeded by the rocks which would confine it, only rushes more rapidly along its narrow channel. The Hebrew writings resemble the first characters that the hand of man traced, chiselled with a pen of iron, and legible to a distance on the sides of the mountains on which they were engraved."[2] The same *evidentia* reappears in the Hellenistic oratory of the New Testament, where the imagery is still Hebrew, though it may sometimes be seen in the new light of the Greek logic. "The difference," says Douglas, "between the genius of the East and the West disappears in the Scriptures, and both are there united together. The strong and the masculine sense of the Europeans is clothed in the fervid imagery of the Orientals."

To the figures elsewhere mentioned as helpful to force we may here add historic examples, analogies, and allusions.[3] When the preacher draws these from sacred history and the Gospel parables, and uses them skilfully, he will find them very forcible to all who read and study the Scriptures. But for the sake of those who do

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1 Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, Dialogue i.

2 James Douglas of Cavers, The Truths of Religion, Pt. ii., c. xii.

3 Happy instances of these may be found in Gregory Nazianzen, *Opp.*, tome i., p. 620; in Massillon's ser. on the Delay of Conversion; Saurin's ser. on Simeon; Thomas Watson's Sermons; Benson's XIVth Hulsean Lecture, and Dr. Payson's ser., Joy in Heaven over Repenting Sinners. These things not only conduce to force, but also to sweetness—to that *glycytes* which Hermogenes found in allusions to classic myths. A union of asyndeton and repetition sometimes contributes much to energy. D. Halicarnassus (De Comp. Verb., sec. 5–9) gives from Æschines this example: "Your argument is against yourself; it is against the laws; it is against the commonwealth." If this sentence, which consists of three members, were made to run thus: "Your argument is against yourself and the laws and the commonwealth," its energy would be destroyed.

not habitually read the Bible, he ought frequently to bring them either from the great facts and well-known narratives of Scripture or from secular events and objects with which they are well acquainted.

Next to figures, familiar language conduces most to energy of style. The Saxon elements of our tongue are not always friendly to perspicuity, since they sometimes put off the people with the mere semblance of clearness; but they never fail to produce vivacity and energy. "It has generally happened that the most effective public speakers, whether secular or sacred, have by a fastidious class been accused of *vulgarisms*. So with Cicero, Burke, and Chatham; so with Patrick Henry and Daniel Webster; and to turn to eminent preachers, so with Luther, Latimer, and Whitefield. The reason was that, intent on the greatest good to the greatest number, they used what Dr. Johnson, after Daniel Burgess, called "market language." Dr. William Bates, an accomplished and courtly Nonconformist minister in the seventeenth century, once complained in the presence of his faithful and unpolished friend, Daniel Burgess, that he found very little success in his work as a minister; when his aged brother smartly replied, "Thank your velvet mouth for that—too fine to speak market language." Whitefield, very happily for thousands, had no squeamishness of this sort.[1] Indeed, it has been abundantly proved that our Divine Master and his apostles employed the market language of the Greeks, and that this very circumstance and its benevolent purpose furnish their best defence against the classical purists of all subsequent ages.[2]

And yet some carry this notion so far that they imagine that in speech the more vulgar they are the more energetic they must be. It is undeniable that such corruptions of language as are prompted by imitation (as in *blarst* for *blast*, when there is an explosion of the word itself) are friendly to forcibleness; but in cases not a few words and phrases hard to pronounce and unpleasant to the ear are, for these very reasons, comparatively feeble. "Nor is it true," says Dr. Ward,[3] "that rough and harsh language is more strong and nervous than when the composition is smooth and harmonious. A stream which runs among stones and rocks makes more noise, from the opposition it meets with in its course; but that which has not these impediments flows with greater force and strength."

The sources of oratorical force in preaching must be sought,

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[1] Dr. Belcher's Life of Whitefield, pp. 306, 307.

[2] Dr. Leland's Reply to Bp. Warburton. [3] System of Oratory, vol. i., p. 337.

First, in the Divine Spirit. We have already made some remarks on this subject in treating of power, or *dynamis*,[1] under the head of Inspiration. The term *energeia* is repeatedly used by Paul to describe the operation of the Holy Ghost in rendering his preaching effectual (Eph. i. 19; iii. 7; Col. i. 29). The most energetic preacher England has ever known was Richard Baxter. That he was much indebted for his force of thought, style, and delivery to the Divine Spirit, who will venture to deny? If we may gather anything from his devotional habits and his counsels to ministers, we must conclude, with Dr. Bates, that it was because "he was anointed by the Holy Spirit and breathed celestial fire that he was able to inspire heat and life into dead sinners and to call them forth from their dark and frozen tombs."

Next to the assistance of the Divine Spirit as a source of oratorical energy, and inseparable from it, we must rank a doctrinal, experimental, and practical knowledge of holy Scripture.

Meditation is another source of oratorical force. There is one sufficient proof that this mental exercise promotes energy of style. Demosthenes, Luther, Massillon, Vieyra, and Baxter were as distinguished for this quality as they were constant in their love of retired meditation.

But let it never escape us that neither the critical, doctrinal, experimental, and practical knowledge of divine revelation, nor meditation, however deep or well directed, nor any other means that either Scripture or reason recommends, can avail to make us in the best sense energetic preachers unless the Divine Spirit speak to our hearts with his tongue of fire, and effuse his refreshing breath over our audience.

Now, if a true homiletical energy springs from the Divine Spirit, it must be something very different from the *energeia* or *vis* of the great orators of Greek and Roman antiquity. The old pagan orator aimed to carry a point of present interest, and to carry it by all possible means, whether fair or foul. He did not scruple to stir up the most malevolent passions. To gain some special and immediate object, he thought it lawful to appeal to motives the most base, and so to undermine the moral principles of communities and nations, and secure a present and limited good by sowing the seeds of ultimate and universal evil. The oratorical energy of the ancients was not restrained by any moral laws. It was the joint offspring of all the good and evil passions of the speaker, and was at liberty to inflame to the utmost the corresponding passions of the

[1] See also Phil. iv. 13; 1 Tim. i. 12; 2 Tim. iv. 17.

hearer.[1] It was, in consequence, intense, exciting, and impelling beyond all modern secular oratory, for the simple reason that the most unprincipled speaker is now held in check by some moral considerations, either in himself or his auditors. He finds it expedient to recognise a higher standard of goodness than was known even to the philosopher of Stagira. And on account of the superior general intelligence of his audience he perceives the necessity and advantage of more strongly impressing their reason by cool and sound argumentation than the classical orator was accustomed to do.

But how much wider the interval between the old classic and the modern Christian force. The preacher seeks the ultimate more than he does the immediate welfare of his hearers. Drawing his subject-matter from the pure oracles of God, and speaking with divine assistance, he endeavours always and only to move the better passions of his auditors. As his object is the regeneration of some and the edification and sanctification of others, he knows that he can safely employ only such means as his conscience approves and the Divine Spirit will make effectual. He knows, likewise, that if envy, pride, hatred, or any other malevolent passion were to find utterance, it would call forth an instant echo from the hearts of his auditors, and he would thus be frustrating the main design of his ministry.[2] He is anxious, therefore, not to speak what his own heart dictates, as the Eurymachus of Homer did (Odys., B. xviii., l. 351), but to speak in harmony with the revealed Gospel of Jesus, and from such feelings, and such only, as are begotten and nurtured by the Holy Ghost. Besides, he is not a mere orator; he is an instructor also. He is, or ought to be, much occupied in teaching his hearers the great lessons which his Divine Master has imparted to him. But in teaching, lucidity is more serviceable than force, which, unless it be kept in subordination to clearness, and be its handmaid, will be a hindrance both to teacher and learner in the school of Christ.

We are not, therefore, to test homiletical energy by an appeal to classical standards. As the spirit, purpose, and subject-matter of the Christian sermon is very different from those of the pagan oration of antiquity, so the force which ought to characterise the former is very different in kind from that which distinguishes the latter. In the sermon we find the energy to be that which proceeds from

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[1] Plato, in his Gorgias, accuses contemporary orators of flattery; cf. Demosthenes in his oration on the Chersonese and 3d Olynthiac. Euripides, Cicero, and Quintilian attribute the fall of Athens to the abuse of the gift of eloquence.

[2] Cf. what is said concerning Reserved Force in sec. "Of the Feelings."

the piety, the discretion, the knowledge of the preacher—from divine truth in opposition to all religious error; from divine knowledge as against ignorance and superstition; from the law of God commending itself to universal reason; from the Gospel of Christ appealing to conscience, to faith, to hope, to love, to patience, and all other moral faculties which the Divine Spirit either begets or raises from the dead; from the lessons of Scripture history and biography; from the example and testimony of Christian martyrs and cross-bearers; from the struggles and triumphs of the religion of Jesus through so many centuries and in so many near and remote parts of the world; above all, from the Divine Spirit graciously present in preacher and hearer, teaching and persuading with a power that is absolute and matchless.

And as homiletical force is different from the old ethnic force in *kind*, so it is evident, from what has just now been said, it may be superior to it in *degree*. Yes, *it may be* superior to it in degree; but it is a lamentable truth that such is the depravity of the human heart that it grieves and quenches the Spirit both in the preacher and the hearer, so that he is not uniform either in the mode or the degree of his operations; whereas the secular orator who appeals to the baser passions of the crowd may safely calculate on the permanency of their residence, the regularity of their exercise, and the certainty of their response to his earnest appeals. When, however, the conditions which the Spirit exacts are performed, the preacher may speak with an energy that is as potent in degree as it is elevated in kind.

The classical student who is called to the ministry should never disregard these important distinctions. He needs to be continually warned against the danger of admiring and imbibing the force of the old classical orators, and particularly that of Demosthenes, whose "vim" is almost idolised by students, who are apt to blink the fact that in debate a cogency and pungency are allowable which could in no case be safely admitted into preaching without being first watered down. And this warning is the more necessary because of the growing tendency of scholars to search out and magnify the many moral qualities which his orations exhibit. Theremin, in his little work entitled "Eloquence a Virtue," from the frequency and the admiration with which he cites Demosthenes, would appear to have set too high an estimate both on the virtues and the eloquence of the pagan orator as compared with Jesus and the prophets and the apostles. Dr. F. Köster,[1] another German scholar

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. xi., p. 527.

and divine, has even attempted to prove that the language of Paul was modelled after that of Demosthenes, while Theremin has written an essay in which he boldly traces parallels between the eloquence of this Greek orator and that of the Christian preacher Massillon. Reinhard, in his "Confessions," and Robert Hall, as reported by his biographers, acknowledge in their ripest years the benefit they had derived from the study of Demosthenes. These and other such commendations from preachers of marked ability, and some of them of deserved celebrity, are apt to blind the student to the seductive faults of this greatest of Gentile orators. And these faults are never so seductive as upon occasions of just indignation, of indignation against high-handed error and wrong on the part of those who profess themselves Christians. Then, however, is Christian forbearance more than ever demanded. When the feudal knight had to keep the lists against a friend, he sometimes blunted the edge and point of his sword.

Among the things that enfeeble public addresses, long and numerous quotations must be mentioned. But still the effect of such materials ever depends on their timeliness, and particularly on the manner in which they are introduced. Dr. Mason adds exceedingly to the energy of his sermon, "The Messiah's Throne," by putting his proof-texts in the form of questions; and Segneri, by his invocations, apostrophes, and other figures, greatly augments the weight of his authorities. He calls on Salvian to come from Marseilles to decide the case between him and his hearer; again he tells the deluded that in order to maintain their ground as to repentance they will have to bring over to their side Jerome, Augustine, and others. In another place, after quoting St. Gregory, St. Bernard, etc., he says: "But why need we go a-begging after other authorities when we possess the Scriptures themselves, painting to us so vividly," etc. To those who refused to give to the poor on the plea that they had not now half the income that was necessary to maintain them decently, he replied: "If you take the usages of a dissolute world as your rule of life, then Christ must come down from the mount where he first opened his mouth, and, breaking off his sermon, desist from those sublime teachings in which he forbade anxiety about food and raiment."

Among the English preachers whose style is energetic, Baxter stands among the foremost. Calamy says of Baxter that though he did not hear him till he was advanced in years, yet "he delivered himself with great vivacity and freedom, and his thoughts had a peculiar edge." Augustine, following Cicero, would have the preacher speak *acute* (with sharpness), yet not *obtuse* (with blunt-

ness); and Baxter met this requirement. Doddridge has, with his usual discrimination, styled him the Demosthenes of the English pulpit; and yet he does not appear to have deliberatively chosen him as his model, or to have been familiar with his orations. He spoke characteristically, and thus unawares followed the great Greek orator. But Baxter is not a model in all things. One fault of his sermons is that which Reinhard confesses that he found in his own—a too frequent use of the interrogative. In common with the great preachers of his age, he indulged in divisions many and minute. And it has been said by one who has not underrated his various excellences as a preacher and writer, that he might have learned to advantage from his contemporary, Bunyan, to insist more than he did on the doctrines of grace as the only ground of the sinner's hope, and the grand motive of a Christian practice. Nevertheless, Baxter's energy of style deserves to be studied, because it is remarkably mingled with benevolence. With what tenderness and compassion does he utter the denunciations of the divine wrath, depict the awful scenes of the general judgment, and describe the eternal torments of the wicked.[1] Whitefield also combined energy and sweetness.

Next to the sermons of Baxter and Whitefield, those of Antonio Vieyra and Paolo Segneri are worthy of commendation for a similar union of strength and pathos.[2]

If we desire to keep clear of a false energy, "we should," to borrow the words of Leighton, "most carefully avoid the bestowing too great zeal upon small things, and too much confidence of opinion upon doubtful things," and, we must now add, too many popular harangues upon one-sided things. "But can there be a one-sided thing?" Read many a popular sermon of the day and determine for yourself.

(A.)

EXAMPLES FROM BAXTER'S SERMONS.

"Alas! sirs, it is a most pitiful sight too see men frisk about in jollity with the marks of death and wrath upon them; and to see men so frantically merry in their sin as to forget the misery that will so quickly mar their mirth. . . Poor sinner! the Lord who sent me on this message to thee knows that I envy thee not thy mirth and pleasure, but only would have it better for thee, or have thee set thy mind on better."—*Right Rejoicing*, Works, vol. xvii., p. 170.

"I exceedingly pity the godly in their unwarrantable, melancholy griefs, and much more an ungodly man that is bleeding under his wounds of conscience. But a man that is merry in the depth of misery is more to be pited than he. Methinks it is one of the most pitiful sights in all the world to see a man ruffle

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[1] See Appendix (A) of this section. [2] Appendix (B).

it out in bravery, and spend his precious time in pleasures, and melt into sensual, foolish mirth, that is a stranger to God, and within a step of endless wo!" —*Ib.*, p. 174.

"Oh! what a pitiful sight it is to see a man under the wrath of God! And are these little sparks so intolerably hot? What then do you think are the everlasting flames? Beloved hearers, if God had not spoken this I durst not have spoken it; the desire of my soul is that you may never feel it, or else I should never have chosen so unpleasing a subject, but that I hope the foreknowing may help you to prevent it."—*The Absolute Sovereignty of Christ*, p. 402.

"Oh! that I did know what arguments would persuade you, and what words would work thy heart hereto. If I were sure it would prevail, I would come down from the pulpit and go from man to man upon my knees, with the request and advice in my text: 'Oh! kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and you perish.'" —*Ib.*, p. 406.

(See also Robert Walker's ser. on Isa. liii. 3, end of Pt. ii. Paolo Segneri did, it seems, venture actually to bow the knee before his hearers. See the 28th ser. of his *Quaresimale*, §14.)

(B.)

AN EXAMPLE FROM ONE OF VIEYRA'S SERMONS.

"The separation of the wicked from the righteous will take place among all classes and conditions of men. But the separation of those who are allied by the strongest bonds of blood and affection will be the most painful. Indeed, all other circumstances will be deeply affecting, but this will be heart-rending. Parents will then be separated from their children; on the one side will Abraham stand, on the other Ishmael; brothers will be separated from brothers; there will be Jacob, and yonder Esau; wives will be separated from husbands; Esther will be on this side, and Ahasuerus on the other; friends will be separated from friends; Jonathan will be here, and Saul there. Thus will these be separated to see each other never more!—those who loved each other in this life—those who had so many reasons for loving each other in the life to come. Never more! Oh! what a saddening word. If for those who love one another it is even now a great grief when they are, in travelling, compelled to part, yet with the hope of seeing one another again; if it already causes deep sorrow to separate in death, with the expectation of meeting each other again in another world, O what a grief it must be for those whom nature and affection have transformed into one being to be separated then and there, with the felt certainty of never seeing each other's faces again as long as God lives! Surely he must have a hard heart who does not desire to escape such a danger."—*The Resurrection of the Righteous and the Wicked*—the third sermon of the first Sunday of Advent.

(See also *Paolo Segneri*, *Quaresimale*, ser. 14th, §10, and ser. 5th, §10.)

Section III.—Gracefulness of Style.

The third and last general requisite of the oratorical style has generally been denominated "Elegance" or "Beauty." We cannot, however, perceive that either of these terms best designates this

oratorical quality, for in oratory, more than any other kind of composition, movement is expected and demanded. Now the idea of movement is not necessarily included in that of elegance or beauty. We therefore prefer the term Grace, which, while it does not exclude the idea of beauty or elegance, comprehends that of motion. By grace we understand that quality of an action which enables it to move along a line of beauty. This grace may be either an actual movement or some posture which either goes before or follows movement, and is, therefore, associated with it. Beauty and elegance may be contemplated in absolute repose, and may, at the same time, be separate and independent objects of thought. They can thus engross the attention to such a degree as to render the employment of reasons and motives unavailing. They may consequently serve merely for the gratification of taste and a supine contemplation. Gracefulness may, we allow, become in like manner a separate and all-engrossing object of attention and affectionate admiration; but it is less liable to become such an object than either beauty or elegance is; for, as it is the result of higher qualities and powers than itself, and a *mode* of the action of the living and intelligent agent, and as it does not necessarily occupy the attention and thoughts of the speaker *while speaking*, it being either perfectly natural to him, or having been so thoroughly mastered by art as to have become natural to him, it is for these reasons apt to keep itself in a subordinate place before the auditors, and is usually content to be considered by them as a modest attendant of the agent or a passing incident of his action. The moment grace ceases to be self-oblivious, it is grace no more. It is transformed into "attitudinising" and an affectation of ease. It is, nevertheless, nothing to its prejudice that it is generally known to be the result of long and well-directed training; for this is our best guarantee that the speaker does not, because he need not, allow it, at any time and in the most inconsiderable degree, to divert his attention from the matter and object of his discourse.

Subsection I.—Movement in its Relation to Grace of Style.

This word in its present signification is of French origin. But the idea it conveys is found somewhere in the writings of Cicero, who asks, "What is eloquence but a continuous motion of the mind?" Elsewhere[1] he says that the orator ought to arrange and compose his matter not only in order, but also with a certain mo-

1 De Orat., L. i., c. xxxi.

mentum (sed etiam momento quodam). Fenelon[1] is the first of the French writers who employs the word *mouvement* in a rhetorical sense. He says that the movements of the orator consist in words and in gestures. "What movement can there be in words? You shall see. Cicero[2] tells us that the very enemies of Gracchus could not help weeping when he delivered this passage: 'Whither shall such a miserable wretch as I betake myself? Whither shall I turn? To the capitol? But that swims with my brother's blood. Shall I go to my own house? Would I not there see my mother, miserable, wailing, and degraded?' These are movements. Were you to speak these words with calmness you would destroy all their force. Do you think so? Just try: 'I know not where to go in my misfortunes, nor whither to turn for refuge. The capitol is the place where my brother's blood was shed, and at home I shall see my unhappy mother weeping for grief.' This is the same thing that was said before; but what has become of its energy? Where are those abrupt words which nature so well employs when transported with grief?" Movement, then, according to Fenelon, is another name for vivacity or energy of style. But movement as we here employ the term may be defined that kind and degree of animation which most promptly express the speaker's thoughts and his progress from thought to thought. It is the first requisite of grace in the oratorical style. Without this, style may be beautiful or elegant, but can never be graceful, because the idea of grace is inseparable from that of motion, either preparing, or begun, or continued, or ended. Yet it differs from that "action" which Demosthenes is falsely reported[3] to have praised so highly, and which consisted in mere delivery or elocution.[4] It differs likewise from continuousness or flowingness of style in being more comprehensive; for the latter only represents the different thoughts as connected by easy transitions, but the former expresses, in addition to this, every variety of mental movement, whether progressive or regressive, digressive or interrupted; whether about to begin, or lost in repose. It includes, at the same time, the idea of the honest and adequate representation of these movements. "It is here," says Marmontel,[5] "that we perceive the force of Lucian's comparison when he desired that the style and the thought, like a horseman

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1 Dialogues sur L'Eloquence, Dialo. ii. 2 De Orat., L. iii. c. lvi.

3 Plutarch's Lives of the Ten Orators.

4 *Hypocrisis, actio, pronunciatio;* Cicero, De Orat., L. iii., c. lvi.; Brutus, De Clar. Orat., c. xxxviii.; Orat., c. xvii.; Quint., L. xi., c. iii.

5 Elements de Literature, vol. iii., pp. 303–315.

and his horse, might be of one will, and move together harmoniously." And, as the same author adds, this oratorical motion is free and various; the bold and skilful horseman, whose steed is well-trained and obedient to the rein and the spur, may sometimes venture to leap the highest fences and clear the widest ditches, but when the chase is over he will slacken his pace and be content to walk slowly along the well-beaten bridle-path. "The orator," says he, "ought to know how to distribute, to vary, and to govern his movements. The laws of *chiaroscuro* in painting, and of *forte-piano* in music are not without their applications to eloquence. In the fine arts, as in nature, the best effects are produced by contrasts. There we must reconcile oppositions and agreements, discords and accords, and so marry contraries that out of unity and diversity may spring one harmonious whole. But when the movements of style most truly answer to those of the soul, they are not in the least objects of study, premeditation, and attention. Herein eloquence differs from declamation; and if, says Marmontel, any one asks why, with the same movements that the true orator has, and with means the most effective to all human appearance, the mere rhetorician and declaimer makes no impression on his auditors, the reason is plain: non erat his locus[1]—they are not in their proper place."

Vinet, in his work of Homiletics,[2] discusses this subject at considerable length. He pronounces movement to be a royal beauty of style, and misapplying the suggestions of Marmontel, he enumerates and illustrates the figures which in his judgment contribute to this superior excellence of style. Among these figures he mentions gradation or modern climax, amplification, reticence, pretermission, irony, hyperbole, paradox, vision, interrogation, exclamation, apostrophe, prosopopœia, dialogismus, and deprecation, or prayer. He assigns the foremost place to repetition, and it is very remarkable that under this head he gives us an illustration drawn from the prophecy of Amos (iv. 6–12)—a thing very unusual for a writer too much imbued with the classical spirit, and yet evidently in need of a thorough knowledge of the systems of the classic rhetoricians. The radical error which pervades this chapter, as well as that which precedes it, on the subject of Colour of Style, is the classifying of figures under the head of the superior excellences rather than the elementary qualities of style. The book, nevertheless, contains

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1 Horace, Epist. ad Pisones, l. 19.

2 Homilétique ou Théorie de la Prédication, Pt. iii., chap. iii., p. 538—or Dr. Skinner's excellent translation.

very many valuable maxims and examples on the general subject of preaching. Nor is it to be denied that figures are helpful to motion of style. The fault of Vinet is in unwittingly conveying the idea to the novice that many of the figures are good for nothing else.

I. So far as mere motion of *style* is concerned, it primarily depends on the connectives. These are not only necessary to perspicuity and energy, but also to that quality of grace which it is now our business to discuss. And here we may briefly observe:

That motion of style is often promoted by employing the old English words compounded of adverbs and prepositions in the place of the relative pronoun preceded by a proposition, as *whereupon*, *thereto*, *therewith*, *thereby*, instead of *upon which*, *to which*, *with that*, *by which*. In opposition to Lord Shaftesbury, who was too fond of imitating the French idioms, Principal Campbell, who has treated these points fully and ably, offers four reasons against dispossessing these ancient words of the ground they still occupy:

First, they afford us a variety of words to express the same ideas. Again, they sometimes interrupt a long and disagreeable succession of monosyllables. In certain cases, moreover, they prevent obscurity, or at least inelegance, as when a relative occurs more than once in a sentence. Finally, they express more than the modern words sometimes do. The pronouns *this*, *that*, and *which* do not so naturally refer to a clause or sentence as to a word; nor do the two first refer so naturally to a plural as to a singular; whereas the compounds of *here*, *there*, and *where*, joined to the preposition, do with equal propriety refer to all these.

This quality of style is, we observe again, maintained by the proper use of conjunctions.[1] But to avoid the too frequent repetition of these we may sometimes expand them into synonyms, or equivalent phrases or sentences; *e. g.*, *Add to this*, *in like manner*, *on the contrary*, *to proceed*, *etc.*, instead of *also*.

The "splitting of particles," although sometimes necessary (as when the particles are emphatic), almost always impedes movement; *e. g.*, "Though virtue borrows no assistance *from*, yet it may often be accompanied *by* the advantages of fortune."

In the place of *likewise* or *moreover* Mr. Gresley[2] would say, occasionally, "There is yet another argument for your consideration;" "So much for this point, let us go on to the next." Instead of *however*, *notwithstanding*, he would say, "Let me not be misunderstood."

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[1] Campbell's Rhet., B. iii., chap. iv.

[2] Treatise on Preaching, entitled Ecclesiastes Anglicanus, Letter xix.

Take another view of the subject: "Though there is some weight in what has just been urged, there is this to be said in reply;" "In this part of our argument we must not forget." Variety may also be secured by transposition: *then*, *however*, *nevertheless*, and *therefore* may be thus transposed. It is now generally admitted that the conjunction *and* as well as *or* may gracefully connect not only words and clauses, but sentences as well.

Motion frequently depends also upon the discriminating use of the figures Asyndeton and Polysyndeton, the former being suitable for sentences briefly expressive of several thoughts that are profound and require meditation, the latter being appropriate in amplifications, exaggerations, and the utterance of passion, confidence, determination, and lively exultation. The former, consequently, is better adapted to slow motion, the latter to rapid. The repetition of the *and* in Jer. xxxi. 28, says Rollin, represents so many redoubled strokes of God's anger. Chrysostom excels in the use of Polysyndeton.

What we have said respecting rhetorical conjunctives applies, with slight modifications, to the adverbs *then*, *hitherto*, *formerly*, *here*, *thus far*, *first*, *secondly*, *finally*, *thus*, *accordingly*, *otherwise*. These, as Campbell says, in uniting the several parts of discourse, have all the effect of conjunctions.

The subject of connectives suggests that of transitions, a happy use of which is helpful to movement; but this more properly belongs to the next subsection

II. Movement is also promoted by avoiding an affectation of scientific accuracy and pedantic discrimination in the use of words. In the full career of discourse it is in some instances wise to unclasp language, lest it fit the ideas too closely, and so impede their free progress. One of Madam de Sévigné's critics has suspected that she sometimes employed vague and general expressions which resemble "those floating garments whose shape a skilful hand can change at pleasure." But we should, on the other hand, remember that words worn slipshod cause style to limp.

III. Rapidity of movement is promoted by the frequent use of verbs in place of nouns, and by the employment of adjectives that express motion. It would be useful for the student to take sentences of Dr. Johnson and quicken their pace by the method here suggested. The idea of motion may often, without any departure from truth, be substituted for the idea of repose; *e. g.*, Dr. Donne employs the familiar simile drawn from the eyes of a portrait thus: "Be therefore no stranger to this face; see him here that you may know him and he you there; and then as a picture looks upon him

who looks upon it, God upon whom thou keepest thine eye will keep his eye upon thee." Melvill, while employing the same figure for another purpose, renders it more effective by setting it in motion: "Such is your nature that, without constant vigilance, the direction may be gradually changed and yet appear to you the same, even as the eyes of a well-drawn portrait *follow you as you move*, and so might persuade you that you had not moved at all." An anonymous writer, in narrating our Saviour's walk to Galilee on the morning of his resurrection, imparts life and motion to the entire scene: "We see him as he goes forth from the cave-tomb, just as the sun casts his first beam on the sepulchre. He walks on as star after star loses itself in the flood of sunlight. As he walks on, at every tread of his sacred feet the world becomes more beautiful; flower after flower sends forth its incense; bird after bird chaunts its lay. How must the exhilarating morning breeze have whispered to his heart of that millennial world which he had already opened to his saints."

IV. Motion of style is interrupted by the frequent use of anecdotes, and particularly by expanding what ought to be brief narratives into graphic descriptions. Athanese Coquerel[1] is opposed to the employment of anecdotes by reason of the difficulty in making graceful transitions to and from them, and of calling back the attention of the audience to the thread of the discourse. In cases where the style is diffuse and declamatory, like that of this French preacher, it is indeed hazardous to undertake to piece into a sermon an anecdote or quotation. But it would be easy to bring forward examples where anecdotes have been woven into the texture of discourses without checking or in any way disturbing their movement. Bede, Damiani, Ethelred, Thomas à Kempis, Vieyra, Segneri, Latimer, Whitefield, and many other popular preachers, were wont to tell anecdotes in their sermons with good success. Only let them be told in the terse, lively, and pointed style which characterises our Lord's parables, and faulty indeed must be the preacher's general diction if they do not increase rather than diminish its vivacity and grace. But they must never, except in funeral sermons, be mere descriptions exhibiting side by side the different qualities of persons or the different characteristics of things. "In the first place," says Theremin,[2] "so far as respects this necessary progress of the oration, it is to be noticed that, though it admits of *narration*, it entirely excludes *description*. In *narration* the

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1 *Observations sur La Prédication*, pp. 103, 104.

2 Eloquence a Virtue (Dr. Shedd's translation), pp. 183–185.

different constituent parts of a subject follow one another, and the progress of the oration is not checked by it; but in *description*, on the contrary, these constituent parts stand beside each other, and form a quiet picture, whereby the swift, strong movement of the oration is stopped." He adds that when the orator is called upon, as is very often the case, to portray the character of a person, he should find an historical thread by means of which his representation may run off like a gradually developing history. We have elsewhere shown that in funeral sermons higher considerations sometimes overrule these conditions of movement.

V. The motion of an argumentative discourse is promoted by avoiding a long chain of abstract propositions, and employing the rhetorical rather than the logical form of demonstration. "Would the orator," says Theremin, "show the possibility of a thing, he does it by proposing a plan, by citing an example, showing that in similar circumstances the like has already been done. Would he prove the actuality of a fact, he cites testimony and establishes its validity by referring to authority universally recognised, and by appealing to what public opinion has on former occasions decided in similar cases. . . In this way Demosthenes constructs his formidable enthymematic trains of reasoning, which, so far from hindering the progress of the orator, are rather to be compared to the lightning in force and rapidity." Theremin would, in our opinion, have better represented the movement of this great orator's style in the more argumentative parts of his speeches if he had compared it to successive claps of thunder, wherein the sharp peal of each falling bolt takes up and repeats the rumbling echoes of the last. This has been happily illustrated by Milton in those familiar lines in which he is describing the political effects of Attic oratory on foreign nations:

> "Whose restless eloquence
> Wielded at will that fierce democraty,
> Shook the arsenal, and fulmin'd over Greece,
> To Macedon and Artaxerxes' throne."

But in reasoning the preacher should maintain that *ethos* which was exhibited by the prophets rather than that *pathos* which Demosthenes displayed. We here use these terms in the classical sense; the former signifying mild and gentle feeling, the latter importing agitated passion, as love and hatred, hope and fear, joy and sorrow. Now, in argumentative sermons a logic which is warmed but not melted by its progress is better than that which is so rapid as to take fire, and so to destroy itself. Passion is useful in many sermons, and in some quite indispensable; but into that part of the

discourse which is devoted to argumentation it ought very seldom to be admitted. If the preacher of the Gospel or the clerical student shares Theremin's too unlimited admiration for Demosthenes, he is in danger of learning to reason with the fist rather than with the open palm[1]—a habit nowise friendly to the cultivation of that kind of rhetorical movement which comports with the gentle and pacific spirit of the Christian teacher.

VI. We have already shown that a proper use of connectives contributes to motion of style. Among these the causals and illatives appear to deserve something more than a passing mention. For, while a sermon should, as far as possible, avoid the form of a cold, dry course of logical deductions, it should, on the other hand, be remembered that not only movement, but more important qualities and effects demand the timely recurrence of the words *and*, *for*, *because*, *if*, *then*, *therefore*, *consequently*, *so that*, and other marks of logical connection and dependence. "It has always appeared to me," says John Foster,[2] "that Mr. Hall's discourses would have had one more ingredient of excellence if the rich and strong production of his thought, while pressing, as it alway did, with an united impulse towards the point in view, had been drawn out in a sequence of more express and palpable dependence and concatenation." As examples of a good use of expressions of logical continuity, he recommends the sermons of Stillingfleet and of South. Of the latter he says, that "glaringly censurable as many of them are on very grave accounts, they are admirable for this linked succession, this passing to a further idea by *consequence* from the preceding, and not merely by that principle of relation between them, that they both tend to the same effect."

VII. Movement likewise demands the discursive rather than the intuitive acts of the mind. The difference between these two acts has been happily illustrated by De Quincey:[3] "Under Burke's treatment every truth *grows* in the very act of unfolding it. Take any sentence you please from Dr. Johnson and it will be found to contain a thought fully preconceived. Whereas in Burke, whatever may have been the preconception, it receives a new determination or inflexion at every clause of the sentence. Some collateral adjunct of the main proposition, some temperament or restraint, some oblique glance at its remote affinities will invariably be found to attend the progress of his sentences. . . Hence, while a writer

[1] Cicero, Orat., cap. xxxii.

[2] Robert Hall's Character as a Preacher, in Appendix of Dr. Gregory's Memoirs.

[3] Note vi. to his Essay on Rhetoric.

of Dr. Johnson's class seems only to look back upon his thoughts, Burke looks forward, and does, in fact, advance and change his own station concurrently with the advance of the sentences. This peculiarity is, no doubt, in some degree due to the habit of *extempore* speaking, but not to that only."[1] Dr. Porson, in conversation with Samuel Rogers, contrasted two other great men in respect of the same points: "Mr. Pitt," said he, "conceives his sentences before he utters them; Mr. Fox throws himself into the middle of his, and leaves it to Almighty God to get him out again." Mr. Fox's style is, however, more impulsive than Burke's; and in general it may be further observed, that a paragraph made up of discursive thoughts may felicitously close with an intuitive thought which slackens the pace of the paragraph a little while before it comes to a halt.

But important as movement is, we must here subjoin the caution that it cannot itself alone secure oratorical gracefulness. When assiduously cultivated apart from its ancillary qualities it may contribute only to a rude energy of style. "The fencer and the gladitor," says Cicero,[2] "discipline themselves not only to give and parry blows with dexterity, but to move with grace, *cum venustate*." Even thus the sacred orator has to add beauty, gentleness, naturalness, and other such excellences to movement before he is master of that gracefulness which constitutes the most powerful charm of eloquence, and which, if it does not spring from several virtues, is, at any rate, coetaneous with them.

Subsection II.—Of Transitions.

In the Odyssey, as Longinus[3] has observed, there are not so many instances of το αγχιστροφον, or quick transition, as we find in the Iliad. This is owing partly to the fact that the former sings of peace, and the latter of war, and partly to the fact that in the latter the matter being more homogeneous, is more closely connected.

It is in didactic sermons that transitions must be made with the most attention and care; for in them it is very important to exhibit truths in their relations, connections, and interdependence.

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1 The prophets abound in this quality which De Quincey finds in Burke. The great orator was educated by a Quaker, under whose eye "I have," said he, "read the Bible morning, noon, and night, and have ever since been the happier and better man for such reading."—*Dr. Croly's Memoirs of Burke.*

2 De Orat., L. iii., c. lii. 3 De Sublimitate, sec. 9, §13.

Thus Moses in Deuteronomy, Ezekiel in his prophecies, and our Lord in his Sermon on the Mount, do not pass so hurriedly from one subject to another as do Isaiah, Jeremiah, Hosea, and Amos. We ought not, however, to look for any formal transitions in the Hebrew eloquence; they would ill beseem the simplicity and energy of the language. In argumentative discourses there is likewise much need of transitions, although these usually make up in number what others supply in length.

The transitions of the inspired preachers are, in general, what would be termed rapid and somewhat abrupt. Not seldom the variations of thought and feeling are as extreme as they are sudden, lamenting or rejoicing, threatening or exhorting, now sinking to the level of dispassionate prose, now mounting to the height and repose of poetry, and at times even soaring into actual song[1] (Isa. i. 4–5; v. 1–2; Hos. ii. 14; vi. 1; xiii. 9; xiv. 1; Amos v. 12). Sometimes, as Professor Taylor Lewis[2] has discovered, the transition "is in the thought alone, the language maintaining its regularity of construction, and even flow of style." Of this he finds a striking example in Nahum i. 2–6. In cases like this the prophet, no doubt, indicated the transition from the storm to the calm by the modulation of his voice; in fact, all oratorical as well as lyrical compositions depend more or less on the modulation of singers and speakers for a proper rendering in respect of this point.

In some of the epistles, as in Hebrews and First and Second Corinthians, the transitions are more deliberate, and yet they partake in some measure of the impetuosity of the Hebrew transition. When, however, we take into consideration the great occasion the Hebrew and Hellenistic speakers had for deep and various feelings, and the nature of their warnings, encouragements, reproofs, and exhortations, we shall find that in respect of abruptness they compare favorably with similar utterances of the best ethnic orators. The Rabbinical maxim, "Lumen propheticum est lumen abruptum," is more applicable to the introductory signals and proofs of their inspirations (coming, as it did, upon these holy men, often against their near interests and those of their auditors, and herein distinguishing them from all false and mercenary prophets) than to any lack of methodical connection in the thoughts themselves, or any want of unity of design and impression in the discourses considered as entireties, and as they were delivered.

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[1] Ewald, Intro. to Die Propheten des Alten Bundes.

[2] Emotional Element in Hebrew Translation, Methodist Quarterly, vol. xliv., June, 1862.

It is deserving of notice that not a few of the transitions of the inspired speakers are made by some exclamation or other expression of deep feeling, after pauses that are not given. When Cicero also, in his fourth oration against Verres (§25), pauses to relate an anecdote about Lucius Piso, he begins by uttering that famous exclamation, "O tempora! O mores!" So Bossuet, in his funeral oration for the Duchess of Orleans, "La grandeur et la gloire!"

"In extemporaneous oratory," says John Quincy Adams,[1] "the most pleasing and impressive species of transition is made by seizing upon some occasional incident or circumstance furnished to the orator while he is speaking." The author gives us an example from the same passage in Cicero's oration to which we just now alluded. After relating an anecdote he goes on to say: "It is utterly impossible for me either to retain in my memory or to embrace in my speech all his (Verres') exploits. I wish only to touch briefly on the different kinds of deeds done by him, just as here the ring of Piso reminds me of what had otherwise entirely escaped my recollection. How many honourable men do you imagine there are from whose fingers this man has torn off their gold rings,"[2] etc. Some of the transitions of Bourdaloue and Massillon are of this description.

Transitions should be long or short according as the style is diffuse or laconic. La Bruyére has been blamed by Boileau for omitting all transitions, whereas he is deserving of praise for having instinctively followed the Proverbs of Solomon when writing on the same class of subjects, rather than Boileau and his friends, who frequently bestow more work on their stiles and bridges than they do on their paths and roads.

Again, when the discourse is long and made up of several divisions of a subject, it is advisable by formal transitions to notify the audience that we have completed one part and are about to commence another. It is in obedience to this rule that the most extended transitions are found in the long epistles of the New Testament.

The ancient rhetoricians have given us no valuable precepts on this subject, and it is clear from the example of Demosthenes that in this respect they indulged in as much freedom and variety as

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1 Lectures on Rhetoric, vol. ii., pp. 109, 110, Cambridge, 1810.

2 Another admired transition of his is in his second speech against Catiline. It is in the form of self-correction and self-reproach: "But why do I talk so long concerning one enemy," etc., and then goes on to describe the other conspirators.

was consistent with brevity. In judging, therefore, of the inspired transitions, we should be guided by ancient rather than modern precedents. The transitions of the former consisted chiefly of thoughts, never of words merely. "True transitions," says Cardinal Maury,[1] "excuse the preacher from making a new introduction to each of his subdivisions; they are such as the amplification of his ideas furnishes, and, as it were, places in proper method without the speaker's knowledge; such as cause the different parts to meet in natural connections, and not in accidental collisions; such, in short, as meditation produces after it has inspired all at once and in an orderly train several great thoughts, and not such as ink glues together by joining parts that are remotely related. Clear and distinct ideas always find for themselves easy and happy transitions. 'Stones that are well cut,' says Cicero, 'unite of themselves without the assistance of cement.'"

In making transitions, extremes are to be sedulously avoided. Nothing is more easy than to devote either too much or too little attention to the subject. He who can pass *quickly* from language highly excitatory or deeply pathetic is no better than a mere actor. Some sermons appear like a number of heavy-laden boats dragged one after another by very long hawsers, the latter being the principal objects of attention; others, like a railway train, plunging off the track, the cars going after but not following, disconnected yet running into each other. But then, as we have already remarked, different subjects require different transitions. The didactic and the argumentative admit of longer transitions than the proverbial. When Palmer[2] censured Reinhard for his formal transitions, he did not consider this. Though unity may do much, and a textual plan still more to diminish the number of connective words and sentences, yet the subject-matter of Reinhard's sermons demanded his mode of handling, and very seldom indeed did he compose so disconnectedly that his transitions were mere crevices covered with dry leaves.

It is not always an easy thing for all preachers to pass to their applications, especially where they are continuous. Keckerman and Segneri[3] have gone so far as to collect a variety of suitable phrases for this purpose. But some abruptness is here desirable, as it increases that "surprise power" which rivets the attention of

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1 *Essai sur L'Eloquence de La Chaire*, tome i., p. 352.

2 Homiletik, pp. 584–587 (first ed.).

3 Rhetorica Ecclesiastica, L. i., c. ix., Arte di Predicar, Trat. iii., cap. xx.

uncultivated hearers. Do not therefore threaten a conclusion before you reach it.[1]

Subsection III.—Beauty of Style.

This quality should be an element of the oratorical style, in so far as it contributes to gracefulness. We can indeed form a notion of grace as existing apart from beauty, if it be not, on the contrary, identified with positive deformity. But our idea of perfect grace must ever be associated with that of positive beauty. They have in common one leading excellence, that is to say, symmetry; beauty being the symmetry of form, and grace the symmetry of motion; in short, every graceful movement traces a line of beauty. Their union, therefore, is congenial and mutually advantageous. Rubens has inspired many of his figures with life, motion, and a certain indifferent kind of grace; but we all feel that he would have made them more graceful in their postures and movements if he had only made them more beautiful. Guido, on the other hand, has undoubtedly imparted to the Hours in his Aurora a degree of grace that would have been beyond the reach of his art if he had been compelled to make them less beautiful.

It is not always easy to distinguish between beauty of thought and beauty of style; and it will often be found that when this quality is attributed to a phrase, sentence, or paragraph, it is traceable to the thought or conception, or mental image, just as readily as a wing lying against the casement may be traced to the carrier-pigeon that rests panting and weary on the window-ledge below.

The same may be said of what are called "ornaments" of style. It will frequently be found that they have no elegance or beauty in themselves, or as detached from the idea they express. If they *have*, a narrower scrutiny will probably reveal the fact that the beauty or excellence is false or meretricious. As in architecture, those are true ornaments which are a part of and grow out of the solid material of the structure, so in oratory those are true "ornaments" which are wrought upon the corners, ends, and edges of the thoughts. "Figures," says Cicero,[2] "are the principal ornaments of an able speaker; I mean those which contribute not so much to paint and embellish our language as to give lustre to our sentiments." But still colour enhances beauty, and, according to the schoolmen, the provinces of rhetoric is to paint "rhetorica verba

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1 Palmer's Homiletik, p. 464. 2 Brutus, sec. 37.

colorat." And this colour in rhetoric, as in painting, not only beautifies, but distinguishes as well.

Nothing contributes more to colour of style than a right use of adjectives, and particularly epithets. Young writers having been often told that redundancy of these is unfriendly to energy of style, and told no more, are left in total ignorance of the fact that the quality now under consideration is not to be acquired without employing these aptly and abundantly. Take any beautiful composition, such, for example, as Gray's "Elegy" or Cowper's "Prophetic Anticipations," and draw your pencil over every adjective, what have you left? Pictures without colour, without light and shade, without life and activity. Repeat the same act upon any eloquent passage of Jeremy Taylor's or of Edmund Burke's, and you produce a similar effect. Concerning the proper management of adjectives no general maxim will suffice. We have to take into our survey the different kinds, some of which express mere limitations, and consequently have more the effect of drawing than of colouring. We have likewise to consider what sort and measure of them may be proper for particular subjects and styles of discourse. Adjectives of condition, and those of quality in their various degrees, are to the preacher of essential service. The adjectives in solemn subjects, like the colouring in the pictures of Ludovico Carracci, should be mild and shadowed; but in the joyful themes of the Gospel the adjectives may be more bright and full, like the colours in the Transfiguration of Raffaelle. Never, however, should the preacher venture to imitate the glare and florid gaudiness of such ornamental painters as Rubens and Veronese.

Such figures as are created by and appeal to imagination may be made to develop beauty of style, provided always that such figures are embodied in language which does not show the results of careful elaboration. Through a mistake of Quintilian[1] or some transcriber of his, Demosthenes is made to say what his example contradicts, and what neither his biographies nor his writings confirm, that the orator who would move his audience by his thoughts will not only write but sculpture them. Quintilian may have intended to quote Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who says of Isocrates and Plato that their works were not so much written as sculptured in marble and embossed in brass. Anyhow, he infers that Demosthenes, with such examples before him, would be likely to study oratorical euphony and melody with unmeasured patience, but he adds, by way of qualification, that it was by his early education,

[1] Inst. Orat., L. xii., c. ix., sec. 16; cf. Dionysius Hal., De Comp. Verb., 625.

joined to subsequent practice, he had acquired such a finished style that he needed not to give any attention to rules while writing and speaking; just as the harpist or the flute player, that, having learned from long practice the art of music and the skilful use of his fingers, can, without any careful attention or recollection, play any tune he hears. Theremin, therefore, and other modern writers, have erred in supposing that Demosthenes bestowed the same care on his rhetorical power that the poet is wont to devote to his diction. At any rate, they have no unquestionable authority for such statements. And if they had the great orator's very words to quote against us, we could still appeal to his example as against his precept. Now what was that example? Do we find any where in his orations anything that may with strictness be termed "word-painting?" Cicero[1] does, indeed, say that in a judicious management of figures of speech and decorations of sentences, Demosthenes was so far superior to all others as to be allowed, in the opinion of the best judges, to be the prince of orators. But Cicero adds that the figures in question "contribute not so much to paint and embellish our language as to give lustre to our sentiments." It must be allowed on all hands that the similes of Demosthenes are very simple and concise; nor do they betray more finish and amplification when they are repeated by him, as they sometimes are. The famous simile drawn from local weaknesses of the body, and thrice repeated, first in the Second Olynthiac, then in the oration on the Letter, or "Eleventh Philippic," and finally in the oration for the Crown, is, by Lord Brougham, thought to be, in each new instance, more carefully worded and more happily applied. But it is not easy for us to discover marks of elaboration which escaped the lynx-eyed Hermogenes and Dionysius. Even Brougham[2] admits that in the repetition of his bold reproach of the Athenians as newsmongers, the original passage is the more spirited, and, on the whole, the finer of the two, and that the application of it to the receipt of the letter in the speech on Philips' Letter, is somewhat flat, after its striking application in the "First Philippic," where he asks, "Can there be greater news than that a man of Macedonia should conquer the Athenians and give laws to Greece?" Nor is this all. In such few words are the great images stamped that Brougham finds it difficult to understand how an audience, hearing them for the first time fall like a stroke upon their minds, could have clearly apprehended

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1 Brutus, sec. 37.

2 Dissertation on the Eloquence of the Ancients, appended to his Speeches. Also his article on the Greek Orators, Edinburgh Review, 1820.

them, or, at least, tasted their beauty and felt their force. He can only account for this conciseness by supposing that it was the result of writing the speeches after their delivery, wherein, as he fancies, greater copiousness was required. But it can be shown that he composed his greatest speeches beforehand. Brougham thinks that the repetition not only of some figures, but of many entire sentences, without a single alteration, clearly proves that Demosthenes bestowed extreme pains upon his compositions. Such repetitions are, on the contrary, strong evidences of hasty preparation. Had the great orator composed his orations with that extreme care which many writers are fond of attributing to him, he would have made it his first study to guard against the repetition of his thoughts, or, at any rate, of his figures, and if driven to employ the same thought a second time, yet the same sentence the second time he would never have been guilty of inflicting on his audience, most assuredly never, if that sentence in its first form was remarkable for its beauty or its aptness.

But why do we stay to settle this question respecting the degree of beauty which the style of Demosthenes possesses. The reason is not far to seek. The inspired speakers, who must be our first authorities in all these matters, give us no specimens of elaborate word-painting, no similes, metaphors, or other figures which check the progress of out thoughts, or cause our attention either to loiter or to wander. Compare, as to this point, the similes of Homer with those of the prophets. For example:

> . . . "As when the whirlwinds of the west
> A storm encounter from the gloomy south,
> The waves roll multitudinous, and the foam,
> Upswept by wandering gusts, fills all the air,
> So Hector swept the Grecians."—*Iliad*, Book ii.

"As for Samaria, her king is cut off as the foam upon the water" (Hos. x. 7). The former of these similes befits the calm and measured pace of poetry; but the latter is more suitable for the lively and running motion of oratory. Some of the parables are certainly of considerable length, but it should be borne in mind that we detect in them no endeavour after a delicate and elaborate development of the accessories, no desire to dwell on probable incidents and circumstances; in short, no set purpose to give us such lines and colours, figures and groups, lights and shadows as shall conspire to make a finished picture. Nor should it escape us that these longer parables are almost always found in didactic discourses, or parts thereof, where the movement is, as it ought to be, slow, gentle, and tolerant of interruption.

Now, observe, we are not discussing here the subject of beauty and ornament of style in general, but inquiring what kind and degree of beauty and of ornamentation are proper and subservient to *oratorical* movement. And here the question arises, What sort or degree of ornamentation is best for objects in motion? After making due allowance for variety of material, form, and colour, which both nature and art take delight in, it appears to be a sound principle that an ornament should, if bright, be small and simple in proportion to the swiftness of the object which it adorns; for if it be large its rapid motion will cause it to fill too great a space in the field of vision, since a little piece of gold or pearl or diamond becomes a long line of light; or if, again, it be pale and lustreless, or consist of some delicately-wrought device, it will, by passing quickly, escape observation. When, therefore, an image is exhibited, it should, like those on ancient coin, be as large and bold as can possibly be crowded into the narrow surface of the ornament. A moving surface may sometimes with happy effect be studded or spangled with brilliant points, for these will become so many lines of beauty, more or less perfect according to the gracefulness of the movements that produce them.

This principle can, in a general way, be applied to Christian rhetoric. In the more animated and rapidly uttered parts of a discourse, similes and metaphors should be concise and striking. And if they are of this description, one simile or metaphor may be closely followed by another, to the great promotion of gracefulness. The quick successions of similes and metaphors which we notice in some parts of the prophetic sermons have a very happy effect, both because they are so many points of light and because the mind's eye is kept in agreeable motion by passing from one to the other. To this we may add, that great bulk is commonly imagined to be, and often really is, unfriendly to impetuosity. But one principal use of this quick succession of figures is to keep beauty in subserviency to gracefulness, and to keep both subordinate to thought; otherwise they are liable to become qualities too attractive and too engrossing. For if each of these figures is exceedingly beautiful, it is soon followed by another equally or more beautiful, so that the mind is forbidden to pause and contemplate the former in passive admiration, but is allured forward to the next, which in turn becomes an object of attention and interest chiefly because it reveals another side, or a different attitude of thought.

It appears, then, that in most kinds of public speaking beauty of composition has a very slender influence. In oratory a manful en-

ergy must be in the ascendant, and ever in armed readiness either to give battle to the enemy or outflank him. Beauty of style loves tranquillity; gracefulness of style demands exertion, adventure, victory, triumph. And yet the conditions of the two are not altogether incompatible. The devices on the banners of Edward the Conqueror were not devoid of all gracefulness, even while they were at rest after the battle of Hastings; and the figures on the tapestry of Queen Matilda did not lose all appearance of beauty while they waved before the zephyrs that danced through the palace in Normandy.

This one thing let us add: that as the grace of oratory is masculine, so it has frequently to give place to virtues that are of a more manly description. All parts should not be equally graceful, or else effeminacy will be the fatal result. This is the great danger which besets the study of metre, melody, cadence, and whatever else contributes to gracefulness. Blair suffers from it, while Logan, with less intellectual vigour, is really more graceful because more animated, more free, and more variable. Popular oratory, like music, must have its *bravuras*. Now, striking passages, the offspring of sudden inspirations, are wont to break through all rhetorical rules. But be not alarmed. Such passages are necessary to prove that your sermon is a thing of life, and not a mere work of art. Of Augustine it has been happily said that when he becomes impassioned he is apt to break out of the proper pace of rhetoric. And Mrs. Browning[1] has remarked a similar quality in Gregory Nazianzen. "Erasmus," says she, "compares him to Isocrates, but the unlikeness is more obvious; Gregory was not excellent at an artful blowing of the pipes. He spoke grandly, as the wind does in gusts; and, as in a mighty wind, which combines unequal noises, the creaking of trees and rude swinging of doors, as well as the sublime sovereign rush along the valleys, we gather the idea, from his eloquence, less of music than of power." The same may be said of Bossuet, who, just before preaching, was accustomed to read Isaiah and Nazianzen for the impulses they gave to his mind. But to go still further into the past: Demosthenes' speeches had more the effect of soaring and diving than appears to modern readers. Why? Because they were often interluded by the reading of decrees, letters, and other documents. These readings enabled the orator and his hearers to descend, and, after resting a while, to mount again to a higher circle than before—or if not higher, to rise more energetically in the face of a fiercer gale than ever.

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1 Essays on the Greek Christian Poets.

Subsection IV.—Gentleness of Style.

Our idea of the graceful in style is inseparable from that of gentleness. The lucid and the energetic may sometimes dispense with it, but gracefulness never.

This quality, which has hitherto failed to obtain a general recognition among rhetors and stylists, should be diligently cultivated by those preachers whose style naturally inclines towards extreme energy. Thus Baxter[1] said that he had aimed to speak in the keenest manner, and "to call a spade a spade;" "but," he adds, "I unfeignedly confess that it is faulty, because imprudent; for it is not good means that doth harm, and is not fitted to the end." Stier[2] detects in many of Luther's writings a heathenish spirit, and a style profanely classical as contradistinguished from that sacredly classical style which marks his translation of the Bible. But the great Reformer was not the first of those whose style borrowed its severity from the masters of pagan eloquence. The sermons of Gregory Nazianzen are certainly not wanting in examples of gentleness, and yet they betray here and there the virus of that ethnic oratory which, as he says, he travelled over land and sea to acquire.[3] Nor was Chrysostom himself always able to rise superior to that violence of speech which his study of the pagan eloquence must have encouraged.

Among the faults of Demosthenes is a want of candor and fairness. This is very conspicuous and very fascinating in his masterpiece, the oration for the Crown. In other orations of his, which most students are less likely to read with critical care, as for example that against the law of Leptines, and the Third Philippic, Demosthenes evinces more moderation in his passions and language. The oration for the Crown is intensely personal, and is full of that hatred which, as all history shows, can make natural men tremendously mighty in every form of evil speech and bloody work. It is more acrimonious than any other of his orations, and is, consequently, no fair sample of the habitual spirit and tone of his eloquence. Hermogenes, in his work (*Peri Ideon*) on the Forms of Style, in the chapter concerning gentleness (*Peri Epieikeia*, L. ii., c. vi.), has adduced all but one of his examples of this virtue from Demosthenes. And Reinhard must have read other orations besides that for the Crown before he formed his very intelligent opinions as to the peculiar nature of this great orator's power.

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1 Life by Orme, p. 784. 2 Keryktik, p. 24. 3 Opera, vol. i., p. 1321.

"The more I read this orator," writes he (Letter vi.), "the clearer it appeared to me that true eloquence is something entirely different from . . that storminess and vehemence, that sputtering and foaming, and that bombast and turgidity, at which the great mass of the people are astonished, because of their ignorance."

But still Augustine, who was familiar with Demosthenes, was not to be captivated except by the sweetness of the eloquent Ambrose, of Milan. In vain shall we search the orations of Demosthenes for that prevailing habit of fairness, moderation, and leniency, which become the preacher of the Gospel of Christ, who should never treat any subject in a narrow, one-sided manner. If he were a mere secular orator, he might be all the more forcible for being a man of one idea, but being a religious teacher he must, if he is worthy of the name and a safe guide of immortal souls, be a man of many ideas, and use himself to consider them broadly in their relations to one another, to hearken to all common and plausible objections, to answer with candor the arguments of popular adversaries, and, above all, to make distinctions among things that make an important practical difference, and to place such restrictions on the ardor of his applications as "uses" of caution and direction may demand. The Great Teacher sometimes limited his precepts, as Archbishop Newcomb[1] has observed. He commands us to give alms and to fast, but secretly.[2] And yet we are bound openly to proclaim the Gospel.[3] We are to pray, but without ostentation, or vain repetitions, or an unforgiving spirit.[4] But he does not enjoin forgiveness without repentance.[5] He condemns anger without a cause.[6] He teaches us that love to our enemies consists not in complacency, but in blessing them, doing them good and praying for them.[7] He tells us not *how* many are to be saved, but declares that many will be lost, because they seek but do not strive to enter his kingdom.[8] We are to expect and ever to be in readiness for, but not to fix the time of our Lord's sudden coming.[9] A multitude of other restrictions, either expressed or clearly implied, might be mentioned. It must not escape us, however, that these distinctions are not very frequent, nor at all philosophical, but merely practical as becomes the teacher and exhorter of the common people when he is treating subjects of general and supreme concern. Equally worthy of note is the candor, moderation, and cautious discrimina-

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[1] See his solid and Scriptural work, *Observations on our Lord as a Divine Instructor.*

[2] Matt. vi. 3, 4, 17, 18. [3] Matt. v. 13–16. [4] Ib. vi. 6, 7. [5] Luke xvii. 3, 4. [6] Matt. v. 22. [7] Matt. v. 44. [8] Luke xiii. 24. [9] Ib. xii. 35–48.

tion evinced by Paul and James, the two apostles who are remarkable for the energy of their style.

Still more direct is the contrast between the severity of Demosthenes and the tenderness of our Divine Instructor. Before he came into the world Isaiah predicted of him, "A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench." And after he had passed into the heavens, Paul declared with great emphasis, "We have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities." An indescribable benevolence speaks in every one of those beatitudes which introduce the Sermon on the Mount. His exhortation to contentment has often been quoted by rhetoricians as an admirable example of force and beauty, but unequalled as this exhortation is for these excellences, it is still more unapproachable for the tenderness that it expresses. In this respect even Jeremiah, as was to be expected, considering his mission, is far behind him. (Compare Jer. vii. 3–7.) Several of our Lord's parables evince a desire to make suppositions that are very lenient towards human depravity; *e. g.*, the Parable of the Virgins, of the Talents, and of the Marriage Feast. He also shows an irresistible compassion and mercy in the subject, plot, and issue of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, the Ungrateful Servant, the Lost Sheep, and the Prodigal Son. Had the Great Teacher here quoted the facts of history or of biography, his own disposition could not necessarily have been thereby exhibited; we might have said that he quoted the facts as he found them with all their imperfections upon them. Happily for us these parables originated in the mind and heart of our benign Ransomer, and consequently express his wonderful gentleness.

Near, if not next, to our Divine Lord stands Jeremiah as a man of benevolent sensibility. True, he witnessed and described scenes that must have melted a heart of stone, and yet he blends with his sorrows a leniency towards these objects and occasions which frequently reminds us of the Man of Sorrows and the acquaintance of grief. The much-suffering prophet became through grace (what he never could have become by the mere agency of suffering) a much-sympathising prophet.

But let us return to the example of Him of whom Jeremiah is believed by many to be a type. When James and John betrayed their temporal ambition, instead of being greatly displeased, as the ten were when they heard of their political aspirations, he framed his admonitory reply in a sweet, tender, and indulgent spirit: "Ye know not what ye ask. . . To sit on my right hand and on my left hand, is not mine to give; but it shall be given to them for whom it is pre-

pared." And when on another occasion his disciples desired him to tell them who was to be greatest in his kingdom, he did not reprove them with sharp words, but merely instructed them with the acted parable of calling a little child to him, taking it up in his arms, and placing it at his feet. At the paschal supper he passes silently by all the instances of their wavering and inconstancy, and praises their persevering devotedness to him: "Ye are they that have continued with me in my temptations." And it has been acutely remarked that, when Jesus at the same supper gave Judas a portion of food before the others, he showed his very great lenity and a long-suffering that should have led him to repentance. When, during the agony in Gethsemane, the disciples slept, he evinced the greatest forbearance, particularly towards Peter, who had a little while before professed the most heroic devotion to him. "Simon, sleepest thou? Couldst not thou watch one hour?" And towards all how gentle and considerate. He uttered an expostulation which was disarmed of its sting by the apology: "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak."[1] But in his valedictory discourse to his disciples his loving-kindness finds a language like that which a guardian angel might well whisper to its sorrowing charge. Holy living, joined with much suffering and deep study, are needed, in order to fathom the divineness of that last discourse and its concluding prayer. At some points the eloquence of Jesus is intellectually on a level with that of the old classic orators; even then it is morally and spiritually far above the bottom of the gulf which separates the sacred rhetoric from the profane; but this last discourse is at the very summit of the opposite mountain.

We ought not, however, to repeat here the mistake of many orators and preachers who, to heighten the more amiable perfections of Immanuel, put them in strong contrast with the severer attributes which such prophets as Moses, Elijah, Elisha, Jonah, Ezekiel, and John the Baptist were called more conspicuously to exercise.[2] The old dispensation, having been mainly one of temporal rewards and punishments, often made "its ministers a flame of fire," executing penal judgments upon the wicked. But we err if we suppose that it wanted provisions of mercy and abundant expressions

[1] For further instances of Christ's benevolence and tenderness, see Newscome's *Character of our Lord as a Teacher;* Sumner's *Ministerial Character of Christ;* Harris' *Great Teacher.* These works are all the more excellent from the fact that they are devoid of every kind of sentimentality.

[2] "The prudence of his conduct," said the First Napoleon, "compels our admiration by its union of force and greatness. Alike in speech and action, Jesus is enlightened, consistent, and calm."

of divine love. It was not, indeed, possible, from the very nature of the case, that the saints of the old economy should hear Immanuel speaking to them face to face, as he did to Moses on the secret top of Sinai, and as he did long afterwards to the first Christian disciples. And yet where, except in the sermons and conferences of Jesus, do we read such words of loving compassion and complacency as the Divine Spirit uttered through Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, and Zechariah.

Nor was the apostle Paul, with all the acknowledged energy of his character and his style, that stern denunciator which some eulogists of John would regard him. His letters are indeed weighty and powerful, and if we may judge by his orations as reported in the Acts, and the hortatory discourse to the Hebrews, equally weighty and powerful are his speeches. And yet with all this force there was blended a tenderness that was altogether worthy of the apostle of Christ. "We were," says he to the Thessalonians (1 Epist. ii. 7, 8), "gentle among you even as a nurse cherisheth her children; so being affectionately desirous of you, we were willing to have imparted unto you not the Gospel of God only, but also our own souls, because ye were dear unto us." How feelingly and indulgently does he write to the Corinthians in his second epistle to them. When he says, "Now I Paul beseech you by the meekness and gentleness of Christ," who can doubt that it was really the Messiah's meekness and gentleness,[1] begotten and fostered in Paul by the Divine Spirit, that were the springs of these tender admonitions. So when he counsels Timothy (2 Epist. ii. 24–26) on this subject, he would have the young preacher more addicted to instruction than to discussion. The phrase "apt to teach" implies, as Bengel remarks, "not only solidity and ease in teaching, but even especially patience and assiduity therein." The scope of the context demands this interpretation.

We have insisted more largely on this gentleness of the inspired preachers, because the theological students of our time are in utmost danger of going to the opposite, and of being fatally injured by an undue admiration of the "vim" of Demosthenes. If they must read his orations, let them also read those of Isocrates, so that they may imbibe some of his sweetness. We must likewise warn them against reading Bolingbroke's political writings, the "Junius" of Francis, the orations of Brougham, and the writings of Carlyle and of Ruskin. They are characterised by a vehe-

[1] In the original it is that ἐπιείκεια which Hermogenes finds in Demosthenes and the other great Greek orators. *Cf.* Phil. iv. 5.

mence that is for the most part uncandid, intolerant, sophistical, and malevolent. How different from these is the spirit of Bunyan, Leighton, Tholuck, Charles Bradley, and James Hamilton.[1] We have sometimes thought, however, that timid preachers, of a temper naturally good, but overvaluing peace, have carried their gentleness to an extreme that was at variance with their duty and the spiritual welfare of their hearers. In our anxiety to offer to the people fruit that is completely mellow we may, alas! bestow upon them much that is really rotten; and even if we unerringly select for them the mellow, we may nevertheless foget that this is certain in no long time to satiate. Here again, therefore, we are called vigilantly and promptly to steer between obscure and variable dangers. "Leaven and honey," observes some old commentator, "were both excluded under the law from offerings by fire—leaven for its excessive sourness, honey for its excessive sweetness." And yet Solomon commends sweetness of style (Prov. xvi. 21–24).

This style is especially adapted for consolation and encouragement. When we are addressing the mourner, the penitent, and the doubter, our speech should be such as that of the great Consoler was—a mild and refreshing breeze, that broke not the bruised reed of the parched marsh, and quenched not the smoking wick of the lamp whose oil was well nigh consumed.

Subsection V.—Arithmus in Hebrew Eloquence.

The *arithmus* of Greek rhetoric is often confounded with the *rhythmus* of Greek poetry. Indeed, we have yet to find the modern author who has determined with precision the meaning of the former term as applied to rhetoric, while it would not be difficult to find ten who, by confounding it with *rhythmus*, have lost themselves in a labyinth of speculation. The best of our authorities on Greek metres, by falling into the common road, have bewildered themselves and their readers. *Arithmus*, or number, has chiefly to do with the quantity or value of the times or feet which properly belong to the beginnings and endings of *prose* sentences. But of this more will be said hereafter.

The Hebrew number is more simple as to form: it consists

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1 To these names may be added that of James Hervey, "the Melancthon of the Second Reformation in England." Watts, Doddridge, and Jeremiah Seed may also be read with considerable profit by those who are naturally severe and ungentle. Mild and passive men, on the contrary, would be damaged by such reading.

chiefly in measuring the second half of a sentence by the first half thereof. And yet like the Greek, it is free from that artificiality which is proper to lyrical compositions; it is, therefore, founded on those natural laws in obedience to which the human mind gives free and various utterance, not only to its emotions and passions, but also to its cognitions, reasonings, and deepest convictions.

The subject of rhetorical *arithmus*, or number, is not held in as high esteem among us as it was among the classic rhetoricians, and even some of the Christian fathers. Augustine, in particular, although he does not write copiously on the art of preaching, finds space for his opinions about number. Having been before his conversion a teacher of rhetoric at Carthage, at Rome, and at Milan and after his conversion the most popular preacher of his age, his views of this subject could not fail to be intelligent and worthy of our consideration. He preferred the eloquence of Amos to that of any of the other prophets, and thus comments on chap. vi. 3, 4:[1] "From these six members we have obtained three periods of two members each; for he does not say (Augustine here quotes the "Itala" version) 'Ye that are set apart for the evil day; ye that draw near to the seat of iniquity; ye that lie upon beds of ivory; ye that play the wonton upon your couches; ye that eat the lambs out of the flock and the calves out of the midst of the stall.' Had he so said there would indeed have been this beauty in the sentence that each of its six members would have flowed from one pronoun repeated, and been closed with a single enunciation or impulse of the voice; but it is rendered more beautiful by connecting the members two and two, with one pronoun in each case, so as to obtain three sentences, the first of which relates to the captivity foretold: 'Ye that are set apart for the evil day and draw near to the seat of iniquity;' the second to lust, 'that lie upon beds of ivory, and play the wonton upon your couches;' the third to gluttony, 'that eat the lambs of the flock and calves out of the midst of the stall;' by which means the speaker is enabled either to close each part by itself, and thus make six members, or utter the first, third, and fifth with a suspended tone of voice, and by connecting the second with the first, the fourth with the third, and the sixth with the fifth, to make three elegant periods of two members each; in the first of which the great calamity is more prominent; in the second the impure couch, and in the third the prodigal table." Thus does he go on analysing and admiring the 5th and 6th verses. It may be fairly deduced from this passage that Augustine in some cases preferred the

[1] De Doctrina Christiana, Lib. iv., cap. vii.

Hebrew parallelism to the Latin period, as being not only better adapted for delivery, but also for expressing ideas with distinctness.

Nearer the close of this celebrated treatise (chap. xx.) he speaks more specifically of number in the Latin sense of the word. "Care must be taken," he observes, "when praising the grave sentences of the sacred Scriptures, lest that, in adding to their number, we do not take from their weight. The prophets, indeed, were not destitute of that musical skill in which this number, when carried to a high degree of perfection, has its origin, as the learned Jerome testifies in his preface to the Book of Job, where he speaks of these matters in the Hebrew original, though in the translation, in order to preserve verbal truth, he has neglected their number. To speak from my own feelings, however, with which I am best acquainted, I must say that, while I pay as much attention as I think humility will permit to number in the closing words of my sentences, I am far better pleased with finding it of very rare occurrence in the sacred writers." The metrical homilies of Ephræm Syrus are well known; they are the free and unlaboured productions of a man that was by nature a poet and by grace a preacher. The great French preacher Bossuet is greatly admired by Maury for the harmony of his periods. And the eloquent German preacher Reinhard says, in his "Confessions," that he aimed to give to his discourses "a certain fulness of expression, without inflation; an agreeable combination of words without artificial rhythm; and an easy flowing style, captivating alike to the ear and the heart. Bulwer, whose authority as a stylist is high, declares that every style has its own appropriate music, and that a style without music of some kind does not deserve the name; it is mere scribbling; whereto he subjoins the useful remark that "rhythm should be cultivated not only for the sake of embellishment, but also for the sake of perspicuity." And this is particularly true of the Hebrew parallelism. Universally the mind of man dichotomises; and the bimembral sentence clearly expresses this natural process. Next to this is the popular love and use of such members of sentences as are short and of equal length. This, too, is embraced in the parallelism, and renders it doubly serviceable to speaker and hearer. It would, consequently, be hard to find a popular preacher, or other public speaker, that is not fond of the ἰσόκωλον. Gorgias Leontius,[1] who was so great a favourite of the people in the earlier days of Athens, employed it largely and with distinguished success. At a very late period it was still found serviceable in regions that were more or less under the influence of

1 Diodorus Siculus, L. xii.

Orientalism. The orators of Asia Minor, as we are told, especially those of Lycia and Caria, were in the habit of giving a kind of rhythmical close to their sentences.

We have thus far taken some general views of number; let us now proceed to consider its twofold aspect, as it appears first in the Hebrew and then in the Hellenistic eloquence.

The difference between Hebrew poetry and Hebrew prose deserves our considerate attention, for it has very often escaped notice. It is too apt to be supposed that the addresses of the prophets are poetic. Ewald thinks there are clear indications that the Psalms were originally written verse-wise, while there is no trace of such a mode of writing in the prophetic books.[1] From this he concludes that the ancients always made a difference between their prophetical literature and poetry in the strict sense of the word. The prophet began his declarations prosaically with the announcement, "Thus saith the Lord." While he sometimes reaches the fulness and power of the poetic style, and, like Proverbs v. 1–7, soars up to lyric freedom and beauty, he seldom employs words and phrases which properly belong to poetry. And Ewald has observed, with great discrimination, that the prophets indulge more freely than the poets in the paronomasia, or play upon words, which is never so much in place as in that lively discourse of which the object is to strike and convince at the same moment. The lyric poet, on the other hand, does not aim at striking others by surprise, but lives and moves entirely in his own sad or joyful feelings (Isa. x. 16; xxiv. 3, 17; lxi. 3; Jer. li. 2; Mich i. 4; ii. 4; Joel i. 15).

As to rhythm, also, Ewald regards the prophets as differing from the poets in this, that the former permit a greater length and extension and variety. "It cannot," he says, "forget the oratorical sentiment and feeling in which the rhythm has originated; a free discourse which aims to produce an effect on others longs for greater fulness and breadth, stronger emphasis, and readier repetitions of thoughts and words than the language of pure poetry allows."

But notwithstanding these and other distinctive differences between the Hebrew prophet and the Hebrew poet, it will be highly conductive to a knowledge of strictly oratorical number to study the structure of "Hebrew Poetry," commonly so called, and more particularly such of its forms as are bound up with the *arithmus* of prophetic discourses. These features are chiefly rhythm and parallelism.

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1 Poet., Bücher i., p. 90. See Proph., vol. i., Intro., sec. 2; Jour. Sac. Lit., 1st Series, vol. i., p. 74, 295 (1848); 2d Series, vol. iii., p. 329 (1852-3). We have in the main followed Dr. Donaldson's translation.

§ I. *Rhythm* has been variously defined. We shall hereafter discuss the significations of the word as formerly employed in classic prosody and rhetoric. In treating of Hebrew poetry, where there is no syllabic metre, the term is used by modern writers to designate the vibration or bounding movement of a verse, or members of a verse, requiring in its delivery one elevation and one depression of the voice. Thus the verse or member of the verse is pronounced as one foot, and the long and variable rising and falling of the voice resemble the *arsis* and *thesis* of the shorter and more regular classic foot. The Hebrew rhythm is sometimes influenced by assonance. In the 5th chapter of Lamentations the same sound recurs forty times in twenty-two verses. But in Hebrew poetry this like alliteration and rhyme is incidental. A *verse* in Hebrew poetry is such an expression as forms a complete sense, or conveys a distinct thought. It may consist of either two or three lines. A *strophe* is such a series of verses as are homogeneous, both in form and in number. Externally the strophe is characterised either by the refrain or alphabetical beginnings; internally the strophe is circumscribed by the rounding off of the thought.

These definitions prepare us to return to the subject of Hebrew rhythm. This depends on the lines or members of the verse which, though not severely restricted, contain on an average seven or eight syllables each. We may remark, by the by, that we here follow Ewald, who in the main follows the Masorites, except in the song in Isaiah xiv. 4–23.[1] A single verse-member may embody and exhaust the general rhythm, so that the first abrupt and emphatic half challenges the corresponding one to keep it company, as in Judges v. 3:

"Hear, ye kings; give ear ye princes!"

Or,

"I´ to Jahve, I´ will sing!"

Here, as also in 2. Sam. xxiii. 4, the beautiful rise and full of the voice constitute the music of the single member of the verse. Such a first member, which is the rise of the verse, is succeeded by another, which is its counterpart, and which is elicited by it. This forms the fall of the verse, as Judges v. 12:

"Up then´, up then´, Deborah´!
Up´ then, ´up then, ´utter the song!"

Thus these two members, as rise and fall, constitue the verse. But it is to be observed that a number of variations and modifications

[1] Proph. Alt. Bund., vol. ii., pp. 400–403.

may arise out of this fundamental form. The variation may be a mere continuation or direct amplification of the fundamental rhythm, just as when a *trochaic dimeter* is extended to a *trimeter*. It may be a composition by which a rhythm which is complete in itself, is yet treated only as a half, and made to refer to a new half, and thus a more complicated and diversified rhythm is produced. This is as if a hexameter and pentameter were combined to make a new verse, which represented the rise and fall in a wider compass. Or, on the contrary, we may have a diminution or enfeeblement of the primitive form.

Now, in the absence of a syllabic metre, the thoughts alone give form to the verse. If, therefore, two members are the fundamental constituents of the verse, they must have two corresponding thoughts to sustain the life of the verse. But the manner in which the thoughts are distributed shows different gradations of symmetry:

(*a*) The most powerful and beautiful concord is sometimes produced by the echo of the whole sentence where the sense which has been poured forth in a complete proposition in the first member, mounts up again in the second in order to exhaust itself more thoroughly, as Gen. iv. 23; Prov. iv. 3; x. i. As the falling member is sometimes feeble in itself, an important word of the first member reserves its force for the second, as Isa. xlviii. 11; lxiii. 18; Zech. ix. 17. Frequently, too, only a principal part of the sense of the first member is further developed in the second, as Psa. xlix. 6; Job xxxviii, 5; Prov. i. 3. The rhythm assumes a somewhat more tranquil form when the members merely string together short cognate sentences in rhetorical style, as Psa. i. 1; xv. 3, 4.

(*b*) The contrary of this is the less animated or more sluggish rhythm which arises when the sentence, being too long for one member, is obliged to trail itself through two, so that the first member is only broken off at an important part of the sentence, as Psa. cx. 5; cxli. 10.

(*c*) This may be called an intermediate rhythm. It is where two sentences are brought together, as protasis and apodosis, or so that the one expresses the antithesis, the comparison, or the ground of the other, or are only brought together by the sense of the whole passage in order to form a complex thought. Hence arises a rhythm of tranquil power, in which the want of external harmony is compensated by the higher internal harmony of the thoughts (Prov. xi. 22; xiv. 30; Psa. i. 12). But this rhythm cannot always be separated from the preceding. Cases like Isa. xxxviii. 13 stand midway between the cases (*b*) and (*c*).

What modifications, then, may the structure of the verse undergo, and what forms may it assume? Let Ewald answer:

I. A *single* member, which we will denote by the sign *a* or 1:0, never can constitute a perfectly isolated verse; but a verse of one member may occasionally maintain its ground beside other verses, as a contrast to the usual norm, as soon as there is an unusual ebb in the diction itself. It is allowable at the commencement of a long series, as Psa. xviii. 2; xxiii. 1; Jer. v. 30; vi. 2, or it may occasionally be suitable at the end (Exod. xv. 18; Psa xcii. 9).

II. The *bi-membral verse*, $\overset{a}{\smile}\overset{b}{\smile}$ or 1:1, on the other hand, is not only the normal verse, but also the commonest in the Old Testament.

III. According to the conditions which have been explained above, there are two ways in which a verse containing *more than two members* may arise:

1. By the *amplification* of the members from two to three, the complete fall being reserved by the second member for the third. Here all three constitute a single whole, each possessing as much power as the other—$\overset{a}{\smile}\overset{b}{\smile}\overset{c}{\smile}$, or 1:1:1 (Psa. vii. 6, 7; v. 12; vi. 7; xv. 3, 4; xxiv. 4).

2. The following various forms of verse are produced by *composition*:

α. Four members, two and two, therefore, in reality like two normal verses, but so that the two members being more lightly and rapidly uttered, are opposed as one-half only against the other, and both thus closely weave themselves into the web of a more ponderous verse. Employing the *slur* or *tie* of elementary music, it may be expressed thus: $\overset{a}{\smile}\overset{b}{\smile}\overset{c}{\smile}\overset{d}{\smile}$, or 2:2. This exactly corresponds to the Indian *Sloka* (Psa. xviii. 7; xxviii. 1; lix. 17).

β. Composition produces two unequal halves: thus, 2:1. Here *two* members, which might possibly constitute a verse by themselves, being more rapidly pronounced, and merely conjoined as the one-half of the verse, poise themselves against *one* member as the other half (2 Sam. i. 22; Psa. ii. 1, 2; xi. 2; xxiii. 3; iii. 8; vii. 9; xx. 6; Isa. xxxviii. 13). Sometimes the poet throws in a third member, parenthetically, between the first and the second (Psa. ci. 2; cvi. 9; cvii. 4). A fourth member is in like manner joined to three, where they are a mere amplification of two, then 3:1, as 1 Sam. ii. 1.

γ. When, by means of this unequal composition, three members come together, no two of which are independent, and no two are on exactly equal counterpoise to each other, yet the three fit easily into each other; in such a case another short but important half

may be subjoined to all three, so that the two unequal compositions balance each other. The following two cases are possible: 3 : 1 and 3 : 2. Thus $\overset{\frown}{a\,b\,c\,d}$ (Psa. lvii. 1; xxxi. 20), or $\overset{\frown}{a\,b\,c\,d}$ (Psa. cxli. 4; i. 3). Moreover, $\overset{\frown}{2:2:1}$ (Psa. xi. 4); and $\overset{\frown}{1:2:2}$ (2 Sam. xxiii. 5; 1 Sam. ii. 10.)

3. It is a very important phenomenon that the verse of many members, after it has thus developed itself entirely, again assumes perfectly new forms by means of *contraction and abridgment*. Two members of a long verse, being two which the sense conjoins more closely, is sometimes compressed so as to form a single larger verse; thus forming a new species of *protracted* rhythm, whereby one member contains on an average from ten to eleven syllables, and, consequently, exceeds the usual measure by one-half, or even by more. In such cases the freer rhetorical character of the verse necessarily becomes more prominent than its genuine singing nature. It is more recitative than song. . . The place which such a protracted member occupies is the beginning of a verse, or place of the first two members. It is as if the voice enjoyed a freer course at the beginning, where it is not yet exhausted; a supposition on which the Masorites proceeded not only in the poetic verse, but in the prosaic sentence. In this case the long member is balanced by two succeeding ones of ordinary length. It may be represented thus: *A c d* (2 Sam. i. 21; Psa. lxii. 4, 5, 10, 11). In rare instances a shorter member, *c*, corresponds to *A*, as in Psa. xviii. 12; xxx. 8; xli. 10. But the second half is so inclined towards the heavy conclusion that a member here may be surprisingly short, as in Psa. xxix. 9. It is, moreover, possible here also to have a case like $\overset{\frown}{A\,c\,d}$, as in Psa. cxli. 5; or even $\overset{\frown}{A\,c\,d\,e}$, as Psa. xxxix. 13; or $\overset{\frown}{A\,c\,d\,e}$, as Psa. xl. 6. This freer and lighter structure has rather a tendency to rhetorical diffuseness, and is peculiarly adapted to an agitated diction. This protracted rhythm is very rarely extended to a second member, as in Psa. xvii. 4: *A B d e*, so that *A B* may be equivalent to *a b c;* to a third at the same time, so that the whole verse consists of *A B C*, and therefore only exhibits on a larger scale the amplification of the structure from $\overset{\frown}{a\,b}$ to $\overset{\frown}{a\,b\,c}$, as Prov. xxx. 4; Psa. xl. 13.

4. We have now fixed the limits of the structure of the verse. But if the coil of thoughts cannot unroll itself in a single verse, then the following verse may take it up with new strength without beginning a fresh sentence, or by the use of an anadiplosis, or a refrain, or a free iteration, as Psa. xcvi. 12, 13 compared with Psa. xcviii. 8, 9; Psa. xviii. 12, 13; Isa. xxxviii. 12, 13; Lam. i. 9–11.

Sometimes a sentence is trailed through several verses, as Psa. lxxxiii. 7, 8. In some such instances the thread of the tissue is taken up again more loosely at each member, and more firmly at each new verse, until it has run out, as in Psa. viii. 4–9.

This pliant rhythm is capable of infinite variety, and easily adapts itself to the expression of every internal experience, and to the different kinds of poetry, whether gnomic, dramatic, or lyrical.

α. The gnomic, or sententious rhythm, is the most symmetrical and tranquil. It has two members, consisting of seven or eight syllables on the average. Some of the gnomic sentences, however, have many members, or trail themselves through many verses.

β. The dramatic rhythm divides the verse into two halves, the longest verse only containing five members. But these members may extend to uncommon length. This is the rhythm of the Song of Songs. Here it is not uncommon to find the construction of two members into one in all parts of the verse. *A B C*, or *A B d e*, frequently occur. This rhythm is not visible in the book of Job, which, except in some highly tragic passages, aims to sustain a gnomic tranquillity.

γ. The lyrical rhythm is of all varieties. The gnomic symmetry and tranquillity is here very rare, but not altogether wanting. (1.) Animation and excitement sometimes produce long and protracted rhythms, as 2:1, and the composite form 2:2; moreover, the verse which has dilated members. (2.) The passionate mood and stormy movement of the thoughts may disturb the concord of the members and the equal structure of the verse. To this head belongs the disparity in the number of the members in both halves of the verse, such as 2:1, 3:1, 3:2. This disparity may, however, be removed by the apparent effect which the shorter half makes to become equivalent in power to the longer one. In rare cases a member of the average length is associated with another which is very short and abrupt. Then the deficiency is made up by the depth of the mute feeling. It is suitable for exclamation or some paroxysm of agony, as Psa. xxx. 3; Job xiv. 4, compared with Ps. viii. 2, 10; xxvi. 1; lix. 12. Assonance is not uncommon in the Psalms. Rhyme is incidental, as in prose (Psa. viii. 5). The alphabetical Psalms have a symmetrical rhythm, in which the members, whether of ordinary or of longer or of a shorter compass, are arranged together, and regularly fill the verse.

As to the prophetic discourses, Ewald admits that their rhythmical structure partakes more of the rhetorical style, and gradually lapses even into prose. And yet he finds here the poetical rhythmus, and particularly in the discourses of the greater proph-

ets, where there is less external ornament than in the poets, so that they show the movement of the rhythm the more clearly of the two.

In the prophets, as in the poets, the rhythm changes decidedly and beautifully with the subject and tone of the discourse. Thus an uneven triple rhythm is introduced with great effect when the discourse sits down on a proud height, as if to subdue the exalted glow of the imagination (Isa. iv. 2–5; ix. 5; xxx. 25, 26; xix. 18; Micah iv. 7–9; v. 4–7), while a very short and compressed verse, after a loftily moving passage, beautifully prepares the way for its rapid conclusion (Micah v. 8). One rule is never constantly followed, for all the various kinds of rhythm may change with each verse according to the inspired feeling or thought of the moment.

But, as Ewald has shown, the prophetical rhythm differs from the poetical in its length and extension. Herein the prophetical rhythm has in some degree a form of its own. The most usual construction is that of verses with members extended to great length, while verses with two or three short members occur but seldom. Besides the verses of the long members we have already described as found in poetry, there are verses with three long members, each of which is equal to two or three short ones, as Isa. xxxiii. 15, *A B C=ab cd ef*. In verse 20 of the same chapter we have *a B C*. Verses with only one member, or so short as to seem such, are found at beginnings, at pauses, or at conclusions (Jer. v. 30; vi. 2). Ewald is not authorised by facts to declare that verses hardly divided into members and gradually sinking into prose were just beginning in the time of Jeremiah. His examples (Jer. vii. 33; Zech. xii. 11) do not bear out this assertion. These cases show no sinking in the feeling, and none in the rhythm; for the short member, "and none shall fray them away," is a free varied iteration of the last member of the preceding verse, to be followed by another in verse 34. The subject of the refrain is pathetically rhythmical:

"for they shall bury in Tophet till there be no place.
. . . . . .
and none shall fray them away.
. . . . . .
for the land shall be desolate."

Ewald endeavours to construct strophes out of some of the prophetic discourses. He acknowledges, however, that in the prophetical books the strophe takes a somewhat different form from that of the poetical. It is not so fresh and lively, so varied and so constantly new as in the latter, but much more uniform and inflexible. Nor does he assert

that the strophe is found in every prophetic discourse. He does not find it in Joel except in the beginning. He finds it in Jeremiah and Malachi, catches glimpses of it in Ezekiel, but loses it quite in Haggai and Zechariah. But it is only by defining strophe a division, real or imaginary, that we can with any propriety apply the term to the prophetic sermons. To support his hypothesis he ventures to suppose that in the earlier times, during the public delivery of the discourse, an appropriate musical performance was introduced at each pause and after every strophe, either by the prophet himself or by his attendant, as is still done by the public story-tellers in Oriental countries. But there is, unhappily for these interludes, no Scripture fact to support them, as there is no intimation in the Masoretic divisions for his theory about the strophe. Ewald is equally wide of the mark when he asserts that the refrain or the repetition of the same beginning or ending is more frequent and characteristic with the prophets than with the poets. There are more refrains in the 136th Psalm than in all the prophetical books. There are rhetorical refrains in Amos i. 3–; Isa. ix. 8–. But the repetitions of *woes* in Isa. v. 8–24; Hab. ii. 6–20 can in no just sense, whether objective or subjective, be termed refrains.

§ II. It will be seen that the foregoing observations relate chiefly to the length of verses, members, and strophes. Hitherto we have followed Ewald. We now proceed to examine the subject of parallelism, not so much in respect of the length of its members, which has already been fully discussed, as of its internal and external nature in general.[1] Hebrew parallelism is essentially either a measured regression or a regulated pleonasm.

(I.) The first kind of parallelism we shall consider may be termed *cognate*. In this, parallel lines correspond to each other by expressing the same or related ideas, the second line often amplifying or diversifying the idea expressed by the first. This is called *exergasia* by Schöettgen, and *synonymous* parallelism by Lowth, who, as Jebb has shown, did not employ this term with due discrimination and exactness (Isa. liii. 1–5; lx. 1–3; Hos. xi. 8, 9). This parallelism has also been called *direct*. It admits of many varieties, the most remarkable of which is an ascent or cumulative force in the terms, clauses, or lines. Among these varieties are the following:

1. This parallelism is sometimes formed by the iteration of the former member, either in whole or in part (Isa. xv. i.; xxvi. 5, 6; Hos. vi. 4; Nah. i. 2; John viii. 23).

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1 Schöettgen, Horæ Hebraicæ, vol. i., pp. 1249–1263; Lowth, Lectures on Hebrew Poetry, Lect xix.; Jebb, Sacred Literature, pp. 23–74, 335–362.

2. Often something is wanting in the latter member, which must be repeated from the former to complete the sentence (Isa. xli. 28; xlix. 7).

3. Occasionally the whole of the latter division answers only to some part of the former (Isa. lx. 1).

4. Sometimes, also, there are triplet parallelisms (Isa. ix. 20; Hos. vi. 1, 2; Joel iii. 13). Others are found in the New Testament, as Matt. vi. 3, 4, 6, 17, 18; vii. 7, 8.

5. Parallelisms of four lines generally form two regular distichs; but there is sometimes a peculiarity in the distribution of the sentences: the latter members are to be alternately referred to the former (Isa. i. 3; ii. 7; xxx. 16; xlix. 4; liv. 5; Amos i. 2). In the New Testament, Matt. iii. 12; Luke xii. 22, 23; John xv. 10; James iii. 4.

6. In periods of five lines, a line not parallel is some times placed at the end of the verse or period (Isa. xliv. 26; Hos. xiv. 9; Luke xii. 33, 34; John iii. 5, 6.)

7. In some instances each line consists of double members. It is then termed bi-membral (Isa. lxv. 21, 22; James iv. 8–10; v. 2, 3). In some instances, however, one of these members is an antithetic parallelism, as in Isa. lxv. 22.

(II.) Antithetic parallelism consists of two lines, which are related to each other by an opposition of thoughts or words, as 1 Sam. ii. 4–7. (Compare Luke i. 52, 53; Isa. ix. 10; liv. 7, 8, 10; lxv. 34; Luke vii. 44–46; John vii. 6; viii. 14, 35, 38; xvi. 16, 28.)

(III.) Introverted parallelism consists of such an arrangement of the lines of a verse or period that the first corresponds with the last, the second with the penultimate, and so throughout, in an order that looks inward to the middle of the verse or period, commencing and concluding with the thought, which is most important, and placing in the centre the thought to which less prominence is to be given. This kind of parallelism naturally stands next in order to the antithetic; for as that is founded on the figure *antithesis*, so this is founded on *epanodos*. We are indebted to Bishop Jebb for the discovery, definition, and illustration of this arrangement of parallels. Though the figure *epanodos*, or inverted *chiasmus*, had before been found in many parts of Scripture, yet Jebb was the first to seek for it, not in words, propositions, and sentences, but in the parallelisms of the Hebrew and Greek Testaments (Isa. xxvii. 12, 13; Ezek. i. 27; Hos. xiii. 14; Matt. vi. 24; vii. 6; xxiii. 16–22; Luke xii. 35–40; John iii. 31; Heb. ix. 11, 12; x. 33, 34; James i. 22–25).

(IV.) Parenthetical parallelism exists where a line or two is

placed between two other lines or two distichs with which it is not parallel. Lowth gives this species of parallelism a place among the different kinds of synonymous parallelisms, but we venture to designate it by another term, and make it the subject of a new division. As the last mentioned parallelism is based on *epanodos*, so this is based on *parenthesis*—a term which is here employed in a limited and special sense. Some of these interposed lines are; "when a multitude of shepherds is called forth against him" (Isa. xxxi. 4); "from his place shall he not remove" (Isa. xlvi. 7); "and the heavens and the earth shall shake" (Joel iii. 16); "and Ekron: for her expectation shall be ashamed" (Zech. ix. 5; Luke xii. 33, 34; John xiv. 27; James iii. 5, 6).

(V.) Synthetic or constructive parallelism is a correspondence and equality between different propositions, noun answering to noun, verb to verb, member to member negative to negative, interrogative to interrogative, and so of all other parts of construction. This is, according to Lowth's division, the third and last sort of parallelism. It is not without synonymes, repetitions, antitheses, and parentheses; but it is chiefly marked by directness, progress, and development (Isa. xiv. 4–9; xliii. 2; l. 5, 6; Hos. xiv. 6, 7).

The preacher should freely imitate these parallelisms; thereby will he avoid a monotonous return of the *isocolus* and an affected fervour and sententiousness. Periods framed on these models facilitate delivery; nor are they ill adapted for the expression of deep thoughts.

In the prophetic parallelisms, as Ewald has remarked, a thought is so very often divided between two members of a verse that the one would not give a complete sense without the other. This is most noticeable in Isa. iii. 12; v. 17; xi. 7, 14; xvi. 5; xxi. 14; Jer. iv. 15; Ezek. vii. 26. The same author adds that when a similar or even the same word is repeated in a second member, a small change of the expression usually takes place, if it be no more than in the sound or in the change of person and the suffix, where the sense will bear different forms and representations (Amos v. 16; Jer. vi. 23; ix. 16; Isa. xv. 3, 7; xvi. 3; xxi. 11; xxiii. 13). In the last case the suffix is changed three times, since the sense actually bears three variations through all, and in the end refers to the same thing.

But we must not pause here. In order to broad and just views of number we must not only survey the *arithmus* of the Hebrews but also that of the Hellenists.

Subsection VI.—Arithmus in Hellenistic Oratory.

The *arithmus*, or number, of the Hellenistic Greek is much indebted to the Dorians, through the Macedonians, for its distinctive qualities. For in spite of the adverse opinions of K. O. Müller,[1] the Doric forms so often found in the Alexandrian and Hellenistic Greek compel us to adhere to Herodotus, who assigns to the Macedonians a Doric origin. Great was that Asiatic revolution in language which began more than three hundred years before Christ. Alexander the Great, by levying reinforcements from the subjugated nations, by planting Greek colonies among them, and particularly by laying the foundations of Alexandria, paved the way for diffusing alike a knowledge of the common or vulgar Greek and of the Hebrew religion through the version of the Seventy. Out of the commingled Macedonian and Aramean sprang a language still Greek, but vulgar, the diction of the common people. But then it had the sonorous vowels and enharmonic intervals of the Doric, and something of the parallelism and idiom of the Hebrew. It also possessed a twofold sacredness; for to the Greek it recalled the Doric language, in which he had sung hymns to the gods, and Apollo had given almost all his prose oracles, while to the Jew it brought back the solemn, deep-toned prophesyings of the synagogue and the psalms of the temple. Writers and other men of culture still appealed to the Attic dialect as the standard of elegance; but the Divine Spirit, aiming to save the many rather than to please the few, condescended to choose as a vehicle the mother tongue of the many, the current words of the farm, the tented field, the boat, the market, and, above all, of the plain and rustic home. There is indeed abundant proof that the Greek of the New Testament (bating its Hebraisms) was to the Attic Greek what the English of our common version of the Bible is to the English of Addison—the former being the language of common life, and the latter the language of elegant literature and of refined conversation. But we have no warrant to stigmatise the Hellenistic as vulgar and barbarous. Learned critics[2] have shown that inspired fishermen spoke better Greek than was written by the seventy learned translators of Alexandria; that the Divine Spirit in the New Testament writers abstained from employing many unusual and cor-

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1 Hist. and Antiq. of Doric Race.

2 Michaelis, De Textu. Nov. Test.; J. A. H. Tittmann's Opuscula; Blackwall's Sacred Classics; Dr. Campbell's Intro. Four Gospels.

rupted words which are found in the Septuagint, a version made about 280 years before Christ, and that while their style is not Attic, it has not erred against the nature and usage of the Greek, nor been guilty of the levity, negligence, and barbarism which the Septuagint so often betrays. The apostle Paul was indeed reproached by his adversaries as being "rude in speech;"[1] but this reproach probably had no other ground than the fact that in his sermons and epistles he used the plain language which was current among the mass of his converts. No disgrace this, when we consider the general efficacy of the Gospel, and when we recollect that Xenophon was not ashamed to confess, "I am indeed *ideotes*, an unlearned man. . . My words I may not use with the art of the sophists;"[2] that Socrates applied the same epithet to himself; he, too, was *ideotes* as compared with the *Sophoi*.[3] Chrysostom (De Sacerdotio) acutely observes that Paul does not say that he is "rude" in *knowledge*—in other words, that he cannot argue convincingly.

The writer on rhetoric who had an early influence in forming the common or Macedonian dialect was Aristotle,[4] whose works are occasionally coloured by this idiom. It is, therefore, important to inquire what were his teachings on the subject of number. "The form of the style," says he, "should be neither metrical nor without rhythm; for the first has no power to persuade, since it appears to have been studied, and at the same time it draws attention to the similarities of cadence. . . That style, however, which is without rhythm has no measure. Now the diction ought to be measured, yet without metre, for what is destitute of measure is displeasing and indistinct. But by number are all things measured, and in (prose) composition the number is to be regarded as rhythm (time) of which the metres are certain divisions.[5] Hence the sentence should have rhythm, though not metre, for then it would be poetry. And it should not be exactly rhythm, although it will be so to a certain extent. . . But of the rhythms (times) the heroic is stately, and not adapted to conversation, and deficient in varied cadence. . . The iambic, on the contrary, is the very style of the multitude; whence it is that of all metres persons in conversation give most frequent utter-

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1 2 Cor. xi. 6. This meant, according to Chrysostom (De Sacerdotio, L. iv.), "unskilled in the nice subtlety of foreign eloquence."

2 *Cynegeticus*, c. xiii., secs. 4, 5.

3 *Plato Hippias Minor*, at the end: "Now that myself or any other *ideoten* should be wandering thus is not at all to be wondered at; but if you the *sophoi* wander also, that will be to us a direful thing indeed."

4 Rhet., Lib. iii., cap. viii.

5 "Metres are members of rhythms," Poetic, chap. iv.

rance to iambic lines.[1] But in a speech there should be a degree of stateliness and departure from the conversational. Yet the trochaic metre is too trifling, and so are all tetrametres, for they are a kind of dancing rhythm. But the pæan remains which orators in the time of Thrasymachus began to adapt. . . Of all the rhythms that have been mentioned, this is the only one out of which it is not possible to construct a metre; so that in employing it, most of all rhythms, an orator will elude detection. At present, indeed, the orators employ one pæan. . . And there are two species of pæans opposed to each other, whereof the one is adapted to the opening (just, in fact, as they employ it); this is that one of which the long syllable is first and the three short ones follow— ⏑ ⏑ ⏑. The other, on the contrary, has the three short syllables first, and the long syllable at the end ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ —. This makes a good conclusion; whereas the short syllable, owing to its being incomplete, makes the sentence seem mutilated."

It has been overlooked that Aristotle here nicely discriminates between the terms *arithmus* and *rhythmus*. The latter is a poetical term, and as here made use of signifies in general prosodical time, but particularly a foot as measured by time. Dionysius Halicarnassus[2] uses the word both in the singular and plural as synonymous with foot and feet. In a more comprehensive sense the term meant time as divided by speech or music or motion.[3] Hence the word was sometimes used independently of the idea of metre, which signifies the arrangement in verse of long, short, or common times.[4] And accordingly rhythm was considered as the father of metre,[5] and metres as members of rhythms.[6] When, therefore, Aristotle says that in rhetoric "arithmus is rhythm," he imports, as we think, that number has the same application to prose that time has in poetry. Number, as having to do with quantities of all kinds, can determine what poetic feet are most suitable for the beginnings and endings of periods; whereas metre, as being concerned with the measure of poetic lines exclusively, has here no proper application. Herein, however, he must be understood as speaking generally; for Dionysius[7] teaches and examples prove that in exceptional cases metres or poetic lines may, with happy effect, occur in prose. In brief, then, as in poetry, rhythm is the father of metre, so in prose, *arithmus* is the father of rhythm.

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1 Hermog., Peri Ideon, chap. i.

2 De Comp. Verb., chap. xvii. Compare chaps. xix. and xxv.

3 Syrianus in Hermog. De Form. Orat. 4 Longinus, Fragment No. 8.

5 Ib. 6 Aristotle, Poetic, chap. iv. 7 *Ut supra.*

One of the best commentators on Aristotle is Aristotle himself. He employs the term *arithmus* in a twofold sense, as signifying, first, that which has been or can be numbered; secondly, that by which we number (*De Physica*, B. iv., c. xi. and xiv.). "Time is not motion, except so far as motion has *arithmus*. A proof of this is that we judge of the more and the less (of all things) by *arithmus*, but of the more and the less of motion by time. Time, therefore, is a certain *arithmus* (*Ibidem*, B. iv., c. xi.). The facts of 'prior and posterior' belong to motion, and time is in these, so far as they can be measured by *arithmus*. . . . Time is the *arithmus* of every motion. Hence time is the *arithmus* of continued motion, and not of a certain motion merely (*Ib.*, B. iv., c. xiv.). Rhythm delights us by means of a known and orderly *arithmus*, and (in dancing) it moves us in an orderly manner" (*De Harmonia* in *Problem.*, sec. 19, §38). The rhythm that is regulated by *arithmus* or number is the most pleasing, because *arithmus* detects every deficiency or excess in the arsis and thesis as regulated by time. For, as both in poetry and oratory, rhythm can neither shorten or lengthen times, so, in both, number can estimate the diminution or increase which a proper delivery may demand. But metre which has its times inviolably fixed, is ill-adapted to the freedom of oratory, wherein even the most elastic laws of rhythm are not scrupulously kept. Number, then, takes into every account all things that belong to it, reckoning the native weight and effect of the discourse no less than quantities of the words and phrases whereby it is conveyed to the ear.

The first to confound these important distinctions appears to have been Cicero. He taught[1] that what the Romans called *numerus* (number) the Greeks denominated *rhythmus*, which he defines whatever offers to the ear any regular measure, be it ever so far removed from verse. In another place he says that the pæon, because it has more syllables than three, is by some regarded as a rhythm and not a foot. Again he says, that what is called number in prose springs not only from number but also from the symmetrical structure of the words and members of a period.[2] Quintilian[3] has repeated this error, and so misled all who have consulted him respecting this matter.

Though, as we have already observed, Dionysius took one exception to the teachings of Aristotle as to metre, the former was not guilty of misguiding Quintilian and other Roman rhetors on the

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1 Orator, chap. xx. 2 Ibidem, chaps. lx. and lxiv.

3 Institut. Orat., L. ix., c. vi., sec. 46.

subject of *arithmus;* for he says with discrimination,[1] "Number (*arithmus*) contributes not a little to the dignity and sublimity of discourse, and I hazard nothing in saying that rhythms (*rhythmoi*) and metres, which belong to poetry, may also be employed in prose." Nor did the distinction between these two words which Longinus also preserved help to disabuse the *later* Latin rhetors and grammarians. He mentions incidentally in his work on the Sublime[2] that he had discussed the subject of melody in two treatises (now lost), and a fragment of his concerning metre still exists. In the celebrated treatise above mentioned he regards the difference between the two words in question as we now proceed to show. He treats at some length of melody as one of the causes of the emotion of the sublime, and gives as an example thereof this sentence of Demosthenes, which he subjoined to a decree in his *De Corona:* "This very decree scattered like a vapour the danger which at that time hung over the city." He admires the melody even more than he does the sentiment of this period. It consists of dactylic rhythms, the finest metre, and most conducive to the sublime. Transpose a clause, or take away or add a syllable, and you will soon perceive how melody can contribute to sublimity. And yet in an earlier section (34) he acknowledges that if the excellence of an oration is to be estimated by its *arithmus*, and not by its sincerity, then Hyperides is superior to Demosthenes, and that in every point except melody he has imitated all the good qualities of Demosthenes, and added thereto the proprieties and graces of Lysias. But while Longinus places Hyperides far below Demosthenes, in spite of his more careful attention to *arithmus*, he is far from undervaluing this; for he says (sec. 40) that "many poets and other writers, who have no natural faculty for conceiving sublime ideas, and have often employed common and vulgar words, have nevertheless so melodiously arranged these words, and given to their sentences such a dignified air and measured step, that they have made their trivial thoughts pass for more than they are worth, just as, among many others, Philistus has done, and Aristophanes in some lines, and Euripides in a great many."

It appears not to have occurred to Longinus that the common and vulgar words of which he writes so disparagingly are the very best materials for a melodious composition, and that Euripides found it no difficult thing to dispose them in poetical numbers. So far from this, he would, in very many instances, have found it difficult to have composed otherwise. The familiar and colloquial style of the

[1] De Comp. Verb., chap. xvii. [2] Sec. 39.

Greek plays, except in the choruses where it is more elevated, has an artless music which is beyond the reach of art, and yet, melodious as it is, it cannot in this respect be pronounced superior to the Hellenistic Greek.

In particular, the Hellenists, like the Dorians, to whom they owed so much (and who wrote entire poems without the sibilant) were bent on exterminating the malicious and untunable *sigma*. Take some of the later nouns ending in *μα*; in Attic and other earlier writers, these often end in *σις*. In Luke ii. 7 we find *κατάλυμα*; in Plato's Protagoras *κατάλυσις*; in Luke xxiii. 24; Phil. iv. 6, *αἴτημα*; Attic, *αἴτησις*. So of nouns with other endings, Matt. i. 11, *μετοικεσία*; Plato (De Legib., c. viii.), *μετοίχησις*; Acts ix. 36, *μαθητρία*; Attic, *μαθητρίς*. Among verbs, 1 Cor. xvi. 22, *ἤτω*; Plato's Repub., *ἔστω*; John xvii. 7, *ἔγνωχαν*; Attic *ἐγνώχασι*; Rev. ii. 22, *δύνῃ*; Attic, *δύνασαι*. It would be instructive to cite many other examples of this description, and particularly to observe how sibilants that were, in some instances, once depraved Hellenistic words, were gradually cast out. For instance, the Alexandrian Greek inserted the syllable *σα* in the termination of the third plural in the imperfect, and the second aorist, ending in *ιοὖν*. See Septuagint, Exod. xv. 27; Psa. xlvii. 4; Exod. xvi. 24; xviii. 28. It is very observable that while in these and other places the Septuagint exhibits this Asiastic termination the New Testament betrays but a single instance, Rom. iii. 13, *ἐδολιοὔσαν* for the Attic *εδολιοῦν*. For the Hellenistic Greek to have thus purged itself in some measure from these sibilant terminations was no small contribution towards euphony; and when we remember how troublesome such terminations are whenever the succeeding word begins with a sibilant, we are so grateful to the Hellenists for returning to the Doric that we can cheerfully pardon them all their unavoidable barbarisms.

In euphony the peasants of Galilee surpassed Socrates; the word-music of the Christian preacher of Tarsus outdid the melody of Demosthenes. After reading the high symphonies of the Attic orators, it is pleasant to turn to the New Testament and listen to the broad and manful chaunt of the common people of the Alexandrian empire; to hear again those Doric words which "in his deep-mouthed song Pindar poured immense." The rusty harp of the captive Hebrew had long hung among the willows of Euphrates, but when it heard the martial trumpet of the army of Macedon, its ancient strings responded to the sound, and prophesied that the Greek tongue would soon be spoken in the East by the sons of Jacob and the disciples of Jesus, and be made more harmonious by

the Spirit who inspired the odes of David. This is confirmed by the general principle that the talk of the common people in all lands is very harmonious. "It is a pleasing amusement," says John Mason,[1] the author of "Self-Knowledge," "in which I have often indulged myself, to listen how naturally men run into those numbers in vulgar style, which are best adapted to the spirit of the subject they talk of, or the passions which animate the person that speaks, and which, to a curious observer, are distinguishable no less by the numbers of his style than the tones of his voice. . . And almost all the foregoing rules you may observe, with a little attention, to be clearly exemplified in the dialect of the most illiterate persons. For, however defective they may be in propriety of expression, they are generally very happy in their rhythmus, to which they are directed by the ear or natural harmony of sounds. In a particular manner you may observe the beauty of their closes, for they commonly finish their periods with anapæsts or iambics (Aristotle[2] says chiefly with iambics), and very frequently with an emphatical word; that is, emphatical either in sound or sense." Let no one, therefore, think it a small thing to master a law of language which all men instinctively and unwittingly think of—a law which we must learn to obey if we would speak naturally and popularly with ease to ourselves, and without unpleasantness to our plainest hearers. Nor are the cultivated less sensible to the charm of number. Augustine was first attracted to hear Father Ambrose by the amenity of his style; and Chrysostom's melodious cadences must have heralded and commended the doctrines of the cross to many[3] a courtly ear; for while he neither adopted nor commended the smoothness of Isocrates, yet a solemn and majestic music still lingers in his periods, although so many centuries have passed away since his golden mouth gave them immortal tones.

Subsection VII.—Number as Applied to English Oratory.

Having in the preceding pages examined the subject of Hebrew and Hellenistic number and the structure of every form of Hebrew sentence, we have thus prepared the way for the study of *arithmus* as applicable to the periods of the English speaker. A thorough knowledge of the structure of English sentences should, however, be first obtained by all who would study and apply the principles

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1 Essays on Poetical and Prosaic Numbers and Elocution, p. 74 (second ed.), London, 1761. 2 Poetic, chap. iv. 3 De Sacerdotio, L. iv., c. vi.

of number with the greatest advantage. Nearly every variety of English sentence has been classified and illustrated by Professor Mandeville, both in his "Course of Reading" and in his "Elements of Reading and Oratory." Few will ever be enabled to read and speak well by confining their vocal exercises to the elaborate system he has constructed; but all may learn therefrom better than anywhere else the structure of almost all kinds of English sentences, and thus gain a knowledge of a much neglected branch of the art of composition.

Every syllable except a monosyllable has some prosodical foot or feet, and consequently every kind of style possesses number; but no species of composition in which feet are unskilfully disposed at the beginnings and endings of periods can properly be termed harmonious. Feet have been divided by rhetoricians into two classes, according to their supposed quality:

The Strong or Noble.	*The Weak or Base.*
Iambic ⏑ —	Pyrrhic ⏑ ⏑
Spondee — —	Trochee — ⏑
Anapæst ⏑ ⏑ —	Tribrach ⏑ ⏑ ⏑
Cretic — ⏑ —	Dactyl — ⏑ ⏑
Bacchic ⏑ — —	Amphibrach ⏑ — ⏑
Molossus — — —	Palimbacchic — — ⏑

These distinctions are founded on two things: First, the quantities or number of times. The foot that contains the greatest number of times is in general the strongest or noblest. Thus as the short syllable is the original unit for the measure of time, a spondee is stronger than a pyrrhic, because the former consists of four times and the latter of two. Secondly, the quantity of the syllable with which the foot ends. A foot that has a long final syllable is stronger than one that terminates with a short one. Thus a bacchic is stronger than a palimbacchic. Such in general is the comparative value of these feet in themselves considered; but still some of the weak feet, when estimated in connection with others, have been denominated strong. For example, according to Dionysius[1] the dactyl becomes noble when blended with the spondee in heroic verse. It is too weak, however, to close a sentence musically.

It has been observed that among the noble feet the most excellent are those in which the final long syllable is preceded by a short one; for the final syllable is thus rendered more emphatic, and

[1] De Comp. Verb., chap. xvii.

therefore still longer, by contrast. And accordingly the iambic and similar feet are the strongest. But this remark can only apply to cadences, otherwise it would be impossible to reconcile it with the assertion of Aristotle,[1] that this foot was more employed by the Greeks in common talk than any other. Still, however, it should here be borne in mind that the last syllable of a prose sentence, like that of a poetic line, is generally allowed to pass for either long or short, as best suits the close, and hence it is called "common."

Some of the ancient rhetors thought they discovered in the noble feet a language peculiar to each. The spondee, they say, is grave and majestic; the molossus sublime and stately; the bacchic strong and solemn; the cretic bold and eager; the anapæst rapid and vehement; the iambic well adapted to express anger. The last two are martial rhythms both. Dionysius[2] teaches that as we are often compelled to express our ideas by words and phrases that are composed of base feet, we should aim to elevate and refine these by mixing them with such as are noble. True, rhetorical number can never impart much dignity to common thoughts, and yet the neglect of it may greatly detract from the majesty of those that are really noble. It has been observed that such noble feet as result from the union of the dactyl and the spondee are employed by Homer in describing Thersites, and by Horace in recounting the dispute between Rupilius and Persius. Hence it is manifest that number cannot exalt the familiar and the ludicrous, although its absence or neglect can prevent the noblest and the grandest ideas from appearing to the best advantage. When measured and apart, these feet are found to possess very different values, and yet "each kind," as Quintilian[3] holds, "is useful in its proper place; for gravity and slowness where there is need of rapidity, and quickness and precipitation where there is need of solemnity, are justly and equally reprehensible."

The principal rules of number are the following:

I. For the beginnings of periods, Aristotle, as we have already seen, recommends the pæon anterior—that is, the foot which begins with a long syllable and is followed by three short ones: — ⏑ ⏑ ⏑. With him concurs Quintilian, although he thinks we may sometimes begin with short syllables, and quotes the first words of Demosthenes' *De Corona* as an unobjectionable number. He adds that the cretic — ⏑ — makes an excellent commencement. He is

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1 Rhet., L. i., c. viii.; cf. Poet., c. viii.

2 *Ut supra*, chap. xviii.

3 Inst. Orat., L. ix., chap. iv., sec. 83.

also of opinion that the first half of a poetic line is unpleasing at the beginning of a period, but the first part of a verse sometimes forms an elegant conclusion, while the last part of a line frequently opens a sentence not ungracefully. He considers attention to the initial numbers of some, though secondary, importance; for then the hearer pays strict attention, and the conclusion, however graceful, may lose all its charms if we are awkward at the outset and awkward continue until near the goal.

II. For the endings of periods Aristotle recommends the pæon posterior ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ —. Cicero[1] says this kind of pæon is almost equal, not indeed in the number of the syllables, but by the measure of the ear to the cretic. There are, we dare say, cases not a few wherein this pæon is quite equal to the cretic. The pæon Cicero does not reject, but prefers others. Quintilian approves it still less, but adds that possibly those who liked it were men that fixed their attention rather on the language of common life than on that of oratory. He would, in our poor judgment, have been more nearly right if he had said that in the time of Aristotle the Greek orators began to use the language of common life.

(2.) The dichoree or double trochee, — ⏑ — ⏑ is a concluding foot, which is approved both by Cicero and Quintilian. The latter says that it is a favourite ending with many. It is found at the end of the well-known example from one of the speeches of Carbo, which the great Roman orator adduces: *Patris dictum sapiens temeritas filii comprobavit*—a sentence which was, it seems, received by the people with wonderful applause. Upon this Mason[2] has remarked that "as the last syllable is common, it may be considered as long, and then the last three syllables may be considered a bacchic; again, as the last syllable may be considered as *hypercatalectic*, or supernumerary, so the three preceding syllables may be measured as a cretic; both of which are strong and generous feet. And this is the reason that a dichoree, though it be in itself a base and feeble foot, yet makes so graceful a close. Marmontel[3] cites a parallel instance from Fletchier's Eulogy on Turenne, "De la religion et de la patrie ĕplŏrĕ̆." In his preference for the dichoree, Cicero was perhaps influenced by some of his Oriental teachers, for he tells us that Asiatic orators commonly rounded their periods with this foot. But still, even in English, it often makes a happy cadence.

(3). The cretic, — ⏑ — as an ending, is preferred by Cicero[4] to

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1 De Oratore, L. iii., cap. xlvii., and Orator, cap. lxiv.

2 Essay on the Power of Number, p. 28.

3 Harmonie du Style; Eléments de Littérature, vol. iii., p. 33.

4 Cf. Dionys., de Comp. Verb., chap. xxv.

the pæon. This foot may be well preceded by the anapæst, or the pæon posterior ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ —. A double cretic may also be employed with success.

(4.) The dochmius ⏑ — — ⏑ — is highly approved by Cicero for every part of a period, on condition that it be employed but once in a period, since its repetition would make the sentence appear too numerous. It is, in fact, a rhythmus of the drummer. Quintilian also recommends us to place a bacchic before its concluding iambic because the cadence will then be a dochmius.

(5.) The dactyl is thought by Quintilian to make a good prose ending. Though the last syllable is common, yet if it be admitted as long it becomes a cretic. He adds that the dactyl may be preceded by the cretic or the iambic, but not the spondee, much less the trochee. Cicero,[1] however, is of an opinion somewhat different. The dactyl, he thinks, may be placed before the last foot when the last foot is either a trochee or a spondee, and that the dactyl, the tribrachys, and the iambic are all of them infelicitous cadences, except when the dactyl takes the place of the cretic, because of the doubtful length of the last syllable. On this point, again, Quintilian says: "I am not ignorant that a short syllable at the end of a sentence is accounted long, because the time in which it is deficient is in some degree supplied by that which follows it; but when I consult my own ear, I feel that it makes a great difference whether the concluding syllable be really long, or only be accepted as long." And he says repeatedly that it makes a difference whether two concluding feet are contained in one word, or whether each consists of a single word. He also says, in another place, that all terminations of periods formed of short syllables have less weight than such as consist of long, nor are they admissible except where the closing words are rapid and emphatic. Whereto we may add this other opinion of Quintilian, that the tribrach is not a very good ending, if the last syllable be accounted short, as it certainly must sometimes be, except in cases where the last word is very emphatic.

(6.) As to the iambic, though Cicero does not recommend it for the endings of periods, he would not exclude it therefrom. And Quintilian, as we have already seen, accepts it as a termination, and particularly when it is preceded by the bacchic, since the cadence will then be a dochmius. The same author says that a spondee may very properly go before this foot.

(7.) The molossus is regarded by Quintilian as a good conclusion, provided it have before it a short syllable of any foot whatever.

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[1] Orator, chaps. xx. and lvi.

(8.) The bacchic may conclude a period, and may either be doubled or take a trochee or a spondee before it — ⏑ ⏑ — — or — — ⏑ — —.

(9.) The palimbacchic is held to be a very proper ending, unless we wish the last syllable to be long. It may be preceded either by a molossus or a bacchic with a pleasing effect, — — — — — ⏑ or ⏑ — — — — ⏑.

(10.) The amphibrach is also considered a good ending. By lengthening the final syllable it becomes a bacchic.

(11.) Quintilian allows even a pyrrhic to terminate a period if it be preceded by a trochee, for then the two form a pæon—an anterior one, however, we may add, which both Aristotle and himself would confine to the opening of the sentence. But still, it is fair to subjoin, he would admit this foot only where rapidity of language is demanded, and no emphasis is to be laid on the close.

(12.) The spondee ought not to be excluded from the end of a period; for, as Cicero says, though it is a slow and heavy foot, yet it has an air of gravity and nobleness, especially in clauses and members where the weight of the feet is thus compensated for their paucity. Quintilian likewise approves this foot, and carefully specifies the feet that may go before it. If the pyrrhic precedes the spondee it will detract from its gravity, and if the pæen precedes, the effect will be still worse. Two spondees can scarcely ever be used in succession unless they can be made to consist, as it were, of three members. Quintilian, adversely to Cicero, as quoted in §5, thinks that a dactyl cannot properly be prefixed to a spondee, because we dislike the end of a verse at the close of a sentence; but the anapæst and the cretic may be, as also the iambic, which is found in both, but is shorter than either by a syllable; for thus one short syllable will go before three long ones. This is agreeable to what he says in respect of the molossus (§7). He thinks that this foot has great stability, and that Demosthenes frequently employed it. Mr. Mason shows that we may sometimes place two or three or even four spondees in succession, particularly when we intend to fix an impression by dwelling on the words that convey it, as in this sentence from Cicero's speech against Verres, beginning: "Cædebatur virgis civis Romanus," etc.

The ancient rhetoricians give some general directions for speaking and writing in obedience to the laws of number, some of which are in substance as follows:

1. The Roman orators occasionally secured a numerous style by using grammatical figures, especially such as consist in a change of case and number. In our language one case can very rarely be put

for another without provoking criticism. As to change of number it is otherwise; by synechdoche the singular is sometimes used for the plural, and the reverse. When a speaker is impassioned, our language, like the Hellenistic Greek, allows him to change person. We may likewise employ the present tense for the future or for the past, and the past for the present.

2. Quintilian recommends a resort to the *hyperbaton*, or the removal of a word to a distance from its natural place. He says that many writers diversify their language by long *hyberbata;* but he admonishes us not to cultivate a studied negligence so far as to introduce *hyperbata* that are extravagantly long.[1] We term this figure transposition, or inversion. In our language it is of less frequent occurrence than in the Greek or Latin. True, we may place the nominative after the verb, as "Blessed are the peacemakers;" "Behold, there came wise men." We are also permitted, for the sake of emphasis, to place before a verb a noun in the objective case, a pronoun with a preposition, as "Therewith bless we God." —*St. James;* or, "One such court there is," etc.—*Sherlock.*

3. Of all figures none is more friendly to number than antithesis. This hint is well illustrated by the celebrated couplet of Denham, which, because of its mysterious and unaccountable sweetness, Dryden proposed to his readers as a puzzle in prosody:

> "Though deep, yet clear; though gentle, yet not dull;
> Strong without rage; without o'erflowing, full."

Whatever other excellences these verses may or may not possess, certain it is that they contain four antitheses, and that the distich is antithetical throughout. True, its music is indebted not a little to its transpositions, but without antitheses it would have been impossible to make so rhythmical a distribution of the emphatic words. Mr. Mason[2] thinks that, while the charm of the distich is partly due to these things, it is also much beholden to the order and quantity of the poetical numbers. "The poet," says he, "has introduced into these two lines every one of the dissyllabic feet—the iambic and pyrrhic in the first, and the trochee and spondee in the second—so that it hath all the advantage of harmony which variety of numbers can give it. Nor is it less happy in the disposition of these numbers. For in the first line, excepting the fourth foot, they are all iambics: the last part of each falling not

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1 Inst. Orat., L. viii., chap. vi., and L. ix., c. iv.

2 Essays on Numbers and Elocution, p. 60, Lond. ed., 1761.

only on the accented syllables but the emphatical words, and those in contrast, too, makes the sound and sense most perfectly accord. The fourth place is possessed by a pyrrhic, which is always an agreeable movement. The second line begins with a trochee, which gives motion, as it were, to the river, but is immediately checked by the spondee and iambic that alternately follow. So that the stately flow of the numbers expresses that of the river they describe, and the sound is still an echo to the sense." We may add that, though the antithesis abounds in the prophetic eloquence, yet such is the state of modern English criticism (which principally admires the negative excellences of sermons), that we should employ this figure as little as possible.

4. When four, five, or more short syllables follow one another we may improve the feet by inserting among them some word or syllable containing a long quantity, as, "how much soever" for "however much." Mr. Mason gives us the following example: "This doctrine I apprehend to be erroneous and of a pernicious tendency." The effect of the many short quantities which weaken this sentence may be destroyed by a slight change in its form and import: "This doctrine I take to be not only false, but of very pernicious tendency." Sometimes the insertion of a short syllable between two long ones smoothens the path of a sentence, as in these words from Cicero in Verr.: . . . "hunc per hosce dies sermonem vulgi." "Why," asks Quintilian, "does he use *hosce* in preference to *hos*, for *hos* would not be harsh? I should perhaps be unable to assign any reason, but I feel that *hosce* is the better." The euphonic figures are prothesis, epenthesis, paragoge, and tmesis.

5. An ellipsis will frequently help the number. We may either contract two syllables into one, or drop a word or phrase. The elliptical figures are aphæresis, apocope, and syncope.

6. Few figures are more helpful to number than amplification, more especially when, as in Milton, Taylor, and Hooker, it gives expression to depth, variety, and fulness of thought. Still it is to be remembered that superficial views of the Scripture are apt to be the truest and most impressive.

7. Let the sentence always close, if possible, not only with a good number, but an emphatic word. Not that the emphatic word ought uniformly to be the very last. It must often be content to be within three or four syllables of the last. Nor should it escape our observation that words composed of feeble feet may in effect become strong when they receive the emphasis. Mr. Mason observes that this last word will produce a very agreeable effect if by paronomasia or antithesis it have reference to some preceding word

in the sentence, as "unhappy man who, obtaining the *pleasure* he so long pursued, finds himself at last possessed of *pain!*"

By way of caution in the use of the preceding rules and examples, it is important to observe:

A. That the feet should be strong or weak, according to the subject or idea, as Quintilian teaches, by recommending even the pyrrhic for the close of some sentences. He also says that the feet to which the Greek rhetoricians object will force themselves upon us in spite of our utmost efforts. Long syllables have more impressiveness and weight; short ones more lightness. Short syllables, if they be mixed with long, may be said to run; if they are continued in unbroken succession, to bound. Statements of facts require a mixture of all kinds of feet. Arguments should not admit more long than short syllables, nor, on the contrary, should they admit the tribrachys, which imparts quickness but not force to the numbers. The elevated portions of a discourse demand long and sonorous feet, like the dactyl and the pæon. Rougher parts are best expressed in iambics. They are opposed to calmness, not only because they consist of but two syllables, and consequently allow of more frequent beats, but because every foot rises springing and bounding from short to long, and is, for that reason, preferable to the trochee, which from a long falls to a short. The more subdued parts of a discourse, such as portions of the peroration, call for syllables that are long indeed, but less sonorous. Such are the judicious precepts of Quintilian.

B. That we should be on our guard against the too frequent use of a favourite foot or of a phrase which is extremely melodious. "An interchange of feet," says Cicero,[1] "will have these good effects, that the audience will not be tired of any offensive sameness, and that we shall not appear to make similar endings on purpose." And yet this orator employed his favourite close, "esse videatur," eleven times in his oration *Pro Lege Manilia*. Nor did its reiteration stop with Cicero, for his imitators took up the strain after his death, and went on repeating it more than a hundred years, so that Quintilian[2] was compelled to declare that the phrase was in his day too much in use.

C. That when necessary, number should be sacrificed to strength, clearness, truth, and feeling. "In general," says Quintilian, "if I were obliged to make a choice, I would prefer words harsh and rough to such as are excessively delicate and nerveless; and indeed we grow every day more effeminate in our style, tripping, as it

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1 De Orat., L. iii, c. l. 2 L. ix., c. iv., § 73.

were, to the exact measures of a dance." To this we may add the authority of Demetrius Phalereus:[1] "Too much study and toil in measuring the members of a period, and in balancing the antitheses, hampers the freedom of the mind and cripples the force of an oration.[2]

D. That while we are not to ignore, we are not always to follow the rule laid down by Cicero, Dionysius, Quintilian, and other classic rhetoricians, never to begin a prose period with the feet which begin a poetic line, nor conclude it with those that close such line, and never to admit into prose the feet of an entire and original line. Though this may be a good general law for the secular orator, it is liable to unavoidable infractions, and especially by the sacred orator, whose elevated themes often transport him to Helicon and Sion hill. And accordingly critics detect hexameters in the writings of the apostles Paul and James (Heb. xii. 13; Jas. i. 17). We only add that these laws of number may be very frequently made void by beginning or ending a period with a word uncommonly long.

Subsection VIII.—Cadence as Affected by Verbal Forms.

Let it not be thought that number as treated by the classic rhetors has little application to English composition. By scanning the beginnings and endings of a few English sentences, any intelligent reader may disabuse himself of this delusion. The Greek and Roman *arithmus* and the more primæval Hebrew parallelisms have their source in those powers of music which are agreeable to almost all, delightful to many, and to some even transporting. The Greek rhythm, with its arsis and thesis, finds its resemblance in the modern musical bar and in our English versification, while the Hebrew parallelisms may be traced in the prose of some of the best English writers.

The subject of cadence, in so far as it is governed by *number*, we have already considered. Here we are to lay down a few rules which have particular reference to those phrases, words, and syllables by which cadence is either favourably or unfavourably affected. But still it should be remembered that some of these rules find their best explanation in the laws of number.

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1 *Περί Ἑρμηνείας*, cap. xxvii.

2 Of the orator Fox's impetuous torrent of feeling it has been happily said that "all the waves did not form waving lines."

As to verbal cadence, the following rules are to be observed:

1. Avoid concluding sentences with adverbs, prepositions, or other inconsiderable words. There are, however, exceptions to this, as in the following sentence: "In their prosperity my friends shall never hear of me; in their adversity, always." Especially should we keep ourselves from concluding sentences with the particles which mark the cases of nouns, as *of, to, from, with, by.* "A late divine," says Mason, "speaking of the Trinity, hath this expression: 'It is a mystery which we firmly believe the truth of, and humbly adore the depth of.'[1] Here," adds Mason, "the language is expressive but not harmonious. And what is the reason of this? Not merely because each clause of the sentence ends with the sign of the genitive case (which, if it be sometimes deemed an inaccuracy, yet does not always interrupt the smooth flow of the words), but because it is composed almost entirely of base and feeble numbers, viz., pyrrhics and trochees, which, by a small transposition of the words, might easily be avoided, as thus: 'It is a mystery the truth whereof we firmly believe, and the depth of which we humbly adore.' According to this disposition of the words, the sentence is composed altogether of strong and generous feet, viz., iambics and anapæsts." It ought, on the other hand, to be considered that the above example, so often since Mr. Mason's day cited as a warning, is good idiomatic English, and makes up in clearness and ease what it lacks in strength and cadence. It has likewise eschewed the untuneful "which." Nor is this all; so thoroughly idiomatic are the prepositions in question that it is not easy in many instances to escape them either by transposition or substitution. Take for example this from Tillotson: . . . "which sense he could find no way to support without such pitiful and wretched shifts, such precarious and arbitrary suppositions as a man of so sharp a reason and judgment as Socinus could not, I thought, have ever been driven to." Long and liquid monosyllables make a good cadence, as *ease, same, shine.*

2. Generally, however, simple verbs are better than compound as terminations of members and sentences. When the last particle is short, emphatic, and abrupt it makes a very bad cadence; *e. g., come up, went over to, bring about.* When, however, it is unemphatic, it may in some cases make a happy close, as *dispose of.* These rules do not apply to the familiar style wherein compound verbs very often contribute to vivacity.

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[1] Dr. Ward thinks that the unpleasant sound arises from the accent falling on the last syllable.—*Syst. of Oratory,* vol. i., p. 382.

3. The pronoun *it* should, if possible, be avoided at the end of a sentence, more especially when it is joined with some of the prepositions; as, *with it, in it, to it.* When it forces itself upon us unavoidably, we may return to good old English, and at the same time to strength and melody, by employing in their place *therewith, therein, thereto.*

4. Any short concluding phrase which expresses exception, qualification, limitation, or some subordinate circumstance, is apt to detract from strength and melody, for this reason, among others, that it is either commonly composed of short syllables, or is read with rapidity; as, "a great advance towards this union was the coalition of parties, so happily begun, so successfully carried on, and of late so unaccountably neglected, *to say no worse.*" "Godliness and honesty, joined with industry and benevolence, will ever be found a surer path to prosperity than the tricks of cunning and policy *in general.*" We must, notwithstanding, except this cadence of Robert Hall: "Yet some benefit will not fail to result from them, *even in their lowest degree.*"

5. In enumerations where the conclusion is made of several nouns connected by a conjunctive particle, melody will be occasionally promoted by placing an adjective before the last noun.

6. Very long words are, as we have said, unsuitable for the close of a period. With long phrases and members of sentences it is often the reverse, especially at the end of paragraphs and subdivisions, where they have an effect similar to that of the Alexandrine, which closes the Spencerian stanza.

7. Words that consist of very short syllables do not conclude a grave and weighty period melodiously; *e. g.*, "contrary," "circumstances," "particularly," "disinterestedness." We may except cases where the thoughts are familiar and playful, and where a train of long syllables going before is enlivened by a succession of short syllables at the end of the sentence.

While the strict observance of the rules of cadence is not certainly a very important grace of style, their neglect is, to some ears, very unpleasant. Doddridge justly complains of Charnock and Bates—no mean writers both—that they are wanting in cadence. Among the sermons remarkable for cadence are those of Jeremiah Seed, Hugh Blair, Robert Hall, and Timothy Dwight. Chrysostom's cadences are monotonous, while those of John Logan are marked by an agreeable variety. But much attention to this subject in sermons is fatal to frankness and energy of style, and injurious to one's character. Hagenbach mentions a certain critic who charged Reinhard with commencing one of his sermons with three short syllables!

Subsection IX.—Euphony.

This term is here employed as importing such a choice and collocation of letters, syllables, and words as secure their smooth and melodious enunciation. It has principally to do with the qualities of articulate sounds in their relation to speaking and hearing. Limiting itself to the vocal qualities of connected letters, syllables, and words, its province is less extensive than the *junctura*[1] of the Latin rhetoricians, which also had reference to phrases, members, and periods. Demetrius Phalereus[2] says that the ancient Greek musicians distributed words into four classes—the rough, the smooth, the mediate, and the elevated. The smooth are composed chiefly of vowels, as the Greek Αἴας (Ajax); the rough are crowded with consonants, while the mediate or compact have a moderate proportion of both. He gives Βρόντα (thunder) as a good example of the elevated or high sounding. It is a remarkable fact that almost everything the Greek and Latin rhetoricians say on this subject is equally relevant and applicable to the English language.

Euphony requires us to avoid, as far as possible, the multiplication of sibilants. The Attics were inclined to condemn their excessive use, and yet their dialect has its full share of them. Plato and Eubulus have derided the accumulated sigmas of Euripides, who, in the following line of his *Medea*, seems to have aimed to do his worst:

Ἔσωσά σ', ὡς ἴσασιν Ἑλλήνων ὅσοι.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus[3] is exceedingly bitter against the sigma. "It is," says he, "disagreeable and harrassing, and when it recurs frequently it is very distressing. This hissing sound seems more proper for wild beasts than for rational creatures." Some of the ancients used it rarely and cautiously. Lasus composed a whole poem without it; and Pindar has left us his opinion about it in the following words: "Long ago, O men, were banished the long-winded sounds of the dithyrambs and the impure sigma." On these lines of Pindar, Athenæus[4] has the following comment: "Pindar uttered this sentence with reference to the ode which was composed without a σ in it, as if some riddle had been proposed to him to be expressed in a lyric ode, since many were puzzled because they considered it impossible to abstain from the σ, and because

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1 Cicero, De Orat., L. iii., chap. xliii.; Orat., §44; Quint., Inst. Orat., L. ix., chap. iv., secs. 32–43.

2 De Elocutione, sec. 178.

3 De Comp. Verb., cap. xiv.

4 L. x., cap. lxxxii.

they did not approve the way in which the idea was executed." Hence Dionysius censures Thucydides for the collocation in the preface of his history, Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε. The σ before the ξ cannot along with the latter make one syllable, and consequently there is a hiatus difficult to pronounce between the two letters.[1]

We learn from Cicero[2] that some of the earlier Latin orators sedulously omitted this sibilant in some cases, and particularly dropped the last letter in the termination *us* when it was not followed by a vowel; as, "*Qui est omnibu' princeps.*" Quintilian[3] enlarges on this subject as follows: "Consonants are also liable to jar with one another in the connection of words, and especially such as are of a harsher nature, as *s* at the end of a word with *x* at the commencement of the following; and the hissing is still more unpleasant if two of these consonants clash together, as "*Ars studiorum.*" This was Servius' reason for cutting off the letter *s* whenever it terminated a word and was followed by another consonant—a practice which Lauranius blames and Messala defends; for they do not think that Lucilius retained the final *s* when he said, "Serenus fuit" and "Dignus locoque."

The English language has for hundreds of years been corrupting its native euphony. This fact may be illustrated by the gradual change into *s* of the *eth* of the third person singular of the present tense. At what time this abbreviation began we are unable to specify. Ben. Jonson, in his Grammar (the edition of 1634), says that the third person singular is made of the first by adding *eth*, which is sometimes shortened into *s*. But after the death of Jonson, in 1637, some editor substituted *commonly* for *sometimes*. But Peter Whalley, in his critical edition of Jonson's works, published in 1756, says: "It seemeth to have been poetical license which first introduced this abbreviation, but our best grammarians have condemned it upon some occasions, though perhaps not to be absolutely banished the common and familiar style." Addison, in the 135th No. of the Spectator, dated 1711, writes in qualified protest against the change as one which had already taken place. "This has," he says, "wonderfully multiplied a letter which was before too frequent in the English tongue, and added to that hissing in our

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1 The Hellenistic Greek is in general superior to the Attic in point of sibilation, and yet there are some exceptions to this rule; *e. g.*, δυσί for δυοῖν, ἐλεύσομαι for εἶμι, etc. On the other hand, κραββατον is in this and other respects better than σκίμποδον, which a Cyprian bishop was on one occasion so nice as to substitute for it (see anecdote in Bingham, B. vi., c. iii., sec. 4).

2 Orat., cap. xlviii. 3 L. ix., c. iv.

language which is taken so much notice of by foreigners; but at the same time humours our taciturnity and eases us of many superfluous syllables." And accordingly Ben. Jonson, Milton, Bacon, and Jeremy Taylor oftenest retain this *th* when its employment does not lengthen the word, as in *hath*, *doth*, etc. But they frequently use it in cases where it adds a syllable to the word. Mr. Mason, about the year 1751, laid down this rule, among others, for acquiring a numerous style: "The frequent concurrence of *s* must be avoided, because it creates a disagreeable hissing in the voice, a fault which foreigners universally find in our language, and is occasioned by three letters in the English alphabet which convey that sound, viz., *s*, *z*, and soft *c;* and we still increase it by an affectation of changing the termination *eth* into *es*." In the second edition of this essay, published in 1761, he still stigmatises this change as an affectation. But Dr. Charles Coote, in his Grammar published in 1788, informs us that in his day the termination *eth* was very rarely employed. Mr. F. W. Newman "regards it as a question about to open hereafter whether a translator of Homer ought not to adopt the old dissyllabic *landis*, *houndis*, *hartis*, for lands, hounds, harts." A really blessed thing it would be for public speakers if such terminations could be revived and brought back into common prose.

The Ionian Greeks were not insensible to the euphony of θ as compared to the σ, and Luke and Paul have followed this dialect in Acts xxi. 35, where ἀναβαθμούς is used instead of ἀναβασμούς, and in 1 Tim., iii. 13, where βάθος is employed for βάσμος. Our poets continue to employ the termination *eth* whenever their feet or their rhyme demand it. Nor can it be quite obsolete in serious discourse so long as the commonly received version of the Bible is daily read and quoted in private and in public on Sundays and other days of worship. How much this Anglo-Saxon ending contributes to the euphony of the English, the student may ascertain by opening the Bible almost at random, as at such texts as the following: Isa. xliv. 14, 25; lv. 1, 2; lxiii. 1; Matt. vi. 4; John xiv. 5; Heb. i. 2, 7; ii. 18; vi. 7; xii. 6.

Euphony, less than brevity, was consulted in the alteration which contracted into one syllable the termination of the past tense, as in the words *drowned*, *walked*, *arrived*. Addison justly complains that this "has very much disfigured the tongue and turned a tenth part of our smoothest words into as many clusters of consonants. This is the more remarkable because the want of vowels in our language has been the general complaint of our politest authors." In some things, indeed, printers and talkers have for many years been changing our language, to the no small vexation of orators and poets.

Certain elements of our language are by Dr. Rush[1] called "Atonics," or "Aspirations," from their incapacity of intonation and their limited power of variation in pitch. These are, *p* as in *pipe*; *t* as in *tent*; *c* hard and *k* as in *cake*; *f* as in *fife*; *c* soft and *s* as in *cease*; *h* as in *he*; *th* as in *thin*; *sh* as in *push*. Of these sharp, abrupt consonants the hardest to pronounce are *p*, *t*, *k*. Next in difficulty of enunciation are the aspirated mutes, *f*, *th*, *h*. But perhaps the very worst are combinations of the two, as in *hotchpotch*. The abrupt consonants, as Mr. Alexander Bain[2] observes, are the most easily sounded in alternation with long vowels, as in *Attica*, *appear*.

The flat mutes, *b*, *v*, *d*, *th* as in *thine*, *g*, allow a certain continuance of voice, and are therefore more easily pronounced. Thus *above* is easier than *puff*; *go*, *thou*, than *cut*. The liquids, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, and the sibilants, *s*, *sh*, *z*, *zh*, all represent continuous sounds, which, for smoothness, more nearly resemble vowels, particularly when they do not terminate words; *e. g.*, *rain*, *loom*, *shame*, *leisure*. When these letters conclude words they are sometimes more abrupt, as in *her*, *slam*, *flash*, *phiz*. This class of consonants are less euphonious when they alternate with vowels, as in *elimination*, *clamminess*, *azure*. An abrupt and flat mute cannot be easily pronounced together, as *up*, *by*, *eke*, *go*. Even an intervening vowel, if short, does not suffice to make the enunciation easy; *e. g.*, *pab*, *keg*, *ted*. A long vowel or a combined liquid or sibilant will remove the difficulty, as in *toad*, *probe*, *trode*, *heed*.

In order to euphony, then, words should contain a due proportion of consonants, and especially of liquids, as *elementary*, *fortitude*, *capacity*.

Long words are generally more agreeable to the ear than monosyllables. One reason of this is that in such cases two accented syllables never meet. And yet not a few phrases composed of monosyllables have, when read with proper emphasis, the musical effect of an equivalent long word.

Avoid if possible the use of compound words, the several parts of which are not closely united, and consequently are not easily enunciated as one word, as *unsuccessfulness*, *barfaccdness*, *wrongheadedness*. Mr. Manwaring taught that a cretic before a dactyl makes a good cadence; *e. g.*, "What will this end in but treacherous knavery?" but that a spondee before a dactyl is bad, as when we substitute *downright* for treacherous. Mr. Mason, however, thinks the latter close quite as good as the former; but this word

[1] Philosophy of the Human Voice. [2] English Comp. and Rhet., p. 111.

is not a good spondee, as the short syllable is almost a long one, and as the word, being compound, admits a pause between its two parts. This rule also applies to compound verbs, as *put off*, *look on*, *come at*. We should except cases where the preposition and verb easily coalesce, as *withdraw*, *undertake*, *overset*. Shun likewise the use of such words as have the syllables which follow the accented syllables crowded with consonants that do not readily coalesce, as *questionless*, *chroniclers*, *conventiclers*.

Employ not such words as have too many syllables following the accented syllable, as *primarily*, *cursorily*, *circumstances* ; nor such words as have a short or unaccented syllable followed by another short or unaccented syllable very much resembling it, as *holily*, *sillily*, *lowlily*, *farriery*.

Shun words which have too many open vowels in succession, causing a disagreeable aperture of the mouth, and resembling in sound the language of the Algonquins, as *bamboozle*, *coöperate*, *zoölogical*.

Long vowels in unaccented syllables should, if possible, be avoided, as *a* in *reprobate*, *ow* in *follow*, *u* in *contribute*. And yet some words there are which allow us more time to pronounce these vowels, as us*u*al, mount*a*ineer, melody.

Guard against a collision of consonants, as in the words *hedg'd*, *fledg'd*, *drudg'd*, *adjudg'd*. This often happens when the vowels, if not omitted, are short and accented, as *scratched*, *strengthened*, *fifthly*. Would that we could revive the older and better pronunciation which added a syllable to the current ultimate.

Euphony demands a proper alternation of long and short or of accented and unaccented syllables, as *degree*, *report*, *consider*.

Hitherto we have treated of euphony in its relation to single words. Let us now consider the subject of *junctura*,[1] in so far as it concerns the euphonious connection of two or more words.

Words of similar length, accent, or opening or closing syllable, should be either avoided or kept at a distance from one another; *e. g.*, "Peter was needy, feeble, and peevish." Cicero was often rallied on account of this line, *O fortunatam natam me consule Romam*.

Avoid such tautophonies as the quick succession of several genitives with the preposition *of* prefixed; *e. g.*, "the consideration *of* the truth *of* the doctrines *of* the Church *of* Rome."

Repeat not similar syllables or sounds at the end of one word

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1 Cicero De Orat., L. iii. c. xliii; Orat, §44, 45; Quint., L. ix., c. iv., §32–43.

and the beginning of the next, thus: "Ano*ther there*fore *may make* a *due use* of the command*ment men*tioned."

Prepositions in compound words should not be repeated after them, as, "an *in*quiry *into*," "an *in*sight *in*to." These phases are indeed sanctioned by usage, but both euphony and analogy demand that the former be "an inquiry concerning" or "as to," and the latter "an insight of."

And, in spite of usage, a word terminating with a vowel distinctly heard, should, if convenient, be followed by a word beginning with a consonant. When, on the contrary, a word closes with a consonant, we should, if possible, place after it a word beginning with a vowel, as, "in respect of," rather than "with respect to."

Guard against two accented syllables in succession, as "an entire absence," "a correct record." Also beware of a long succession of unaccented syllables, as "the exigencies of our eleemosynary institutions."

Alliteration, like rhyme and assonance, should not often occur in prose except accidentally. Especially ought we to guard against beginning successive words with the letters *w* and *s*. An expletive will sometimes prevent an alliteration of two hard sounds, as "we do wipe" (Luke x. 11). The alliterations which abound in the sermons of Dr. Chalmers are agreeable because spontaneous.

Pope, in the following lines of his Essay on Criticism, has shown by examples in the verses themselves how untunable are collisions of vowels, the intrusion of expletives, and a procession of long monosyllables:

> "These equal syllables alone require,
> Though *oft* the *ear* the *open* vowels tire;
> While expletives their feeble aid do join,
> *And ten low words oft creep in one dull line.*"

Dante puts into the mouth of a stupid giant certain unmeaning words in which the broad vowel *a* frequently recurs:

Raphel mai amech izabi almi.

Euphony is promoted by a due alternation of words of different length, and especially by avoiding several long words in succession.

We should remember, however, that euphony may be cultivated to excess, and harsh combinations of sounds are sometimes admissible for the sake of preventing a satiety of mellifluous words. Besides, the sense to be conveyed not unfrequently demands what are in themselves very disagreeable sounds. When Milton is describing the gate of hell turning on its hinges, the words have a

jarring, harsh, and grating sound; when representing the opening of the gate of heaven, the words, like the golden hinges themselves, emit celestial melodies. In some measure applicable to the orator is Pope's well-known advice to the poet:

> "Soft is the strain when zephyr gently blows,
> And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;
> But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,
> The hoarse rough verse should like the torrent roar."

Of the famous couplet of Denham, elsewhere considered, Mr. Crowe[1] observes that it has but one sibilant, and this (*s*) being at the beginning of the word, does not dwell upon the ear; neither has it any strong aspirate. In the first line *r* is the only rough consonant, neither is there any broad vowel or diphthong, while the vowels in *gentle*, *not*, and *dull*, are combined with the liquids *n* or *l*. In the second line, the word *strong* has a broader vowel and a larger combination of consonants. The broad diphthong *ou* and the letter *r* occur repeatedly, but as these are tempered by letters of a different quality, viz., short *i* and by long *o*, they are sonorous, but not rough. It may be so subjoined that the arrangement of the long and short vowel sounds here well harmonise with the sense.

These things are indeed of most importance to the poet, and yet the orator cannot afford altogether to neglect them. All the followers of Isocrates, it would appear, bestowed too much attention upon these small matters, while Demosthenes evidently inclined to the opposite extreme. As to Cicero, we must think, in spite of Quintilian's opinion to the contrary, that both in his orations and didactic works, he was far too careful about these things. Be this as it may, the English preacher will find that the style will be euphonious in proportion as it is popular, so that if he aims to be understood and felt by all, he will naturally observe a euphony which art cannot greatly improve. It will be chiefly when he is expressing sentiments magnanimous, grand, and magnificent,[2] that he will have occasion to give to his diction any uncommon degree of harshness.

Subsection X.—Onomatopœia.

The imitative or suggestive properties of words may contribute not only to grace, but also to energy and perspicuity of style. They are, according to Dionysius,[3] discovered in the Greek poets, more

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1 Laws of Versification, p. 226.

2 Demetrius Phalereus, De Elocutione, sec. 48. 3 De Comp. Verb., sec. 16.

especially in Homer, but the fact is that they may be traced in all literary compositions, ancient and modern. Philologists are now studying them as among the clews to a knowledge of what language essentially is. We here discuss the resemblance of sound and sense as related to gracefulness. This resemblance has been frequently detected; first, in words denoting sounds; secondly, in words representing motions; thirdly, in some words that are supposed to express emotions and passions.

1. Of the first class, the Hebrew of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New afford many examples, as the Hebrew kārā and the Greek *kradzo* for the English *cry*, because of fear or joy, or Heb. hālăl, Gr. *ololutzo*, to cry aloud dithyrambically in prayer or praise.

Not only in words, but phrases also, do the sounds echo the sense, as in the original of Job xxvi. 11: "The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his reproof." Also Psa. xviii. 7: "Then the earth shook and trembled; the foundations also of the hills moved and were shaken because he was wroth."

2. The last example seems to express not only sound but motion, and therefore belongs partly to the second class. It is indeed very observable that such words as describe motion belong essentially to the first class, because it is principally by the different sounds made by different motions that these words represent them. The English words *precipitation* and *impetuosity* are instances of this remark. Thus in Hebrew slow motion is expressed by dādāh. The word for slippery places, helăklăkkōth, imitates the sound of withdrawing the foot from the mire. In Psa. xxxviii. 10, "my heart *panteth*"—Heb. sehărhăr. In the original of Psa. xviii. 10, "And he rode upon a cherub, and did fly: yea, he did fly upon the wings of the wind," we hear the sound of a swift vibratory motion like that of pinions. In the original, from verse 13, "The Lord thundered in the heavens, and the Highest gave his voice," we hear first the sharp and near fall of the bolt, and then the redoubling of the thunder among the mountains. Both the motions and the sounds of ocean waves are imitated in this line:

> "Dark-heaving, boundless, endless, and sublime."

Campbell and his disciples condemn Pope for using the Alexandrine to describe quick motions, as in the lines:

> "Flies o'er th' unbending corn, and skims along the main.
> . . . . . .
> Thunders impetuous down, and smokes along the ground."

But after criticism has opposed these verses to the utmost, they

still remain as admirable examples of the power of the Alexandrine in expressing quick motions repeated over great distances which are divided into two parts. Witness, too, how the conjunction *and* describes the transition from the hill to the plain and from the land to the sea. The final stopping of an old clock is admirably represented in the following lines from Dryden's tragedy of Œdipus. The speaker announces the death from mere old age of a person whose life had been prolonged

> "Till, like a clock, worn out with eating time,
> The wheels of weary life at last stood still."

3. As to the third class, usage has decided that there are some states of mind that are occasioned by or have an analogy to the sensations produced by sounds or motions. That part of the theory of number which demands that we should employ strong or feeble feet according as our subject is grave or lively, and vary them according to the nature of the thought or feeling, is founded on this mysterious principle. We may add to this what is implied in not a few metaphorical adjectives, as *rough* or *soft* applied to manners, or *quick* to the temper, and *turbulent* to the passions.

Subsection XI.—Dignity.

By this term we here intend the use of such a diction and style as are worthy of the speaker, the hearers, the nature of the subject, the character of the thoughts, and the object of the discourse. There may indeed be gracefulness of an inferior kind without dignity, or even propriety (which we may regard as a species of dignity), but both are requisite to gracefulness of a high description. The classic rhetoricians often restricted the term to designate propriety and elegance in the use of tropes and figures; but it can be best determined by answering wisely the questions, Who? What? Where? By what means? How often? For what purpose? In what manner? At what time?

Properly to vary the manner of expression is, according to Isocrates,[1] among the things that demand great talents and diligence. Language that would be grand in one speech would be tumid in another; while low words become ridiculous when found in discourses of the demonstrative kind.[2] Some of Virgil's critics have

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1 Oratio V. contra Sophist.

2 Arist., Rhet., L. iii., c. vii.; Cicero, De Orat., L. iii., c. xxiv.; Quint., L. viii., c. iii.; Log., c. i.; Segneri, Arte Predicar Bene, Trat. iv., chap. xxii.

illustrated the nature of rhetorical dignity by their comments on one of his lines in his Eclogues, and repeated with one alteration in his Georgics. In the fifth eclogue (verse 37), the shepherd, according to some copies, thus complains of the barrenness of his land:

"Infelix lolium et steriles nascunter avenae."

But in the Georgics (L. i., v. 154), instead of the plain word *nascunter*, grow, the poet substitutes a metaphor, *dominantur*, command. In the former poem, composed in the low style, it was proper for the shepherd to speak in familiar terms; but in the latter, which belongs to the middle style, where the poet speaks in his own person, and addresses the greatest men in Rome, a metaphor drawn from government is agreeable to the dignity of the author and of his readers.[1]

The quality under consideration is not, in its general relations, foreign to any part of rhetoric, although it is more strictly a part of the subject of adaptation. It is here, be it observed, considered chiefly in its relation to gracefulness. Dignity is best exemplified by the preaching of Christ, of the apostles, and prophets; but in order to the most profitable study of the inspired addresses, with a view to the cultivation of the sense of rhetorical propriety, we have to take a comprehensive survey of the circumstances of person, motive, subject, audience, time, and place. Thereby, and thereby alone, can we secure ourselves against the temptation to put on a false dignity of style. Arnobius,[2] a converted rhetor of Sicca, in Africa, and the teacher of Lactantius, defends the Scripture style by an appeal to the example of the pagan philosophers themselves: "Some philosophers properly adopted a vulgar manner of style when they might have spoken with greater elegance and richness, lest, forsooth, they might impair the stern gravity of speech, and revel rather in the pretentious show of the sophists. For indeed it evidences a worthless heart to seek enjoyment in matters of importance; and when you have to deal with those who are sick and diseased, to pour into their ears dulcet sounds, not to apply a remedy to their wounds." On the other side lurks the danger of attempting to awaken emotion by the deliberate sacrifice of dignity. When we analyse the ground of some preachers' power, we find that it resolves itself into fetches and surprises, wherein the speaker runs lightly towards an abyss of profanity or an inorganic deep of nonsense, and then, turning on his heel, makes his escape to less dangerous ways. Or else they occasionally venture

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1 Ward's Oratory, vol. i., pp. 156, 157. 2 *Adversus Gentes*, L. i., c. lix.

indirectly to suggest sentimental and romantic ideas. They touch upon amorous themes, as Jeremy Collier says the chorus in the *Trachiniæ* do; they glide along like swallows upon the water; they skim the surface without dipping a feather.

Straightforwardness of style is promotive of its dignity. Haply it was an analogous directness of step which Agur admired in a lion, a greyhound, a he-goat, and a king (Prov. xxx. 29–31).

Everything considered, we are inclined to adopt the opinion of Cicero,[1] that propriety or dignity of style is not a thing that can be taught. Any how, it can only be taught in a negative or fault-finding way. And yet hereto we can hardly apply the maxim of Chrysostom,[2] that the artist should be allowed to be the proper judge of his own work. We should rather hearken to those who from time to time venture to criticise our sermons, although they are perhaps either ignorant or malicious, or even both combined. Luther says that a good preacher should be willing to be vexed and criticised by everybody.

Subsection XII.—Naturalness and Individuality of Style.

Another essential property of the graceful is naturalness. No action that is either improper to the race to which the agent belongs, or unsuitable to him as an individual, can be unfeignedly graceful. In personal traits there is a mysterious charm which art can never counterfeit with any tolerable success, for it is the work of the great Creator. This is especially observable of style. Our interest in many very faulty compositions is owing to the fact that the language and the manner of expression are faithful not only to the thoughts, but above all to the peculiar qualities of the writers. This it is that confers a lasting value on many volumes of published correspondence, and causes us to set great store by certain letters of our friends, which are devoid of important matter, and even blemished with levity and nonsense. We treasure them because they are the characteristic effusions of a well-known mind.

Still more graceful are the honest, spontaneous, and fearless utterances of the Christian whose individuality is composed of two natures, the old and the new, partly at war and partly in alliance. And hence in every true preacher there is an individuality which is as much beholden to grace as to nature. This twofold life ought to pervade the sermon. It is this that gives features and complex-

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1 De Orat., L. i., c. xxix. 2 De Sacerdotio, L. v., c. v.

ion to a discourse, whilst almost endless combinations of phases in Christian experience and in humanity contribute not a little to the unfailing variety and freshness of the ordinance of preaching.

Some bold critics have characterised the respectives styles of the sacred speakers and writers with more confidence than reverence and judgment. Malachi is, they say, a dialogistic reasoner, Habakkuk sublime, Nahum bold, Micah has vehemence and tenderness, Amos energy and graphic vividness, Hosea abruptness and fiery brevity, Ezekiel is marked by imagery, detail, erudition, repose, and unity of application; Jeremiah is at once plaintive and practical; Isaiah is mainly energetic and exultant, but also the versatile master of all styles. Now, while we are not disposed to censure any fair rhetorical analysis of the sacred *compositions*, we must deprecate the practice of attempting thence to determine the idiosyncrasies, peculiar capacities, and respective styles of the inspired *writers themselves*. In the case of such a prophet as Isaiah, or Jeremiah, or Ezekiel, who has left us many of his inspired addresses, we can perhaps be permitted to speak of their rhetorical peculiarities with modest assurance; so may we likewise speak of the dictional qualities of St. John and St. Paul, both of whom were inspired to write or speak on different subjects. The simplicity, directness, the particularity, and emphasis of St. John's style, as exhibited in his gospel and epistles, are less observable in treating the prophetic themes which occupy the book of Revelation, where the rhetorical qualities of an Ezekiel, a Daniel, and a Zechariah are blended with his own. As to St. Paul, we gather from his epistles, his speeches, and his discourse entitled "The Epistle to the Hebrews," that his style adapted itself admirably to the matter in hand; that in his speeches before his judges his style was suited not only to his special aim as an apostle, but to judicial oratory in general; that in his sermon before a Hebraising church he adopted a style of alternate argument and exhortation, such as was every way proper for a religious discourse of that nature; that in his epistles he shows that open-heartedness, variety, negligence, and animation which the epistolary style demands, and at the same time those Christian virtues which became an apostle in writing on the most solemn subjects to the churches he had planted. Dr. Hug said he "would like to compare St. Paul with Isocrates, whose letters to Demonicus, and some of those to Nicocles, bear a certain resemblance to St. Paul's in design and purport." In thus wishing to bring together these letters, Dr. Hug showed that he had received a more thorough rhetorical training than most theologians and Biblical scholars have received; for they are often found com-

paring St. Paul's *epistles* with classic Greek or Latin *orations*. Dr. Friederich Köster has endeavoured to prove that St. Paul modeled the language of his epistles, to a considerable extent, upon the orations of Demosthenes! He acknowledges, however, that the apostle's "acquaintance with Demosthenes in no way destroyed his own individuality, nor his Rabbinical erudition, nor the impulse of his fiery spirit, which hurries him forward with such facility into parentheses, anacolutha, and negligent arrangement of words that are far from Demosthenean." If any one has written largely on various subjects, we may, after long study of his works, recognise his style, "just as," to borrow a simile from Sextus, "a man knows a friend under all the various casts and turns of his countenance." Thus he who has daily for many years read the sermons of the celebrated French preachers will easily detect the logic of Bourdaloue, the pathos of Massillon, and the sublimity of Bossuet. We concur, however, with the learned Jeremiah Jones[1] in the opinion that a person may be easily deceived in this matter; and therefore there is need of the greatest care and long and intimate acquaintance with an author before we venture to judge of the character of his style.

But, in order to examine this subject more closely, let us now inquire what is naturalness of style? We answer, those qualities which are found peculiar to an individual when science and art have developed what is good and removed what is bad among his personal characteristics. It is only by knowledge and training that our natural gifts and energies can be discovered and distinguished from such wrong prejudices and bad habits as are the results of false instruction in early life.

Naturalness may be, and often is, understood to be that quality which is peculiar to an individual, or peculiar to that which is written or spoken by him *spontaneously* on any occasion, at any period of life. In this sense the communications of the most ignorant and immature minds may have a seeming naturalness; but in many cases of this kind it is ultimately found that what first appeared natural was sheer affectation, the chequered effect of indiscriminate imitation, or the random effusion of brazen independence, or else the modest mistake of one who has a wrong object or an unwise aim. This kind of naturalness may sometimes be confounded with what the French term naïveté, or that which is natural to a child, or the involuntary and unconscious simplicity of a modest, right-minded, but ignorant person. As, however, naïveté is an at-

[1] Method of Settling the Canon, vol. i., p. 76 (Oxford ed., 1798).

tribute of single expressions or actions, it cannot in strictness be predicated of style, which is always supposed to be the instrument and the result of habit. The word natural is many a time used to designate what is familiar. Thus some speakers are commonly said to have a natural manner, who on all themes and occasions use a diction and delivery which are only proper for certain subjects of conversation. Some declare that what they have written or spoken is natural because they are certain that it is not the product of study or imitation, or any thought whatever. They conclude that what is not the manifest effect of art must be the effect of nature; whereas nature is not the inevitable antitheton of art. All the vices and bad habits that are contracted unawares, and all the nameless and mysterious blunders to which the unnatural is ever leading men, are equally remote from true nature and true art. Others, again, hold that the natural state of man is that to which he has a tendency, and hence that intellectual improvement is the natural style of human society, since history demonstrates that all nations have made some progress in the arts and sciences. And yet these writers do not undertake to maintain that there is in human society a tendency to moral progress. But we should recollect that most of the ancient nations at length visibly stopped and went backward in the cultivation of the arts and sciences, and that if some modern nations are kept from a similar pause in civilisation, and a similar return to barbarism, it is wholly owing to the regenerating power of the religion of Christ. This proposition is, however, best demonstrated by the undeniable growth of the juvenile intellect, and every man's progress in knowledge from early infancy to the period of senile decay. This is observable generally even in those nations which, as such, and on an average, have begun to return to savage life. This principle applied to rhetoric would warrant the inference that, in so far as one's natural style is traceable to his intellect, it is likely to be continually growing better, but that in so far as it is traceable to his heart, it is liable to be constantly changing for the worse. At any rate, the natural in style is in many actual cases found undergoing this twofold change, while the decline of spiritual life also operates indirectly upon style by retarding the progress of the intellect, sometimes to such a degree that the intellect is not merely brought to a stand-still, but likewise compelled to follow the retrogression of the heart. But far otherwise it is where sanctifying grace makes spiritual progress a kind of second nature. There the heart and the intellect do not pull each other in opposite directions, but propel and draw each other forward to the twofold profiting of rhetorical naturalness.

Now, as that kind of naturalness which true rhetoric approves is both discovered and improved by long study and practice, it may be of some service to the reader in determining this property to bear in mind the following criteria:

1. That which is not expressed with sincerity is either unnatural or culpably natural. Indirection and double-dealing do, indeed, appear to be natural to some men, as an extreme reserve is a personal characteristic of others. Men of either of these two classes may well ask themselves whether they ought to begin to preach before they have by the help of the Spirit of Truth begun to gain a mastery over their respective enemies. "The personality of the preacher should be a sanctified personality which shines in the light of Christ."[1]

2. As a want of sincerity may prompt us to an unnatural expression of our thoughts and feelings, so a lack of physical strength or soundness may, if long continued, have an influence on style. "Observation," says Professor H. N. Day,[2] "abundantly shows how a naturally imaginitive and highly impassioned style may be gradually changed into one that is dry and tame by the continual influence of the conviction that we are unable appropriately to deliver strongly impassioned discourse. A conscious power and skill to express with effect the most highly-wrought discourse will, on the other hand, ever be stimulating to the production of it." A good illustration of this remark is Cotta, as he is described by Cicero:[3] "He had a ready invention, and spoke correctly and freely; and as he very prudently avoided every forcible exertion of his voice, on account of the weakness of his lungs, so his language was equally adapted to the delicacy of his constitution. There was nothing in his style but what was neat, compact, and healthy; and (what may justly be considered as his greatest excellence), though he was scarcely able and therefore never attempted to force the passions of the judges by a strong and spirited delivery, yet he managed them so artfully that the gentle emotions he raised in them answered the same purpose and produced the same effect as the violent ones which were excited by Sulpicius." And the contrary is equally true, that an unsuitable style often produces an unfavorable effect on the delivery and the vocal organs of the preacher. Thus the man of ardour and sensibility, who habitually writes his sermons in a style proper for an essay or dissertation, is liable to impair his elocution and even his general health.

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1 Palmer, in *Homiletic*, p. 689.

2 Elements of the Art of Rhetoric, 2d Division, Pt. ii., c. iv. 3 Brutus, c. lv.

3. Beware of a favourite professor's manner of thinking, writing, and utterance. Richard Rothe, of Heidelberg, was in the habit of saying to graduating students, "Do your best to shake *me* off from you."

4. Preachers not a few are so anxious to preserve their official character and standing that they lose all naturalness, and acquire one or more of the various kinds of affectation. This may partly account for the historical fact that comparatively few ecclesiastics of high rank have ever been distinguished as popular preachers, or if they were popular in the early part of their ministry they ceased to be so in no long time after they were advanced, or rather degraded, to some new and coveted rank or title. The natural in style and delivery is not unfriendly to the preservation of official propriety, but it is ever in danger of being destroyed by the assumption of ecclesiastical dignity on the one hand, and on the other by too low an esteem for the official service of God.

5. What is natural to men in preaching on certain subjects or occasions would be unnatural to them if preaching on other subjects or occasions. And yet each preacher, when writing or speaking spontaneously, will betray some traits that are marked if not unique. One is distinguished for a particular habit of thought, or feeling, or method in treating all subjects; another for certain modes of expression on all occasions; some again have one almost uniform way of constructing their sentences; others draw their figures from their own favourite sources, or employ certain kinds of figures almost exclusively, or show an idiosyncrasy in the wording or application thereof. Some, alas! are ever inclined to the platitudinous, and as they shuffle along they make good the maxim, Via trita, via tuta.

6. A real and trusty naturalness being of slow growth and late maturity in most public speakers, that which is the natural style and delivery of most young preachers will consequently need to be checked, or spurred forward, or otherwise instructed. At this period the natural will demand the exercise of vigilance and self-denial. Always and chiefly ought they to guard against all the approaches of egotism and dogmatic positiveness. But the occasional use of the pronoun I is not necessarily egotistic. It may be the expression of the deepest humility.[1] A few young preachers, like Spencer and Summerfield, have exhibited peculiar traits which, along with their fervent piety, constituted the principal attraction and charm of their sermons. The preaching of Jeremiah, Luther,

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[1] Tholuck's Sermons, Biblical Cabinet, Edinburgh, vol. xxviii., pp. 93, 94.

Latimer, and Whitefield everywhere betrays the individual man without eclipsing in the least their themes. Their sermons will always have a special value for their refreshing naturalness. Their later sermons especially possess that fascination which a great, good, and deeply experienced soul ever has when it pours out all its thoughts freely and with unaffected simplicity. This it is that, more than anything else perhaps, characterises that indescribable quality which we term sweetness of style. "When the children say 'the blackberries are ripe,' I know," writes Mr. Donald G. Mitchell, "that they are black only, and I can wait. When the children report, 'the birds are eating the berries,' I know I can still wait. But when they say, 'the bees are eating the berries,' I know that they are at full ripeness." And yet, remarkably enough, this perfect sweetness of style is not often very popular. Most of the children of the kingdom prefer that red and green acidity which sets their teeth on edge.

And hence maturity in knowledge and in sanctification will develop a right individuality. In preaching both piety and nature should speak, but the former should speak first and oftenest. But still he who studies to be natural more than he studies to be pious may be very popular in a world where certain decorous vices are of all things the most popular. The rhetoric which Aspasia taught Pericles may have been far more fascinating to the degenerate Athenians than that which was taught by the more honest Anaxagoras.

7. Not only in self-examination but in giving our opinions of other men, we should remember that the Creator has made us differ, and that no endeavours of ours after "a symmetric development of the faculties"[1] can destroy this beautiful and needful diversity. "'Our beloved brother Paul writes,' says St. Peter, 'according to the wisdom given unto him.' But there are Peters in our days who would say, 'Paul is too learned. Away with these things which are hard to be understood. We should be more simple. I dislike all this reasoning.' And there are Pauls who would say, 'Peter is rash and unguarded. He should put a curb on his impetuosity.' And there are Johns who would say, 'They should both discharge their office in my soft and winning manner. No good will come of this fire and noise.'"[2] We frequently hear criticisms on innate peculiarities of style that are equally superficial and one-sided. "Some men," says Mr. Arthur,[3] "always treat richness

1 Palmer's Homiletik, p. 711.

2 Cecil's Remains.

3 Tongue of Fire; *cf.* Palmer's Homiletik, p. 700.

of style as if it were the result of effort, just as if deal, which always owes its colour to art, were to say of mahogany, or maple, or rosewood, 'What labour it must have been to produce all these shadings!' No labour whatever; it is all in the grain." But let no indolent and self-conceited reader take occasion from this principle to excuse every fault by saying, "It is my peculiarity." And we have to consider, that not only are we unlike one another, but that the preacher is in some sense a witness whose testimony may be weakened by the artificial and theatrical way in which he had been taught to give the same. We do well, therefore, to respect the scruples of those students who are unwilling to deliver sermons and prayers as exercises in elocution. Such were Stier and Rothe, who in their address to the authorities in Wittenberg Seminary held the following language: "We are convinced that the work of preaching is indissolubly bound up with the person of him who performs it and with his own living conviction; so that every testimony and every discourse of the preacher should be no other than the immediate and free utterance of the Spirit living in him." In his *Kerykti*k,[1] Stier stigmatises such rehearsals as profane, and maintains that "we must actually preach if we would learn to preach; that we cannot learn to preach effectively by rehearsing any more than we can learn to swim on dry ground, or to walk by sitting in a chair; and that he who has been wont to preach to benches as if they were men will afterwards preach to men as if they were benches." These difficulties he may in part overcome, either by composing sermons that are especially applicable to students, or, what is better, by reciting secular compositions under the superintendence of a competent professor, but by all means apart from other students, lest he unwittingly adopt the faults of one or more of them, or be discouraged by their unjust and abusive criticisms.

But may we not imitate? Certainly we may, and in some measure must. What, then, are we to imitate? In general, we answer, the peculiar excellences of the best orators. Thus Cicero imitates the energy of Demosthenes, the copiousness of Plato, and the sweetness of Isocrates.[2] But let us say here, once for all, that such imitation is perilous before we have thoroughly mastered the principles of rhetoric. This was the error of Hermogenes, who, in his wanderings among the beauties of his author, frequently lost sight of the great landmarks of oratory. This was also the error of the critic Aristophanes, and still more of his famous disciple, Aristar-

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1 Pp. 29–31; *cf.* Life and Labours of Stier, by his two sons.

2 Inst. Orat., L. x., c. i., sec. 108.

chus, who confined their admiration to the ten Attic orators whose lives Plutarch[1] briefly relates. The speeches of these they minutely analysed, commented on, and held up as models for imitation. As these unenlightened efforts to emulate the best qualities of several great orators were justly thought to cramp the genius and mar individuality, some went to the other extreme, and confined themselves to only one pattern, the best of its kind. Among these was Cardinal Bembo.[2] He made Cicero his exclusive pattern, and recommended his friends to confine themselves to the imitation of but one master. But Dr. Ward[3] thinks that this course is apt to lead to that stiffness of style which he detects in Bembo and other Ciceronians. Still, however, Bembo's way was none of the worst for reaching a pure Latinity. A third method is recommended by Quintilian[4] and Vossius.[5] They would have us first make choice of one only for a considerable time, the best of his kind, and then join with him one or more who most nearly approach him in excellence, and then others perhaps; but we should still continue to be most conversant with the first and best. Conformably to this is Sir Joshua Reynolds' counsel to young artists.[6]

In following, however, the advice of Quintilian and Vossius, which is, all things considered, the best, we must take some pains to select such models as are within the reach of our capacity; otherwise we may squander our time in quest of things unattainable. Cicero says that Nature herself led Sulpicius irresistibly into a successful imitation of the magnificent and noble style of Crassus.[7] And yet it is to be feared that many proceed very thoughtlessly in choosing their patterns, or rather, perhaps, they bestow much thought on their models, but none on themselves with a view of ascertaining, first, what is natural to them; next, how far, if at all, the defects of their nature may be most effectually remedied; and finally, to what degree or in what points their natural excellences are susceptible of improvement. Neither educators nor pupils have as yet valued highly enough this remark of Quintilian:[8] "Such a teacher, however he may wish everything that is right to be found in the highest excellence in his pupils, will not labour to any purpose in that to which he shall see that nature is opposed."

More especially should we beware of imitating too sedulously such distinctive qualities of great orators as force themselves upon

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1 In a separate book, usually bound up with his Morals.

2 Epist. ad J. F. Pico.

3 Oratory, vol. ii., p. 420.

4 *Ut supra*, L. x., c. ii., secs. 24–26.

5 De Imitate., c. xi., secs. 5, 6.

6 Discourse vi.

7 De Orat. L. ii., c. xxi.

8 B. x., c. ii., sec. 21.

general attention. The manner and peculiar marks by which great artists are distinguished, Sir Joshua Reynolds holds to be generally, if not always, real defects.[1] The same is true in general of great orators; for being themselves aware of their own distinguishing manner, they are apt to give it an undue prominence, as was the case of Cicero, who, knowing that he was particularly happy in his cadences, repeated too often his darling *esse videatur*. And in cases where an orator's peculiarities are not defects in him, they are liable to become defects in most of those who copy those distinguishing qualities, partly because they do not consider the many points of difference between them and their pattern, and partly because they copy such peculiarities in justification of their own depraved taste and tendency. "The dull and languid," says Quintilian,[2] "if they but express themselves in a long period, declare that Cicero would have spoken in like manner." Here again Reynolds'[3] advice to artists is applicable to speakers: "Instead of copying the touches of the great masters, copy only their conceptions; instead of treading in their footsteps, endeavour only to keep the same road. Labour to invent on their general principles and way of thinking. Possess yourself with their spirit. Consider with yourself: 'How would a Michael Angelo or a Raffaelle have treated this subject?'" Very instructive is the observation of Dr. Young, which we have quoted in our general Introduction: "He that imitates the Iliad is not imitating Homer;" and there is much in what Pope says of ancient models: "To copy nature is to copy them." It is notwithstanding needful to do something more than study and copy nature, as many suppose Homer to have done to the exclusion of all previous models. For it is probable, as Vossius[4] holds, that Homer availed himself of the productions of earlier writers; and Aristotle[5] teaches, what is obvious to all, that the father of poetry is much indebted to his invention, and has represented better men than any that have ever lived. To imitate this great epic bard, therefore, is to study nature, and to study those who have written on the same subject before us, and to work up in the imagination and the heart the materials thence collected. But still it is not always easy to determine how far we may borrow without acknowledgment. Of Cowley it is said that he wore the garb but not the clothes of the ancients. Our originality must be relative. In what manner and to what extent we may even imitate others is a difficult question to answer. Segneri publicly confesses in one of his

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[1] Discourse vi. [2] L. x., c. ii., sec. 17. [3] Discourse ii.
[4] De Poet. Græc., L. i. [5] Poetic, c. ii.

sermons (Quaresimale, ser. xxiv.) that he owes more to Chrysostom than to any other father.

Some things there are which have a tendency to impair individuality and a manly originality. Among these is a false liberalism which leads one easily to surrender articles of faith and industriously to enucleate heresies in order to find in their kernels great redeeming truths; and so he ultimately becomes a very uncharitable advocate of charity, and while playing the part of the Good Samaritan, eclipses his hero not only by befriending the body of the dead-alive Jew, but also by furnishing a donkey and an inn for his religion. Such a man was the late Rev. F. W. Robertson, of Brighton. Another way is habitually to put one's self in the place of errorists, and to *stay there*, in order to judge of their creeds and doings. Of this kind is Prof. John Ruskin,[1] who now confesses that he scarcely knows how far he thinks with other people's minds and how far he feels with their hearts. Akin to these habits is that of dealing in paradoxes and that of defending self-contradictions.

For various reasons certain preachers very seldom quote Scripture. Niemeyer would have Bible expressions banished from sermons, on the ground that they appear Hebraistic; others never quote Holy Writ, on the plea that it is not natural for them to do so; others, again, who confess that it is natural for them to quote it, defend themselves against the temptation, because, it seems, they feel that such quotations are in bad taste. But the question of taste is decided by the amount and manner of quoting. "The charm," says Gilfillan,[2] "which Scripture quotation adds to writing let those tell who have read Milton, Bunyan, Burke, Foster, Southey, Croly, Carlyle, Macaulay, yea, and even Byron, all of whom have sown their pages with this 'orient pearl,' and brought thus an impulse from divine inspiration to add to the effect of their own."

Demosthenes, as we are told,[3] imitated the speeches he found in Thucydides' history, and copied them with his hand eight times; Cicero emulated the great Attic orator in something more than his energy; for Dr. Ward[4] has proved that in five particulars, at least, he has followed the pattern he so justly admired. In the kindred arts of painting and sculpture imitation has been carried quite as far. Reynolds[5] thinks that the more extensive the artist's acquain-

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1 Christian Art and Symbolism, by Rev. R. S. Tyrwhitt, Preface, p. x. (London, 1872). 2 Bards of the Bible, p. 51.

3 Denis of Hal. and Plutarch. 4 Orat. Lect., L. iv.

5 Second and sixth Discourses; cf. Segneri, 'Arte di Predicar., Trat. vi., cap. ii.; Preaching and Public Speaking by A. Wykehamist, chap. i., p. 14.

tance is with the works of those who have excelled, the more extensive will be his powers of invention, and the more original will be his conceptions. He goes further, and maintains that even genius, at least what is generally so called, is the child of imitation, and that it was because Raffaelle employed others to draw for him what was in Greece and distant places, and because he took so many models that he became himself a model for all succeeding painters; always imitating and always original.

It is safe, however, for the preacher to imitate less closely than Cicero and Raffaelle were warranted in doing. So often has plagiarism been attributed to preachers (sometimes without any better grounds than the choice of the same subjects or texts), that it were wise to avoid not less the fault itself than every appearance thereof. True genius extracts knowledge from everything, but eats, digests, and assimilates it all into flesh and blood and bone. In such wise it makes everything its own. After all, both the mind that is consciously poor and the mind that is proud of its wealth have equal need to adopt the prayer of Agur (Prov. xxx. 8, 9).

In respect of the true Christian preacher, it should be considered that he can imitate the inspired style with more safety than the secular orator can, because his new nature is constantly bringing him into more and more harmony therewith. In some sense may it be said that in him the spiritual is coming to be the natural, so that at length nothing will be more natural to him than holy thoughts seeking utterance in their own holy diction.

Altogether, therefore, whatever is innocently peculiar and characteristic in him will not and should not be totally transformed. As we are Christians before we are preachers, so we may add (though the argument from priority has sometimes been abused) we are men before we are Christians.[1] The human, therefore, is to the two others what the earth is to the sea and the atmosphere—it is their foundation; and though the profiles of its mountains and the indentations of its coasts show an innumerable variety of shapes, yet they are all comparatively permanent. And what if the earth cannot reflect the sun in such diverse and changeful hues as the sky and the ocean can? Its marked features join to serve as an admirable foil of them both. Only let us guard against that perversion of this maxim which consists in being content with the foundation and the foil. No merely human qualities, however winning, can compensate for the want of high spiritual habits of feeling. The old pagan rhetoricians caught a glimpse of this when they recom-

[1] Stier's Keryktik, p. 170.

mended ἦθος and *auctoritas*,[1] or the expression of one's own character for honesty and good-will. If we are to move the hearts and consciences of our audience, we must convey to them the impression of something better than that which can be made by strong natural qualities. Before they will believe in us, they must be convinced that we are sincere, benevolent, and prayerful Christians; they much desire to behold individuality; still more do they desire to behold individuality transfigured. They would gladly see all their brethren of all nations on the way to Jerusalem, riding "upon horses and in chariots, and in litters and upon mules, and upon swift beasts," provided only they see likewise the festal new moon shedding its silver lustre upon the scene. They delight to contemplate the twelve different kinds of precious stones which garnish the foundations of the New Jerusalem, the jasper, the sapphire, and all the rest, on the one condition that they shall have the assurance that the "Lamb is the light thereof." And so in their minister would they behold not only the man but also the palpable evidence, the living demonstration that he is of God, an ambassador for Christ, fully accredited and declaring faithfully the means of reconciliation to God, and the conditions of the divine ultimatum.

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[2] Arist., Rhet., L. i., 2, 3–8; Cicero, De Orat., ii., 27, 115; Quint., ii, 8, 12.

BOOK IV.

ELOCUTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD DELIVERY.

ELOCUTION is theoretically a part of rhetoric, but practically it is now regarded by many as an independent art or science, demanding its own professors, text-books, and classes. This is all very well. But in order to an enlightened progress, elocution must ever remember that it is still a part of rhetoric, and that although the two may be prudently separated, yet they are never immiscible. Words are deep-rooting, and they who occupy themselves chiefly with whatever appears above ground, with the leaves, flowers, and fruits of vocables, run the hazard of forgetting the seeds whence they sprang, and what kind of soil and culture is the most friendly to their growth and fecundity. "But," it may be said, "is not the mere rhetor in danger of neglecting delivery?" Be it so; we are not careful to answer in this matter; all that we now ask is that elocution do not come to imagine that rhetoric is a part of itself, and so the handmaid be heir to the mistress.

The few materials which the Scriptures have provided for the discussion of this branch of our subject should, if we mistake not, admonish both preachers and hearers that it is possible to devote too much attention to the voice and gestures and the other comparatively small matters that pertain to pulpit delivery. And an impartial examination of modern church life must convince any one that whenever and wherever pulpit elocution, or church music, or spectacular worship has come to be demanded as an article of great value, and even of indispensable necessity, as a theme for æsthetical criticism, and one of the principal sources of sabbatic enjoy-

ment, then and there must it be considered as both an effect and a cause of deep and general declension in Christian devotion and morals.

Great is the absurdity of much of the current talk of church-goers about the voice, attitude, and gestures of preachers, accompanied as it most always is with total silence concerning the essential qualities of sermons. Suppose boys in our schools or students in our universities were in the habit of conversing, not about the subjects or the lessons and lectures, but about the quality or force of their instructor's voice, or the way he managed his eyes or hands, what could we reasonably expect from the culture and learning of the next generation? Nothing better than a self-sufficient and contented ignorance. What, then, can we justly anticipate, but the speedy death and burial of all Christian piety in congregations which turn away with disrelish from the truth and knowledge of God only to feed the senses with pulpit theatricals and melodious vanities. "Suppose," says Rowland Hill, "you were hearing a will read where you expected a legacy to be left to you; would you employ the time of its reading in criticising the manner in which the lawyer told you? You would not; you would give all ear to hear whether any legacy had been left you, and how much. That is the way I advise you to hear the Gospel."

The value of delivery has likewise been exaggerated by professors of elocution. They love to quote the traditions that have been brought down to us by Plutarch as to the very severe discipline to which Demosthenes subjected himself, in order to remedy his stammering and indistinctness. But they forget, that after all his self-training, Demosthenes never acquired such a delivery as was approved by well-educated men. For, we are told, that while it was very pleasing to the common people, yet the more cultivated, like Æsion and Demetrius, the Phalerian, considered it mean, humiliating, and unmanly. It is very doubtful whether this great orator ever attempted more than the removal of obstinate defects of speech, or at any time entertained a high esteem for elocution as it was in his day taught. "But did not Demosthenes once say most emphatically, that action is the first, second, and third requisite in oratory?" Cicero does certainly (De Oratore, lib. iii., cap. lvi.) teach us as much; but we are inclined to think this great rhetor was misled by accepting a doubtful rendering of a passage in Plutarch's Lives of the Ten Orators (ed. Reiskii, vol. ix., p. 360), which may be construed as follows: "But he was especially urged forward by the player, Andronicus, who told him that his orations were indeed very well, but that he was

still somewhat deficient in action; and then he repeated certain passages he had just delivered in the assembly. And Demosthenes believing what was told him, put himself under the instruction of Andronicus. Whereupon he asked him what was the first thing in oratory. He replied, "Action." What is the second? "Action." What is the third? "Action." Now, with all due submission, we cannot help thinking that this false but high-sounding reply was made by the actor himself, of whom it was characteristic, not by the orator Demosthenes, who could never have been provoked to give such a response except in irony. If we are to accept as genuine his speech against Lacritus (p. 937), we must admit that he entertained no very high opinion even of rhetoric as taught by Isocrates, and more than once has he expressed his contempt of delivery when separated from intelligence and virtue. Read his repeated sneers concerning Æschines' fine and well-trained voice. Read those sentences of his in which not only delivery but style, and even eloquence itself, are pronounced valueless in comparison of loyalty to the commonwealth.[1] Had it been generally known that he had taken such extraordinary pains to perfect himself in the art, and had he declared that delivery (not mere action or gesticulation) was the great secret of success in oratory, how could he have thus ventured to hold up Æschines' delivery to derision and contempt. One day, when his voice failed him in the midst of his oration, and he was therefore hissed by the people, he said to them: "Ye ought, indeed, to judge of players by their voice, but of orators by their mind." Nor did Cicero himself deem the labourious training proper for the actor necessary for the orator.[2]

Object not that these examples are exceptional, for we are happily not without universal authorities on the subject of pulpit elocution, although it must be conceded that they are almost wholly of a negative description. Many are the examples, precepts, and admonitions of Scripture about the affections of the preacher and the matter of his sermons, but we find not many in favour of a cultivated style, and very few in behalf of a finished delivery. The silence of the sacred writers on so many parts of this subject may be variously interpreted without undervaluing the art or discouraging the practice of elocution; but it is very comforting to those who, while they

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1 De Corona, p. 68, ed. Reiskii; cf. "Plutarch's Lives" and his Lives of the "Ten Orators."

2 De Orat., L. i., c. xvi., lix.; cf. Auctor ad Herenn. (L. i., c. ix.), who cannot regard delivery as the first requisite of the orator, nor admit that it has extraordinary power.

deem themselves called to preach the Gospel, are painfully conscious of a delivery incorrigibly perverse. "We wish," says Dr. Burgon,[1] "that men who attribute their want of success to their imperfect elocution would be content to bear in mind that in this respect Moses and St. Paul were as they are." The history of the pulpit is not wanting in instances of those who, like the mumbling Bishop Sherlock, and the stammering Richard Sibbes, and the bad-voiced Claude, in spite of very great infirmities and irregularities of speech, have preached with edification and distinguished success. We know very well what answer might be made to this; but we are not here, be it remembered, attempting to disparage the just importance of vocal discipline, or of such a delivery as seizes and holds the attention. And yet there is danger of assigning the art a place relatively too high; and great injury may result either from the most thorough instruction in a system that is false, or else from an immethodical or excessive or defective discipline in a system that is true.[2] And the same holds good of rhetoric.

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1 Pastoral Office, p. 173.

2 Archbishop Whately and others have been wrongly prejudiced against *all systems* of elocution *as such*. They have, however, not been slow to put forth their own theories and empirical observations on the subject, thus, after all, virtually conceding that herein much instruction is still reasonably and loudly demanded.

CHAPTER II.

ELOCUTION IN ITS SUBJECTIVE RELATIONS.

A GOOD delivery, like a good invention or a good style, has its source in a true inspiration. When the Divine Spirit speaks through the soul, there is an elocution such as no art can attain, for he is the originator of all perfect art that now addresses us; it is he who is wont to defy and master in his chosen speakers all the oppositions of the slow and stammering tongue, the feeble voice, and the awkward and unmeaning gesture. The great secular orator is both born and made; but the great sacred orator is more than this—he is born again, and sanctified and assisted by the Holy Ghost. It was the divine *afflatus* that caused the malicious to call Wesley an actor, and made Whitefield the envy of Garrick.

The Paraclete vouchsafes not only *immediate* aid, moral, intellectual, and physical, but likewise and more especially *mediate*. That spiritual help is the most substantial and the most trustworthy which is the fruit of that which the speaker received while engaged in solitary invention and composition. The chief difficulties in delivery are created by a neglect of preparation, which Robert Hall declared to be the first, second, and third requisite of preaching. But it is inspiration, be it remembered, that precedes and determines this intellectual preparation, or else the latter fails to impart to the matter of the sermon that form, life, and momentum which will secure an effective elocution. Help from the Divine Prompter is needed, and should always be sought for the time of the utterance; but who can so confidently ask spiritual assistance in bringing forth the sermon as he who all along implored that assistance during its gestation in his thoughtful soul?

Do we then set aside elocution as an art of no service to the young minister? Certainly not. So far from it, we have been endeavouring to show that the proper foundation of this art, as applied to preaching, is to be laid in a Scriptural pneumatology. This is the sum of what we have already taught in Chapter III., Book I. We may here go farther, and finally infer that all who teach elocution to divinity students ought to be men of piety; otherwise they

will be very liable to debase and secularise that which they were appointed to discover, correct, and develop. This they will be in danger of doing by one or more of these several ways:

1. By encouraging insincerity of speech. When an unregenerate man adopts the language of the true preacher, he can speak from the soul no farther and no otherwise than an actor is able to do. He must needs play the part of a dissembler, and is therefore a declaimer, and is almost certain to make his pupils such. Honesty is the first moral requisite of a good delivery.

2. By imparting to the students that lukewarmness which proceeds from a want of personal interest in the subject-matter delivered. How can any man express himself with a proper earnestness on religious themes when they are not home-felt and not regarded as matters of supreme concern? Let such a man attempt to read one of the sermons of Richard Baxter, or of George Whitefield, and how will he of necessity quench all its words of fire. Nor can any amount of study merely intellectual of such a sermon enable him to deliver it with the fervency of one who feels that the sentiments are to him of vital and eternal importance. To have no deep personal interest in religion is, therefore, a capital defect in a teacher of pulpit delivery. This point may be illustrated by the different success of Tertullus and Paul when they both pleaded before the Roman governor. "Tertullus," says Dr. John Smith,[1] "must have been eminent in his profession, otherwise he would not have been chosen by the high priests and elders as their pleader on an occasion which they deemed of such importance that they themselves took a long journey in order to be present at the trial. Yet this famous orator, with all his eloquence, made no impression upon Felix, whereas St. Paul moved him, charmed him, and made him tremble. Why? The one, a mere hireling, spoke what he did not feel, and substituted an artificial instead of natural eloquence. The other felt, deeply felt all he said, and therefore made others feel also. He spoke the words of truth, the earnest, unaffected language of the heart, and therefore he prevailed." Hence, as William Ames[2] observes, "just in proportion as affectation is discovered does power and efficacy diminish."

3. By teaching his pupils to deliver spiritual things in a natural way, instead of teaching them to deliver spiritual things in a spiritual way. Not a few of these men consider the conversational manner as the true standard of the natural, and the natural as the

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1 Lectures on the Sacred Office, Lect. xix.

2 Medulla Theologica, L. i., chap. xxxv., sec. 66.

true standard of the oratorical. Hear them read, in their conversational way, the 18th chapter of St. John's Gospel. Now we desire to know whether this is the natural which becomes the pulpit. Nature does notably teach us many serviceable things respecting modulation, emphasis, and cadence in the delivery of ideas merely human and secular; nay, even many necessary things concerning the right utterance of a sermon. While therefore we should be unwilling to ignore the teachings which we receive from the grave and pathetic language of common life, still it must be remembered that no man's delivery of sermons is to stand or fall by the decisions of those who have certain scanty and arbitrary notions of "the natural manner," to which, as they insist, everything must conform, or else be totally condemned. Archbishop Whately, in his zeal for a "natural manner," condemned all instruction in elocution as unfriendly to the preservation of such manner; but he appears to have had in view the many and minute rules and marks of Sheridan and Walker for managing emphasis and modulation. As against such authors his inculcations are just; but in relation to the whole subject they set forth only one side of the truth. Whoever, I take it, would teach the natural manner of speaking in public, must begin with the maxim that the tone (*cantus dicendi*) of the pulpit, the senate, and the bar ought to be different not only in degree, but also in kind, from the tone of elegant conversation. Cicero discriminates between the tones proper to each. The Catuli were praised for *talking* in a voice neither languid nor songful (De Offi., L. i., c. xxxvii.); but Cnæus Lentulus is said to have owed his success as an *orator* partly to this same songful voice (Brutus, c. lxvi.). Not less to elocution than to exegesis do these words of the apostle Paul apply: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Only think how incapable an unregenerate man is of fathoming the experimental depths of the Prophets and the Psalms, or of any discourse that has legitimately grown out of them, and that has derived from them its life and fruitage. There are passages in these parts of Scripture which none but the most advanced Christians can unfold and apply with anything like the requisite kind and degree of spiritual feeling.

4. By inability to teach others the necessity of suiting vocal expression in each sermon to the dominant and pervading feeling in which it was composed, and which gives it a practical unity; or where the necessity is not underrated, by failing to acquire a holy skill in adapting the delivery to such feeling. Exceedingly various

are the spiritual moods—almost as various, indeed, as are the subjects of sermons. A certain animated monotone, a varied unity of sentiment and of tone runs through many religious discourses. It corresponds to that "level speaking" which actors admire, and for which the elder Kean was distinguished. Not to pitch too high, and not too low, but to take the key-note of the subject is the easy instinct of a Christian sensibility. Here devout feeling is the best schoolmaster, in spite of the fact that most secular elocutionists, in their ignorance of its nature, habitually ridicule and silence it. In their just war with cant, sing-song, and other forms of religious affectation, they too frequently invade the territory of their best friends, and carry death and desolation into sacred fields and holy temples. Emotions of a religious nature may find expression in the broken sounds of animated talk, or in the stormful undulations of heated debate; but Christian affections are too deep and too steady to be thus tossed about for any long time. The emotions are many-voiced waves, and everywhere audible, which rise and run and fall upon the vast and mighty but slow-paced tide of the affections, whose deep undertone is seldom heard except by ears that the Wonderful has healed.[1]

5. Not only does the unregenerate teacher of elocution fail to produce the effects which flow from gracious affections and habits of Christian feeling, but also those which proceed from a holy semi-inspiration—from that *afflatus* which affords immediate and special aid for each occasion of speaking. This is that refreshing breeze from the presence of the Lord which braces with superhuman energy every moral and intellectual faculty, which lifts up the head with humble confidence, and imparts to the voice, the look, and the gesture a peculiar life, dignity, and attractiveness. How imperfect are the greatest miracles of elocutionary art without this! They are what the temple of Solomon was before the Shekinah had as yet descended to its throne-room between the cherubim. They are without their complete dedication and their central and crowning glory. David more than once employs a word which has been translated variously, *tongue*, *soul*, *glory*.[2] Whichever may be the best rendering here, certain it is that when the tongue gives faithful expression to the inspired soul it is the authentic glory of the human tabernacle.

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[1] As music is the universal language of the affections and emotions, the student who is skilled in this art will study advantageously Dr. Comstock's "*Vocal Gymnastics*," and Professor G. J. Webb's treatise on "*Purity of Tone*," appended to Mr. Russell's "*Vocal Culture*." [2] Psa. xvi. 9; xxx. 12.

But while we can hardly urge these considerations with too much insistence, we must, on the other hand, keep clear of an excessive inwardness in preaching, whereby we mean a habit of setting up our own emotions as the dictators of the matter, the manner, and occasions of our discoursings. Hernhutt[1] and others, misinterpreting, as we think, Rom. xii. 6, advise us, whenever we do not find ourselves in a frame for persuading, to confine ourselves to exposition; and Pregizer[2] would sometimes say to his congregation, "I am not properly prepared; let us go over and hear the minister in the next village." When a preacher like Thauler finds himself unregenerate, he may be justified in imposing a silence both sudden and long on his unhallowed tongue; and although, as Vinet says, we would be always eloquent, yet honesty and real efficacy alike demand that we should never force our spiritual mood, but should sometimes content ourselves with being cold and feeble. We are not, bless God, commissioned to preach out of ourselves alone. Some preach argumentative sermons in times of spiritual desertion, but reasonings without spirituality are as dangerous to our hearers as exposition without application. Is there then no help for us? None whatever, unless in answer to prayer, assistance shall quickly descend, or unless some other preacher, more blessed, shall fill the void with a gracious address.

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[1] Vinet's Pastoral Theol., p. 194. [2] Palmer's Homiletik, p. 699.

CHAPTER III.

PROPHETIC EXPRESSION AS MODIFIED BY FEELING.

As to the utterance of the Scripture preachers, especially of the Hebrew prophets, we have but little positive knowledge. The prophet Isaiah was on one occasion commanded to 'cry aloud . . and to lift up his voice like a trumpet' (lviii. 1); but it would be unreasonable to think that the tone which became reproof for hypocrisy was employed in all the prophet's varied ministrations. Again, when Jehovah said to Ezekiel (xxxiii. 32), "Lo, thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice and can play well on an instrument; for they hear thy words, but they do them not," we are not forced to conclude that the prophet had a pleasant voice. The Lord informs him that the divine messages he delivered were received by the people just as they listened to the song of a minstrel, for their amusement, and not for their amendment and reformation. The false prophets and prophetesses of the East were *chirpers* and *mutterers* (Isa. viii. 19).

It is from partial inductions that De Wette, Knobel, Ewald, and other such writers assert that the vocal expression of the prophets was fiery and spasmodic. The speaker, according to them, had the look and manner of men half insane. He fell into violent convulsions at the moment of being surprised by some new idea. He raved and vociferated. But we have in Book I. proved that this real or dissembled madness characterised the false prophet, not the true. And we would do well if we here discriminated between the psychological state of the prophets while they were receiving their messages from the Divine Spirit and their psychological state while they were delivering those messages. This distinction is no mere splitting of words, but valuable on many accounts; and were we here called to discuss the whole subject of the prophetic inspiration, we might show some of the advantages of always keeping it in view. What chiefly concerns us now is the fact that none of the Scripture instances of the extraordinary effects of the Spirit on the bodies and minds of holy men have any reference to *delivery*. See

what is said of Abraham (Gen. xv. 12); of Isaiah (vi. 5–8); Ezekiel (i. 28); Daniel (viii. 27; x. 8–10, 15–17); John (Rev. i. 17). Thus did the true prophets stand in direct contrast with the priestesses of Apollo and other soothsayers, who never began to be in ecstasy or intoxication before credulous consulters approached them with bribes in their hands. The Pythian prophetesses and sibyls are described by ancient writers as uttering oracles with dishevelled hair, rolling eyes, foaming mouth, and furious voice. They whirled around through the temple, scattering the tripods which stood in their way. And the more they looked and acted like insane persons the more fully inspired they were believed to be; and consequently, as Plutarch and others inform us, they took stimulants and narcotics to increase their furor and madness. Wherefore many of the Christian fathers, in opposition not only to the heathen oracles and prophets, but to their Christian brethren, the Montanists, maintained that the true prophets *spoke* with conscious intelligence and in a calm and sober manner. With the prophetic ecstasy as a purely psychological question, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Basil, Chrysostom, and Jerome had little or no business. They were content to show that the heavenly wind blew not overwhelmingly.

While on the one hand their delivery was marked by no wild and raving vociferations, was it, on the other, equally removed from cant and sing-song? The *arithmus* or number of the Hebrew eloquence does undoubtedly intimate to us that they must have had something like a *subcantus*, or a measured tone, more perceptible in the vocal renderings of the Hebrew prophets, and slightly so, perhaps, in that of the Great Teacher himself. In reading some of these inspired sermons we almost unavoidably fall into it; and if we regard the words more than the sense, we easily descend into sing-song. The Puritans and the Covenanters appear to have contracted the habit of canting from their frequent endeavours to express their exalted ideas of the Lord's perfections and of his wonderful works. Besides, their love to the Messiah and to their neighbours was too devoted to find any fitting utterance in the talking tones of our rationalistic preachers. This habit would be further strengthened by exactitude and formality in repeating Holy Writ, and by that hoarseness and feebleness of throat and lungs (often the effect of excessive exertions of the voice) which, as Quintilian[1] says, seeks relief in an offensive and unnatural kind of singing—*deformi cantico*. And yet, according to John Mason,[2] George

[1] L. xi., c. iii., s. 13.

[2] Essays on Poetical and Prose Number and Elocution, p. 17.

Gregory,[1] and George Gilfillan,[2] this singing or canting tone often deeply affected the hearers, and many a time melted them all into tears. It also had the merit of being well heard at a considerable distance. Whitefield, who had a voice of singular melody and compass, was playfully said to *cant*.[3] He who is compelled to preach in the open air or in very spacious churches must adopt at least an imperceptible chanting if he means to be audible from afar. This concealed singing is, under certain limitations, approved both by Cicero and Quintilian. The latter considers it one of those varieties of tone which proceed from an impulse of nature, and which are needed for the proper utterance of certain kinds of thought and feeling. Hence he teaches that these words of Cicero (Pro Archia, c. viii.), "Rocks and deserts respond to the voice of the poet," etc., should be delivered in a *cantus*, and that it is this which Cicero attributed to Demosthenes and Æschines. As each of these Greek orators reproaches the other with sing-song, Quintilian fairly infers that both were addicted to it. The *cantus obscurior* did not in their speeches take the form of an affected and unvarying modulation, but of occasional higher notes, which were demanded for the fitting delivery of the more impassioned sentences. And Quintilian subjoins words which we commend to the attention of those elocutionists who are resolved to know nothing but the conversational manner: "It was not assuredly in a straightforward tone of voice that Demosthenes swore by the defenders of Marathon and Platæa and Salamis, nor was it in the monotonous strain of daily talk that Æschines bewailed the fate of Thebes."[4]

As to rate of oral rendition we know little, but may well believe that the prophets and orators of ancient times spoke more slowly than their writings are now commonly read. Even Cicero, a "master of the music of speech," had, at least in his later years, a deliberate and measured delivery. Seneca[5] compares it to pacing or ambling: "*Cicero . . gradarius fuit.*" Luther, alluding to this comparison, says that "to speak deliberately and slowly best becomes the preacher; for thereby he may the more effectually and impressively deliver his sermon."

One practical deduction from these facts is that he who would be heard distinctly and agreeably should, as already hinted, culti-

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1 On the Composition and Delivery of a Sermon (near the end).

2 Martyrs and Heroes of the Church of Scotland, p. 152.

3 Walpole's Letters, vol. ii., p. 154.

4 Cicero, Orat., c. xviii.; Quint., L. xi., c. iii., §60, and §166–168.

5 Epist. xl. 6 Table Talk, §408; cf. Forcyth's Life of Cicero, vol. ii., 327.

vate the musical powers of his voice, whether they be tenor or base, alto or baritone. It is true that the best voice is that which draws no attention to itself; and yet whoever would be heard by the most distant member of a large congregation will do well to avail himself of the peculiar musical qualities of his voice. These may be kept so subordinate as to be imperceptible to all except those who listen for the purpose of criticising them. That modulated sounds are the most audible has frequently been shown by the example of the housewife, who, when she calls her distant husband or child, does not shout, put pitches her voice to a musical key, and of the clergymen in the cathedrals, who, in order to be heard by all the worshippers, intone the service. It was the melody of Whitefield's voice that, among other things, so well qualified him for an open-air preacher: Franklin said that it produced in him the same kind of pleasure he felt in listening to music. While he was one day preaching in Philadelphia, the words, "And he taught them, saying," as pronounced by him, were heard at Gloucester Point, a distance by water of two miles. Our day furnishes other examples hardly less striking and instructive.

But this principle ought not to be, as it commonly is, dissevered from another equally important. It is this: that the audibleness of the voice depends not only on its melody, but likewise on its speechfulness, or power of articulation. Perfect human speech is marked by a free and conventional enunciation of the consonants, while among brutes fixed and inarticulate sounds preponderate. Now why is it that the voice of man may be heard at a greater distance that of any other animal? Not merely because of its power of melody in the upper register, but by reason of its clear and forcible articulation of the consonants. And this accounts for the fact that those instruments of music which, like the violin, emit consonant sounds that most nearly resemble those of the human voice, are heard most distinctly and at the greatest distance. Of the consonants, the most difficult to pronounce are the "atonics" or "aspirations," which are all enounced within the compass of a whisper. It is neither the chest tones nor the head tones, whether the high or the low, that are the hardest to deliver (although these should be intelligently cultivated), but the sounds which are formed by the whisperings of the lips, the teeth, and the palate. But this difficulty is more than compensated by the audibleness with which they wing the music of human language.

For the rest, a careful study of the messages of the prophets will, on the one hand, keep us from that kind of colloquial emphasis which makes the reader or quoter of the Scriptures appear the au-

thor of them,[1] and, on the other, from that ecclesiastical monotone or sing-song, which resembles the old nomic melody in which the promulgators of the Athenian laws were compelled to speak. No aphorisms, no exercises, however excellent, can excuse us from a careful study of the passage to be read or repeated. Clergymen are not to imitate the player, and yet they might well emulate his well-directed diligence. Edmund Kean, who had a notably feeble voice, said that he owed his success to silent preparation; and his friend Talma ascribed his own great power as an actor, not to reciting the words of his part, but to studying their import. "To think is hard," said Goethe, "and to act according to thought unpleasant." And yet assuredly this is the only way to an all-sided knowledge of elocution, or even the ability to deliver a short address easily, faithfully, and with good acceptance.

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1 The Rev. W. Cazalet, in his book "On the Voice," teaches us to produce the effect of emphasis by pauses. The late Dean Alford, in his Essays and Addresses on Church Subjects (p. 153), favoured an almost total absence of emphasis.

CHAPTER VI.

THE VARIOUS MODERN KINDS OF DELIVERY.

Does any one ask how a man ought to give? I cannot answer until I know how he ought to possess. And so one's mode of preparation goes far in determining his mode of delivery. The verb *to have*, in one of the senses that come down to us from the Latin *habeo*, signifies *to hold*, with the accessory idea of power exerted, as in the colloquial phrase *have after*, for follow, and *have at*, to strike. This old use of the Latin word is perhaps best rendered by *hold forth*. Delivery, therefore, comprehends the related ideas of *having* and *giving*. Its methods may be divided into five kinds:

First, *Improvisation*, or a holding forth without the consciousness of having any premeditated store of fitting thoughts or words. Such thinking aloud approaches most nearly to preaching under a full inspiration; in other words, the intellectual states and exertions of the improvisator and of the prophet who is plenarily inspired are very much the same. Under a partial inspiration, as we have seen in Book I., Chapter III., preachers have sometimes taken wing and sailed superior to a part or even the whole of the matter which they had elaborately prepared and brought into the pulpit. It is notably the case that the very best things in sermons are spoken impromptu; and yet with this important kind of delivery sacred rhetoric has hitherto had little more to do than astronomy has with the wind.

We need not repeat here what we have said in the first book about improvisation. Again, however, must we reprove those who, in their presumptuous reliance on the Spirit, are continually giving their people mere rhapsodies. Too often, we fear, they and their admiring hearers resemble the Cumæan sibyl, who, when the inspiration left her, had no power to recall anything that had been spoken.

The next method we consider is the *extemporary*. By this we here mean the manner of speaking which consists in a preparation of the matter, but without much previous attention to the language

of the sermon, and going into the pulpit either with or without a memorandum. Some extemporaneous preachers, after carefully writing the outlines of their sermons, commit them to memory; others lay a few catch-words before them. Here, however, no rule is applicable to every one. Those who study the *matter* the most thoroughly will thereby be led to convey it in the best language and with the most persuasive earnestness. But not every one that has seemingly a great aptitude for extemporising should indulge it without restraint. Chalmers and Whately, the former from too much fluency of mind, and the latter from too much fluency of tongue, wisely restricted themselves to written discourses. Whether a young man shall adopt this as his principal mode of delivery may, in cases not a few, depend less on his own fitness for it, or its intrinsic excellence, or its superiority over other modes, than on the conditions of time and place. Thus when James Hervey, John Newton, and Leigh Richmond saw that the extemporaneous delivery of the Methodists had come to be popular in England, they prudently and successfully learned to extemporise also. Archbishop Secker had the good sense to recommend off-hand preaching to his clergy, urging this, among other motives, that as the followers of the Methodist preachers were apt to think it a supernatural gift, the regular clergymen might undeceive them by imitating in this case the practice of St. Paul in another, which he describes thus: "What I do, that I will do; that wherein they glory they may be found even as we."[1]

The third method we notice is *recitation*, or repeating from memory. Hereby the sermon is first written, and then either the composition or the thoughts thereof learned by heart. The former is sometimes recommended to the novice as an intellectual exercise, or a trial of gifts and acquirements, and is pursued by many Italian, French, and German preachers, both Protestant and Catholic. The Italian preachers often have prompters concealed near them. The latter consists in committing to memory the ideas and their order, the entire substance of the sermon, to the almost total neglect of its language. Tholuck habitually preaches in this manner; in this way also many of the Scottish ministers pronounce their sermons. To the first sort belonged the delivery of Robert Hall, who had a singular faculty of continuous mental composition apart

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1 Dr. Ware's Hints, appended to Dr. Ripley's Sac. Rhet.; Dr. Abel Stevens' Preaching Required by the Times; Bautain's Art of Extemporising; and Dr. Park's Three Fundamental Methods of Preaching, in Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. xxix.

from the aid which writing supplies. Essentially of the second kind is the extemporiser, who while speaking recalls the substance of his sermon, but not the words of his skeleton.

Reading next asks our attention. Some of the advantages of this mode of utterance are these: It enables the preacher to acquire the oratorical style, without which the extemporiser cannot excel; it checks in some too great an affluence of thought or language; in others it remedies the want of a ready and copious flow of fitting words; it many times protects both speaker and hearer against the effects of hasty and unguarded words in searching and admonitory sermons. It also secures us from the obscurity and misunderstanding caused by those long and complex sentences which the extemporiser is often tempted, if not compelled, to construct. It insures us even against the teasing and distracting fear of blunders and break-downs. And above all, it invests the preacher with the confidence and persuasiveness of one who is delivering matters of intelligent and well-grounded belief, thoughts which he has carefully selected, accurately weighed, and stamped with the authentic marks of his full and permanent approval.[1] Of his best thoughts the preacher in his most enthusiastic moments is often prompted to say, with Job, "O that my words were now written!"

The highest excellence in reading cannot be reached without such a familiarity with the ideas and words of a sermon as enables the preacher to keep its object and its entire field of thought continually before his mind, while a glance at the beginning of a sentence, or even of a paragraph, will sometimes suggest enough to carry him to their period. Then, if he have what Garrick once said Mr. Romaine had—"not only the *art* but the *heart* of preaching"—he will, when the subject or the occasion demand, throw his whole soul into the business; the word of God will be in his heart as a burning fire shut up in his bones; and yet his fervency will have as true a sacredness as if his lips had been consecrated by a live coal from the altar and applied by the hand of a seraph.

Such reading will not compel him to keep his eyes fixed on his manuscript, nor require him to read every word and phrase exactly as he wrote them: Miser enim et pauper orator est, qui nullum verbum æquo animo perdere potest.[2] But we have already begun to consider what Dr. Kidder[3] has termed *a composite mode of delivery*, which aims to conjoin two or more of the other approved methods in such wise as to secure the peculiar excellences of each

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[1] For a more full discussion of this subject see the next chapter.

[2] Quint., Lib. viii. [3] Homiletics, p. 314.

in a single sermon. Two kinds have always been united by many of the best readers; they have taken the liberty to improvise here and there. Others deliver parts of their sermons from memory; others, again, extemporise parts of them. On the other hand, not a few extemporisers and reciters read sketches or abstracts of their discourses while they are delivering them. Their notes are little other than a quiver, on which they cast their eye now and then to see what arrow is to be next fetched from thence.[1]

Can any man do his very best in the use of the composite method? Some pastors, after fair trials of one simple mode, are fully persuaded that they can in this fifth way make their ministrations the most useful to their flocks. Not otherwise are they able to give free and full utterance to the multiform contents of their minds —more especially to the matter which lies on the heavenward side of them. True, their transitions have thereby come to be somewhat rapid, but not more so than those of Hosea and Micah; they indulge in digressions more frequently than they once did. So much the better; for they have had many subsequent proofs that "gusts of the Spirit" drove them out of their pre-arranged course and caused them to lose their reckoning, in order that they might be taken under the convoy of Him whose "way is in the sea, and his path in the great waters, and his footsteps not known."

Which of these five modes the preacher shall adopt he must decide for himself. He may have to try several of them before making his final choice, and it is not impossible that he may learn to make use of all without giving the preference to either.

In mastering that method of preaching which appears to him the most difficult yet the most serviceable of all, let him not be discouraged by his early failures and disappointments. As Peter Martyr observes, "God gives these gifts little by little, in order that we may apply our diligence and endeavours." "Begin by saying four words," as Francis de Sales advises, "then go on to eight, and then to twelve, and in the end you will be able to continue for half an hour."

Your proficiency in any of these modes will very much depend on the orderliness of your mind while storing itself with homiletical knowledge. Of Bacon we are told that he could keep all subjects within his view almost at once, in their relative proportions, as in a map. If you would quickly and at any time bring out of your treasure the things you want, you will have to pack them away in an accessible method—a phrase suggestive of much that

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1 Cotton Mather's Manuductio, sec. 17.

we cannot here mention. Generally may it be expected that the excellence of the delivery will be as was the excellence of the preparation. This is even true of improvisation itself; for one's success therein is measured by the amount and kind of one's general and remote preparation. Neglect preparation, and your sermons, be your elocution ever so attractive, will at length, like the nymph Echo, pine away to a mere sound, or become like the sweet-songed nightingale, which afforded so little meat to the hungry Spartan, that, in his disappointment, he originated the proverb: *Vox es et præterea nihil.*

CHAPTER V.

EXTEMPORISING HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED.

SOME writers have ventured the opinion that the delivery of the Hebrew prophets was a kind of singing, which was not seldom accompanied with minstrelsy. The Gentile pythonesses and soothsayers were, indeed, incited to oracular words by Phyrgian songs and by drums and cymbals;[1] but these resembled the true prophets far less nearly than did the Homeric prophets, who, whatever may have been the rhythm or cantillation in their vocal expression, were not moved to ecstatic utterances by instrumental music. Ewald[2] supposes that in earlier times, during the public utterance of his message, either the prophet or an attendant played a tune at each pause and after each strophe; just as the Eastern singer of metrical romances, after chanting each verse, plays a few notes on a viol. Others[3] have conjectured that to this end music must have been taught in the schools of the prophets. Now there is only one thing to prevent us from finding out whether the prophets delivered their sermons after the manner of public singers and improvisators—it is this: the total silence of Scripture on the subject. That Habakkuk did not himself sing his prayer or psalm is implied in its destination: "To the chief singer on my stringed instruments." Other prophets also wrote psalms; but did they sing them? Possibly. We concur, however, with Quintilian as to the admirable relation of music to eloquence, and commend the example of Basil the Great and Gregory Nazianzen, who, while mastering the art of oratory, added music as a tributary exercise, because it attuned their souls to tender and elevated sentiments. If, then, the prophets did not sing their sermons, the next question is, Did they extemporise them?

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1 Cicero, De Div., i., 5, and Jamblicus De Mysteriis, viii. 9.

2 Propheten des Alten Bundes, vol. i., p. 50; cf. Lane's Modern Egyptians, vol. ii., p. 128.

3 A. Knobel, Prophetismus der Hebräer, vol. ii., pp. 39–52; Keil and Bertheau, Com. O. T., vol. i., p. 369, in note.

The Hebrew prophets appear to have generally written their sermons (whenever they wrote at all), after they were delivered. Moses, indeed, is said to have read the book of the covenant in the audience of the people, but he had probably delivered it from memory on previous occasions (Exod. xxiv. 3, 7). And Baruch and Jehudi read, by divine command, before the princes and Jehoiakim the predictions of Jeremiah, who was prevented by his imprisonment from delivering them personally, while they were as yet unwritten. It would seem that this prophet had been making divine communications during some three and twenty years before he was commanded to commit them to writing (Jer. xxxvi.). Whether the 30th and 31st chapters were written before oral rendering it is impossible to determine. The 50th and 51st chapters were read to the people by Seraiah on the banks of the Euphrates, in Babylon. The prophecy of Habakkuk is supposed to have been written on tablets (ii. 2)—such perhaps as received the proclamations which messengers would carry to foreign nations. The last clause may be rendered, *that he may prophesy that readeth it.* That the reading of a royal message was the proper manner of making proclamation is pretty evident from 2 Chron. xxx. 6–; xxxvi. 22–, and the book of Esther, and elsewhere.

The Messiah at the beginning of his ministry *read* out of Isaiah his own commission as a *proclaimer.* And there are passages in the N. T. which make the *reading* of the law and the prophets synonymous with *preaching* (Acts xv. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 15; Rom. ii. 21; Gal. iii. 8). The written word was able to make Timothy savingly wise (2 Tim. iii. 15). The five brothers of the lost rich man could be as effectually persuaded by the sacred books read or heard read as by the personal warnings of a risen Lazarus (Luke xvi. 27–31). Yes, and those sacred books may have been more courageous and faithful than our risen Lazarus may have been permitted to be; and, by the way, Demetrius Phalereus persuaded King Ptolemy to get and study such books as treated of government and leadership; for the reason that *those things are written in books which the friends of kings dare not advise* (Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. ac Imp., p. 189, Reiskii ed.). Are there not some rich men of our day who will have to be persuaded, if at all, by reading the Scriptures or other good books? for from the preachers of their choice they are never likely to hear the searching and alarming things they ought to learn.

But the prophets must have spoken impromptu whenever they were moved to make divine communications as soon as they were received, or at least without any long delay (1 Kings xi. 29; 2

Chron. xx. 15; Jer. xxi. 4–; xxviii. 5–; Ezek. xiv. 3–; xx. 3–; Amos vii. 14–). In cases like these there was no time for previous writing. In other cases there was leisure for writing, but there is little positive proof that the prophets either wrote or meditated beforehand their communications (2 Sam., c. vii. and xii; 1 Kings xiv. 5–; xx. 35–; xxi. 17; Isa. vii. 3–; xxxvii. 21–; Jer. xlii. 7–). Plenary inspiration almost always precludes the idea of invention and of composition previously studied and elaborated. The prophets that arose after the age of Malachi probably predicted orally, and foretold nothing that was not fulfilled in the lifetime of their hearers. The later scribes were not always the successors of the prophets. They were sometimes the writing and teaching priests. Their legitimate work was to transcribe and expound the inspired Scriptures. And in order that their teachings might not be foisted into the sacred page, they were required to deliver them by word of mouth alone.[1]

Some of the advocates of extemporising think they have settled the question beyond all further discussion when they have said, "Repeating from the open manuscript or from the memory is not the Scriptural way of delivering sermons. Neither Jesus nor Isaiah, Peter nor Paul preached in this manner." Now such advocates are deserving of approval for seeking light from Scripture on this subject; but they would have deserved our warmer approbation if they had considered that plenary inspiration in the Scripture examples superseded the utility and even possibility of premeditating either their thoughts or their words. Had they written their communications beforehand, English and German Rationalists would have had good grounds for asserting what they now assert without any good grounds, that the holy prophets themselves invented and elaborated parts of their sermons. They therefore extemporised either from necessity or from considerations drawn from the very nature and effects of plenary inspiration. But as *we* are very differently situated, it is often *our* necessity and *our* duty to premeditate either our thoughts or our words, or both. Yes, and we must choose for ourselves our messages and our time of delivering them. The chief difficulty in the work of extemporising is the timely recollection of well-considered thoughts and words. But the fully-inspired prophets were promptly supplied with both, without any ordinary effort of memory. Only grant *us* this afflatus of the Creator Spirit, and we, too, can extemporise, or rather can surpass the best efforts of the best extemporiser that ever lived. No. Before men bring forward Scripture examples to support the exclusive

1 Jost's Judenthum, vol. i., pp. 93, 367.

practice of extemporary preaching, they do well to prove that post-apostolic preachers should seek and expect plenary inspiration, or at least that we should imitate Scripture examples in those things wherein the Divine Spirit does neither permit nor enable us to imitate them. We may, indeed, emulate the devotedness, vivacity, freedom, and many other imitable qualities of the Scripture preachers, both in our written and extemporaneous sermons. But to require us to speak just and only as they did, what is it but to require us to extemporise our thoughts as well as our words, and always to speak without any imperfection, either moral or intellectual? Far be it from us to condemn extemporising in its time, place, and due subordination to study and invention and writing. This, however, is a very different thing from the lame logic of the advocates in question, whose argument amounts to this: The fully inspired speaker never, in our modern sense, extemporised at all; consequently we in the modern sense ought always to extemporise.

"But," some one will say, "does not extemporising resemble more nearly the inspired mode of speaking than reading does?" Our answer is, yes and no—yes, if the mere and sheer physical act of vocal communication is meant; but no, if the psychological state of the reader is considered. Regarded from the throat outwardly, the extemporiser is more like the inspired speaker than the reader is. His head and his eyes, as well as his vocal organs and arms and hands, are more fully disengaged and more ready for certain elocutional services; but whether they do or do not act their parts as naturally and efficiently depends on the speaker's power to compose mentally or to remember what he has thus composed; and these, again, depend on natural and spiritual endowments, practice, health, the assurance that he is handling the proper theme, the quietude and attention of the audience, and other such conditions. But if, on the contrary, we look into the mind of him who is reading, we discover that, other things being equal, its mood in one important respect bears a closer resemblance to that of the inspired speaker. It is this: no uneasiness has it as to the matter and composition. It is therefore not only more peaceful in itself and more quieting to all sympathising hearers, but has also secured the liberty to devote all its energies to the work of oral rendition. Hence the reader more nearly resembles the inspired preacher in respect of all those elocutional excellences which flow from a mind that is self-possessed and independent of casual states and surroundings; so that the peculiar advantages which the extemporiser enjoys are perhaps outweighed by the accuracy, ease, and powers of expression which distinguish an inspired utterance.

Against the reading of sermons has arisen the notion that the oral message is more favoured of God and more beneficial to men than the read; whereas the oral word has, ever since the days of Moses, been always returning to and reposing on the written and the read. The prophets and apostles often evolved as from a germ their own inspired messages out of some portion of the existing Scriptures. Paul, Barnabas, and other apostles, in reasoning out of the Scriptures with their countrymen in synagogues, must have read their proofs aloud, and that abundantly. The apostles and evangelists appear to have regarded their writings not as separate from but as a part of their preaching, for their narratives of Christ's career were called "gospels," and Paul, in writing to Timothy, found comfort, as a prisoner in bonds, in the reflection that the "word of God was not bound." Missionaries not a few, and they not ignorant of the original New Testament, have believed that in translating and circulating the Bible they were really and faithfully obeying the apostolic commission; and accordingly many in heathen lands have been converted by no other means than the printed word. Chrysostom (in his homily on 2 Thes. iii.) makes public Bible reading an act of royal proclamation. The epistles of Paul were some of them read to the primitive churches, and would it be unreasonable to believe that John in his old age may have sometimes read his own gospel before his audiences? At any rate, from a distance so remote as to fade off into the primitive time, preachers of the Gospel have considered the public reading of the Scriptures as an indispensable part of their ministry. And so in nearly all the earliest homilies we find large portions of the written word quoted for interpretation—portions which must have been read aloud to the people while preaching. In no age, therefore, has it been customary or thought expedient to disrupt *all* reading from the idea and the act of preaching. Hitherto the oral word has indeed been more widely efficacious; but that it is essentially so we cannot conclude until the word written and read has been as earnestly and as extensively employed. Any way, the written word, as Luke hints to Theophilus (Luke i. 4), is necessary to accuracy and fulness of Christian instruction.

The completion of the sacred canon and the consequent withdrawal of plenary inspiration marked a new era in the history of homiletics. Thenceforth, as we have already shown, the preacher was to be compensated for the deficiencies of a partial inspiration by the possession and comparative study of all the genuine books of writers who were fully inspired. How far delivery was at first modified by this important twofold change we do not know. It

has been conjectured by Thiersch that "the sermon was an unpremeditated effusion, and the less premeditated the nearer the preacher lived to the time of the original simplicity of the Gospel, while the memory of the free manifestation of 'spiritual gifts' had not yet died entirely away." If we may judge from some of the early homilies, it would seem that then, as now, certain preachers neglected study, and reposed a presumptuous trust in the assistance of the Spirit while they were in the act of speaking. Yes, some, moreover, then as now, thought and acted, wrote and spoke as if during the time of writing sermons *no* spiritual assistance was to be expected, and as if the divine afflatus could *only* be enjoyed while the preacher was extemporising, or rather improvising. But the Holy Spirit did not show preference for the *oral* address by granting it a fuller inspiration, or because it had *per se* any higher moral qualities than the *written*. For the inspired preachers to have meditated beforehand their sermons would have militated against the divine arrangement, against our faith in the divine origin of their communications, and against the proprieties and exigencies of persons, times, places, and occasions which rendered it necessary that they should speak extemporaneously if they spoke at all. But ever since then those proprieties and exigencies have often reversed the medal, and bidden us examine the superscription. In cases not a few it is only by premeditation, writing, and reading that there can be any approach to that readiness, accuracy, and superiority to adverse contingencies which were once secured by plenary inspiration.

Here, therefore, the history of preaching and a generalisation of contemporary instances alike rebuke our onesidedness. Neither extemporising nor writing, nor reading, can be adopted by all preachers, in treating all subjects, for all purposes, before all congregations, and upon all occasions. Some may sometimes and others may at all times combine the three methods of communication.

Without exaggerating the importance of an intellectual ministry, it must, on the other hand, be considered that those churches and communities, which refuse to hear a preacher who, either occasionally or always reads his sermons, will many times deprive themselves of pastors who are able to "feed them with knowledge and understanding." Who will doubt that the majority of diligent students, of deep thinkers, and of those patient investigators who are wont to examine all sides of life-and-death questions are at best slow and cautious speakers, and even stammering or silent sometimes. There are in the ministry men having Sir Matthew Hale's infirmity, "who was but of slow speech and sometimes so hesitating

that a stranger would have thought him a man of low parts, that knew not readily what to say, though ready at other times." And yet this same chief justice wrote some of the best sermons that are to be found in English literature. How few pulpit discourses of his age will abide a comparison with his sermon, "Of the Knowledge of Christ Crucified." He had, moreover, in spite of these occasional derelictions of his tongue, that manifold knowledge which, according to Cicero in his *De Oratore*, is the chief thing to make an excellent orator.[1] Now had this great and good man (few better or more gifted have ever lived) been cast on our times, and been persuaded that it was his duty to give himself wholly to the ministry of the Gospel, there are churches, and ministers, who would have refused to give him ordination.

Or, a young man may have almost every other quality of a perfect orator except that distinctness of voice which gives each syllable and word its just and full sound; and that combined moderation and evenness of voice which is most pleasing to the ear and is best fitted to secure the close attention of the common hearer. Not a few of this class can neither require nor retain these excellences without habitually reading their sermons, while some of this class who have learned to extemporise are at times forced to resort to reading in order to keep their natural defects from growing to be intolerable.

More than a few write and read their sermons, not from lack of zeal nor from the want of ability to extemporise, but from high moral considerations. They find that while they are extemporising they are too intent upon the matter and language to keep a constant watch over the spirit and tones of their preaching. The late Abp. Whately[2] distrusted extemporaneous speaking as an instrument of pulpit oratory, although he felt his own capacity of producing a great effect thereby." The temperament may either be too sanguine or too nervous for a calm and otherwise satisfactory off-hand delivery. "There are preachers," says Edward Paxton Hood,[3] who read their sermons from a godly fear. The paper before their eyes, the exact word, leads to a subdued manner of discourse which is also one of the most effective and powerful; the paper pulls the too impulsive speaker back, reins him in wisely, where otherwise he might trip and stumble, or where he might rush into too bold and irreverent a style of speech." Others[4] conscien-

1 Richard Baxter's Appendix to the Life of Hale. 2 Life, vol. i., p. 54.

3 "*Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets*," a course of Lectures delivered before Spurgeon's theological school, pp. 525, 526.

4 R. W. Evans' Bishopric of Souls, p. 156.

tiously avoid extemporaneous preaching lest they be tempted, at the spur of the moment, to say less than they ought, or else to express themselves in language confused, ambiguous, and even contradictory.

The question is often asked, "Why cannot ministers of the gospel speak extemporaneously as easily and as well as lawyers and statesmen do?" To this it has been forcibly answered that the house of God is not a court of law, nor a legislative hall, and that a sermon is neither a defence of a prisoner nor a reply to a speech. Besides, it is to be remembered that few but *orators* make speeches in parliament, and they only when they please; that few but lawyers of uncommon ability make prolonged addresses, and they only occasionally; but *every* minister of the gospel has to preach *twice every Sunday*. Is it reasonable to expect that every pastor shall be an orator?[1] Nor should it escape us that lawyers, congressmen, and members of parliament write their most important addresses and orations; some distinguished ones even read them to their hearers. And the same thing may be said of some of the most famous men of long ago.

The orators of Greece and Rome, indeed, usually spoke from memory; and yet Isocrates undisguisedly wrote an oration and sent it to be read by another to Philip of Macedon.[2] He and Demosthenes composed speeches for others. The latter seems habitually to have written his orations beforehand, and was not unwilling that it should be publicly known that he spoke only after preparation made to the utmost of his power (see speech against Midas, p. 576; cf. Plutarch's Lives). Æsion, a fellow-scholar of his, was of opinion that his speeches were less effective when heard than when read. In the course of his great speeches he often paused and bade the scribe read some decree, letter, oracle, or poem. Had the Greeks been so averse to reading as some modern critics fancy they were, Demosthenes would not have compelled his audiences to hear so many things read. The matter read during the oration on the Crown amounts to about one-eighth of the whole, to say nothing of five additional documents (now lost) which were also read. Once a sophist, being about to read a panegyric on Hercules, Antalcidas, the Spartan, said, "Why, who has blamed Hercules?" (Plutarch, Laconian Apophthegms, Reiske, vol. vi., p. 217). This Spartan courtier did not, it seems, complain that the eulogy was to be *read;* and it is certain that Cicero read from manuscript to the

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1 Altered from Dr. Burgon's Pastoral Office, p. 195.

2 Oratio ad Philip. exordium.

Roman Senate the first speech he made after his return from exile (Post Reditum in Senatu). This we learn from his own words in the oration for Plancius (s. 30), where he says of it, "which, on account of the importance of the matter (propter rei magnitudinem), was pronounced from a written paper." The younger Pliny (Epist. xvii., L. vii.) apologises to a friend for having read his speeches by saying that the reading of orations was practised both by the Romans and the Greeks—that he saw as much propriety in reading an oration as in publishing it. "But," says the objector, "it is difficult to give satisfaction to an audience by the mere reading of an oration." This objection, rejoins Pliny, may hold against the reading of some, but not against reading in general. Augustus, it is said,[1] did not want the talent of speaking extempore, but lest his memory should fail him, as well as prevent the loss of time in committing his speeches, it was his general practice to read them. Tiberius,[2] although he usually spoke best off-hand, read an oration at the funeral of this same Augustus. And Constantine[3] spent much of his time in writing discourses which he delivered before his subjects; but he was, it would seem, so familiar with his manuscript that when new and important thoughts occurred to him in reading, then "he immediately stood erect" and uttered them extempore. Even in the classical period of Rome the conspicuous use of notes was not forbidden to the orator, for Quintilian[4] recommends speaking extempore and from memory, but approves, nevertheless, "short notes and small memorandum books which may be held in the hand, and on which the orator may occasionally glance."

The Christian fathers and their audiences were chiefly influenced by the precepts and examples of the secular orators. So largely, indeed, did they allow their taste to be formed by the ethnic rhetoricians that they incurred the reproofs of some of the more conscientious. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find in *many* of the sermons of Basil, Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen and others evidences enough that they were studied and composed beforehand, not after their delivery. As they followed, in this matter, the counsels of the classical rhetoricians, so we may fairly infer that they did not do otherwise as to the rest; that they not only elaborated *these* discourses, but elaborated them beforehand, and

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1 Suetonius, Life of Augustus, c. lxxxiv.

2 Dio Cassius, Hist. Rom., L. lvi., c. xxxiv.–xliii.; Life of T., by Suetonius, cap. lxx.

3 Life by Eusebius, L. iv., chap. xxix.

4 L. x., c. vii., secs. 131, 132.

either committed them to memory, or, in cases where they had not time to do so, and the occasion demanded a discriminating use of language, read them to their hearers.[1]

That some of their sermons were in part, and some wholly improvised is also capable of the clearest proof. It can be shown from Chrysostom, Augustine, and some of the other fathers, that in unexpected exigencies and cases of necessity they prayed for and relied upon the special assistance of the Holy Ghost. But so extraordinary were cases like these, that not a few of them were remembered and have been transmitted to us. Had improvising been the prevailing mode of delivery, how shall we account for the fact that instances of thinking aloud or speaking from immediate impulses (for this is what they meant by speaking extempore) were deemed worthy of particular notice and lasting remembrance? And why was it that the period of Origen's life during which he extemporised exclusively was so carefully marked by two of his biographers? "Oh, but," it has more than once been said, "you forget that Eusebius[2] testifies only to this, that Origen was more than sixty years of age when he had, from long practice, acquired such facility in speaking that he now for the first time allowed ready writers to take down his discourses." Conceding, as we must, that these words do not of themselves settle the question, we may nevertheless affirm that they are of great weight when they are pondered along with those of Pamphilius,[3] a learned contemporary and literary companion of Eusebius, who says explicitly that Origen did at this period extemporise—*habebat extempore.* Gregory the Great read some of his own homilies. As the people often heard the Scriptures read in the church, and occasionally listened to secular orators who read their speeches, they would not be likely to start back from the voice of the reading preacher as if some strange thing had happened to them. And consequently, as early as the time of Jerome the homilies of Ephræm Syrius were often read as lessons after the reading of the Scriptures; and Gregory the Great had some of his own homilies read aloud by shorthand writers. The just conclusion, therefore, appears to be that of Neander:[4] "The sermons were sometimes, though rarely, read

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[1] What Chrysostom says about those who falsely accused preachers of plagiarism and frequent repetition seems to imply the practice of composing sermons beforehand.—*De Sacerdotio,* L. v., c. i.; cf. Ullman's Nazianzen, p. 190.

[2] Hist. Eccles., L. vi., c. xxxvi.

[3] Apology: This only survives in a Latin translation. Cf. Bingham's Eccles. Antiq., B. xiv., chap. iv., sec. 11.

[4] Church History, vol. ii., p. 317.

off entirely from notes, or committed to memory; sometimes they were freely delivered, after a plan prepared beforehand; and sometimes they were altogether extemporary." Augustine,[1] though he often extemporised, recommended the practice of recitation to those who could not write their own sermons—a practice which, after the tenth century, was almost universally adopted. Atticus, Bishop of Constantinople (A. D. 408), preached extemporaneously, but while presbyter he often composed his sermons and committed them to memory.[2]

Calvin, it would seem, wrote many of his sermons, but respecting his usual mode of delivery we know nothing except this, that, as we have in the first book shown, he was not such a servant of words as to be without that liberty of speech which the Spirit inspired. Luther preached out of the book, not of necessity, as if he could not do otherwise, but for the sake of setting an example to others.[3] Most of the distinguished preachers of France, as Bourdaloue, Bossuet, and Saurin, wrote their sermons and delivered them from memory. Massillon, however, having on one occasion forgotten what he was to deliver, was so intimidated by the occurrence that he ever after read his sermons; and Bourdaloue, lest his memory should fail, preached with his eyes closed (except when he glanced at his manuscript), his hands united and reposing on the pulpit, and his body motionless. Taylor, South, and Barrow wrote and read their sermons.[4] The great Puritan preachers could for the most

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[1] De Doct. Christ., L. iv., c. xxix. [2] Socrates, Eccles. Hist., L. vii., c. ii.

[3] *Table Talk*, c. vii. The more recent followers of Luther have delivered their sermons from memory. Thus did Herder and Reinhard. In his early years Schleiermacher wrote his sermons, and where much was expected from him, as in his discourses before magistrates, he read them; but in later life he extemporised with great ease and dignity. Schott and Palmer are averse to the reading of sermons. The former says that the principle he maintains is not overthrown by the single exceptions of skilful and celebrated preachers who, on account of peculiar circumstances and the important contents of their sermons, have been obliged to read, and who, from the general love and respect they enjoyed, and their manner, have read their sermons not without great and blessed success. Palmer, in the fifth edition of his *Evangelische Homiletik*, has greatly moderated his strictures on those who read their sermons (cf. pp. 602–3, first ed., and p. 519, fifth ed.).

[4] Archbishop Whitgift, whose practice was the same, used to say that if he trusted to his memory only his preaching would in time become prattling. His biographer says of extemporisers, that "whether senso or nonsense, all is one running like a horse with an empty cart over hedge and ditch, till the hour-glass stops them." Not a hundred years ago a curate was hunted from a London pulpit because it was his custom to raise his eyes from his manuscript.—*Neale's Mediæval Preaching*, p. 10.

part adopt the language of Baxter: "I use notes as much as any man when I take pains, and as little as any man when I am lazy, or busy, and have no time to prepare." Manton and Calamy were readers. Wesley and Whitefield were in the habit of preaching extemporaneously, but it should be remembered that they repeated their sermons, some of them fifty times; and yet they wrote very many of their sermons, and either committed them verbally or in substance. Davies never departed from the words of his manuscript; in his earlier years he preached *memoriter;* in his later he always read. Dwight preached at first from short notes, but afterwards wrote his sermons and read them as they were written. Principal Campbell, the author of the Rhetoric, after extemporising many years, finally adopted and recommended the practice of writing and reading. Dr. J. M. Mason preached *memoriter* and *extempore* in the beginning of his ministry; but towards the close of his life the failure of his memory compelled him to read his sermons. This he did, we are told, not without a severe mental struggle, as he had all the old Scottish prejudice against what he called "readers of the Gospel," and had said some severe things about them. Among the readers of sermons stand Edwards and Chalmers, Gordon and Harris, James Hamilton, D'Aubigné of Geneva, Van Der Palm of Leyden, William Anderson and George Gilfillan, Scottish preachers both. Payson wrote and read his sermons for the second service of Sunday, but extemporised on Sunday mornings and Thursday evenings. He seems to have adopted the invaluable precept of Quintilian:[1] "I know not whether both exercises, when we perform them with care and assiduity, are not reciprocally beneficial, as it appears by writing we speak with greater accuracy, and by speaking we write with greater ease."

We are often told that the reading of sermons is unfriendly to revivals. But Payson, Davies, and Edwards were revivalists, of whom the last named and most successful always read from his MS., without a single gesture. The Presbyterian church at Hanover, Va., originated in the divine blessing on the reading of Whitefield's sermons by laymen. Luther, Latimer, Baxter, and Chalmers[2] were at once readers and revivalists.

The improvisators of the Gospel who preach without any premeditation whatever belong to a different class. Those among the ancient orators who had this power were said to be inspired with a

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1 Inst. Orat., L. x., c. vii., s. 29.

2 Dr. Chalmers did on some occasions speak from memory, but that he ever in any sense preached extemporaneously waits to be proved.

deity. Plato accounts oracle-singers inspired, and not only prophets who interpreted their words but also statesmen when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without knowing beforehand anything of what they are saying. And Longinus[2] thinks that when Demosthenes uttered his celebrated oath he was inspired by Apollo. Philostratus[3] asserts that Æschines was the first to speak thus divinely, i.e., extemporise fluently, without preparation; while Cicero[4] tells us that Gorgias of Leontium was the first who put himself forward in an assembly to speak on any subject his hearers might suggest, but he pronounces it a bold proceeding. Origen, according to Suidas and Epiphanius, once preached at Jerusalem from the first text that met his eyes. This happened to be Psa. l. 16; and he improvised so pathetically upon it that his audience was melted into tears. Bingham[5] proves that Chrysostom and Augustine sometimes preached without previous study of their texts. The distinguished Catholic preachers, Cardinal Bellarmin and Abbe MacCarthy sometimes improvised and habitually extemporised.[6] It is very evident that improvisation will in general be the most easy to those who have long been in the habit of extemporising, and to those who have learned to write their discourses with great rapidity.

But we were discussing the comparative merits of reading sermons. The more thoroughly we investigate our subject the more will we incline to the opinion of Goethe that the limits between reading and speaking are very narrow. Urge not, therefore, against the reading of sermons, the objection that it is calculated to foster insincerity and false pretension. "What can be more ludicrous," exclaims the witty Sidney Smith, "than an orator delivering stale indignation and fervor of a week old." If the orator could lay aside, with his pen, his indignation or any other passion that belonged to his theme, and then, after the interval of a week, deliver his discourse without any of the passions or feelings he experienced while composing, this would be a proper occasion for lamentation rather than laughter. But generally the earnest man does not thus lose interest in his subject: so far from it, his mind goes on warming with the lapse of time; the longer he muses the more fiercely does the fire burn. Writing laid fuel on the coals which invention had

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1 Meno., c. xli. 2 De Sublim., c. xvi.

3 De Vitis Sophistarum, L. xviii., c. iii.

4 De Orat., L. i., c. xxii.; and De Fin., L. ii., 1; Quint., L. x., c. vi., s. 20.

5 Antiquities, xiv., c. iv., s. 11.

6 Lezioni di Sacra Eloquenza, par D. W. Audisio, tome i., Lez. 27.

collected, and each day's recurrence to the subject has served to fan the flames, until the hour of delivery finds his heart a 'furnace exceeding hot, heated, it may be, seven times more than it was wont to be heated.' And while discoursing, he knows that the feelings of his auditors will be all the more deeply stirred when he tells them that he has thought of the subject frequently and long; nay, honestly reminds them, perhaps, that this is not the first time he has drawn their attention thereto, and can sincerely adopt the language of the apostle: "I have told you often, and now tell you even weeping." Alas for the poor preacher who imagines he must read his sermon with no higher degree of fervor than that with which he composed it.

Extemporising is equally exposed to the same unfriendly influences as those complained of above. One professor says to the young extemporiser, "Do not stop. Talk at random even—anything rather than stop." We would rather say, If you have broken down do not try to conceal the fact; on such occasions nothing pleases a congregation so greatly as honesty and plain-dealing. We much like the conduct of Mr. Binney of London, who, when his memory fails him pauses and tells the audience so, and then immediately recovering the clue goes forward to his conclusion. Once, when Father Taylor of Boston was preaching to his audience of seamen, he lost himself in a thicket of accumulated clauses: he extricated himself by the exclamation: "I have lost track of the nominative case, but, my brethren, one thing I know, *I am bound for the kingdom of heaven.*" A preacher seldom loses any esteem by such frankness, and if he lost all esteem by it, he had better be frank nevertheless.

We are often told that the grand objection against the practice of reading sermons is that we thereby destroy that naturalness and informality of delivery which are secured by improvising and extemporising. But little as we may have observed the fact, it is nevertheless true that both improvising and extemporising are exceedingly apt to foster habits of formal and unnatural delivery, while the speaker, moreover, is so absorbed in the matter and language of his sermon that he is the last man to detect the faults of his own elocution. Rev. George Gregory,[1] having tried various methods of delivering sermons, did not hesitate to give his preference to reading: "Though," says he, "in speaking *extempore* the emphasis will in general be right, this is more than counterbalanced by defects of modulation and by the want of that harmonious and

[1] Composition and Delivery of Sermons.

full conclusion of the periods which may be effected when we are previously acquainted with the extent of the sentence." Charles De la Rue is described by Gisbert[1] as having an astonishing facility of conception and expression, and as being a model of sublime, tender, and pathetic eloquence; and yet he always read his sermons, contending that he not only thus saved the time he would have spent in committing to memory, but that, being at ease with his notes before him, he could deliver his sermon with greater animation.

"But," it is said, "a discourse which from its fineness and precision of ideas is too difficult for a preacher to deliver without MS. is too difficult for a hearer to follow; and if a book be imperative for teaching, it is also imperative for learning." This objector ignores a principle which the history of Didactics has established, namely, that he is not the best teacher who can best memorize the matter of his instruction, but he who can best formulate, methodise, illustrate, and express it in written words. Besides, he forgets that there is very little of most good sermons that hearers need to learn by heart. If there is any book that most deserves committing to memory it is the Bible; and yet, if this objector be right, his audience would be right if they refused to hear him read the Scriptures, and said to him, "If the lessons for the day are too difficult for you to repeat to us from memory, then they are too difficult for us to consider and practice."

Much is said, and truly, of the importance of acquiring a facility in extemporary speaking. *We are not opposed to the early formation of a habit of extempore preaching.* Far from that; but we are opposed to those who teach the young preacher to extemporise prematurely and exclusively. It is a significant fact that the most zealous advocates of the false principle that nothing but extemporising is preaching have been men who prepared themselves to adopt this mode of delivery by long practice in writing and reading or reciting. They appealed to their own success, whereas they should rather have encouraged young men to pursue that long and thorough course of preparation whereby they achieved their success. Would you then commend to our imitation the example of Origen, Louis Wolsogen, Schleiermacher, Thomas Scott, Wayland, and many others who did not begin to speak extemporaneously before they reached the period of middle life? Not to all; but to some, and especially to those who are naturally either too slow of speech, or too fluent. From Quintilian's[2] opinion, that the power

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1 Christian Eloquence. 2 Inst., L. x., c. vii., s. 1.

of extempore speaking is the crowning fruit of study and the greatest recompense of long labour, some have inferred that he did not favour any but late attempts of this kind; but he is writing about the rewards of a thorough training in rhetoric, not of long practice in speaking. Both he and Cicero[1] set much store by writing as a preparation for this mode of delivery. Let the student therefore acquire a knowledge of rhetoric, and form a habit of writing oratorically before he gives himself fixedly to this practice; otherwise he will be in danger of forming bad habits without knowing that they are bad, and of remaining forever ignorant of the best way for *him* to compose and speak. Of how many may we adopt the language of Cicero:[2] "What they have heard deceives them, that men by speaking make themselves speakers; for equally true is the saying, that men by speaking badly very easily become bad speakers." There is much force in Dr. J. W. Alexander's remark,[3] that "a young man learns to extemporise just as puppies are taught to swim—by chucking them in." But we must add, by way of caution, that it is not safe to throw puppies into the water before their eyes are open.

Hereto we ought to add a few cautionary words for those who are laudably aiming to combine the respective advantages of good reading and good extemporising. For, strange to think, some writers regard the attempt as impracticable, and even dishonest. Thus Christian Palmer, in the earlier editions[4] of his work, brands with deception any endeavour to make reading appear like extemporising. Though he omits this and other offensive passages in his fifth edition,[5] where growing infirmities, perhaps, or twenty-five years of further observation, incline him only to pronounce as a misfortune (unglück) the want of ability to preach *memoriter;* yet as the passage is still quoted with approbation, we must notice the foundling for the sake of those who have adopted it. These fosterers, like many others, overlook the fact before stated, that in general writing and reading do not tend to repress feeling. It is only to sermons written in the style of essays or disquisitions that Palmer's disowned precept about the necessity of always reading in a tranquil manner can with justice apply. The young preacher who will learn to compose in the oratorical or spoken style, and especially in that form of it which is natural to him, can without any unfair or

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1 Id., L. x., c. vii., sec. 29; Cicero, De Orat., L. i., c. xxxiii., sec. 150.

2 *Ut supra.* 3 Thoughts on Preaching, p. 141.

4 Homiletik, first ed., p. 603.

5 Fifth ed., p. 519; cf. Stier, Keryktik, pp. 195, 196.

mysterious artifice cause reading to approach asymptotically near free speaking.[1] No three styles are seemingly more dissimilar than those of Luther, Baxter, and Chalmers; and yet they coincide in this, that they are all oratorical. And accordingly, when an admirer of Chalmers was taunted for going to hear a preacher who read from a *book*, she replied, "Ay, ay, the Doctor *reads*, but O, it is *fell* reading though." Had he written his sermons in the style of a dissertation, his reading would have been anything but fell, and his vehemence very unnatural. We are told that Chalmers, like Whately, found reading the only corrective for faults incident to excessive ardour. It enabled him to preach in conformity with this wholesome maxim of the "Methodist Demosthenes," Samuel Bradburn: "Be neither an air balloon nor a steam engine, but as the moon walking in brightness, and as the sun in all his glory."

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1 Whately's Rhet., Pt. iv., chap. iii., §1.

CHAPTER VI.

OF SYMBOLICAL ACTIONS.

ACTED parables, like spoken ones, are not intended as mere illustrations (for they themselves often need explanation), but are designed also to excite curiosity and exhibit objects to the imagination, and thus leave on the mind and heart *an ineffaceable impression.*

The custom of speaking by visible representations is older than the hieroglyphics of Egypt, and seems as natural to all men as vocal language itself. Sending land and water to the ancient Persians was considered as a formal acknowledgment of their supremacy. Thrasibulus, the Milesian, advised Periander, the Tyrant, to destroy the chief citizens of Corinth by the symbolical act of breaking off the highest ears of wheat. Tarquin conveyed like counsel to his son as to the principal men of Gabii, by leading the Gabinian messenger into his garden and striking off with his staff the heads of the tallest poppies. Cato, wishing to give the Roman Senate a vivid idea of the nearness of Carthage, held up a fresh fig plucked in that city only three days before. The Roman ambassadors declared war in the Senate of Carthage by throwing open the lap of their robes. When Trajan was in Egypt he consulted the oracle at Heliopolis, whether he should successfully finish the Parthian war and return to Rome. He received for an answer a vine-twig wrapped up in a napkin, and divided into many parts. This was thought to be verified by the carrying of Trajan's bones to Rome. Pilate washed his hands before the multitude in order to declare, according to a Levitical ceremony, that he was innocent of the murder of Christ.

The acted parables or symbolical actions of the prophets (the *facta prophetica* of the old theologians), as recorded in their history and writings, are many and various. Thus we are told that once when Jeroboam[2] went out of Jerusalem, the prophet Ahijah found him in the way; "and he had clad himself with a new garment.

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1 Deut. xxi. 6, 7; Psa. xxvi. 6; lxxiii. 13. 2 1 Kings xi. 29–31.

And Ahijah caught the new garment that was on him, and rent it in twelve pieces, and said to Jeroboam, 'Take thee ten pieces; for thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel, Behold, I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee.'" The Rationalist Knobel[1] would make a difficulty here. He cannot believe that a man of this prophet's culture could be so carried away with his zeal as to rend and ruin his new cloak. But he forgets how common a thing it was for kings to rend the most costly garments, whereas this was probably a large square of cloth such as is by a modern Arab cast over his shoulders as a covering by day and used as a coverlet by night. This is the first instance of the kind. The next is that of Zedekiah,[2] who made him horns of iron, and said, "Thus saith the Lord, 'With these shalt thou push the Syrians until thou have consumed them.'" He was indeed a false prophet, and some may therefore object that he is not a fitting example to cite here; but we have to remember that the false prophets ever endeavoured to imitate the true ones. Sometimes, instead of performing these acts themselves, they requested others to do so, as when the prophet Elisha,[3] during his last sickness, bade Joash, King of Israel, smite on the ground with his arrows, and as when Jeremiah[4] sent a prophecy written against Babylon by the hand of Seraiah, with the command to read it to the exiles, and then bind a stone to it and cast it into the midst of Euphrates, saying, "Thus shall Babylon sink," etc. In some cases the prophet himself becomes a passive type of a suffering nation, as when a disciple of the prophets[5] said to one of his fellow disciples, "Smite me," as a sign of God's judgment on the Syrians. In the primitive Christian time the prophet Agabus[6] bound himself with a girdle as an ocular prediction of the bonds that awaited Paul at Jerusalem.

It being thus established that the prophets made symbolical actions a part of their delivery, it is reasonable to infer that whenever we find in the history or writing of the prophets accounts of such actions, they were many times really and externally performed, and not, as some hold, internally or in vision alone. If they are represented as mere visions or parables, the connection and style will in most cases enable us so to determine; thus where, under the type of a wine cup, Jeremiah (xxv. 15–38) predicts the destruction of all nations, the very first sentence decides the question: "Thus

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1 *Prophetismus*, vol. i., chap. iv., sec. 38. 2 1 Kings xxii. 11.
3 2 Kings xiii. 14–19. 4 Jer. li. 60–64; also 1 Sam. xv. 27, 28.
5 1 Kings xx. 35–43. 6 Acts xxi. 10–13.

saith the Lord, Take the wine cup of this fury at my hand." So in the visions (Ezek., chaps. viii.–xi.). The suggestive action of loosing the sackcloth and going naked (Isa., chap. xx.) is by some critics thought to have been a mere vision, on the ground that such an exposure would have been inconsistent with decency; but other critics have shown that a man was sometimes described as naked when he had only thrown off his outer clothing or upper garment. The account of the hiding of the linen girdle (Jer. xiii. 1–10) has, notwithstanding the objections of some writers, every mark of an historical proceeding. We have no good reason to suppose that the prophets either of the Hebrews or of other nations confined their labours to their native land. Jonah had intercourse with the polytheistic mariners of the Mediterranean as well as the inhabitants of monotheistic Nineveh. Ahab sent to various kingdoms and nations in order to secure the person of Elijah. Other prophets fleeing from persecution, or else from real or accidental crimes like manslaying, would sometimes naturally seek refuge among the Gentiles. Similarly a Homeric prophet, Polypheides, leaves his country because of a quarrel with his father; so also did the seer, Theoclymenus, on account of his having committed homicide. If Jeremiah made this journey to the Euphrates, it explains the fact that a special command was given in his favour by Nebuchadnezzar (chap. xxxiv. 11), who probably made the prophet's acquaintance during this very visit to the land of the Chaldeans.

But a full discussion of these questions would lead us too far out of our way. Passing forward, then, to the prophets of the new dispensation we also find our Lord, the Prophet of prophets, teaching and exhorting by symbolical actions. When his disciples asked him who was the greatest in the kingdom of heaven, he called a little child to him, and set him in the midst of them, and said, "Verily I say unto you, unless ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever, therefore, shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven," etc. (Matt. xviii. 1–6). Three times did the Teacher of teachers probably point to this child in the course of his admonition. Many of his miracles appear to have been recorded rather than the others he wrought, because they were designed to be understood not only as proof of his divine mission, but also as acted parables which illustrated and enforced his new teachings.[1] When he drove the traders out of the court of the Gentiles he declared his zeal for the sanctity of the temple as a house of prayer

[1] Matt. xxi. 21, 22; Mark xi. 13–22; vii. 33; John ix. 6.

for all nations, thus teaching by this significant action that the Gospel was offered, not to the Jews only, but to the Gentiles as well. So when he washed his disciples' feet he taught them that in humility they should serve one another. And when he appeared to his disciples on the evening of his resurrection he breathed on them and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." In this way he taught them that he would send them the Divine Spirit, who should be to them as the breath of a new life.

His disciples were likewise to shake off the dust of their feet as a token of renunciation of all share in the guilt of the houses and cities that rejected the Gospel. Accordingly Paul and Barnabas shook off the dust of their feet against the Jews of Antioch; and Paul shook his raiment as a testimony against the Jews of Corinth. Not a few instances of ocular proof and persuasion are given in the works of Cicero, Quintilian, and others. Thus the great orator Antonius is represented by Cicero[1] as putting himself forward as a good example of this kind of visible appeal to judges, when, as he boasts, he led into court his client Manius Aquilius, an old man clad in mourning, and enforced his pathetic address by tearing open the tunic of the veteran and exhibiting his scars as evidence of his patriotism. Cicero[2] relates that on one occasion he had himself held a young child in his hands while summing up, and when again a man of noble birth was on trial, he lifted up his little son—an action that filled the forum with wailing and lamentation. So Mark Antony[3] showed to the people the torn tunic of Cæsar, exclaiming, "Ah, wounded and mangled tunic! O Cæsar, the invincible! O invincible Cæsar, didst thou put this on that thou mightest die in it!"

Object not that such demonstrations would now provoke derision, that Burke's "dagger scene," was ridiculed by Sheridan, who said, "The gentleman has shown us the knife; now where is the fork?" But it is justly doubted whether Sheridan uttered such a jeer when the House was in a very serious and deeply agitated mood.[4] Gilray did indeed afterwards caricature the scene, not Burke, however, but Pitt and Dundas, who are represented as horror-stricken at the object presented to their view, while Fox and Sheridan are delineated as gloomy and alarmed conspirators, whose diabolical plots have been thus revealed. But a recital of all the facts in this case would be prolix. The wonder is that the "dagger scene" was not

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1 De Orat., L. ii., c. xlvii. 2 Orator, c. xxxviii. 3 Dion Cassius, L. xliv.

4 Thos. Macknight's Life and Times of Burke, vol. iii., pp. 501–503 (Lond., 1860). Cf. Twiss' Life of Lord Eldon, vol. i., p. 152.

more ridiculed than it appears to have been by an age so prosy that, as we are told, it heard Burke with little attention, and accounted him a third-rate speaker!—an age that read with great admiration the graceful but unimaginative sermons of Dr. Hugh Blair. But the English of to-day approve demonstrations that are as superfluous as Burke's was. The late Prof. Faraday did not think he was insulting the intelligence of his audience when he dropped a stone in order to illustrate gravitation. And even Cicero (Academics, L. ii., c. xlvii.) did not consider it beneath the dignity of philosophy to repeat the anecdote about Zeno's use of his hands and fingers to illustrate the difference between perception, assent, comprehension, and knowledge. And we are not without other examples in which the rhetorical propriety of the actions have never been questioned. At the time Augustine[1] forbade the people to keep the festival of Leontius with their usual carousals, he heard that some murmured, saying, "Were not those who hitherto permitted this custom Christians?" He therefore deliberately purposed that if, contrary to his prohibition, the people would still keep the festival with the usual rejoicings, he would go into the pulpit in the morning and read to them Ezek. xxviii. 9, where it is said that if the watchman warn the wicked, he has delivered his own soul, and afterwards shake the dust off his own garments in their presence and return home. His pathetic sermon, however, preached the day before, had dissuaded them from their usual riotings and so prevented this solemn demonstration. An example equally worthy of attention is found in the life of Alexander Peden, "the Scottish Prophet." At the time of his ejectment, while coming down the pulpit at the close of his farewell sermon, he knocked on the door three times with his Bible, saying, "I arrest thee, in my Master's name, that any never enter thee but such as come in at the door as I did." And it was notably the case that neither Episcopal curate nor indulged Presbyterian ever entered that pulpit till after the Revolution.

But we do well if we occasionally glance at the reverse of the medal. Nothing is more easy, we must add by way of caution, than for the enthusiastic young preacher to allow himself to be carried beyond decorum in the invention and use of emblems and acted parables. And to keep him on his guard against the abuse of his Scriptural liberty in this respect, we now cite an instance or two of such abuse: Father Honoré[2] was a French Capuchin preacher

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[1] Epist. xxix., §8, ad Alypium.

[2] Predicatoriana, by G. Peignot, Dijon, 1841, pp. 198, 199.

of much natural earnestness. Bourdaloue said of him, that though he galled the ear he could rend the heart. He used to preach a sermon on the vanity of the world, in which a skull played a conspicuous part. This skull, with various attire, he hid behind the desk or lifted above it with great dexterity, according to the character he intended to represent. Now the audience beheld the skull covered with the flowing hair of the magistrate. This he would address, saying, "Art not thou the head of a magistrate? Once thou didst, etc., but now," etc. Again the skull betrayed the curled tresses of the gay man of fashion, and was addressed accordingly. Then the death's head was surmounted with the hero's military plumes; next, perhaps, with a female head-dress, which varied according to the character either of a prude or a coquette, a widow or a nun.

Another instance of the abuse of visible representation was William Dawson, an English Methodist preacher and farmer. He loved to repeat a sermon of his from the text, "The Lord shut him in." After announcing the text in the pulpit, his first movement was out of it. "This," he would say, "won't do." He went down the pulpit stairs, and standing in the large class-leader's pew, he supposed himself to be Noah, the pulpit to be the ark which he was building, and the hearers around him to be the ungodly world to which the patriarch was preaching righteousness. Meanwhile the ark was building and filling with animals of all sorts. As Dawson talked he gradually mounted the pulpit step by step till he reached the door, then slamming it to, he would shout, "The Lord shut him in!" And now the flood, the fall of rocks and crags and the shrieking of perishing sinners rose around, while the ark drifted safely over the billows, amidst the terrors of thunder and lightning and howling tempest. He was wont to preach another startling sermon from the text: "He brought me up also out of the horrible pit," etc. The colloquy between the preacher and some person he supposed to be beneath the pulpit, down in the miry clay, was often spoken of by those who heard it as a singular illustration of his skill as a ventriloquist.

And yet are not such things, even when managed best, unsuited to a cultivated audience, and particularly to such English and Anglo-American audiences as are very intelligent, who cannot abide anything that looks like a premeditated gesture or theatrical display of any kind in the pulpit? Would not even our theatre and opera-goers pronounce such things in bad taste?

There are, no doubt, many things allowable on the stage that would be intolerable in the pulpit. But as emblematic actions and

ocular demonstrations are authorised by Scripture examples, as music is, why should the former be shut out of the churches any more than the latter is? If the fashionable world would prevent such innovations from coming into pulpits, or drive them out of pulpits where they may already have gained a footing, let them be equally zealous for the preservation of what they deem good taste on the stages of the opera and the theatre. But it is ever to be remembered that, so far as the world is concerned, the preacher is to adapt himself, in things indifferent, to the taste of the many, and not that of the few. Garrick,[1] a few years before his death, offered to the public an amendment of Shakespeare's Hamlet. The grave-diggers were absolutely thrown out of the play. The spectators no longer saw skull after skull thrown out by the diggers, and heard no longer the hero's address to the skull of "poor Yorick." To this change the people submitted patiently during the life of Garrick, but they did not approve it. Soon after the emendator's death they called for Hamlet as it had been acted from time immemorial, and would not be content until they could see again their old friends the grave-diggers. The severest critics do, as we have somewhere read, admire the emblematic action in the last scene of La Sonnambula, where Amina, the unjustly discarded spouse of Elvino, walking in sleep, takes from her bosom the flowers he had given her, and as she wails the lament, "*Ah non credea*," she slowly and almost unconsciously lets drop leaf by leaf the sweet pledges that now seemed to her so sadly faded. If such things are not only tolerated, but applauded, in the theatre and the opera, as we are told they are, and that by persons of acknowledged taste, why should they be always and everywhere shut out of pulpits? If it can be proved that they are demoralising, then let them by all means be avoided and condemned by all Christian people. At any rate, those who can applaud such things in places of amusement as touching and pathetic, and in good taste withal, cannot consistently protest against their appearance in the pulpit unless they can show that they are out of place in Christian oratory.

But both Cicero and Burke, illustrious examples of eloquence both, did, as we have already seen, exhibit physical objects to illustrate and enforce their thoughts. To these great names another might be added—that of Edward Everett, an orator who, as he was too fastidious, and elaborated his orations excessively, could not be supposed to have introduced such objects in delivery without studious deliberation. Nor did he. Professor Park says that while the

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[1] Dramatic Miscellanies, by Thomas Davies, vol. iii., pp. 146, 147, Lond., 1784.

great orator was preparing an address to be delivered before Amherst College, he wrote a letter to a friend, asking him whether it would be proper, in enforcing one of his thoughts, to put his finger in a glass of water in order to suspend a drop therefrom. Again, in an academic address, after an allusion to the fiery wire which was destined to travel the deep soundings of the ocean, among the bones of lost Armadas, he emphasised the description by displaying a veritable piece of submarine Atlantic Telegraph Cable; and proceeding to compare that wire murmuring the thought of America through leagues of ocean to the printed page; more wonderful as murmuring the thought of the poet Homer through so many centuries to us, he held up before the audience a little volume of the Iliad and Odyssey—the immortal picture unfaded there, of Hector's parting with Andromache, and the scenes of Ulysses' vagrancy.[1]

If the firm objector urges again, that though symbolical actions and the exhibition of physical objects may be proper for the secular orator but not for the sacred, we must appeal to the example of the holy and venerable prophets, or rather to their infallible inspirer, the Divine Spirit, and to the example of Jesus, the Prophet of prophets. If these authorities do not silence the objector, it surely is not becanse they have not the power to silence him.

But the greatest care is to be observed as to the occasion, manner, and object of using symbolical actions.[2] The sense of decorum is not in all equally refined. The observances and customs of the Orientals would tolerate many things which ours forbid. They are also more imaginative and demonstrative than we. And then the question arises, how frequently may the best chosen objects be introduced in modern discourse? The Scripture precedents furnish no answer. For we must no more conclude that our Lord and the other prophets made use of no representative actions and visible similitudes except those which are on record, than we ought to conclude that they preached no sermons except those which have been reported to us. All we can prudently say is that right feeling and deep study must in each case determine what is best. But in general we do well to ponder the remark which Lord Bacon makes about parabolical poetry: "It is not good to stay too long in the theatre."

Here it is perhaps worth while to consider the best means of re-

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1 E. G. Parker, Esq., Golden Age of American Oratory, pp. 301, 302.

2 On the Abuse of Visible Representations; see Cicero, De Orat, L. i., c. liii.; Quint., L. vi., c. i; s. 30–49.

calling the wandering thoughts of the auditory and sustaining their interest in our discourse. The subject has generally been thought unworthy of a place in modern treatises on rhetoric. Aristotle,[1] however, thought otherwise, and consequently gave some good advice respecting what he terms antidotes. Discussing the question whether these belong to the exordium or not, he says, "The business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech wherever it may be necessary. . . It is ridiculous to range this head at the beginning, when more particularly every one is giving the closest attention. So that whenever it is convenient we may use the formulary, 'Lend me your whole attention, for the question does not affect me any more than yourselves;' and this one,—'for I will relate to you a thing so strange, so wonderful that you never yet heard the like.'" Demosthenes, we may add, violates this rule in the introduction of his oration against Aristocrates, and if we may believe Plutarch,[2] he did on one occasion at least tell an anecdote in the introduction of an oration in order to secure the attention of the Athenians who at first would not suffer him to speak, but when he assured them that he had only a short story to tell, they all became silent. "A certain young man," said he, "hired an ass, one summer day, to ride from here to Megara. About noon, when the sun was scorching, he and the owner being both desirous of sitting down on the ground on the shady side of the ass, thrust each other away. The owner said, 'I hired you the ass but not his shadow.' The young man answered, 'Did I not hire the ass? Then all that belongs to him is at my disposal.'" Demosthenes said no more, and seemed inclined to go his way; but the Athenians, wishing to hear the rest of the story, called him back and cried, "Go on!" Then he demanded, "How comes it to pass that you are so eager to hear a story about the shadow of an ass, and yet refuse to give ear to matters of greater importance?"

When the Great Teacher wished to recall or rouse attention he employed an epiphonema, saying, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," "Verily, verily, I say unto you," "Hearken unto me every one of you." St. Peter and St. James said "hearken," and St. Paul on one occasion beckoned with his hand, saying "give audience;" at another time he said, "I beseech thee to hear me patiently." Some of those who preach to audiences of industrious people on warm summer afternoons or evenings might, without loss of time, keep even habitual sleepers awake by announcing that one of the hymns will be sung at a pause in the middle of the sermon.

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[1] Rhet., Lib. iii., 14. [2] Lives of the Ten Orators, chap. viii.

Chrysostom,[1] having preached two-thirds of an afternoon sermon, found the eyes of the audience wandering to the act of lighting the lamps, and happily reproved them for thus forgetting the light of the word. "If their attention flags towards the middle or end of the sermon, I have observed," says Mr. Gresley, "that a few words of weighty import in a loud, animated tone will make them still again. . . You may relieve a long argument by an appeal in the midst of it: 'I, would not detain you, brethren, so long on this point, but that I consider it of very great importance.'" "I miss my aim," says Dean Milner, "if I do not make myself rightly understood." "Let this be noted," says Walker, "as a most certain yet tremendous truth." Cecil once roused a congregation out of the stupefaction of a full dinner by exclaiming, "Last Monday morning a man was hanged at Tyburn!" Instantly all was silence and expectation. Dean Ramsey tells an anecdote about a Scottish minister who, in explaining the term "hyperbolical," said: "Suppose that I were to say that this congregation were *all* asleep in this church at the present time, I would be speaking hyperbolically, because (looking round) I don't believe much more than one-half of you are sleeping." But in general such words are of doubtful effect, for they are liable either to provoke the laughter of the wakeful or the indignation of the dullheads. "Whatever," says the earnest Dr. Burgon,[2] "borders, however remotely, upon drollery, is to be strenuously shunned. Far better to adopt the straightforward practice which prevailed twenty years ago at Kerry, in Montgomeryshire, namely, of sending round the sexton during sermon, shod with list slippers, and armed with hand-bell, in order to wake the drowsy." The golden bells which hung on the hem of Aaron's robe were, as some opine, intended for a like service.

The expediency of making use of any of the demonstrations here considered will, in a given case, depend much on the kind of worship to which the congregation have been accustomed. In a Catholic church, whether Roman, Gallican, or Reformed, where the spectacular representations are a part of the *cultus*, such things ought neither to astonish nor offend. A writer[3] who has profoundly and admiringly studied the ritual and calendar of these churches, is convinced that their whole aim and design is to be dramatic. The same is true of much of the mediæval preaching. While speaking of the death of the Redeemer the preacher would sometimes exhibit a crucifix, or an image of Jesus bound to a pillar, or a crown

1 Fourth sermon (*not homily*) on Genesis. 2 Pastoral Office, p. 203.

3 Rev. J. M. Neale's Mediæval Preaching, p. 57.

of thorns. Ferrarius[1] justifies these and such like tragic shows; and yet he confesses that, unless they are managed prudently, they are calculated to excite laughter rather than sorrow. Paolo Segneri[2] does not wholly condemn the wearing a rope round the neck, a practice of the preachers of Italy in the seventeenth century, but he thinks that, as to this and other such demonstrations, we should exercise the utmost caution.

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1 De Ritu. Concio., L. i., c. xxxi.–xxxiii. 2 Arte di Predicar, Trat. v., c. vii.

CHAPTER VII.

ATTITUDE AND GESTURE.

THE inspired prophets commonly sat, but sometimes stood, while they were speaking.[1] The former posture is more friendly to good temper and ease and audibleness. In places where there is no pulpit, it is likewise more modest and unassuming. Health, climate, custom, and dress are also to be considered in determining the expediency of adopting this attitude. Pretty certain we are that it will not, except from necessity, be adopted by those theatrical preachers of our time who favour the removal of everything that resembles a pulpit in order that the speaker may be seen at full length.

As to our eyes, we are all taught to look our audience in the face. Sweet George Herbert would have the parson "diligent and busy casting the eye among the auditors, to let them know that he observes who marks and who not." Others recommend it as inspiring animation and assisting, if not conveying our meaning. But this rule has important exceptions which are never subjoined. The first is that the significance of the eye often demands that it should not survey the audience. In shame or grief the eyes are naturally downcast or averted; in deep thought they gaze on vacancy; they are raised in apostrophe; in weeping they are covered, in prayer closed. There is, again, a timidity natural to some men which renders it unsafe for them to look their hearers full in the face. Even Luther[2] was not destitute of it, and he gives us his remedy in these words: "When I stand there (in the pulpit) I look upon none, but imagine that they are all blocks that are before me." Charles Simeon's advice to bashful students was: "You must learn to look upon all the heads before you as if they were so many heads of cabbages." But every form of timorousness is not thus mastered. In some cases it were better to drop the eyelids or to close the eyes, as Bourdaloue did. Physical bravery is not always the ally

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1 Homer's heroes and prophets stand while speaking; among the Romans sitting was the posture of authority. 2 Table Talk, §411.

of moral courage; and there are, we doubt not, preachers who would have more fear if they had more faith or more knowledge. Great preachers, moreover, are apt to fill their minds with their subject, and the whole train of their thoughts to such a degree as to preclude attention to the bearing of the head and the direction of the eyes. Especially are they so disposed when they are handling life-and-death questions. Thus of the judicious Hooker we are told that "his eyes were always fixed on one place, to prevent his imagination from wandering, insomuch that he seemed to study as he spoke." Robert Hall's eyes often declared that he was totally absorbed in his subject. Dr. Emmons held up his manuscript in his left hand before his face. Of Dr. Chalmers we have authentic evidence that he "made no attempt to look at his audience; there was nothing beyond a passing flash of the eye as he occasionally darted his head upward." "As for myself," says M. Bautain, "I carefully avoid all ocular contact with no matter whom, and restrict myself to a contemplation of the audience as a whole, keeping my looks above the level of the heads, so that my entire attention is fastened upon my plan and ideas." A third exception is demanded by the science of sounds. Cardinal Maury and a great Italian authority, W. Audisio,[1] concur in advising us to speak ordinarily towards the centre of the mass of the audience; for if we direct our eyes and voice alternately to both sides we render ourselves inaudible to each in turn. Professor Audisio further teaches us to direct the voice, not towards cavities and draperies, but towards walls and columns, so that, reverberating from these centres of repercussion, it may distribute itself in equal rays over all the assembly. A final exception is provoked by high pulpits, whence the speaker cannot eye his audience without an unnatural drooping of the head and a hurtful compressure of the vocal organs.

On the subject of gesture, or "action," as distinguished from symbolical and parabolic signs, modern rhetoricians have not agreed in opinion. Mr. Smart recognises four kinds: 1. The emphatic (adding to the force); 2. Referential (pointing at something); 3. Impassioned (expressive of some natural impulse); 4. Imitative (describing by action). The last he excludes from the pulpit. The Great Teacher would naturally have pointed at those objects to which he directed attention by the word "behold." On one occasion he said: "As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world," and then anointed the eyes of a blind man with clay and

[1] Leçons d'Eloquence Sacrée, traduites de L'Italien, tome i., p. 437 (ed. Lyons, 1844).

bade him go wash in the pool of Siloam. The significance of this act of the peerless Prophet, at once a miracle and a parable, has been commonly overlooked. The one gesture of his which the evangelists have recorded was the lifting up of his pierced hands in benediction. That act, so simple in itself, was a summary of the Gospel. The apostle and tent-maker Paul undoubtedly held forth his scarred and callous hands while delivering a passage in his charge to the elders of Ephesus;[1] and at the close of his defence before Agrippa and Festus[2] he would naturally have shaken his manacles, not, however (as some masters represent him), in the face of the proconsuls. Raffaelle, in his cartoon of the apostle speaking to the Athenians, has very properly delineated him lifting up both hands as high as possible to enforce the words, "God . . dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands." Of the action of the earlier Greek preachers we know very little. But as it was no uncommon thing for the preacher to sit and his congregation to stand, and there was current a strong prejudice against the false art of secular rhetoric (even Athanasius betrays it), we may reasonably infer that a calm and undemonstrative action was most acceptable. Some, we learn, were displeased with the gestures of Paul of Samosata, who was in the habit of striking his thigh and stamping his feet. Borromeo,[3] by precept and example, taught a moderation in action which few of his Italian disciples appear to have acquired.

English and Anglo-American clergymen gesticulate less than preachers of other nations. Addison wrote one of his most pleasant essays[4] on the subject, concluding with this observation: "We ought to lay aside all kinds of gesture (which seems to be very suitable to the genius of our nation), or at least to make use of such only as are graceful and expressive." In favour of this immobility of English preachers, the words of Dr. Johnson have frequently been cited. The judgment of this sensible critic appears to have been influenced partly by the example of Dr. Watts, who, being little of stature, was too prudent to indulge in any gesticulations, and partly by the example of Garrick, who made use of fewer gestures than any other actor of his day. It should be remembered that he greatly admired the delivery of these two friends of his,

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1 Acts xx. 34. 2 xxvi. 29.

3 Instructions to Pastors, Pt. i., chap. xxv., xxvi. Hereof his opinion is that as the actor is permitted to be more free than the orator, so the orator may be properly allowed a larger liberty than the preacher.

4 Spectator, No. 407.

both favourites, also, of many other cultivated Londoners of his time. Nor should we overlook the essay which has escaped almost all his quoters, and in which he very judiciously resolves the matter into a question of adaptation, and then disposes of it with just discrimination and good sense. "Whether action," writes he,[1] "may not be yet of use in churches where the preacher addresses a mingled audience may deserve inquiry. It is certain that the senses are more powerful as the reason is weaker; and that he whose ears convey little to his mind may sometimes listen with his eyes till the truth may gradually take possession of his heart. If there be any use of gesticulation, it must be applied to the ignorant and rude, who will be more affected by vehemence than delighted by propriety. . . As all innocent means are to be used for the propagation of truth, I would not deter those who are employed in preaching to common congregations from any practice which they may find persuasive; for compared with the conversion of sinners propriety and elegance are less than nothing." A conclusion this worthy of a Wesley or a Whitefield."

If we pass over to Germany we find a nation that, for sedateness, closely resembles England; and yet, as Luther, a man of famous zeal, set the pattern to all his successors, we need not wonder that many German preachers have indulged in gesticulation to excess. The tradition that Luther broke the desk which is exhibited at Eisenach we very much doubt, it was, more probably, split by some later preacher, who had a larger fist and a smaller heart than the great Reformer. When we look at those delicate fingers of his, which could play so skilfully on the flute and the guitar, we must believe that it was his words, and not his blows, that were wont to fall like thunderbolts. But still some distinguished disciples of Luther have been far from demonstrative. Herder was a motionless preacher, and so was that "little hunchbacked, sickly man," Schleiermacher. Others have shown more animation. The printed sermons of Krummacher convinced Palmer[2] that the hands of him that preached them could not have been quiet for three minutes together. Of Reinhard's gestures we are told that they were generally of an indefinite character, indicating a deep interest in his discourse, rather than an attempt at visible representation.

In general the action of the secular orator ought to be more bold

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[1] Idler, No. 90. Young Greek and Roman orators for a time used no motion of the arm, but kept it confined in their toga, as an evidence of their modesty, till age and experience allowed them greater freedom.—*Cresoll. in Ward*, vol. ii., 358. [2] Homiletik, p. 617 (First ed.).

and irregular than that of the religious teacher. The former alone can safely follow the advice of Cicero,[1] that we should learn action not from the theatre and the player, but from the camp, or even from the palæstra. For the preacher to imitate the actor is bad, but to imitate the soldier and the pugilist is, of all things, the most improper. Of the latter sort are they that sally from behind the desk whenever they wish to deliver a *bravura*, and they that, in Christian churches, play the soldier or the caged lion. "I have known a clergyman," says Dr. Comstock, "to traverse the whole length of his pulpit platform twenty-three times during the delivery of one sermon." Such marching and countermarching may keep some people awake, but it grievously offends all those who desire to treasure and improve the *matter* of the preachment.

Say not, 'Nature is the only safe teacher; heed her instructions and you will never be guilty of such extravagances as these.' The art of elocution is expressly intended to collect, formulate, and apply the mysterious suggestions of nature. Those who decry this art are exceedingly liable to be misled by inductions from too few individual cases. Thus Archbishop Whately[2] holds that natural action always precedes the words it assists; but the principle does not apply universally, and the observance of it would betray many speakers into a very unnatural timing of some of their gestures. It is indeed true, as the Rev. Mr. Austin[3] remarks, that the *excited* speaker, appealing to the *passions* of his audience, will make gestures before his words can find utterance; but in *calm* discourse the words and gestures are nearly simultaneous. All emphatic gestures (than which none are more frequently and more impressively made by preachers) will naturally fall at the very same time with that stress of voice which they help to distinguish.[4] Some interjections, moreover, and other words which are cast forth by sudden emotions, must often dart ahead of gestures. Then, again, it should be considered that so diverse are the temperaments and mental habits of men that the unstudied and spontaneous utterances of one speaker will outrun, while those of another will come behind the gestures which enforce them.

If we consider all these things well, clearly enough will it appear that there is no short by-path to rhetorical delivery. If you would speak safely, decorously, and with all serviceableness, keep the high-

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1 De Orat., L. iii., c. lix. 2 Rhet., Pt. iv., chap. i., § 6.

3 Chironomia, p. 381. 4 Prof. B. H. Smart.

way of an enlightened elocution—a way which reposes on reclaimed Nature, and is walled on either hand by the prudence of the past. Adventurously strike out therefrom, and you encounter nature more than enough, ledges hard to climb or swamps unfordable; or else you soon find yourself brought to a standstill, amidst briers, nettles, and entangling vines, not far from the spot where the mere pathfinder to civilisation stood nearly three thousand years ago. But is elocution already a perfected art? No, manifestly not;[1] and we may reasonably hope that its professors who have oftenest travelled the ancient highway will lead forward, not with the desire of fixing their own footprints miraculously on the very rocks, but rather of helping the student to cast out of the way-side chapels all idols, whether they be those of the "tribe," the "den," the "market," or the "theatre." And, above all, let them resolve that, if it be anywise possible, they will analyse fully the inborn peculiarities of each student, and often, if not always, criticise and advise him specifically and apart from all others, whereby they may honour alike the oneness of a creature living, human, and intelligent, the grace of God as individualised in him, and his own process of honestly, freely, and manfully speaking out these in Christian discourse.[2]

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1 The two great standard works on elocution are the Rev. Mr. Austin's "Chironomia" and Dr. Rush's "Philosophy of the Human Voice." Upon the latter is founded Prof. William Russell's elaborate treatise on "Pulpit Elocution," which is very commendable; indeed, amongst books of its own class, it stands as yet without an equal. His manual of "Vocal Culture" and his "Elocutionist," both intended for more general instruction, are likewise systematic, lucid, and practical. Also read Rev. J. H. Howlett's "Instruction in Reading the Liturgy," last ed., London (Murby).

2 It was the opinion of Chrysostom, a first-rate authority in all such matters, that eloquence is not a gift of nature, but acquired by a learned education.—*De Sacerdotio*, chap. v.

I.

INDEX OF FIGURES.

WITH DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES.

In the following Index we have attempted to name and define all known rhetorical figures. We have even ventured to admit to our list a few terms which might, with critical severity, have been excluded; but as ancient authorities have given them a place among figures, and as modern writers on rhetoric have, by slighting this part of their subject, recommended too strongly a dry and unimpassioned style, we have not considered it profitable to ignore them. Nor have we omitted the synonyms and some antonyms of the more common terms. As to illustrations, those taken from the prophetical Scriptures have taken the first place, those from post-apostolic sermons the second place. For reasons elsewhere given we have very seldom cited poetry. The Scripture examples have, for the most part, been merely referred to, because it is presumed that every reader has the Bible always lying before him, and is in the habit of consulting passages and their contexts. To neglect these references is to remain ignorant of the foundations of this system of homiletics and of the very seeds of all sacred eloquence. A useful monograph might be written about these figures; but as holy Scripture furnishes us so many illustrations of their real nature and most advantageous use, such volume, however desirable, is not indispensable. And it would not even be desirable if it kept the young preacher from studying these illustrations in their scope and connection, whereby alone he can acquire that style of speaking which is sacred, and at the same time level with the capacity of the common people—a style which is neither gold nor copper, but "silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times."

The writer has not, he may be allowed to add, attempted here to name the innumerable sources into which he has dipped.

Accismus is an apparent or assumed refusal (Matt. xv. 24, 26; xxi. 29).

Accommodation (*adaptation*) is the use of a passage in a broader or deeper sense than that which was at first or is now commonly found in it, on the ground of the adaptation of its inner meanings, or of its twofold or even manifold application to kindred times, persons, or subjects.

Cajetan, Glassius, and others formerly taught that quotations were made from the Old Testament in the New, either according to the sense intended by the Divine Spirit or according to "analogical accommodation." The sense intended by the Spirit is, they said, either literal or typical—literal, as Isa. vii. 14; Matt. i. 23; typical, as Exodus xii. 46; John xix. 26. They defined an analogical accommodation the use of words of the Old Testament in the New on the ground of fitness or similitude, so that they were adapted to events, persons, or things which were beyond the knowledge or meaning of the first sacred writers. They give as examples Matt. xiii. 35; Psa. lxxviii. 2; 1 Pet. ii. 24, 25; Matt. viii. 17; Isa. liii. 4. Here Peter quotes according to the literal sense, and Matthew analogically. But as these writers cannot tell us how much inspired men knew and understood, they base their definition on a mere assumption, while they ignore the spiritual fulness of the Hebrew Scriptures and the omniscience of the Holy Ghost.

This figure should not be confounded with the theory of accommodation *syncatabasis*, according to which, as some maintain, the sacred writers and speakers used certain words and illustrations in condescension to the errors and prejudices of their contemporaries. We here employ the term along with *chreia*, *gnome*, and *noëma*, to designate the various kinds of quotation.

Paul was called by the Athenians a sower of words. He was in very truth a sower of words, but a reaper of works.—*Augustine.* The wine which Christ poured forth as an offering to his Heavenly Father was pure and unmixed. But to all the rest of mankind that saying of the prophet is applicable: "Your wine is mixed with water."—*Bernard.*

Addubitatio (*dubitatio*, *aporia*, *diaporesis*) is a figure by which we express doubt as to what we ought to think or say or do (Isa. lxiii. 11–13; Hos. vi. 4; Luke xvi. 3).

To express such great mysteries in human language is to belittle them. What, then, am I to do? Shall I hold my peace? Or shall I speak? Neither ought I to remain silent nor am I able to speak. How can I remain silent as to such great mercies? And yet how can I speak of such ineffable mysteries? To keep silence were ingratitude, and to speak were temerity.—*Luis de Granada.* For of his prophets what should I say?—*Sandys.* Shall I term such families Christians or heathens?—*Whitefield.*

Adjunction (*synezeugmenon*) refers to one verb, several words or phrases, each of which, if placed alone, would require that verb to complete the sense. According to *Auct. Rhetor. ad Herennium* this verb may be placed either at the beginning or at the end of the sentence. *v.* ZEUGMA and ANTEZEUGMENON (Psa. xv.; Isa. ii. 3; Eph. iv. 31).

A religion which men of good nature must abhor for its many cruelties, men of sense for its many absurdities, and men of virtue for its large indulgencies to and encouragements of immorality.—*Seed.*

Ænigma (*enigma, hypœnixis*) is an idea or thought expressed in obscure language.

And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots.—*Isa. xi.* 1. The King of Sheshach shall drink after them.—*Jer. xxv.* 26.

The word *Babel*, as some Biblical critics think, is here concealed from the enemies of God by using the letters of the Hebrew alphabet in an inverted order, according to the cabalistic "Atbash." A *parable* without any explanation is sometimes synonymous with *enigma* (Matt. xiii. 35).

Ætiology is a figure which either explicitly or by implication renders a reason for thinking, saying, or doing something.

The lion hath roared, who will not fear? The Lord hath spoken, who can but prophesy?—*Amos iii.* 8. He was unknown to them when he was come; for he came at first in humble guise and concealed.—*Augustine.*

Agnominatio. *v.* PARONOMASIA.

Aganactesis is the expression of indignation by language and delivery.

Allegory (*translatio*) has been differently defined by the ancients and moderns. I. Cicero (*Orat.* xxvii.) says that when several metaphors (translationes) follow one another, the Greeks call the figure *allegoria;* but it would, he thinks, be better to include *allegory, hypallage,* and *catachesis* under the term *translatio.* Quintilian (B. viii., ch. vi., §44) says: "Our writers interpret the word by the term *inversio,* which represents one thing in words and another in sense—sometimes a sense quite contrary to the words. Among the different kinds of *allegory* he mentions *sarcasm, asteismos, antiphrasis,* and *parœmia.* There are those, he adds, who affirm that these are not species of *allegory,* but *tropes,* on the strong ground that *allegory* is obscure, but that the other figures speak with clearness. Elsewhere Quintilian calls *allegory* a continued *metaphor.* II. The apostle Paul (Gal. iv. 24), showing that the history of Isaac and Ishmael was repeated by their descendants in a higher sphere, and at the same time represented the old and the new covenants and their heirs, says, "which things are allegorised." Here

the verb is employed to signify the interpretation of an actual narrative, as if it were a typical representation. III. *Allegory* in the modern sense may be defined: A fictitious narrative which has another and deeper meaning than that which is directly and literally expressed.

Dr. Carson thus distinguishes allegory and metaphor, *as now understood:*

1. Allegory presents to immediate view the secondary object only; metaphor always presents the principal also.

2. Metaphor always imagines one thing to be another; allegory never.

3. Everything asserted in the allegory applies to the secondary object; everything asserted in the metaphor applies to the principal.

4. In the metaphor there is but one meaning; in the allegory there are two—a literal and a figurative.

5. Allegory is a veil; metaphor is a perspective glass.

Dean Trench distinguishes the allegory and the parable as follows: The allegory, unlike the parable, contains its interpretation within itself. We may add that, like the parable, it embraces other figures, and that the conditions and acts of its representative objects are in keeping with their own nature and sphere (Isa. v. 1–7; Ezek. xxxi. 3–17; Matt. xiii. 3–23; John x. 1–18; xv. 1–8).

The allegory and the parable are often confounded. As both admit of a great variety of forms, most of which are observable in each, good usage has not yet clearly defined their peculiar qualities.

Alliteration. *v.* HOMŒOPROPHERON.

Allœosis. *v.* ENALLAGE.

Allusion is an intimation of or reference to something that is supposed to be generally known. It is sometimes used for *mimesis.* Several of our Lord's parables are allusions, as Luke xvi. 39; xxviii. 33.

I am the Lord thy God that divided the sea.—*Isa. li.* 15. Man without the prospect of eternal happiness was like leviathan in a little pool.—*Manton.* Those who are in the ship with Christ are more tossed by storms than those who travel by land.—*Dyos.* An edifice reared stone by stone, instead of as by Aladdin's lamp.—*John Foster.* Perhaps the walls may be so thick, their foundations may be so deep, that they will not give way except at the sound of the trumpet borne before the Ark of the Lord.—*J. C. Hare.*

Amœbæon. *v.* REFRAIN.

Amphibologia is a phrase or sentence which may bear more than one intepretation.

Jeremiah prophesies as to Zedekiah (xxxiv. iii.): "Thine eyes shall behold

the eyes of the king of Babylon, and he shall speak with thee mouth to mouth, and thou shalt go to Babylon." Ezekiel prophesies as to the same prince (xii. 13): "I will bring him to Babylon, to the land of the Chaldeans; yet he shall not see it, though he shall die there." Josephus tells us that the apparent inconsistency of these two predictions determined Zedekiah to believe neither of them. Yet both were strictly and punctually fulfilled.—*Dr. Hurd.* Ye men of Athens, in all things I perceive that ye are very devout.—*Acts xvii.* 22. Usury hath grown so strong that it hath sinews and bones like a man, and walketh up and down the streets like a serving-man, like a gentleman, like a merchantman, and I hope no man may justly say, like an alderman, "God forbid!"—*W. Burton.*

Amphidiorthosis is a mixed figure composed of *correctio* and *prodiorthosis* (*q. v.*).

Ampliatio is rather a species of anachronism than a figure. It has two applications. It is employed, I. Where though the person or thing is changed the old name is retained.

"The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb."—*Isa. xi.* 6. "Matthew, the publican."—*Matt. x.* 3. Here we may remark that "the late Professor Richardson, of Glasgow University, gave Horace's *callida junctura verborum* a place among figures. By this figure a word is brought back to its original signification from a later sense. 'Thus I shall a tale declare.' By this figure the poet ventures to bring back the word *tale* to its primitive sense, and applies it to what he represents as an historical fact."—*Dr. Carson.*

II. Where synonymously with one species of *prolepsis*, a name or attribute is given by way of anticipation, or where persons or things are described not as they are now, but as they will be. *v.* HYPERBOLE.

"His neighbor's wife," for "betrothed virgin" (Deut. xxii. 24). "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold" (John x. 16; Jas. ii. 23).

Amplificatio (*enumeratio, expolitio, auxesis, epauxesis, incrementum, aparithmesis*) is the enrichment of a discourse or a part of it by enumerating particulars, or by multiplying epithets, or by giving a graphic description of anything. Several other figures, as *ampliatio, commoratio, distributio, exaggeratio, epimone, praunsis*, etc., are species of *amplification.*

It is also used in a restricted sense as synonymous with *auxesis*, and as opposed to *meiosis. v.* HYPERBOLE (Isa. lx.; Jer. xlviii; Lam. iii.; Ezek. xviii. and xxvii.; Heb. xi. Edmund Burke was of opinion that every passage which is in a high degree eloquent ought to contain a thought, an image, and a sentiment. He adduced as an illustration of his maxim his famous invective against the Duke of Bedford, ending with a Latin sentiment.

Some consider amplification as one of the necessary parts of a discourse rather than as a figure. Cicero (*De Orat.*, Lib. iii., c. xxvi.) pronounces it the greatest glory of eloquence (*summa laus elo-*

quentiæ), and makes it consist not only in magnifying and extolling anything, but also in extenuating it and making it appear contemptible. Examples of amplificatio may be found in his *Pro Leg. Man.*, c. xi. and xxv. and xxvi.

That quaint old writer, John Spencer, in "Things New and Old," illustrating another subject, dwells on the utility of amplification thus: "There may be a fish or two hang on the net being let down in a heap; but that is a chance. It is not the net lapped up together that bringeth in the draught, but trailed out at length and spread all abroad, that closeth in fish. So it is the spreading of the Word, the stretching it out upon every soul present by the work of the ministry, that is the way to catch many; so that the reason of such ill success in many ministers is not spreading the net, not dilating upon the matter in hand."

Did not Christ know that it behooved him to suffer? Oh, yes, he knew it—full well he knew it; all that was to happen to him happened only "according to his own predestinate counsel and foreknowledge;" and all therefore that was to happen was known to him, both as to its necessity and nature, as surely and clearly before it did happen as at or after its actual occurrence. Yet he did pray, and pray to escape it—so pray that in the earnestness and agony of his supplication great drops of blood streamed from his face to the ground.—*C. Molyneux.*

Anabasis exists where the speech or discourse ascends step by step from the beginning to the end, or where the words are so arranged that they express more and more vehemence. It is sometimes the same as the modern, but often different from the ancient *climax*. *Auxesis* is occasionally used with the same signification.

The Word was God. He was contemplating the Godhead of the Word. What a mountain was this! How highly exalted! He had ascended above all the mountain tops of the earth, he had ascended beyond all the fields of the sky; ascended beyond all the heights of the stars; ascended beyond all the choirs and legions of angels. For unless he first ascended beyond all created beings he could not reach the presence of Him by whom all things were made.—*Augustine.*

Catabasis (*decrementum*) is the opposite figure. It is especially proper for the utterance of sorrow (Isa. xl. 31; Jer. ix. 1, 2; Lam. iv. 1, 2; Ezek. xxii. 18; Amos ix. 2, 3; Matt. v. 18).

Anachoresis is a digression. *v.* EPANACLESIS.

Anaclasis. *v.* ANTANACLASIS.

Anacœnosis (*communicatio*, *symbouleusis*) is when we appeal to such passions, affections, feelings, opinions, or faculties of others as they are supposed to have in common with ourselves, and so submit to their own judgment the merits of our cause. It is sometimes synonymous with *association* and *erotesis* (Isa. v. 3, 4; Jer. xxiii. 23; Mal. i. 6; Luke xi. 19; Acts iv. 19).

If the walls of your mansion were tottering with age, the roof shaking above you, and the edifice wasted, wearied out, threatening an instant ruin of its time-enfeebled structure, would you not in all haste go forth from it? See a world tottering and falling, etc.—*Cyprian.*

Anacoluthon is a sentence the end of which does not grammatically correspond to its beginning—a want of sequence which may nevertheless be intended by the speaker. *v.* HYPERBATON and HYPALLAGE (Matt. vii. 9, 12; xii. 11; Acts iii. 16).

Anadiplosis (*epanastrophe, reduplicatio, reversio, epanadiplosis*) exists where the same word that closes a sentence or clause is repeated at the beginning of the next. This has been termed "Echo" (Psa. xcvi. 13; xcviii. 45; cxxi. 1, 2; cxxii. 2, 3; Isa. xxvi. 5; xxx. 9; Joel ii. 27, and John xviii. 37, in original; Rom. viii. 17).

Come unto him and he will give you rest—rest from the hard servitude of sin and appetite and guilty fear.—*Horsley.* You have charge of unlimited souls—souls which, as our Saviour has taught us, are, each of them, worth more than the whole world.—*Payson.*

This term is sometimes applied to words thus placed which only agree in derivation.

Anæresis is an *antenantiosis* introduced by way of *digression* or *parenthesis; e. g.*, "Not with stones nor with bricks did I fortify the city," etc.—*Demosthenes, Pro Corona.*

Anagoge takes place when the sense and thought rise from things inferior and terrene to things superior and celestial (Luke x. 25–37). *v.* ANABASIS.

Anamnesis is a calling to remembrance (Jer. ii. 2; Luke xv. 17).

Anancæon is when we show the necessity of a thing (Matt. vi. 24).

Anaphora (*epanaphora, relatio*) is the repetition of the same word or phrase at the beginning of successive clauses or sentences (Deut. xxviii. 3–6; Isa. ii. 7, 8; vi. 10; xv. 8; xlii. 15, 16; Jer. iv. 23–26; Micah v. 9–12; Matt. v. 2–11; Acts xx. 22, 25).

Farewell, thou great and august temple. Farewell, apostles, ye leaders of my conflicts and my sufferings. Farewell, episcopal throne, thou dangerous and envied preëminence. Farewell, choirs of monks, harmony of chaunters, nocturnal processions, holiness of nuns, modesty of matrons, bands of widows and orphans, eyes of the poor fixed upon God and upon us.—*Gregory Nazianzen.*

Anasceue. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Anastrophe (*inversion* or *trajection* of words, *parallage*) is a grammatical and poetical figure, by which a preposition or other indeclinable word is removed from its usual place, as "the crags among."

Misplaced negative: *e. g.*, "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray" (Deut. xxii. 1), for "if thou shalt see," etc., "thou shalt not hide thy face" (Acts vii. 48).

Misplaced adverb: *e. g.*, "Are there yet the treasures of wickedness in the house of the wicked" (Micah vi. 10); in the original we have, "Yet are there," etc.

Flacius considers this figure synonymous with *syncategorema*. Others give the name to a species of *hyperbaton*, and define it: A figure by which we place far apart the members of a sentence that are commonly connected.

Annominatio. *v.* PARONOMASIA.

Anomœosis (*dissimilitude*). *v.* COMPARATIO.

Antanaclasis (*anaclases, antistasis, dilogia*) is when a word is repeated, but in a different sense or inflection from the first. *v.* PLOCÉ.

"If thou draw out thy soul to the hungry, and satisfy the afflicted soul," etc. (Isa. lviii. 10). Here the word soul is employed in two senses. See the word "liberty" in Jer. xxxiv. 17; "greatest," Matt. xviii. 1, 4; "almost," Acts xxvi. 28, 29; Isa. lix. 18; Matt. viii. 22.

Some designate by this term a return to a former thought after a *parenthesis*. *v.* APOSTASIS.

Anesis. *v.* EPITASIS.

Anteisagoge (*anticatalexis, compensatio*) is when, contrary to what is expected, we reply to what is said against us by admitting its force, and then adding something on the opposite side that is of greater force, or else when we answer one question by asking another (Matt. xxi. 23–25).

And had the Lord need to be betrayed? I answer at once by asking in return, Had the Lord need to be born? to be crucified? to die? to be buried?—*Augustine.*

Antenantiosis is when we express an idea all the more positively by expressing it negatively.

Thou art not least among the princes of Juda.—*Matt. ii.* 6.

Anteoccupation. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Antezeugmenon (*injunctum*) makes one sentence out of words that might be expanded into two or more sentences. It is often employed for *adjunction*.

Anthropopatheia (*syncatabasis*) exists when we ascribe human or brute or inanimate attributes to the Divine Being.

The Lord hath sworn by his right hand and by the arm of his strength.—*Isa. lxii.* 8. My fury shall come up in my face.—*Ezek. xxxviii.* 18. Their angels do always behold the face of my father which is in heaven.—*Matt. xviii.* 10. And now Lord behold their threatenings.—*Acts iv.* 29. God looketh when we will come; he waiteth when we will return unto him; he daily and hourly watcheth when we will submit ourselves and receive his mercy.—*Bp. Jewel.*

Anthypophora. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Anticatalexis. *v.* ANTEISAGOGE.

Anticategoria is when we retort upon another the very accusation, insinuation, or reproof he has uttered against us.

I may boldly ask of them which say they have no leisure to hear God's word, how will they find the leisure to be saved?—*Abp. Sandys.*

Anticlimax. *v.* CLIMAX.

Antimeria. *v.* ENALLAGE.

Antimetabole (*commutatio, epanodos, metathesis, diallelon*) repeats in an inverse order words that have the same sound or sense, for the sake of explanation, distinction, or qualification. It is sometimes used to designate an *inverted chiasmus.*

Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil.—*Isa. v.* 20; *Ezek. vii.* 6, 7; *xxxii.* 16; *xxxvi.* 6. The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath.—*Mark ii.* 27; *John viii.* 47; *xv.* 16. Then the houses were churches, but now the church is become a house.—*Chrysostom.* If I should not only not help the Lord against the mighty, but help to strengthen them that are mighty against the Lord, worthy I were to bear my own judgment.—*Hooker.*

Antimetathesis is when in description the hearer is addressed in the second person, as if he were actually present as a spectator of or an actor in the scene depicted. It is also used for "change of persons" in general. Longinus brings under this head *polyprosopon.* Vossius employs this word in the sense of *antimetabole, commutatio.*

Antiphrasis. *v.* IRONY.

Antiptosis is the use of one case for another.

Antistasis. *v.* ANTANACLASIS.

Antistrophe (*conversio*) is a repetition of the same word at the end of successive phrases or members. *v.* EPISTROPHE and ANAPHORA. *Antistrophe, antistropha, biaion, antistrephon, antistrephonta* are terms sometimes applied either to words that may be retorted or to the retort itself, as when an objection is turned against the objector (2 Cor. xi. 22). When the retort is violent it is called *biaion.*

Antithesis (*enantiosis*) is a figure by which two thoughts, words, phrases, or sentences are set in opposition to each other in order to render them more striking by contrast. *Antitheta* are, (1) The parts of an *antithesis;* (2) *Enantiotes;* (3) Theses arranged *pro et contra* (Isa. lxv. 13; Ezek. xvi. 33, 34; Luke vii. 44–46; John xv.).

Behold! Compassion kneels, and misery refuses to kneel. Holiness abases itself, and sin will not abase itself. The judge lies prostrate on the earth, and the criminal has the face to stand erect!—*S. Cesaire, of Arles.* Ah, dear hearer, it is between two eternities, so to speak, that you are travelling through this mortal life, the one happy, the other miserable. Your salvation depends on the means you use for escaping the one and reaching the other.—*Brydayne.*

Antonomasia exists when a proper name is put for a common or appellative noun, or when, on the contrary, an appellation derived from some attribute is put for a proper name (Hosea xii. 14; Matt. viii. 20; Acts iii. 14).

When Christ suffered his passion, there was one Barabbas. St. Matthew calleth him a notable thief, a gentleman thief, such as rob now-a-days in velvet coats, and other two obscure thieves, nothing famous. The rustical thieves were hanged and Barabbas was delivered. Even so now-a-days the little thieves are hanged that steal of necessity, but the great Barabbases have free liberty to rob and spoil without measure in the midst of the city.—*Bernard Gilpin.* The laws of God and man were but withs upon the arms of these Samsons.—*Bp. Atterbury.*

Apantesis. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Aparithmesis. *v.* AMPLIFICATION.

Apeuche. *v.* COMMINATION.

Aphæresis is the taking of a letter or a syllable from the beginning of a word; as "Coniah" for "Jeconiah" (Jer. xxii. 24); *'neath* for *beneath.*

Aphodos (*digression, parecbasis, parabasis, ecbole*) is a figure by which the speaker mentions his digression and promises a return to his subject. *v.* DIEXODOS and METABASIS.

Aporia. *v.* ADDUBITATIO.

Aphorismus (*diorismus*) is a weighty matter expressed in few words; an aphorism.

Apocope is the taking of a letter or letters from the end of a word; as *Jude* for *Judas, th'* for *the.*

Apodeixis is a rhetorical demonstration or the giving of an obvious reason (Jer. xii. 5; Matt. x. 25).

Apodioxis (*detestatio, rejectio*) is where something is repelled or spurned as wrong, absurd, or intolerable (Isa. i. 12–15; Jer. ix. 2; Matt. iv. 10; xvi. 23; Acts viii. 20).

Away with impiety and discords.—*Lactantius.* Flee from sin as from a toad; come away from popery and all antichristian religion.—*John Bradford.* Again I say, let such doctrines be cast out.—*J. C. Hare.*

II. The term is sometimes used to designate a wish that an evil omen may be averted. Holmes, without any good authority, calls this figure *abominatio:* "God forbid" (1 Sam. xx. 2, 9; Matt. xvi. 22; Luke xx. 16).

Far be it from us that our unthankfulness should bereave us of this felicity. —*Abp. Sandys.*

III. It has also been defined a figure by which the speaker merely mentions such particulars as he is either unwilling or unable to amplify (Heb. xi. 32).

IV. It has been employed in the sense of *apoplanesis* (*q. v.*).

V. Bengel uses the term in the very mild sense of a skilful transfer from ourselves to another of the duty of narrating or explaining something. He regards it as an epistolary figure (Eph. vi. 21, 22; Col. iv. 7–9; Cicero's Epp., L. i., Ep. viii.).

Apologue (*fabula, fable*) has been employed in various senses. Aristotle used the word *logos* to designate the fable as we find it in Æsop, while he used the word *mythus* to denote the composition of incidents in an epic poem. Apthonius, a Greek rhetorician of the fourth century, employs the word *logos* in the Aristotelian sense. Among Latin authors the word *fabula* signifies, 1, narrrative, common report; 2, fictitious narrative (*logos*, *ainos*); 3, tragedy or comedy; 4, an epic poem. In the New Testament Greek we have the word *mythus* in the sense of the Hebrew legends, but not of fables, either in the classical or modern sense. The fable, in the modern acceptation, is a fictitious narrative which is intended to illustrate some maxim of morality or providence, and in which brutes, trees, and other unintelligent objects are for the most part represented as acting above their natural capacity and sphere. According to this definition, some of Æsop's fables, so called, would be more properly termed parables, and some of our Lord's parables, fables. To give examples were needless.

Apophasis (*parasiopesis*) is when we forbear to express roundly and positively ideas which, however, we insinuate to our hearers by the use of negations. It does not differ essentially from *cataphasis*. *Apophasis* says, 'I will not mention,' and *cataphasis* says, "I pass by his libertinism." This figure is not often employed by the inspired speakers (Philemon, verse 19). *v.* PARALEIPSIS, often written *paralepsis*.

Apophonema is a responsive sentence.

Aphora. *v.* ADDUBITATIO.

Apoplanesis is where an advocate purposely turns the attention of the judge from the point at issue.

Aposiopesis (*reticentia*) begins a sentence, but increases its force by leaving it unfinished, because some after-thought, sudden emotion, or overpowering passion of the speaker compels him to retain the residue (Exod. xxxii. 32; Hos. ix. 14; Luke xiii. 9; xix. 42).

O eternity! eternity! all the more lovely and ravishing art thou to my soul because thou art incomprehensible. Eternity!—best described by adoration, wonder, and—silence!—*Brydayne.* The farther our two pilgrims go from Jerusalem the more their dejection increases. Care and sorrow make it pain for them to breathe, and the world is all too narrow for their oppressed hearts. "Yes, our fond dreams are over. Cleopas, we have no refuge from the fearful thought that—may God have mercy upon us!"—*F. W. Krummacher.*

Apostasis is employed in two senses: I. As a figure by which, when a sentence is interrupted or the connection of the thought is broken by a parenthesis, we arrange it in order, as in one kind of *epanalepsis*. II. As a figure by which the last word is repeated after a pause, as in *anadiplosis*.

Appositum. *v.* EPITHETON.

Apostrophe (*aversio, prosphonesis*) is a figure by which the speaker turns from the tenor of his discourse, and rises to a higher strain, either by uttering a solemn oath, or by addressing directly some person or thing present or absent. *v.* OBTESTATION (Isa. i. 5; Jer. xi. 18; Ezek. xiii. 11; Joel ii. 21; Matt. xi. 21–23; Luke xxiii. 30).

Now we say, as Athanasius said, "If I be deceived, thou hast deceived me, O Lord!"—*Bp. Jewell.* What utility is there in this pompous cortege of the rich at the burial of a corpse? Why are so many priests sitting luxuriously on cushions round a coffin, whilst thou, O Christ! stoodest weeping over the tomb of Lazarus, and humbly invokedst thy Father?—*John Huss.* Alexander! Julius! was it good for you to have been masters of the world, and to be now where now you are? They cannot answer me, but answer me ye who can!—*A. Vieyra.*

Ara. *v.* COMMINATION.

Archaism is a word or phrase employed according to ancient usage.

Association includes ourselves in what we say only for others, or it includes others in what we say only for ourselves, or it includes many in what we say only for a few or for one. Dumarsais terms this figure "*communication* in words," to distinguish it from *communication* as a figure of thought (*v.* ANACŒNOSIS); but it would more properly be called a kind of *synecdoche* (Acts xvii. 29; Heb. ii. 1, 2, 3; iii. 6; x. 25).

In that place (hell) what is burned is not consumed. What then shall *we* do there? For to myself also do I say these things.—*Chrysostom.*

Assonance. *v.* PARECHESIS.

Asteismus is where, in pleasantry or banter, we apparently try to conceal what we still disclose, or where in general we use any graceful language or happy turn of phrase (Isa. xliv. 9–20; Matt. vi. 34; John x. 32).

Those who are continually complaining that things run cross—that the world is much worse than it should be, have every reason to complain that there is one individual person in it much worse than he should be.—*J. Seed.* The accession which the Gallican church gained by the suppression of her opponents was like the small accession of length a body gains by death.—*Robert Hall.*

Asterismus is a figure by which we employ some word in directing the eye to some object, or the attention to some subject, as, "Lo!" "Behold!"

Asyndeton (*dialyton, dialysis, dissolutio, solutum*) is a figure which omits conjunctions or other particles. This figure is more often rhetorical than grammatical (Longinus, c. xix.; Mark xvi. 17; Luke xvii. 27; xviii. 28; John ii. 10; iv. 22). Winer, in his Grammar of the *Idioms* of the N. T., says that the connecting particles are wanting, 1. In enumerating divisions and gradations (Mark xvi. 17, 18; Heb. xi. 37; Jas. v. 6); 2. In antithetical clauses (John ii. 10; iv. 22; Jas. i. 19); 3. In parallelisms of the sense (Mark xvi. 6; Acts xxv. 12); 4. When the reason of a sentence or proposition is subjoined (John xix. 12).

The Gospel of Christ had no encouragement, no protection from the civil power; no force or cunning to uphold it; no men of eminence and esteem to engage on its side.—*Atterbury.* But there, far perhaps above the sun, new scenes, new beings, new wonders, new joys will present themselves to our enlarged views.—*Seed.*

Athrœsmos. *v.* SYMPERASMA.

Auxesis. *v.* AMPLIFICATIO.

Aversio. *v.* APOSTROPHE.

Benedictio. A solemn act of imploring the blessing of God, or else a declaration of happiness (Deut. xxviii. 3–6; Eccles. x. 17; Isa. xxx. 18; Matt. v. 2–11).

Brachiologia (*breviloquence*) is the omission of such words as the hearer will naturally and readily supply from the context (Ezek. xi. 11; Micah vii. 3; Mark xiv. 49; John xv. 25). Formerly this figure was included in *ellipsis*, which is now applied to omissions of words that are not obviously suggested by the context.

Biæon. *v.* ANTISTROPHA.

Burden. *v.* REFRAIN.

Catabasis. *v.* ANABASIS.

Cœnoprepe (*innovatio*) is a new word or a new collocation of words.

Catachresis is a figure by which a word is used in a sense remotely analogous to its own; as "victory" for *life* (Isa. xxv. 8); "mercies" for *promises fulfilled* (Isa. lv. 3); "vessels" for *bodies* (Hos. xiii. 15); "hate" for *forsake* (Luke xiv. 26); "against heaven" for *against God* (Luke xv. 21); "to fail" for *not to be fulfilled.* (ch. xvi. 17).

Our heart burneth and is taken up with a kind of holy concupiscence of seeing thy Father who sent thee.—*Augustine.*

Cataphasis is the utterance of what we profess to postpone saying. *v.* APOPHASIS.

Cataplexis is where the speaker employs the language of menace.

Cataploce. *v.* PAREMBOLE.

Challenge is a defiance or invitation to a trial or ordeal (1 Kings xviii. 24; Isa. xli. 21, 22; xliii. 8, 9).

Characterismus is a graphic description of the character, morals, or manners of a person. *v.* HYPOTYPOSIS.

Charientismus (*scomma*) is where language which might appear too severe is mitigated by a mild word or phrase (John ix. 30; 2 Thes. iii. 10).

It was once employed to denote a smoothing joke, as "Bona verba quæso." —*Terence.* A strange delusion it is wherewith the man of sin hath bewitched the world.—*R. Hooker.*

Chiasmus (*epanodos, hysteresis, synchysis*) exists when two pairs of words or propositions are so arranged that a relation subsists between the former pair and the latter pair. It is called a direct *chiasmus* when the relation is of the A to the C and of the B to the D; in *inverted chiasmus* when the relation is of the A to the D and of the B to the C. (See Bengel's Gnomon with Burk's Index, Latin ed., p. 1160).

Chleuasmus, or *epicertomesis*, is where the speaker excites laughter by a jeer or playful comparison of persons or things. *v.* MYCTERISMUS.

Chreia. *v.* GNOME.

Chroma. *v.* EUPHEMISMUS.

Chronographia is a description of *an event*, by dwelling on its conjunctures or circumstances.

The kingdom of God did not establish itself like other kingdoms, in a slow and leisurely manner, so that lookers-on might trace it easily from its rise through the several steps of its progress, but fixed itself at once almost everywhere with so rapid and amazing a course as did at once leave the eyes and observation of men behind it.—*Atterbury.*

Circumductio (*peribole, proslepsis*) is the expansion of *paralepsis* beyond its proper limits by actually proceeding to narrate what we profess to omit. (See Hermogenes, on this.)

Circumlocutio (*circuitio*). *v.* PERIPHRASIS.

Climax (*gradatio*) repeats one of the words of the antecedent clause or sentence in the following clause or sentence, and continues this process through several successive clauses or sentences (Hos. ii. 21, 22; Joel i. 3, 4; Matt. x. 40).

If we are shocked at the Pagans in their festivities, let us grieve; if we grieve, let us pray; if we pray, may we be heard; if we are heard, we gain them likewise.—*Augustine.* When we have practised good actions awhile they become easy; and when they are easy we begin to take pleasure in them; and when they please us we do them frequently; and by frequency of acts they grow into a habit.—*Tillotson.* O blessed state when I shall behold face to face Him who is

infinitely lovely! love what I behold! and be made happy in the enjoyment of what I love.—*J. Seed.* The Roman orators, to avoid the appearance of art, sometimes did not repeat the same word that stood in the former member, but some other equivalent to it.—*Quint.*, L. ix., c. iii.

The terms *climax* and *anticlimax*, as now employed, are synonymous with *anabasis* and *catabasis*.

Cœnotes (*complexio*) is where several sentences begin with the same word and end with the same word. The figure consists of a union of *epibole* and *epistrophe*.

Cohabitatio is a conjunction of opposite ideas in the same person or thing (John xvi. 32; Gal. ii. 20). See SYNŒCEIOSIS.

Commination (*ara*, *imprecation*, *maledictio*, *apeuche*, *misus*, *execratio*) is a figure by which the speaker utters a solemn denunciation or predicts calamity (Deut. xxviii. 16, 17; Isa. iii. 11; Jer. xlviii. 10; Matt. xi. 21).

Commoratio (*epimone*) is a kind of amplification which dwells long upon or frequently returns to the principal point of a subject until it be well understood and rest with due weight upon the mind of the hearer (Isa. ix. 12, 17, 21; Zech. i. 3–6; Matt. vii. 21–23; xii. 31, 32; Mark vii. 21–23; John xxi. 15–17).

The day of prosperity always paves the way for evil, and is its sure precursor. What we call happiness is full of danger, and exposes us to a thousand evils. In the repose of paradise the first man lost God, but afterwards, amidst toils and griefs, he received the blessed promise of salvation. In the wide world the mass of mankind was drowned, while in the narrow enclosure of the ark Noah outrode the deluge. Where the Egyptians flourished under the reign of Pharaoh, there darkness prevailed; but in Goshen, that small corner of the land where the children of Israel sighed and suffered, the light was resplendent. Prosperity brought ruin upon Solomon, while fasting, nakedness, and continual persecution lifted Elijah into the fiery chariot.—*Luis de Leon.* See example from *Molyneux* under the head of *Amplificatio*

Communicatio. *v.* ANACŒNOSIS.

Communication in words. *v.* ASSOCIATION.

Commutatio. *v.* EPANODOS.

Compar (*isocolon*) is when the successive members of a sentence have almost the same number of syllables (Isa. i. 5; xxix. 1; Amos v. 24).

Comparatio (*eicasia*, *syncrisis*, *parathesis*, *comparison*, *simile*) is a figure by which two things are brought together in thought, while one or more of the attributes of each is formally likened or contrasted (Isa. i. 18; lv. 10, 11; lxvi. 12; Matt. xxiv. 27; John viii. 55).

Go and teach all nations. Consult neither the course of rivers nor the direction of mountain ranges. Go straight on; go as the thunder goes of Him who sends you, as the creative word went which carried life into chaos, as the eagles go, and the angels.—*Lacordaire.*

Dissimilitude, anomœosis, by which things are contrasted, is by some considered a separate figure (Isa. i. 3; lxv. 13; Jer. viii. 7; Luke ix. 58; xvi. 19–22). The *unparalleled* comes under this head (Isa. vii. 17; Ezek. v. 9; Joel ii. 2; Matt. xxiv. 21).

Compensatio. *v.* ANTEISAGOGE.

Complexio (*symploce, cœnotes*) is a repetition of clauses or sentences which both begin and end with corresponding words or phrases. It is sometimes a repetition of the *epanalepsis* (Jer. ix. 23, in the original). The term *complexio* is often applied to that kind of transition in which we recur to what has been previously said.

Hallelujah is the sound of the waves; and the mountains reply hallelujah! Hallelujahs float along in the murmuring of the streams, in the whisperings of the grove and forest; yea, even in the silent courses of the stars his spirit hears the mystic hallelujah.—*J. C. Hare.* An act which God condemns, an act which conscience condemns, an act which public opinion condemns; how can you praise it, how can you so much as justify it, how can you even excuse it?—*Anon.*

Concessio (*synchoresis, epichoresis*) is when we confess or admit something in order to carry our point (Jer. xii. 1; Habak. i. 13; Jas. ii. 19).

Let it be admitted for a moment that you will live as long and longer than you promise yourself you will—does it thence follow that the time you have fixed upon for repentance will be a time of penitence and conversion for you? Ah, no, doubtless not.—*Brydayne.* . . Not simply, "Before Abraham was, I was;" not simply a declaration of having existed before Abraham, but a taking to himself the great, the incommunicable name, carrying with it the assertion of self-existence, of supreme divinity. So they understood it who instantly took up stones to stone him as a blasphemer. And so let us understand it, not taking up stones to stone him, but lifting up hearts and hands together to crown him Lord of all.—*Dr. W. Hanna.*

Conclusio is an argument in few words from that which has already been said or done, and the deduction thence of a necessary consequence. The author of the Rhetoric "Ad Herennium" gives *conclusio* a place among figures.

Conduplicatio. *v.* EPIZEUXIS.

Confession (*paromologia*) is a figure by which the speaker acknowledges his faults with a view to obtain pardon of God or of his hearers, to illustrate, or prove, or warn, or encourage. It is sometimes used to denote a concession of the weight of an objection, while it is turned against the objector (Isa. vi. 5; lix. 12, 13; Jer. iii. 25; Dan. ix. 5, 8, 10; Ezra ix. 6; Jas. ii. 19).

Conformatio. *v.* PROSOPOPŒIA.

Congeries. *v.* SYMPERASMA.

Conjunction (*conjunctio*) unites the members of a sentence by a conjunction, or else adds qualifying clauses to the principal

proposition. The Latin rhetoricians sometimes used the term in the sense of *zeugma*.

Conquestio is a passionate bewailing or complaining (Isa. liii. 1; Ezek. xx. 49; Habak. i. 2).

Contentio. *v.* ANTITHESIS.

Continuatio is a phrase or sentence so constructed that while it contains one complete sense it can be delivered rapidly and almost without any pause.

Contrefision (*confision*) feigns to inspire hope or confidence in something, while it really renounces all hope or confidence in that thing. It is a species of *irony*.

Conversio. *v.* EPISTROPHE.

Correctio (*epanorthosis*, *diorthosis*, *epidiorthosis*, *metanœa*) is a figure by which the speaker recalls or retracts what he had said in order to substitute something better in its place (Isa. lix. 15; Matt. xi. 9; John xvi. 32; Acts xxvi. 27). It is of three kinds: I. Where what is said is wholly retracted (Mark ix. 24; John xii. 27). II. Where the retraction is partial or relative (John xvi. 32; Gal. ii. 20). III. Where the correction is made by a supposition (Gal. iii. 4).

But if thy heart be so hardened that all this gear will not move thee, surely thou art in a very evil state; and remedy now know I none. What! said I none? Know I none? Yes; there is one which is suresby, as they say, to serve, if anything will serve.—*John Bradford.* Thou who with grey head and trembling hands standest before me soon, soon will thy course be finished. Thou art already bent to the earth which probably in a few days will receive thee. Receive *thee?* God forbid! It will but possess thy outward frame, the mere habitation of thy immortal spirit. Thou thyself wilt soar on high to see sublime things, to collect sublime knowledge, and to be perfected in holiness.—*Dinter.*

There is a kind of *correctio* which has been termed *collation* (Prov. xxx. 15, 18, etc.).

Crama is a figure which mixes praise with blame.

Cyclus. *v.* EPANALEPSIS.

Deference is a figure by which the speaker, instead of directly answering a question or objection himself, directs the opponent to another if not higher authority (Luke xvi. 29, 31).

"I have sinned but once," you say, "and what evil will come upon me?" Ask the rebel angels, and they will tell you that in consequence of one proud thought they were cast into hell.—*Brydayne.*

Crasis is the contraction of two vowels into one.

Deasis. *v.* OBTESTATION.

Decrementum. *v.* CATABASIS.

Definitio (*horismus*) is a figure by which we fix the meaning of our terms or describe with brevity and precision the qualities of an object.

Demonstratio. *v.* HYPOTYPOSIS.

Deprecation is used by the rhetoricians in various senses: I. As a mode of proceeding before the pardoning power by which the advocate begs the forgiveness of the criminal on account of his former good character, mitigating circumstances, or the venial nature of the crime. It is sometimes tolerated as a method of defence in judicial proceedings. II. As a figure by which the speaker invokes assistance or prays that some evil or punishment may befall him who speaks falsely, whether that person be himself or his adversary. III. As an ejaculatory prayer for the prevention or removal of any evil.

Derivatio. *v.* PAREGMENON.

Descriptio is of seven kinds—*chronographia*, *effictio*, *ethopœia*, *hypotyposis*, *pragmatographia*, *prosopographia*, *topographia*.

Designation by opposite extremes. "This figure," says Carson, "designates something that is very great or very small by the name of something that is remarkable for a great degree of the opposite quality." "The Child of Hale" was a famous English giant. The club of a noted cudgel-player was known by the appellation of "Jemmy's switch." "Clarke's Lambs" was a designation of most ferocious soldiers. It is a kind of *irony*.

Detestatio. *v.* APODIOXIS.

Diabole is where the speaker forewarns the judge of the effects of his severity.

Diacope. *v.* TMESIS.

Diæresis is the separating of two vowels that might be supposed to form a diphthong; as *orthoepy*, not *orthœpy*. *v.* TMESIS.

Diallage is found where several arguments are made to conspire to one end, or else where subjects are divided into their parts or different actions are predicated of different persons. *v.* DISTRIBUTIO.

Diallelon. *v.* ANTIMETABOLE.

Dialogismus. *v.* SERMOCINATIO.

Dialysis. *v.* TMESIS.

Dialyton. *v.* ASYNDETON.

Diancœa. *v.* SUBJECTIO.

Diaphora (*differentia*) is found where, for the sake of a clear discrimination, things that are different are separated and placed opposite to one another. It is a kind of *antithesis* or *dissimilitude*. The term is also employed in the sense of *antanaclasis*, to designate a repeated word which expresses a different idea from that which it conveyed in the first instance.

Diaporesis. *v.* ADDUBITATIO.

Diasceue is such a mode of reasoning as moves the passions by means of a graphic description of circumstances.

Diasyrmus is a sort of railery or reproach which attempts to belittle or disparage some person or thing.

Friend, wherefore art thou come?—*Matt. xxvi.* 50.

Diastole. *v.* TMESIS.

Diatyposis. *v.* HYPOTYPOSIS.

Dicæologia is when we state the equity of our cause in a few words.

Diexodos is a copious exposition of facts. It is the opposite of *syntomia*. It is sometimes used in the sense of *digression*.

Diezeugmenon (*disjunction*) is where several members which might form one sentence are separated into two or more sentences. *v.* DISJUNCTION.

Digression. *v.* APHODOS and ANACHORESIS.

Dilogia. *v.* ANTANACLASIS.

Diminutio. *v.* HYPERPOLE.

Diorismus. *v.* APHORISMUS.

Diorthosis. *v.* CORRECTIO.

Dissolutio. *v.* ASYNDETON.

Distinctio. *v.* PARADIASTOLE.

Distributio (*diallage, discriminatio, digestio, merismus, epimerismus*) divides a period into many clauses or enumerates many particulars with order, energy, and feeling (Isa. xxiv. 1–3; Ezek. xxxvi. 4). One kind of *diallage* is synonymous with *distributio*.

Disjunction is when several clauses or members of a sentence, which are not connected by conjunctions, depend upon one word for the complete expression of the thoughts. In *adjunction* the clauses or members depend upon one *verb*. *v.* SEJUGATIO. *Diezeugmenon* is sometimes used in the sense of *disjunction*.

The pomp of war, the sound of the trumpets, the glitter of the weapons, the order of the troops, the silence of the soldiers, the heat of the strife, the beginning, the progress, and the completion of the victory, the different cries of the conquered and the conquerors, assault the soul on so many sides that it loses all its wisdom and moderation, and forgets both God and itself.—*Mascaron.*

Divisio. *v.* TMESIS.

Dubitatio. *v.* ADDUBITATIO.

Ecbole. *v.* APHODOS.

Ecphonesis (*exclamation*) is an outburst of words prompted by some passion or emotion, and either is not addressed to any person or thing, or, if it is, expects no reply (Isa. vi. 5; Ezek. ix. 8; Matt. xvii. 17; Acts vii. 51).

If these men had been of us indeed (O the blessedness of a Christian man's

estate!), they would have stood surer than the angels; they would never have departed from their place.—*Augustine.* O happy death! when Jesus, the vanquisher of death, stands by the couch and covers the departing soul with the wings of his mercy! O glorious victory of life over death when the worn pilgrim hears with his spirit's ear the rustling palms of the conquerors that have gone before! O sweet sleep on the bed of earth and under the canopy of stone, if it only be a sleep in the arms of Jesus!—*Hofacker.*

Ecphrasis. *v.* EPEXEGESIS.

Ectasis. *v.* TMESIS.

Ecthlipsis is a figure of Latin prosody, by which final *m* with the preceding vowel is cut off when the following word begins with a vowel. Final *s* is sometimes thus cut off by the early poets.

Effictio (*portrait*) describes a person by delineating his character, manners, habits, and features.

Eicasia. *v.* COMPARATIO.

Ejaculation is a short prayer which is commonly appropriate to, if not suggested by, the subject or occasion (Hosea ix. 14). It sometimes partakes of the nature of *aposiopesis*, as in the above example.

God grant that the wise ones of the world may at length attain unto that faith! Amen. But in the second place Paul saith, etc.—*Luther.* But, God be praised! there is no need to abandon either our common faith or this essential and most comfortable part of it.—*Heber.*

Eleutheria. *v.* LICENTIA.

Ellipsis is the omission of a word, phrase, clause, or sentence that must be implied in order to make out the sense. It is either grammatical or rhetorical. It is the former when it omits some word or words from inadvertency or for the sake of brevity; it is the latter when it omits because of some gentle emotion, strong feeling, or sudden outburst of passion (Isa. xxvi. 1; Jer. xix. 1; Hos. ix. 4; Luke xxii. 37; Acts vii. 51).

One way or other, our life must be lost; unwillingly, and we lose it forever; willingly, and we gain it forever.—*J. C. Hare.*

Emphasis (*significatio*, *ratiocinatio*, *syllogismus*) has several applications:

I. It means an augmentation of the sense, either by eliciting some latent idea in what is said, or by intimating something that is not said, but is purposely omitted.

II. It is also employed when by some sign the greatness of a person or thing is shown, as Goliath by the magnitude of his sword (Isa. ii. 4; iv. 1; xlix. 20; Matt. x. 30; xxiv. 20; Luke vii. 44).

III. It is likewise used to designate a mode of defence by which in judicial proceedings the advocate, not finding an express statute, reasons from some analogous law.

Ratiocinatio has yet another signification, which is given elsewhere.

Enallage (*enallaxis, allœosis*) is a change of words. It is of two kinds: I. *Antimeria* is when one part of speech is substituted for another. II. *Heterosis* is a change in the inflexions of the parts of speech, or the use of one gender, number, case, person, mood, or tense for another. The present tense is often used in narrating the past and the future. It includes *synthesis* and *antiptosis.*

Enallaxis. *v.* ENALLAGE.

Enantiotes (*antitheta*) is proof derived from the statements of the opposite party.

Enantiosis. *v.* ANTITHESIS.

Enargeia. *v.* HYPOTYPOSIS.

Enigma. *v.* ÆNIGMA.

Enthymema was employed by Vitellius as synonymous with *commentum* or *conceptio.* The full definition of this figure has not come down to us. Among modern rhetoricians the *enthymeme* is a sentence which contains the materials of a *syllogism*, but does not itself furnish a legitimate conclusion. The *logical enthymeme* is a syllogism with one premiss suppressed.

Enumeration. *v.* AMPLIFICATION.

Epagoge. *v.* PARABLE.

Epanaclesis—a return from a digression. *v.* ANACHORESIS.

Epanadiplosis. *v.* EPIZEUXIS and ANADIPLOSIS.

Epanalepsis (*cyclus*) is a figure which repeats at the end of a sentence the same word or phrase that is placed at its beginning (Eccles. i. 2; Mark xiii. 35–37; Jas. ii. 14–16).

Make that thy goal, O soul! despising all beside, or also transcending them; make that thy goal!—*Augustine.* Hallelujah is the sound of the waves; and the mountains reply, hallelujah!—*J. C. Hare.*

Some call it *epanalepsis* when the antecedent is repeated after a *parenthesis.* This species of *epanalepsis* is also termed *apostasis.*

Epanaphora. *v.* ANAPHORA.

Epanastrophe. *v.* ANADIPLOSIS.

Epanodos. *v.* ANTIMETABOLE and CHIASMUS.

Epanorthosis. *v.* CORRECTIO.

Epauxesis. *v.* AMPLIFICATIO.

Epembole. *v.* PAREMBOLE.

Epexegesis (*exegesis, ecphrasis, exergasia, epexergasia, epichirema, hermeneia, synonymia, interpretatio*) is when an explanation immediately follows the word or words which the speaker has employed (Psa. lxxvii. 19; Isa. i. 22, 23; xxxiv. 6; xliv. 3; Jonah ii. 3, 4; Amos iii. 8; Hos. vii. 8, 9; Luke xvi. 13; John xvi. 7–11).

On the one hand we have seen the dove descending upon the Lord; on the other, the cloven tongues upon the assembled disciples. In the one case simplicity is shown, in the other, fervency.—*Augustine.* The blessed martyrs offered a mixed cup of red wine. Mixed, I said; for none has ever offered it pure but our Lord Jesus Christ, who is perfectly pure himself.—*Bernard.*

Epexergasia. *v.* EPEXEGESIS.

Epibole is when the same word or several words which have the same signification begin two or more sentences. It has nearly the same application as *anaphora.* When *antezeugmenon* places its verb between the members of the sentence it sometimes takes the name of *epibole.*

Epicheirema is called a logical figure when it is only another name for an assumption in a minor proposition. It is sometimes employed to denote a short argument in a single sentence.

Epicrisis is when to what has been said something is added by way of approval or confirmation or explanation (John v. 39, 40). It is sometimes a species of *epiphonema;* sometimes it is called *epitasis.*

Epichoresis. *v.* CONCESSIO.

Epidiegesis is the repetition of a statement of facts with such an amplification as serves to kindle indignation or melt compassion.

Epidiorthosis. *v.* CORRECTIO.

Epimerismus. *v.* DISTRIBUTIO.

Epimone. *v.* COMMORATIO.

Epiphonema is a brief and animated expression prompted by something that was just before said or done. It is of three kinds: I. When to a narration a short general reflection or passing remark is added. II. When in a comparison we explain our meaning, as when, after describing a shipwreck, we show what we understand by a shipwreck of the state. III. When we add to a narrative or argument an exclamation by way of approval or confirmation. The term is now commonly used in the last signification (Jonah ii. 9; Hos. xiii. 9; Zeph. ii. 10; Matt. xi. 15; xxii. 14; Mark vii. 14; Acts xix. 20).

Oh! abomination, and that not only herein, but in all their penance as they paint it.—*John Bradford.* Be sure, if you forget every part of this sermon, carry this home with you, "God is a refuge for me."—*John Berridge.*

Epiphora. *v.* EPISTROPHE.

Epiplexis. *v.* EPITIMESIS.

Epiploce is a figure by which a second sentence springs from the first, a third from the second, and so others in succession.

Epistrophe (*antistrophe, epiphora, conversio*) is the emphatic repetition of a word or phrase at the end of successive sentences

or members of a sentence. *v.* REFRAIN (Deut. xxxii. 10; Ezek. xxxiii. 25, 26; xxxvi. 23–27, in the Hebrew; Joel ii. 26, 27).

The poor in spirit have come to us; they that mourn have come to us; they that hunger and thirst after righteousness have come to us.—*J. C. Hare.*

Epitasis (*intentio*) is when to what we have said we add something by way of emphasis or explanation. It is sometimes used as synonymous with *epicrisis*. It is, in strictness, the opposite of *anesis*, which subjoins something that diminishes the effect of what has been said (Exod. iii. 19; Mark x. 44; John xiii. 34; Acts vii. 5).

What has human nature that it did not receive, yea, even human nature in the Only Begotten.—*Augustine.* Instances of her goodness were not known till after her death; no, not by him who was partaker of all her joys and sorrows. —*Atterbury.* The absurdity of courting the favour of Rome is England's sin— England's great sin, England's very great sin. There can be little doubt that except repentance and amendment avert the stroke, this will prove England's plague, England's great plague, England's very great plague.—*Hugh McNeile.*

Epitimesis (*epiplexis*) is a figure by which a rebuke or reproach is conveyed.

Epitrechon. *v.* PARENTHESIS.

Epitrope (*permissio*) takes the form of a serious or ironical command, entreaty, permission, concession, or surrender, in order the more effectually to carry a point (Eccles. xi. 9; Jer. ii. 28; vii. 21; Ezek. xx. 39; Amos iv. 4, 5; Matt. xxiii. 32; John xiii. 27).

Thou hidest thine heart from man; hide it from God if thou canst.—*Augustine.*

Epitrochasmus (*percursio*) is a figure by which events are briefly and rapidly mentioned, in order to shorten apparently the intervals of time that separated them. Or else it is a rapid and copious pouring forth of words in order to embarrass an adversary. It is sometimes confounded with *synathrœsmus* and *epimone*. It is generally associated with *asyndeton* (Exod. xv. 9, 10).

Epitherapeia is when we subjoin to what we have said a declaration of kind or respectful feeling towards our hearers, or add some statement or explanation by way of apology or qualification. *v.* PROTHERAPEIA (Matt. xxvi. 41).

Now it were to weary you out of all grateful and thankful frames beseeming our festival were I to enlarge further. Let me therefore only add, etc.—*Charles Wadsworth.*

Epitheton (*appositum*) is some adjective or noun attached to a word or phrase for the purpose of conveying an idea that is not expressed by the latter. It is employed for the sake of distinction or explanation or description.

Ezek. i. 24: I heard as the voice of the Almighty. John xvii. 3: The only

true God. Leaving it to such *things* as these—to the low, mercenary, Machiavelian herd, etc.—*Charles Wadsworth.*

Epizeuxis (*epanadiplosis, palilogia, conduplicatio, repetito, iteratio, geminatio*) is an immediate repetition of the same word or series of words for the sake of force or emphasis. Earnest repetitions in prayers are sometimes called *ingeminations.*

Deut. xxviii. 43: The stranger that is within thee shall get up above thee, high, high; and thou shalt come down low, low (*literal translation*). Isa. xl. 1: Comfort ye, comfort ye my people (Isa. li. 9, 17; Ezek. xxi. 9, 27; Matt. v. 27; xxiii. 37; John i. 51). Dost thou see a soul that has the image of God in him? Love him, love him; say, this man and I must go to heaven some day.—*John Bunyan.* But away with them! Away with them! God will have none of them.—*Charles Wadsworth.*

Erotema. *v.* EROTESIS.

Erotesis (*erotema, pysma, peusis, percontatio, interrogatio*) is a figure by which the speaker asks animated questions, not to obtain information, but to declare a conviction, to make an assertion, to excite curiosity, to express indignation, to vindicate authority, etc. As from the nature of this figure it is not easy to define it with brevity, we may form some notion of it by examining its various uses. It is employed, I. In admonitions (Matt. iii. 7; II. In affirmations (Isa. li. 19; Luke xiv. 5); III. In disparagements (Isa. ii. 22); IV. In demonstrations (Ezek. viii. 6; Matt. xi. 7–9); V. In doubts (Hos. vi. 4; Micah vi. 6, 7); VI. In expostulations (Isa. v. 4; lviii. 3); VII. In indignation (Matt. xvii. 17); VIII. In lamentation (Lam. ii. 20; Habak. i. 17); IX. In negations (Deut. vii. 17; Matt. xii. 26); X. In pity (Lam. i. 1; ii. 1; Matt. xxiii. 37); XI. In prohibitions (Eccles. v. 6; Jer. xxvii. 13, 17); XII. In raptures (Jer. xxii. 23; Habak. iii. 8); XIII. In reproaches (Jer. xxiii. 33, 35, 36; John xviii. 38); XIV. In retort and refusal (Num. xxiii. 8; John ii. 4); XV. In wishes (Isa. vi. 8; Jer. xlix. 4); XVI. In wonder (Isa. lxiii. 1, 2; Mark vi. 37).

What is the use of soldiers arrayed in gold when the general is dragged along captive? What the profit of a ship beautifully equipped when the pilot is sunk beneath the waves? What the advantage of a well-proportioned body when the sight of the eye is stricken out?—*Chrysostom.* Where is Horace, where is Pindar now? Let them come here and throw their palms down before the sweet singer of Israel.—*Whitefield.*

Ethopœia (*notation*) describes a person's disposition or feelings by delineating the manners, caprices, expressions of his countenance, language, voice, gestures, dress, and the like (Isa. iii. 16, 17; Jer. xlviii. 3–46; Luke xviii. 9–14).

Euche (*votum*) *a prayer* or expressed desire, as in Paul's defence before Agrippa (Acts xxvi. 29); or as at the end of Cicero's first oration against Catiline (Deut. xxviii. 67; Isa. lxiv. 1, 2).

Euphemy (*euphemismus, periploce, chroma*) is a figure by which a disagreeable or offensive idea is conveyed by language rather suggestive than expressive, or more elegant than literal (Matt. viii. 11; Luke vii. 35; xiii. 1; John xi. 11; Acts ii. 39).

Evidentia. *v.* HYPOTYPOSIS.

Exaggeratio. *v.* AMPLIFICATION.

Exartesis. *v.* SUSTENTATIO.

Exclamatio. *v.* ECPHONESIS.

Execratio. *v.* COMMINATION.

Exemplum (*example*) is when something said or done is employed by way of similitude or dissimilitude, or as a precedent to be followed or avoided. This application of the term is not to be confounded with that in "Arguments from Example," as when we adduce a known object of a certain class as a sample of that class in respect of some point (Luke xvii. 32).

Exergasia. *v.* EPEXEGESIS.

Expeditio is when the speaker enumerates the reasons which may serve to prove something either possible or impossible, and after setting aside all the others, selects that reason which is valid and conclusive. It is frequently used in partitions.

Expolitio. *v.* AMPLIFICATIO.

Extenuatio. *v.* LITOTES.

Exouthenismus is where we speak in disparagement or contempt of anything.

Fabula. *v.* APOLOGUE.

Frequentatio is a brief and animated summary of the scattered details of a cause in order to make the speech more weighty and effectual.

Geminatio. A doubling of words. *v.* EPIZEUXIS.

Gnome (*sententia*) is a brief general maxim concerning human life or affairs, without the name of the author.

Eccles. ix. 4: For a living dog is better than a dead lion. There is an old Punic proverb: "The plague looks for a piece of money; give it two, and let it be off."—*Augustine.* There is a proverb among the Germans: "The pocket gives courage."—*Luther.* "The death," everybody says, "is the faithful echo of the life."—*Brydayne.*

A *noema* is a *gnome* either alluded to or applied to person, time, or place.

He that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad.—*Matt. xii.* 30. For, brethren in Christ, there are some who are the very opposite of him who said, "I have not reigned to-day, for I have not conferred a single benefit."—*Eustathius of Thessalonica.*

Chreia is the quotation of a short and suggestive saying to which the name of the author is prefixed or subjoined. The *direct* cita-

tion of another's words in narration is more common in the Hellenistic than in the Attic Greek. (See *Accommodation*, which *adopts* the language of another, but uses it in a different sense from that which it first conveyed.)

Gradatio. *v.* CLIMAX.

Heirmus is when all or most of the nouns in a sentence are in the same case (Isa. iii. 18–23). F. S. Charisius (Institut. Gram., Lib. iv.) gives the following illustration:

> Principio cœlum ac terras camposque liquentis
> Lucentemque globum Lunæ Titaniaque astra
> Spiritus intus alit.—*Virg., Æn., Lib. vi.*, 724–6.

Hendiadys is when one idea that is usually expressed by one word is conveyed by two words. This figure may be formed in three ways: I. When one thought is expressed by two words, one of which takes the place of an adjective. Jer. xxiii. 3: "Justice and righteousnes," for strict justice. II. When two *nouns* are connected by a copulative conjunction, one of which takes the place of or is to be understood as if it were in the possessive case. Acts xxiii. 6: "Hope and resurrection," for hope of a resurrection. III. When two *verbs* are thus connected, one of which has the signification of an adverb. Acts ix. 31: *Oikodomoumene kai poreuomene*—"were progressively edified."

Hermeneia. *v.* EPEXEGESIS.

Heterosis. *v.* ENALLAGE.

Hibernicon is a figure which employs words of the worst meaning to express the greatest affection. "Its peculiar province," says Dr. Carson (who is the first to dignify this mode of speech with a place among figures), "is in the caressing of children, who will receive with the utmost pleasure a rating of this kind, even accompanied with blows given with a corresponding manner." In Ireland, he tells us, the most dreadful imprecations are exchanged by friends when they meet after long absence, as the highest expression of affection.

Hirmus. *v.* SYMPERASMA.

Homœoptoton is a repetition or rhyming of the same case or tense, or else of cases that resemble one another, while the declensions of the words may be different:

> Ad hanc te amentiam natura perperit, voluntas exercuit, fortuna servavit (Nature has formed you, resolution has trained you, fortune has preserved you for this madness).—*Cicero.*

Homœopropheron (*alliteration*) is the frequent recurrence of the same letter at the beginning of words.

Homœosis. *v.* PARABLE.

Homœoteleuton is where two or more neighbouring words have like endings.

Multa palam domum suam auferebat; plura clam de medio removebat; non pauca suis adjutoribus large effuseque donabat; reliqua constituta auctione vendebat.—*Cicero.* (Matt. vi. 3, 4, 6, 18.)

Hononymy is when, on the ground of analogy, we call by one name persons or things that are different in the aspects or relations of their nature (Zeph. ii. 11; John x. 34, 35).

Horismus. *v.* DEFINITIO.

Hypænixis. *v.* ÆNIGMA.

Hypallage is such an interchange of words that what is said of one person or thing is to be understood of another. It is often the result of attraction (Isa. i. 18); *i. e.*, Ye shall be so thoroughly cleansed from your sins that the change will appear as great as if scarlet were to become white as snow, and crimson like wool (Isa. vii. 11; xxxi. 6). See Bengel on Matt. x. 15; Acts v. 20; Heb. ix. 23; xiii. 2; Jas. ii. 17; iii. 4.

Hyperbaton (*synchisis*) is such a transposition of words or members of periods as ignores the laws of their arrangement. *v.* ANACOLUTHON and HYPALLAGE (*v.* Hebrew in Isa. xxiii. 11; Jer. xiv. 1; xvii. 3; Isa. xxxiv. 4; John iv. 24; vii. 4; xvii. 5; Acts xvii. 23).

Habeat ergo apud nos honorem propheta, quia non habuit honorem in patria sua.—*Augustine.*

Hyperbole is when the speaker says more for the purpose of enlarging or diminishing a thought than he intends shall be literally understood. It is of two kinds:

I. *Auxesis, epauxesis, hyperoche, hyperthesis, amplificatio* uses such language as enlarges the thought (Isa. xiii. 13; Jer. xxxvii. 10; Ezek. xxxii. 5–8; Habak. ii. 5, 11; Zech. ix. 3; Matt. xxi. 13; Luke xviii. 5; John iii. 32). Bengel employs the term *amplificatio*, or *ampliatio*, to designate words that are used in the permansive and anticipatory sense; *e. g.*, Believers (1 Cor. xiv. 22) put for those who are about to believe; again, the lost (2 Cor. iv. 3) put for those who are on the way to destruction.

I declare and maintain, with St. Augustine, that it were better that families be ruined and estates lost, better that provinces be desolated, kingdoms and empires fall, that the heavens and the earth, even the whole universe pass away than that we should commit one venial sin.—*Brydayne.* These calamities would have been, and in fact they were, a judicial example, engraven on the gates of hell.—*J. C. Hare.* Indeed, a month seldom goes by but the sound as of some fresh crack in the walls of our Church seems to pass from one end of England to the other.—*Id.*

II. *Hysteresis, litotes, meiosis, tapeinosis, diminutio, extenuatio*

employs such language as diminishes the thought. And yet sometimes, even when the figures appear to lessen, it really increases the force of a thought (Isa. xl. 15, 17; Ezek. xvii. 10, 20; Micah v. 2, as quoted Matt. ii. 6; Luke xii. 30; John vi. 37; Acts x. 47; xxvi. 19; Heb. ix. 13).

Nevertheless, it is certain that our Saviour's words were not spoken to the winds.—*J. C. Hare.*

Hyperoche. *v.* HYPERBOLE.

Hypobole. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Hypocatastasis is the substitution of a figurative for a literal predicate, by which the speaker or writer describes one act in place of another, in order, by way of resemblance, to exemplify and enforce that for which the substitute is used. Thus has David N. Lord, Esq., defined a certain form of speech which has always been denominated metaphor. Among his illustrations are the following: Deut. xxxii. 40–42; Isa. i. 5, 6, 22; v. 26; x. 33; xl. 12–16; Ezek. xxxii. 7, 8; Matt. xviii. 8, 9.

Hypodiegesis is a kind of narration in which we set forth along with the events, the passions, desires, purposes, or other causes which led to them.

Hypographe is where, chiefly in narratives, things are represented as if painted to the life, with a view to persuade or dissuade.

Hypomone. *v.* PARADOX.

Hypophora. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Hypostrophe is a figure by which, after a digression, we return to the matter in hand. It occasionally means an addition to the principal proposition of a reason for something, and the repetition for this purpose of something before said.

Hypothesis has several significations: I. A dissertation. II. Subject or object, as of a treatise. III. A limited and narrowed question concerning particular persons, places, causes, or times, in distinction from *thesis*, or a disquisition on a general subject. IV. A supposition advanced in order to deduce from it some conclusion which establishes the truth or falsity of a proposition. A parable or fable made in the form of a case supposed is of the nature of an *hypothesis*.

Hypotyposis (*diatyposis*, *enargeia*, *phantasia*) is such a description of an action, event, phenomenon, condition, or passion that the main points are represented in the most lively and forcible manner (Deut. xxviii. 49–68; Isa. v. 26–30; ch. xxxiv., ch. liii; Jer. iv. 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31; Zech. viii. 20–23).

Hypotimnesis is a parenthetical apology for the use of a bold, extravagant, or vulgar figure, word, or phrase. The term *meilig-*

mata is applied to the apologistic words or phrases which this figure employs; as "if I may say so," "as it were," "so to speak."

What, Lord! it seems as if we might say, wouldst thou restore the world to its former state.—*Vieyra.*

Hypozeuxis is when every subject has its own verb, and when, generally, the corresponding members of a sentence are expressed instead of being understood. It is the opposite of *zeugma* (Psa. cxlv. 5–7; 1 Cor. xiii. 8).

Hysterologia (*hysteresis*) is such a form of construction in historical narrative that what is placed *last* ought, according to the usual order, to be placed *first*. *v.* HYPERBOLE (Isa. xxxviii. 21, 22. Comp. Luke iv. 9 and Matt. iv. 5, 8).

Hysteron Proteron is such a form of construction that what is put *first* ought, according to the usual order, to be put *last* (Amos vi. 2; Heb. iv. 2).

Hysteresis. *v.* HYSTEROLOGIA and HYPERBOLE.

Idiotismus has three significations: I. The language peculiar to the vulgar. II. The language peculiar to a nation or tribe. III. The language peculiar to any author or speaker.

Imago (*eicon*) is such a lively representation as has much the same effect upon the mind as the exhibition of a work of plastic or graphic art, or as the contemplation of the very objects which are described. *v.* HYPOTYPOSIS (Mal. iv. 2).

Imprecation. *v.* COMMINATION.

Incrementum. *v.* AUXESIS.

Innovatio. *v.* CŒNOPREPE.

Inopinatum. *v.* PARADOX.

Intentio. *v.* EPITASIS.

Interjectio is a natural sound expressive of some passion or emotion thrown (often parenthetically) between words, phrases, or sentences.

Interpretatio. *v.* EPEXEGESIS and SYNONYMIA.

Interrogatio. *v.* EROTESIS.

Injunctum. *v.* ANTEZEUGMENON.

Inversion. *v.* ANASTROPHE.

Involutio. *v.* PERIPLOCE.

Irony (*permutatio*) expresses a sense contrary to or better than that which the speaker evidently intends to convey. It is of three species: I. That which is expressed by single words. It is commonly called *antiphrasis*. "Wise men," "knowledge" (Isa. xliv. 25); "excellency of Jacob" (Amos vi. 8). II. That which is expressed by phrases and sentences (Deut. xxxii. 37, 38; 1 Kings xviii. 27; xxii. 15; Isa. xxix. 1; lvii. 12; Jer. xxii. 23; Ezek. xxviii.

3, 12; Amos. iv. 4; Mark vii. 9; John vii. 28; x. 32). The prophets employ irony chiefly against idolaters—Christ against the Pharisees. III. *Sarcasmus* is language in which scorn or contempt says one thing and means another. Sarcasm is that kind of irony which has a sinister look. Its eyes are like those of the fabled basilisk—red, with a kind of cloudy blackness, as if fire were mixed with smoke (Matt. xxvii. 29; Mark xv. 32). Some rhetoricians place under this head the following figures: *Asteismus*, *charientismus*, *diasyrmus*, *mimesis*, *mycterismus*, or *chleuasmus*. It is the distinguishing mark of Scripture irony that it is followed by a forcible conclusion in the serious style (1 Kings xxii. 17; Eccles. vii. 18, 19; xi. 9, 10; Matt. xxiii. 24).

O sensible man! If the wine in thy bottle is diminished, thou art sad; days art thou losing, and thou art glad!—*Augustine*. I hear the excuse made, "Come, now! persecution is a strong term—unjustifiably strong; I never persecuted any one for leading a holy life; I may have teased So-and-so, but that is all; just teased him in joke, you understand." In joke! a joke more ruinous than the worst cruelty of a persecutor. A joke! Ah, ha! a right merry joke, a capital joke, indeed! Go, cut the pipes which bring water into this city—only in joke, of course—cut the pipes, then, and watch the result. Such a joke! the fountains fail, the mills cease working, the gardens are parched up, men and beasts perish through thirst. Oh, magnificent joke!—*Joseph De Barzia* (Mr. S. Baring-Gould's trans.). See also Segneri, in *Quaresimale*, ser. xiii., §6.

Isocolon. *v.* COMPAR.

Iteratio. *v.* EPIZEUXIS.

Leptologia is a minute explanation or discussion.

Licentia (*eleutheria*, *parrhesia*) is when the speaker, without intending any offence to those whom he ought to respect, reverence, or love, reprehends them with freedom and boldness (Job xxxii. 6–12; Luke xiii. 32; John viii. 44). The word *parrhesia* is found: Acts ii. 29; iv. 13, 29, 31; xxviii. 31.

"They sank as lead in the mighty waters. Thou stretchedest out thy hand, the earth swallowed them." Pharaoh and his host all went to hell, without one escaping, because where all persecute and all enslave, all are condemned. Is not the example good? Now mark the reasoning. Every man who holds another unjustly in servitude, being able to release him, is certainly in a state of condemnation. All men, or almost all in Maranham, hold others unjustly in servitude; all, therefore, or almost all, are in a state of condemnation. . . . But you will say to me, This republic cannot be supported without Indians. Who will bring us a pitcher of water or a bundle of wood? Who will plant our mandioc? Must our wives do it? Must our children do it? In the first place, as you will presently see, these are not the straits in which I would place you; but if necessity and conscience require it, then I reply, yes! and I repeat it, yes! You and your wives and your children ought to do it! We ought to support ourselves with our own hands. Far better it is to be supported by the sweat of one's brow than by another's blood. O ye riches of Maranham! What if these

mantles and cloaks were to be wrung? They would drop blood!—*Antonio Vieyra.*

Litotes. *v.* HYPERBOLE.

Locutio concisa. *v.* CONCISA LOCUTIO.

Logismus. *v.* SERMOCINATIO.

Macrologia. *v.* PLEONASM.

Maledictio. *v.* COMMINATIO.

Meiligmata. HYPOTIMNESIS.

Meiosis. *v.* HYPERBOLE.

Merismus. *v.* DISTRIBUTIO.

Mesarchia is where a line or sentence has the same word in the beginning and middle.

Mesodiplosis (*mesophonia*) is a repetition of the same word in the middle of two sentences.

Mesoteleuton is where the middle and end of a line or sentence have the same word.

Metabasis (*transitio, interfactio*) is when the speaker passes from one thing to another by reminding his hearers of what has been said and what yet remains to be said. It is sometimes used for a brief or abrupt transition. It is also chosen to designate that kind of apostrophe in which the speaker turns from what he is saying to address some absent person or thing as if it were present. *v.* POLYPROSOPON and APHODOS. This figure in its first signification is not found in any of the inspired speeches, except, perhaps, in Heb. vi. 1–3.

If one good man has been thrown back in his devotions, hundreds and thousands have been extremely forwarded by it. III. And this is what I shall now more particularly endeavour to prove under my third general head.—*Atterbury.*

Metabole is a figure that produces a variety by means of a a brief and animated combination of different particulars. II. This term was once also employed to designate such changes in the rhythm, figures, and structure of periods as relieve the mind by way of variety. III. It likewise denoted the point of transition from one kind of transition to another.

Metagoge. *v.* POLYPTOTON.

Metalepsis (*translatio, transumptio*) has various meanings: I. It was once used for a certain species of *metonymy;* as *metonymy* of antecedents for consequents, and *metonymy* of consequents for antecedents; *e. g.*, *metalepsis* of the antecedent is when *doing* is put for saying; *metalepsis* of the consequents is when *speaking* is put for feeling. II. It now denotes several gradations or intervening senses which come between the word that is expressed and the idea intended to be conveyed by it; in other words, it is employed

to designate a figure wherein the same trope is repeated or different tropes are expressed by the same word or phrase. For example—Acts xx. 25: "And now, behold, I know that ye all, among whom I have gone preaching the kingdom of God, shall see my face no more." Vossius calls this *metalepsis* of *gradation*. It may be explained, if not defined, as a figure that uses language which, if literally understood, has no relevant, adequate, or reasonable sense, and therefore the words are construed as a common medium by which our thoughts pass from one thing to another.

Hosea iv. 18: Their wine is stubborn or unruly. Micah ii. 7: Are these his doings? Zech. xi. 13: The pride of Jordan is spoiled; xiv. 21: There shall no more be the Canaanite in the house of the Lord of hosts. Peace, too, has its crowns. —*Cyprian.* That we hear the sound of bells and not the thundering of guns, do we think it a small or common benefit?—*Sandys.* Vossius finds a twofold synechdoche (Virg., Buc. Eccl. i.) in the word *aristas*, where *ears of corn* is put for *corn season*, and this for *years*. He also finds a metonymy and a metaphor in (Virg., Georg. iv.) *fovere Larem: cherish their Lares*, where the *domestic god* is put for *household*, and this for a *subterranean cell of bees*.

Metallage (*suppositio, materialis*) is when a word or phrase is spoken to or of as a separate object of thought (Hos. iv. 18).

O frightful and terrible *perhaps!*—*Brydayne.* Judas accosting his glorious Lord with a "Hail, Master"!—*Whitefield.* A man nailed to the cross was yet a king, and before his Ephphatha "be opened" even the gates of Paradise must be unclosed to a repenting malefactor.—*Tholuck.*

Metancœa. *v.* CORRECTIO.

Metaphora (*metaphor*) puts one word and idea for others which they resemble, or, more particularly, it is an affirmation expressed or understood that an agent, action, or quality is that to which it bears some resemblance, either direct or analogical (Isa. i. 10; lv. 12; lxii. 3; Jer. xv. 20; Zech. xii. 2; Matt. iv. 19; v. 13; Acts xxiii. 3).

Nor does anything so much cause men to be rivetted to worldly concerns as ignorance of one's self.—*Chrysostom.* Concerning this virtuous gentlewoman only this little I speak, and that of knowledge—she lived a dove and died a lamb.—*R. Hooker.*

Metaplasm is a general term that comprehends all those grammatical figures which consist in alterations of the letters or syllables of a word; as *aphæresis, paragoge*, etc.

Metarrhysis (*antirrhesis*) is the refutation of objections.

Metastasis (*translatio*) is found where the cause or blame of anything is transferred from one person to another (1 Kings xviii. 17, 18; Lam. v. 7; Matt. xv. 26, 27). It was once occasionally used to denote a transition from the present in order to give a lively representation of the future (Jer. xxxi. 29).

Metathesis. *v.* ANTIMETABOLE.

Metonymy is a figure by which the name of an idea or thing is substituted for that of another to which it has a certain relation. It is distinguished from the metaphor by being chiefly applied to nouns. There are four kinds of metonymy: I. *Metonymy of the cause*, which is employed where the person acting is put for the thing done, or the instrument by which a thing is done is put for the thing effected; or where an action is put for the effect produced by that action; in short, *wherever the cause is put for the effect* (Isa. xxix. 10; Jer. xviii. 18; Ezek. vii. 15; Amos vii. 9; Matt. x. 34; xviii. 16). Here properly belongs "metonymy of the antecedent," where the antecedent is put for the consequent (Luke xi. 52; Acts xv. 10). II. *Metonymy of effect*, on the contrary, occurs when the effect is put for the efficient cause (Deut. xxx. 15, 20; Eccles. xi. 1; Isa. xi. 2; xlix. 6; Jer. iii. 24; xxi. 8; John iii. 19; xi. 25). Under this head may be placed what is called "metonymy of the consequent," where the consequent is put for the antecedent (Luke iv. 23; Acts xiii. 46). III. *Metonymy of the subject* is where the subject is put for the adjunct—that is, for some circumstance or appendage belonging to the subject; where the place or thing containing is put for that which is *contained* in such place or thing; where the *possessor* is put for the thing *possessed;* where the *object* is put for the thing that is conversant about it; where *the thing signified* is put for *the sign;* where an *action* which is said *to be done* is put for that which is declared, or permitted, or foretold that *it shall be done;* or where an action which is said *to be done* is put for *the giving of an occasion* for that action (Deut. ix. 1; Isa. v. 21; xiii. 1; xlix. 16; Jer. i. 10; iv. 10; xxxviii. 23, in original; xlix. 12; Ezek. vii. 27; xiii. 19; xiii. 22, in original; xx. 25, 26; Hab. ii. 14; Hos. vi. 5; Matt. xvi. 19; xxvi. 26; Acts i. 18; ix. 9; x. 15 in original). IV. *Metonymy of the adjunct*, on the contrary, is found where that which belongs to anything serves to represent the thing itself (Eccles. vii. 10; Isa. x. 14; xx. 5, 6; lx. 1; lxii. 4, Jer. xvii. 7; Micah v. 4; Zech. x. 11; Matt. xxiii. 2; xxv. 10; Luke xvi. 15; xix. 42; John iii. 27; Acts i. 4, 15).

To see that face of mildness turning away from us.—*Chrysostom.* To what purpose do we fatigue and exhaust ourselves, if those men, O noble Venice, queen of the Adriatic—if those men who preach to you the truth are to be thrown into prisons, thrust into cells, and loaded with chains and fetters?—*Ochino.* The sin of Magus must be removed.—*Sandys.* It is the very folly of foolishness.—*Atterbury.* When the Vatican issued the celebrated bull *unigenitus*, etc.—*W. R. Williams.*

Meiosis. *v.* HYPERBOLE.

Mimesis (*imitatio*) is when we allude to or repeat the words

of another for the sake of argument, reproof, direction, or encouragement. Denis of Halycarnassus uses the term to designate such language as imitates motions and thoughts (Isa. xiv. 13, 14; xxviii. 15; Hos. xiii. 2; Micah ii. 11; iii. 11; Acts xxii. 3). The term is now sometimes defined a ludicrous imitation of a blunder or of a mispronunciation; as, "Have you any *very* good *weal* in your *vallet?*"

Misus. *v.* COMMINATION.

Modalis Sermo. A modal proposition in logic is one which asserts that the predicate exists in the subject in a certain manner. A modal speech in rhetoric is one which is not put forth absolutely, but in such a way that we must consider the ardent feeling with which it is uttered in order to reconcile the predicate and the subject (Matt. xxvi. 25; Mark xii. 38; John v. 44; Acts iii. 23).

Mycterism is a kind of delicate sneering which appears partly pretended. Longinus is of the opinion that Hyperides is very skilful in the use of this figure. It is not employed by the inspired speakers, though the covetous Pharisees were guilty of "turning up the nose" (Luke xvi. 14).

Mythologism is fictitious language borrowing from or alluding to mythology; as *Phœbus* for the *sun; Aurora* for the *morning*, etc. See what Gregory Nazianzen says of *Tantalus* (see his 4th oration), and Segneri of *Gyges* (Quaresimale, Pred. 12).

Brazil has had many opportunities of recovery; many times we have had the remedy, as it were, in our own hands; but we have never reached it, because we came always a day too late. And how can that man lay hold of Occasion who always attempts to seize her where she is bald?—*Vieyra.*

Obsecratio. *v.* OBTESTATION.

Obtestation (*deasis, obsecratio*) is used when the speaker solemnly swears by or calls God, heaven, or some person or thing held sacred or memorable, to bear witness to the facts which he relates or to the truth of what he maintains (Jer. xxii. 5). Some illustrations of this figure are also examples of *apostrophe.* Indeed, this figure is often a species of *apostrophe*, and were it not desirable to fix attention on the oath which characterises *obtestation*, it would not have demanded a separate term to designate it. Longinus (De Sublim., sec. 16) places under the head of *apostrophe* the celebrated oath in Demosthenes for the Crown, p. 297 (ed. Reiskii). There is another *obtestation* in Cicero's oration for Milo, "*Vos enim jam Albani*," etc. "I implore, I call you to witness—you, I say, O ye Alban hills! . . And you, too, O sacred Jupiter of Latinum!" The inspired speakers do not often employ this figure in the classical form as we commonly define it (Deut. iv. 26; xxx. 19). Paul, in his epistles, frequently uses the *obtestation*, and

comes very near employing one in his address to the elders at Miletus (Acts xx. 26). In the prophetic sermons it is Jehovah himself, and not the mortal speaker, that utters the form of oath in question (Isa. xiv. 24; lxii. 8; Jer. xxii. 5; Ezek. v. 11; xxxiii. 11; xxxiv. 8).

Occupatio (*anteoccupation, præmunitio, prolepsis, procatalepsis, cpantesis*) is when we state and do away what we anticipate will be said against us. It is of two kinds. *Hypophora, prolepsis* is when we merely state what may be said against us. *Anthypophora, schesis, anasceue, prosapodosis*, or *hypobole*, is when we *answer* beforehand what may be said against us. *Prolepsis* is of three kinds: I. It is *grammatical* when we speak of things in general terms, and then speak of each of those things separately. II. It is *rhetorical* when it is synonymous with *hypophora*. III. It is *poetical* when circumstantials are presumed to belong to persons or events to which, in the order of time, they do not really belong. This is a species of *ampliatio* (Isa. xxxvii. 23; xlviii. 5, 7; xlix. 14, 15; Amos. v. 25, 26; Matt. iii. 9; Acts ii. 23; xiv. 16; Heb. ii. 8; Jas. iii. 17).

"What then? Are we to shut up the theatre?" it will be said, "and are all things to be turned upside down by thy word?" Nay, but as it is, all things are turned upside down. For whence are they that plot against our marriages? Is it not from this theatre? etc.—*Chrysostom.* He who looks upon a woman and thinks that he would gladly commit sin with her, has, in God's sight, already done the deed. What, brother Berthold! how many would then be lost! Well, suppose thou shouldst find in thy cellar a man that had broken open thy chest, though as yet he had purloined nothing from it; what wouldst thou take him to be? Surely thou wouldst take him to be a thief, and send him to the gallows. Just so God holds thee to be an actual adulterer, etc.—*Berthold.* Almost all men in Maranham hold others unjustly in servitude; almost all, therefore, are in a state of condemnation. You will tell me, that even if it were thus, they did not think of it, nor know it, and that their good faith would save them. I deny it. They did think of it and did know it, as ye also think of it and know it, etc.—*Vieyra.*

Œonismus (*optatio*) is a figure by which we express an ardent desire or lively anticipation (Deut. xxxii. 29, 30; Isa. xlviii. 18). Cicero wields the figure in *Oratio pro Lege Manilia:* "I wish, O Romans, that you had such a great number of brave and honest men that it were difficult to decide whom you thought best to appoint to take charge of such important affairs and so great a war." Again, in his *VIIIth Philippica:* "O that Lucius Cæsar were in health; that Servius Sulpicius were alive. This cause would be pleaded much better by these men than it now is by one alone" (Acts xxvi. 29).

Onomatopœia (*nominatio*) is the making or else the use of words which, by imitating the sounds or motions of the lower ani-

mals, of the elements, or of instruments, and the like, suggest their own signification; as the Hebrew, rūah, a gentle breeze; gāāsh, a blast; zăphzăph, the chirping of a bird; shibbēr, to shiver in pieces; gălgăl, a wheel or any round thing, so called from its sound in rolling. In a sermon on the Trumpet of the Last Judgment, Luther more than once employs this figure: "In an instant all that are in their graves shall live. They shall hear the kettle-drum and trumpet of the good God. It is thus that they will sound—*poumerlé poump! poumerlé poump! pliz, plaz! shmi, shmir!* . . It will be the cry of war and the *taratantara* of the good God. Then shall all heaven resound with the noise—*kir! kir! poumerlé poump!*" The great Reformer has been ridiculed for his use of this figure in such excess, and yet it should be remembered that the instruments whose sounds he imitated were sometimes employed in public worship. I am not aware that the poet Ennius has ever been ridiculed for imitating the sound of a trumpet by using the word *taratantara.*

"We have no wine." Mary was not long in *bibble babble,* saying she wist not what; but said one word, Help, for it is needed. She doth not as our Papists do, which *prittle prattle* a whole day upon their beads, saying our Lady's psalter. But she only saith, "They have no wine, help," etc.—*Latimer.* Observe: Eternity approaches. Do you know what this eternity is? It is a pendulum whose vibrations say continuously, "Always! Ever! Ever! Always! Always!"—*Brydayne.*

Optatio. *v.* Œonismus.

Orismus. *v.* Horismus.

Orthotes is such an arrangement of words as is direct and clear.

Oxymoron is a figure which acutely unites words or phrases whose literal meanings are incongruous, if not even contradictory, or where we speak in one sense wisely and in another sense foolishly at the same time. *v.* Synœceiosis (Isa. lviii. 10; Jer. xxii. 19; Acts v. 41).

Others will cozen for lands and extort all they can, and then will make them their farmers who were the owners, and think they do them a pleasure, and thus they threaten kindness, like lawyers and usurers, which pay themselves with ours and yet say we are beholden to them.—*Edward Topsell.* O cruel love!—*Segneri.* Blessed misfortunes. . . Such are the consolations the wicked will enjoy in hell. O bitter and remorseful consolations!—*Brydayne.* They have dreamt of strengthening the building by cementing it with this universal solvent.—*J. C. Hare.*

Pæanismus is a figure by which the speaker rejoices or calls on others to rejoice (Isa. xliv. 23; Zeph. iii. 14; Luke x. 21; Jas. i. 9).

Palillogia is a figure in which the same word ends one clause of a sentence and begins the next. *v.* Epizeuxis.

Palinodia is when, having spoken against any person or thing, we make a retraction and speak well of him or it.

Parabasis. *v.* APHODOS.

Parabole (*symbole*) has different significations: I. In the *Hebrew* the word *mashal* is employed in the sense of *parable* according to the New Testament Greek, in Ezek. xvii. 2; xxiv. 3. In other parts of the O. T. it is used with various meanings, as a *resemblance*, a *comparison*, a *vision*, *figurative language*, and *poetry* of several kinds. II. In the classic Greek the word *parable* signifies *a case supposed for the sake of illustration.* Aristotle, in Rhet., B. ii., 20, says there are two species of examples—one matters of fact, the other fictitious cases. Of the last species there are two kinds—the *parable* and the *fable.* He adds that the *parable* is like the Socratic similes. III. *In the classic Latin*, Quintilian says that most of the rhetoricians of Rome chose to give the name *similitude* (similitudinem) to that which the Greeks denominated *parable.* Seneca employs the word *parable* in the sense of *imago*, which, according to his notion, must also include the idea of *comparison*, if we may judge by the example he gives: "As an army forms itself into a square when it is threatened with an attack of the enemy on every side, so ought a wise man to draw out all his virtues on every side, so that he may be ready for any temptation or emergency." IV. *In the New Testament Greek* the word signifies: 1. A comparison (Mark iv. 30); 2. A parable according to the modern acceptation of the word as applied specifically to the comparisons reported in the first three Gospels. It may be defined: A brief fictitious description, usually in an historic form, of possible events, in which men or animals or things are represented according to their habits and the laws of their existence, employed by way of comparison, to explain or foreshadow the nature of Christ's kingdom, or to illustrate or impress or prove or apply his teachings. Some of the parables are *allusions*, and not distinct and formal narratives; as Matt. vii. 13, 14; Luke vi. 39; xiv. 28–33. 3. A structure which was typical of spiritual things, as the first tabernacle (Heb. ix. 9). 4. A symbolical action representing a resurrection, as where Abraham received back Isaac from expected death (Heb. xi. 19). 5. A proverb or adage in a figurative form (Luke iv. 23). 6. A psalm containing brief historical sayings, to be used for instruction and exhortation (Matt. xiii. 35; compare Psa. lxxviii. 2). We gather from the Greek commentary on Homer, by Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica in the twelfth century, his notion of a parable as derived from the similes of Homer. According to this scholar, a parable is a comparison in which

familiar objects and occurrences are employed to illustrate and confirm any subject whatever. *P. Rutilius Lupus* classifies parables thus: I. Homœosis, or similitude. This is of two kinds—*paradeigma* and *parabole*. (1) The *paradeigma* is of three species: (*a*) It is an example of a person without words; (*b*) of words without a person; (*c*) of both person and words. (2) *Parable* is also of three kinds: (*a*) Icon where the simile forms a complete image; (*b*) Homœon, or a simile founded on certain points of resemblance; (*c*) Epagoge, or the argument from induction.

Paradeigma. *v.* PARABOLE.

Paradiastole (*distinctio*) is where we make a distinction between things that have some resemblance (1 Cor. iv. 19; 2 Cor. iv. 8, 9).

O thou Invisible, who seest all! Unchangeable, who changest all! Thou to whom neither origin gives beginning, nor time increase, nor consummation end. Thou art he who created all things without necessity, and who upholds them all without weariness, governs all without labour, and sets all in motion without being moved. Thou dwellest in all things, and yet art not encompassed by them. Thou dwellest outside of all things, but art not shut out of anything; below all things, but not degraded by them; above all things, but not exalted by them.—*Luis de Granada.*

Paradiegesis is a narration of facts which, although they are outside of a cause, yet help to establish it.

Paradox (*hypomone*) is a proposition which seems to be absurd or at variance with common sense, or to contradict a known truth, yet when explained or investigated it is maintained or admitted to be well founded. President Dwight was of opinion that paradoxes are usually absurd, not only in appearance but in truth. It was sometimes taken to designate any surprising or unexpected idea or thought, as Isa. v. 2.

Jesus alone knew what it was to lose Jesus (Matt. xxvii. 47).—*Philip von Hartung.* Oh! how are we deafened by these ears of ours! And how are we blinded by these eyes of ours! that we cannot hear the voice of God calling us to heaven; that we cannot behold the divine light that shines through all things.—*John Howe.* I tell you the truth. I am against good works—don't run away before I have finished my sentence—we are against good works being put in the room of Christ, as the ground of our acceptance.—*Whitefield.*

Paræneticon is when the speaker uses the language of exhortation.

Paragoge is the addition of a letter or syllable at the end of a word—*withouten* for *without*. *v.* PARELCON.

Parallage. *v.* ANASTROPHE.

Paraleipsis (*paralepsis, parasiopesis, prætermissio, præteritio*) is a figure by which the speaker expresses a wish to pass in silence or ignore what he nevertheless briefly mentions. It embraces the

figures *apophasis* and *cataphasis*. We have an example of this figure in Philemon 19; Heb. xi. 32.

Helias, Saul, David—But what! go I about to avouch ancient examples, where daily experience doth teach?—*John Bradford.* I might allege the like out of Joel, Jeremy, Amos, Micheas; but the matter is clear enough, and needeth rather to be considered than proved.—*Sandys.*

Parasceue. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Parasiopesis. *v.* PARALEIPSIS.

Parathesis. *v.* COMPARATIO.

Parecbasis. *v.* APHODOS.

Parechesis (*parison, parisosis, paromœon*) is a kind of *paronomasia*, wherein two or more syllables, words, or members of a sentence are pronounced with a similar sound. *v.* PAROMŒOSIS.

O fortunatam natam, me consule, Romam.—*Cicero.*

Paregmenon (*derivatio*) is the use of several words of the same origin in one sentence (originals of John iii. 20; Acts viii. 30; Jas. ii. 4).

He wished rather to die a present death than to live a miserable life.—*Cicero.*

Parelcon (*parolce*) is the addition of a syllable or particle to pronouns, verbs, or adverbs. It is the same as *paragoge.*

Parenthesis is a figure that divides a sentence by the insertion of words, phrases, or sentences which have no grammatical connection with the members that precede or follow (Isa. lx. 12; Heb. xii. 18–28). *Cataploce* is that kind of parenthesis which consists in a quick and lively turn of thought; *e. g.:*

When the Phocian war had broken out—not through me, for I had not then commenced public life—you were in this position, etc.—*Demosthenes, Pro Coro.* Of whom the world was not worthy.—*Heb. xi.* 38; *Ezek. xvi.* 23.

Epitrechon, subcontinuatio is a rapid statement thrown between sentences, and so making parts of discourse parenthetical and circuitous. Hermogenes gives us the following illustration of the figure:

The Pandionian tribe had not had a choir-master for two years, and the assembly having met, etc.—*Demosthenes against Midias,* §19. Dives was one of that set of men (a numerous set) who are very hospitable to those who do not want, and very unfriendly to those who do.—*Seed.* After such examples, my brethren (I blush, alas! to offer them to you, because I fear that through your neglect of them they will but confound and condemn you), after such examples, I say, etc.—*Brydayne.*

Parembole (*epembole, cataploce, paremptosis*) is such a parenthetical sentence as would make complete sense if it were separated from the sentence which it divides.

If our Lord Jesus Christ had been the only one baptised with John's baptism (hold fast what we say, . . . for why are we constrained to say the same things

again but because we are not sure of the memory of your heart?); if then the Lord had been the only one baptised, etc.—*Augustine.*

Paremptoses. *v.* PAREMBOLE.

Parison. *v.* PARECHESIS.

Parœmia—a common saying. Such is its rhetorical signification. It is used in John's Gospel as synonymous with *parable* (Jer. xxxi. 29; Ezek. xvi. 44).

Paromœosis (*paromœon*, *parechesis*) is a peculiar kind of alliteration, in which either the beginnings or the endings of two clauses are similar in sound; when it is in the beginnings the two words must have the same root.

Paromologia. *v.* CONFESSION.

Paronomasia (*annominatio*) is the use of two or more words which resemble each other in sound or form, but differ as to signification, for the sake of emphasis or antithesis or playful allusion. *Annominatio* differs from paronomasia in this, that it comprehends a reference both to the sound and to the meaning of words, and consequently, for the most part, it is a kind of antithesis (Matt. xvi. 18; John ii. 23, 24; Acts viii. 30). It was sometimes used to designate an alteration in the meaning of a word by interchanging, transposing, adding, or omitting one or more letters or syllables. Some rhetoricians misname this figure *prosonomasia;* others include in this figure *antanaclasis*, *parechesis*, and *annomination*, applying the last term in the sense of *pun*. *Paronomasia* may be divided into three kinds: I. *Synonymous* (as Isa. x. 16; xxiv. 3; Micah i. 14; ii. 4; Nahum ii. 10). II. *Antithetic* (Isa. v. 7; lxi. 3). III. *Of varied signification* (Isa. xxiv. 17; Jer. li. 2; Luke xxi. 11; Acts viii. 30, in the original). This figure, though condemned by Addison, is approved by Aristotle (Rhet., L. iii., c. xi.), and employed not only by the sacred writers, but by Cicero, Augustine, Milton, and many other first-rate human authorities.

Sanabilem, non sanum.—*Augustine.* . . . Quæ ibat effusa redit confusa.—*Id.* How many other officers of new names and jurisdictions would be created and founded (*fundir*) for these mines to confound (*confundir*) you and bury you in them. . . . They would distress you for what you had or for what you had not, and your mills would have much to grind (*moer*), because you and your children would have to be ground (*moidos*).—*Vieyra.* Bishop Jewel, walking on foot in the dirt, going to preach to a few people, was asked by a person that met him, "Why does your lordship, weak as you are, expose yourself thus?" He answered, "It becomes a bishop to die preaching." Lord send all the world that have bishops such jewels as he was.—*Whitefield.* Whether you were converted formerly or not, you are perverted now.—*Id.*

More examples of this figure are found in Isa. x. 30; xxx. 7; Zeph. ii. 4–6; Matt. xxiv. 7; Acts xvii. 25; Heb. v. 8.

Parrhesia. *v.* LICENTIA.

Pathopœia is a figure by which the speaker expresses some strong affection, as love or hatred, joy or sorrow (Isa. xxii. 4; xlix. 15; Jer. ix. 1, 2; xxiii. 9, 10; xxxi. 20; Hos. xi. 8, 9; Mark iii. 5; vii. 34; Luke xix. 41, 42; Acts vii. 55, 56).

This gift (speaking of King Edward) God gave unto us Englishmen before all nations under the sun, and that of his exceeding love towards us. But alas and well away, for our unthankfulness' sake, for our sins' sake, for our carnality and profane living, God's anger hath touched not only the body, but also the mind of our king by a long sickness, and at length hath taken him away by death, death, cruel death, fearful death.—*John Bradford.*

Percontatio, or *Percunctatio.* *v.* EROTESIS.

Percursio. *v.* EPITROCHASMUS.

Periphrasis (*circuitio, circumlocutio*) is the use of two or more words to express the sense of one, in order to veil a disagreeable thought, to impart power to ideas, or to speak with the exactitude of truth. *v.* PLEONASM.

Pariphrasis for God (Gen. xviii. 25); for death (Isa. xiv. 15; xxxviii. 10); for wife (Ezek. xxiv. 16, 21, 25); for men (Matt. xi. 11); for wine (Matt. xxvi. 29; Heb. i. 14). When we consider that we have but a little while to be here, that we are upon our journey travelling towards our heavenly country, where we shall meet with all the delights we can desire, it ought not to trouble us much to endure storms and foul ways, and to want many of those accommodations we might expect at home.—*Tillotson.*

Periploce (*involutio*) is a circuitous phrase or sentence which expresses agreeably a disagreeable idea. *v.* EUPHEMY.

Peristasis is where we make an argument out of the circumstances of a particular case, or out of those which are peculiar to a case.

Permissio. *v.* EPITROPE.

Permutatio is a figure which conveys to the mind a sense different from that which the words strictly signify. The term includes those of metaphor, sarcasm, and irony. For examples *v. Auct. ad Herennium*, Lib. iv., c. xxxiv., a work attributed variously to Cornificus, Cicero, and others.

Personification. *v.* PROSOPOPŒIA.

Peusis. *v.* EROTESIS.

Phantasia. *v.* VISION.

Pleonasm is using a greater number of words than is necessary to express the bare meaning to a cultivated intellect, in order to impart greater clearness or emphasis, or to move the common mind by the employment of repetition and other amplifications. The term is often applied to any redundant or needless expression. Under this head some writers include *parelcon*, *polysyndeton*, *hendiadys*, and *periphrasis* (Judges v. 27; Isa. iii. 9; xxxviii. 1; li. 1, 2; Jer. xiii. 17; Ezek. xviii. 13; xxxiii. 11; Hos. ii. 2; Mark xii.

30; John v. 24; Acts xviii. 9). The Hebrew parallelism is often a regulated pleonasm.

Ploce has various significations: 1. It was once used to designate a blending of two or more kinds of repetition in the same context, as *epanalepsis*, *anaphora*, etc. 2. The use of the same word twice in the same connection, but in different senses. This is the same as *antanaclasis*. 3. When a word is so repeated that in the one instance the word itself, and in the other a property or attribute of it, expresses the meaning (Eccles. vii. 6; Isa. xxxvii. 18; lxvi. 3, 4; Jer. vii. 18, 19; viii. 4, in original. Also Matt. v. 45; Luke xi. 36; John iii. 31; x. 13; xii. 27; Jas. iv. 11).

"Barabbas was a robber." And is not Barabbas a robber still?—*Stephen H. Tyng, Sen.* What he giveth, he giveth.—*Charles Wadsworth.*

Polyprosopon (literally, manifacedness) is found where the person spoken of is, without notice, by a quick transition, represented as speaking for himself, or else, when speaking of some one, we turn aside to address the person himself. It seems to be considered a species of *antimetathesis* by Longinus (sec. 26, 27), who adduces an example of this figure from Iliad, B. xv., l. 346:

"But Hector, shouting aloud, exhorted the Trojans to rush upon the ships and to let go the bloody spoils. 'And whoever I shall discover away from the ships anywhere, there will I kill him.'" Also this from Demosthenes' oration against Aristogiton: "And shall not one among you boil with wrath when the iniquity of this insolent and profligate wretch is laid before your eyes? This insolent wretch, I say, who—Thou most abandoned creature! when shut out from the liberty of speaking, not by bars or gates, for these indeed some other might burst," etc. (Ezek. xvi. 23; Luke v. 14; Acts i. 4; xvii. 3; xxiii. 22; xxv. 8.) Nor doth the Spirit make living members any except those whom the Spirit itself findeth in the body which it quickeneth. For the Spirit which is in thee, O man, doth it make alive a member which it shall find separated from thy flesh? . . . These things are said that we may love unity and fear separation.—*Augustine.* So that keeping bad company was another step that led to his great fall. Oh, Peter! my blood begins now almost to run cold within me. I tremble for thee more than ever. . . Well, the blessed Jesus is now at the bar. —*Whitefield.*

Polyptoton (*metagoge*) is a repetition of the same word in different cases, genders, numbers, etc. (Isa. xxiv. 16; Hos. x. 1; Micah ii. 4; Zeph. i. 15; John iii. 13).

Polysyndeton is found where copulative conjunctions are repeated between successive words, clauses, and sentences. The term is sometimes used for a redundancy of conjunctions (Isa. iii. 18–24; xxxvii. 37; Jer. xxxi. 28; Hag. i. 11; John x. 27, 28). A good example of the pairing of nouns (carried to such excess in modern essays and reviews) is to be found in Zeph. i. 15, 16.

Yea, and there are both foul sayings, and gestures yet fouler; and the dressing of the hair tends that way, and the gait, and apparel, and voice, and flexure

of the limbs; and there are turnings of the eyes, and flutes, and pipes, and dramas, and plots; and all things, in short, full of the most extreme impurity.—*Chrysostom.*

Portrait. *v.* EFFICTIO.

Præmunitio. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Præteritio. *v.* PARALEIPSIS.

Prætermission. *v.* PARALEIPSIS.

Pragmatographia is such a description of *actions* that they appear not so much described to the ear as exhibited to the eye (Joel ii. 1–11; Matt., c. xxiv. and xxv.).

Praunsis is a figure by which anger is assuaged or extinguished. This has but a doubtful claim to a place among figures. *v.* AMPLIFICATION.

Procatalepsis. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Proecthesis is a reasoning from what has been lawfully done to what ought to be done. It is more commonly used to signify an explanation or justification of what has been said or done (Matt. ix. 12, 13, 15–17; xii. 11, 12; Mark iii. 4).

Prodiorthosis is a preparation of the audience for hearing something that might otherwise have shocked or offended them. It resembles *protherapeia.*

Proepiplexis. *v.* PROTHERAPEIA.

Proepizeuxis (in place of a repetition) is the separation of two substantives by means of an intermediate verb in the dual or plural number, for the sake of speaking of both, instead of employing a separate verb for each of them, or one verb agreeing with only one of the substantives, as in *zeugma.* It has also been defined a grammatical figure by which a verb is placed between two substantives in construction. Example:

Then they approached each other; the one eager to launch his pointed spear, the other an arrow from the string.—*Iliad, B. xiii.*, 585, 586.

Prolepsis. *v.* OCCUPATIO and AMPLIATIO.

Prosapodosis is found where, after expressing two or more opinions, we return to give a reason for each, or else subjoin to each assertion its proper reason. It is also employed for *redditio*, or a return to a word in order to repeat it with emphasis or to dwell upon it. Then it differs little from *sejugatio.* It sometimes means a reply to an objection. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

So then Christ is rich and poor; as God, rich; as man, poor.—*Augustine.*

Why will you perish, O house of Israel? You, my brethren, who have been distinguished by so many blessings, to whom in your earlier days the immaculate page of divine revelation was unfolded, who were nurtured upon the holy bosom of Christianity, why will you perish? You for whom this roof resounds with the voice of the preacher, for whom the sacred table is spread with celestial food, why will you perish? You for whom Jesus died, you for whom he

rose from the dead and now intercedes, showing to his Father the holy wounds he received for your salvation, why will you perish?—*Bossuet.* Run the race set before thee, fight the good fight, win the bright crown, the race, and the fight, and the crown of an overcoming faith.—*W. R. Williams.*

Prosopographia is a lively description of a *person* by delineating his features, mien, disposition, dress, manners, etc. (Isa. lxiii. 1–6; Ezek. xvi. 4–26).

A new and mighty teacher appeared in the wilderness of Judea. His dress, his voice, his aspect were the image of austere holiness. His hair and beard unshorn, after the manner of the Nazarites, hung wildly over his breast and shoulders; his half-naked body was macerated by frequent fasting; his raiment was the coarse hair-cloth which covered the Arab's tent; his food the insects of the air and of the field; and his luxury the honey left by wild bees in the sun-burnt rocks of Arabia Petræa.—*Heber.*

Prosopopœia (*conformatio, personification*) is a figure by which we give intelligence, language, or other human attributes to inanimate objects or abstract ideas. The term is sometimes used to designate cases where the absent are introduced as present, or the dead as if they were alive again (Isa. iii. 8; xliv. 23; xlix. 13; Jer. xxxi. 15, and Matt. ii. 18; Jer. xlvi. 10; xlvii. 6, 7; Ezek. xxxi. 9, 15; Hos. ii. 21, 22; Habak. ii. 11; Matt. vi. 3, 34; compare Luke xvi. 29 and Heb. xi. 2).

O England, England! if thou obstinately wilt return into Egypt—that is, if thou contract marriage, confederacy or league with such princes as do maintain and advance idolatry, such as the emperor who is no less an enemy unto Christ than ever was Nero—if for the pleasure and friendship of such princes, I say, thou return to thine old abominations before used under papistry, then assuredly, O England, thou shalt be plagued and brought to desolation by means of those whose favour thou seekest, and by whom thou art procured to fall from Christ and to serve Antichrist.—*John Knox.* Many agonies hast thou gone through, unfortunate Brazil. Many have destroyed thee to elevate themselves; many have built palaces with materials from thy ruins; many eat their bread, or rather the bread that is not theirs, with the sweat of thy brow; . . they rich and thou poor, they safe and thou in peril, they through thy means living in prosperity, and thou through theirs in danger of expiring. But rejoice now and take heart, and recover thyself and give thanks to God.—*Vieyra.* (See also *Segneri,* Quaresimale, Pred. xxviii., §8.) Mercy calls: Him that cometh, etc. (John vi. 37). Faith answers: I will arise and go to my father, etc. (Luke xv. 18, 19).—*John Arndt.* They look upon Christianity—may I not say so?—as a scheme for just paring the claws of sin and then letting it run about at will.—*J. C. Hare.*

Prosphonesis. *v.* APOSTROPHE.

Prosthesis is the prefixing a letter or syllable to a word: *adown* for *down; evanished* for *vanished.*

Protherapeia (*procpiplexis*) is found where, by way of precaution, we conciliate faith or indulgence in behalf of something we are about to say. *v.* EPITHERAPEIA (John xii. 27; Acts ii. 29; xvii. 22, 23; xxvi. 2, 3).

Protimesis enumerates things according to their order or importance, using the particles *first*, *again*, *then*, etc.

Protrope. An exhortation.

Proupergasia (*parasceue*, *præmunitio*). *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Proverb. *v.* PARŒMIA.

Pysma (*peusis*). *v.* EROTESIS.

Ratiocinatio is when the speaker questions himself or demands of himself the reasons for his assertions or the motives he has for saying or doing anything. The term is also employed sometimes in the sense of *emphasis*. The author of *Rhet. ad Herennium* commends the use of this figure as helping to hold the attention of an audience. He gives this illustration of it:

Our ancestors were right in not taking the life of any king they had defeated and made prisoner. Why? Because it is unjust to make use of the power which fortune has given us over one who, a little while ago, she placed in the highest rank among men. But why so? Did he not lead an army into the field against us? I ought no longer to remember that. Why so lenient? Because it is worthy of a brave soldier to regard as enemies those who fight against him for the victory, and as fellow-men those who are conquered, so that he may by his magnaminity lessen the horrors of war, and by his humanity increase the blessings of peace. But if your royal adversary had been the victor, would he have done as much? No; doubtless he would not have been so wise. Why, then, should you not refuse to show him any clemency? Because I always despised and never imitated such folly. (See Epistle to Romans, chap. iii.)

Reduplicatio. *v.* ANADIPLOSIS.

Refrain (*burden*, *amœbæon*) is the repetition of the same phrase or sentence at the end of poetic strophes and prophetic periods. *v.* EPISTROPHE (Isa. ix. 12, 17, 21; x. 4; Jer. iii. 1, 12, 22; Amos iv. 6–12; John vi. 39–44; Matt. vi. 2, 5, 16; John vi. 39, 40, 44).

Look at these excellent gifts that Christ bringeth with him. He bringeth justification with him; and is not that an excellent gift? He bringeth sanctification with him; and is not that an excellent gift? He bringeth joy of the Holy Ghost with him; and is not that an excellent gift? He bringeth the love of God with him; and is not that an excellent gift? He bringeth patience under sufferings with him; and is not that an excellent gift? But why should I name what he bringeth? He bringeth himself and all things, and what would you have more?—*Andrew Gray, of Glasgow.* I remember, O gracious Lord, how thou who thoughtest it no robbery to be equal with God, . . and all this to save us sinful men. I remember, O gracious God, how thou didst endure a most bitter agony, . . and all this to save us sinful men. I remember how thou, O God of truth, wast accused by false witnesses, . . and to save us sinful men, etc.—*Bishop Ken's Thanksgiving for Christ's Sufferings.*

Regressio. *v.* ANTIMETABOLE.

Rejectio. *v.* APODIOXIS.

Relatio. *v.* ANAPHORA.

Repartee is a smart, witty, and pleasant reply. It differs from sarcasm in not being severe or offensive.

Repetitio. *v.* ANAPHORA, ANADIPLOSIS, ANTANACLASIS, ANTIMETABOLE, EPANADOS, EPANALEPSIS, EPIPHORA, EPISTROPHE, EPIZEUXIS, REFRAIN.

Reticentia. *v.* APOSIOPESIS.

Reversio. *v.* ANADIPLOSIS.

Sarcasmus. *v.* IRONY.

Schesis. *v.* OCCUPATIO.

Scomma. *v.* CHARIENTISMUS.

Sejugatio (*diezeugmenon, disjunction*) is found where two or more words or members of a sentence are separately repeated and more fully discussed (John xvi. 8–11; Rom. xi. 22; Phil. i. 15–17).

Some are condemned for certainty, others for doubt, others for ignorance. They who are certain are condemned for not making restitution; they who are in doubt are condemned for not examining; they who are in ignorance are condemned for not knowing what it was their duty to know.—*Vieyra.* (See example from *Don Antonio Guevara*, under *Subjectio.*)

Sententia. *v.* GNOME.

Sermocinatio (*dialogismus*) is a figure by which we represent one or more persons as speaking in a manner suitable to their character or situation, or as we may suppose they would if they were brought forward to speak on the subject we are handling. When the speaker both objects and answers, the figure is said to be *in dialogismo;* otherwise *in logismo* (Isa. xiv. 16–19; lxiii. 1–6; Micah ii. 4; Zech. viii. 20, 23; Luke xiii. 6–9). Sometimes this figure is enlivened by natural repetitions (Matt. xxv. 37–39; Luke xv. 18, 19, 21).

And why, O blessed Paul, dost thou bid us keep the feast? Tell us the reason. "Because," he says, "our passover is sacrificed for us, even Christ, who is God."—*Chrysostom.* How then shall man be justified by faith without works? The apostle himself answers, "For this cause said I this to thee: O man, lest thou shouldst seem as it were to presume on thy works. Thou knowest that faith found thee a sinner, though faith bestowed made thee righteous."—*Augustine.* Zion said, "The Lord has forgotten me." Foolish thought, indeed, and unworthy of a believing soul. Behold the wounds he received near thy walls, and consider whether he can have forgotten thee. "I have," saith he, "graven thee on the palms of my hands, and I cannot lift them to my eyes without remembering thee." The sufferings we endure for others kindles our love to such a flame that we glory in the wounds we receive in their defence.—*P. J. Marquez.* I seem now to hear the voice of God speaking to me, as he once spoke to the prophet, saying, "Preacher of the living God, what seest thou?" Lord, I see, and see with comfort a great number of the noble and the rich moved—affected for the first time in view of the condition of these unfortunate ones. It is as if the Lord again said to me, "Pass to look at another spectacle; dig through the wall, dig into the vaults; what do you see there?" I see, O Lord, a crowd of prisoners, more unfortunate, perhaps, than blameworthy. "Descend; what do you discover?" I find, O Lord, a funereal light, tombs for habitations, a hell upon earth, food that serves to prolong misery rather than life, a little straw

scattered here and there, some rags, haggard faces, sepulchral voices, men, or rather frightful ghosts. "Follow these victims to the place of execution; what do you see there?" I see, O Lord, etc. "Consider what you have witnessed and draw your own conclusions." Lord, the more I observe the more I am persuaded that there is in the world a law of exact compensation, that there is a protector for every one that is oppressed, a liberator for every captive, and only a wall between these prisoners and the hearts of the rich, etc.—*Abbé Louis Poule.*

Significatio. *v.* EMPHASIS.

Simile. *v.* COMPARATIO.

Similitude. *v.* COMPARATIO and PARABOLA.

Simploce. *v.* COMPLEXIO and SYNTHESIS.

Simultaneum is found where, in the narration of two facts which occurred at the same time, the statement of one of them is divided into two parts, while the statement of the other is placed as a parenthesis between the two. (See Bengel's Gnomon on Mark xiv. 13; Rev. xvi. 14).

Solutum. *v.* ASYNDETON.

Subcontinuatio. *v.* EPITRECHON.

Subjectification consists in saying of some physical or abstract thing by which a subject acts or speaks, or which is its organ, instrument, or attribute, what in preciseness of speech can only be said of the subject itself. This figure is always either a species of *metonymy* or of *synecdoche.*

The sound of the axe and the hammer preached respecting that deluge; the noise of the saw in its sawing cried aloud of the inundation.—*Ephræm Syrus.* Oh! happy eyes that see these things, and most happy hearts that feel them.—*John Bradford.*

Subjectio (*dianœa*) is a figure by which the speaker uses animated questions and answers in developing an argument, amplifying a subject, or making an application. The term is sometimes employed in the sense of *hypophora. v. Occupatio. Dianœa* is now and then defined a figure by which a subject is treated not as it ought to be, but as is suitable to the occasion.

O Alexander! either thou seekest to redress wrongs, or thou wouldst form alliances; or thou seekest peace, or thou wouldst make friends. But how can we believe that thou desirest to redress wrongs when thou dost lord it over the whole earth? How can we believe that thou wouldst form alliances, since thou makest tributaries of those who receive thee without opposition, and treat as enemies those who question thy claims? How can we believe that thou seekest peace, since thou carriest tumult into all the world? How can we believe that thou wouldst make friends, since thou art the scourge of human weakness?—*Don Antonio Guevara.* Consider how he hath made thee a man or a woman which might have made thee a toad or a dog. And why did he this? Verily because he loved thee. And trowest thou that if he loved thee when thou wast not, to make thee such a one as he hath most graciously made thee, will he not now love thee, being his handiwork? Doth he hate anything that he made? Is there

unableness in him? Doth he love for a day, and so farewell? No, forsooth, he loveth to the end, his mercy endureth forever.—*John Bradford.*

Suppositio Materialis. *v.* METALLAGE.

Suspension. *v.* SUSTENTATIO.

Sustentatio (*suspension, creman, exartesis*) is found where the speaker so constructs his sentences that the hearer waits for their conclusion to solve their import (Prov. xxiii. 29, 30; Matt. xi. 7–9; 1 Cor. ii. 9).

My chief reason for appearing here to-day is that I may prove myself obedient. But to whom? Their lordships? No, indeed. Excuse me—I am not bound to obey what is evil. Well, hast thou come to be persuaded by the people? By no means; it is not to be believed that I would allow myself to be persuaded in this matter by any man. Art thou minded, then, to obey the high prelates? Not a word has been spoken to me by any of the prelates. But know that I have come here to obey one who is Prelate of prelates and Pope of popes.—*Savonarola.* He that will not shroud himself under this vine, he that entereth not into this ark, he that will not be partaker of these celestial treasures, these heavenly mysteries, this true bread of life so largely offered unto all nations, if his soul die the death, who will have pity or compassion of him.—*Abp. Sandys.* "Now is the son of man glorified?" Tell me in what manner he is going to be glorified? What means the emphatic word—*now?* Is he at once to rise above the clouds and thence to launch vengeance on his foes? Or is the angelic hierarchy, seraphs, dominions, principalities, and powers to descend from on high and pay him instant adoration? No. He is going to die with malefactors. This he denominates his glory.—*Bossuet.*

Syllepsis is a figure by which one word is made use of twice to convey two different ideas. As a figure of syntax it is defined, a figure by which an adjective or verb belonging to two or more nouns of different genders, persons, or numbers agrees with one rather than another. *Zeugma* is, in this sense, included by some under this term (Matt. viii. 22).

Scourged he was with the scourges of the Jews; scourged he is with the blasphemies of false Christians.—*Augustine.* What can be oftener from home than their persons? Than their thoughts, which are continually from home, ever wandering abroad and returning empty and unsatisfied.—*Seed.* What he giveth, he giveth.—*Charles Wadsworth.*

Syllogismus. *v.* EMPHASIS.

Symbol. The use or mention of any material object in order to represent some intellectual, moral, or spiritual notion.

Symbole. *v.* PARABOLE.

Symbouleusis. *v.* ANACŒNOSIS.

Symperasma (*athrœsmus, synathrœsmus, syrmus, hirmus, congeries*) is a conclusion which contains a brief summary of the foregoing discourse. The second, third, and fourth terms are sometimes used to signify an enumeration of the parts of a whole, the species of a genus, or the different name of one species. *v.* APODIOXIS (Isa. i. 11–14; iii. 18–23; Rom. i. 29–31; Heb. xi. 39).

What is all this visible world but a great and wonderful book, which thou, O Lord, has written and opened before the eyes of all nations, in order that all of them may study it and learn who thou art. What, then, should all his creatures be but preachers of their Creator, witnesses of his greatness, mirrors of his beauty, heralds of his glory, awakeners of our slumbers, stimulators of our affection, and reprovers of our ingratitude?—*Luis de Granada.*

Synæresis (*synecphonesis, symphonesis, synizesis*) is the contraction of two vowels or syllables into one; as *seest* for *séest*, *'tis* for *it is*, *does* for *doeth*.

Synalœpha is a figure of Latin prosody by which a final vowel or diphthong is cut off in scanning when the following word begins with a vowel. Thus, *terra antiqua* is read *terr' antiqua*.

Synantesis is a repetition of two words or phrases in an inverse order. The repetition begins with the last word and ends with the first.

Corydon and Thyrsis had driven their flocks together; Thyrsis his sheep, Corydon his goats, distended with milk.—*Virg., Ecl. vii.*

Synapheia is a figure of prosody by which verses are so connected together that the first syllable of a verse has an influence on the final syllable of that which precedes either by position, *synalœpha*, or *ecthlipsis*.

Synathrœsmus. *v.* SYMPERASMA.

Syncatabasis. *v.* ANTHROPOPATHEIA and ACCOMMODATION.

Syncategorema is an accessory proposition, or one added to a principal one.

Synchoresis. *v.* CONCESSIO.

Synchrisis. *v.* COMPARATIO.

Synchronism. *v.* p. 325.

Synchysis is a confused or disorderly placing of words in a sentence. It is sometimes identified with *hyperbaton*, *epanodos*, *chiasmus*, *hysterologia*, and *anacoluthon*.

Syncope is the omission of a letter or syllable in the middle of a word; as *e'en* for *even*, *o'er* for *over*.

Synecdoche is a figure by which words are made to comprehend either more or less than they literally signify; as where the whole of a thing is put for a part of it, or a part of a thing is put for the whole of it. Here, as Ernesti says, the change or transfer of a word from one idea to another is made on account of the *internal* connection of the two ideas. *v.* ASSOCIATION. I. Genus for species, or universals for particulars (Hos. vii. 4; Mark ix. 23; John x. 8; Acts ii. 17). II. Species for genus, or particulars for universals (Isa. lxiii. 16; Jer. xvii. 5; Ezek. xx. 6; Joel ii. 7). III. The whole of anything for a part of it (Zeph. ii. 13; John xviii.

20). IV. The part of anything for the whole of it (Isa. iii. 15; lxi. 2; Zeph. i. 16; John iv. 23).

Synesis. *v.* SYNTHESIS.

Synezeugmenon. *v.* ADJUNCTION.

Synœceiosis (*cohabitatio*) is a figure by which contrary qualities or conditions are affirmed of the same subject. The term as now commonly used may be defined, a figure by which two words convey contradictory or incongruous ideas if taken literally, but harmonious and consistent ideas if one be taken literally or in one sense, and the other figuratively or in another sense. *v.* OXYMORON. Quintilian says that rhetoricians oppose to this figure *distinctio*, or *paradiastole*. He quotes an example which may be translated thus: "The miser wants as well what he has as what he has not." It would appear from the context that Quintilian regarded this figure as a species of *synezeugmenon*, which might be defined, a figure by which two phrases that convey opposite ideas are referred in combination to the same word. Vossius gives us this example: "Unlimited servitude and unlimited liberty are both extremely bad." This figure as now made use of may be illustrated by such texts as the following:

To him that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken from him.—*Matt. xxv.* 29. Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it.—*Luke xvii.* 33. (1 Tim. v. 6.) Disperse therefore, that thou mayest not lose; keep not, that thou mayest keep; lay out, that thou mayest save; spend, that thou mayest gain.—*Chrysostom.* Thou art longing for India; thou wilt pass the Cape of Good Hope, and so lose all hope of eternal felicity.—*Vieyra.*

Synonymia (*interpretatio*) is found where the same thing that was said before is repeated in equivalent words or phrases. It is sometimes a species of *epexegesis*, and sometimes a kind of *amplification*. When sentences are synonymous, the figure is called *exergasia* or *epexergasia* (Isa. xix. 8).

Synthesis (*synesis*, *symploce*) is adapting the construction to the sense of a word rather than to its gender or number. It has also been defined, a figure by which a pronoun, verb, or participle is constructed with a collective noun not grammatically, but according to the sense (Matt. xxv. 32; xxvii. 19, in original). The term is sometimes used as synonymous with *hyphen*, or the making of a compound word. *Symploce* was once employed in this sense, which is opposite to that of *tmesis*.

Syntheton is found where two words are in common usage joined by a conjunction for the sake of emphasis; as "Mighty in words and in deeds" (Act vii. 22); "end and aim," "rank and fortune," etc.

Syrmus. *v.* SYMPERASMA.

Systole is a figure of prosody by which a syllable which is long by nature or by position is sometimes shortened; as *multimodis* for *multismodis*, *hodie* for *hoc die*.

Systrophe is a graceful brevity of expression, as opposed to a loose, disconnected phrase.

Tapeinosis. *v.* HYPERBOLE.

Tautologia is a repetition of the same word or phrase. It is sometimes used in the sense of *epanalepsis* (Acts xxiii. 6).

Tautotes is found where the same word is repeated from ignorance or without good reason.

Taxis is where the meaning of a sentence is clearly determined by its last word.

Thaumasmus is an expression of wonder (Matt. viii. 10; Jas. iii. 5).

Thesis is a proposition either affirmative or negative, which is put forward to be supported by reasoning. *v.* ANTITHESIS. It was once used to designate an indefinite universal question in contradistinction to *hypothesis*. In prosody there is an alternate elevation (*arsis*) and depression (*thesis*) of the voice in pronouncing the syllables of verse. These terms sometimes, also, designate the parts of a foot in which the elevation or depression occurs.

Tmesis (*diacope*, *diæresis*, *diastole*, *ectasis*, *dialysis*, *divisio*) is a grammatical figure by which a compound word or connected phrase is divided; as *to us ward*, *how much soever*. *Diæresis* divides a syllable or diphthong into two syllables; as *coöperate*. *Diastole* or *ectasis* lengthens a syllable that is naturally short. These terms, with the exception of *diastole* or *ectasis*, were often employed as synonymous by the old grammarians and rhetoricians.

Topographia is a lively description of *a place*; as a field, mountain, temple, palace, city, or the like (Isa. xxx. 33; xxxiii. 20; lxv. 17–25; Joel ii. 3; Luke xvi. 24–26).

Traductio. *v.* ANTANACLASIS.

Transitio. *v.* METABASIS.

Translatio. *v.* ALLEGORY, METASTASIS, METALEPSIS.

Transsumptio. *v.* METALEPSIS.

Vision (*phantasia*) represents a past, future, distant, or fictitious action or event as transpiring in the present. By this figure we speak of things with such passion and enthusiasm that we seem to behold them with the eye of the mind and to depict them before our hearers. The term is often used synonymously with *hypotyposis* and *imago* (Isa. vi. 1–4; Ezek. i. 4–26; Luke x. 18).

See! see! He cometh! He maketh the clouds his chariot! He rideth upon

the wings of the wind! A devouring fire goeth before him, and after him a flame burneth! See! He sitteth upon his throne, clothed with light as with a garment, arrayed with majesty and honour! Behold! his eyes are as a flame of fire, his voice as the sound of many waters! How will ye escape? Will ye call to the mountains to fall on you, the rocks to cover you? Alas, the mountains themselves, the rocks, the earth, the heavens, are just ready to flee away! Can ye prevent the sentence? Wherewith? With the substance of thy house, with thousands of gold and silver? Blind wretch! Thou camest naked from thy mother's womb, and more naked into eternity. Hear the Lord, the Judge! "Come ye blessed of my Father! inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world!" Joyful sound! How widely different from that voice which echoes through the expanse of heaven, "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels!" And who is he that can prevent or retard the full execution of either sentence? Vain hope! Lo, hell is moved from beneath to receive those who are ripe for destruction! And the everlasting doors lift up their heads, that the heirs of glory may come in.—*John Wesley.* (Cf. Whitefield's ser. on Beholding the Lamb of God, John i. 35, 36, Pt. i.) Brethren, what do I hear? Truly our desires and prayers for blessing pierce through the heavens. A voice from above comes hovering down to us. Ye may all hear it. To the assurance and great joy of your hearts ye may hear it echoing—it is the voice of God, the Faithful and True—"Amen, so let it be." This is the voice from the clouds. Thus let all be glad and rejoice. Brethren, what we desire, may it be granted! Amen, it will! Yea, Hallelujah, Amen.—*F. W. Krummacher.*

Votum. *v.* EUCHE.

Zeugma is a term that has been differently applied. It has been defined: I. A figure by which one verb or other common or connecting word is put in grammatical connection with two or more words or phrases, each of which would require the verb if placed alone. *v.* ADJUNCTION. II. A figure by which a verb is used as the predicate of two or more nouns, while it can in strictness refer to only one of them. III. A figure by which words used but once are to be understood a second time, but in a related, connected, or contrary sense. IV. It is applied to the repetition of two words in the order they were first placed, in opposition to *synantesis.* The second definition of the term is now most generally accepted. Where the verb or connecting word is in the beginning of the sentence, the figure is sometimes called *protozeugma;* where it is in the middle, *mesozeugma;* at the end, *hypozeugma.* *v.* HYPOZEUXIS (Mark xiii. 26; 1 Cor. iii. 2; 1 Tim. iv. 3).

II.

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